# ANALYSING THE EFFECTS OF INVESTMENTS IN DURABLE SOLUTIONS ON DISPLACEMENT DYNAMICS IN SOMALIA

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DTM
IOM DISPLACEMENT
TRACKING MATRIX

GIST

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# 1. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BRCiS          Building Resilient Communities in Somalia

CAP            Community action plans

CBP            Community-based planning

CCCM           Camp Management Coordination Cluster

DAC            Displacement-affected community

DSA            Detailed Site Assessment

DSI            The Somalia Durable Solutions Initiative

DTM            Displacement Tracking Matrix

ETT            Emergency Trend Tracking

FAO            Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FGD            Focus Group Discussion

FGS            Federal Government of Somalia

IDP            Internally Displaced Person

IOM            International Organisation for Migration

KII            Key Informant Interview

MUAC           Mid-upper arm circumference

NDSS           The Somalia National Durable Solutions Strategy

NFI            Non-food item

PRMN           Protection and Return Monitoring Network

RRF            Recovery and Resilience Framework

SWALIM         Somalia Water and Land Information Management

UNOCHA         United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

WASH           Water, sanitation, and hygiene

# 2. GLOSSARY

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| **Durable Solutions** | **Durable solutions are achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs linked to their displacement.** Such persons enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement. Durable solutions can be achieved through return, local integration or resettlement, with the end goal of all three being (re)integration.[1] The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) framework provides a list of criteria that can be used to determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved:[2] |

- ▶ Long-term safety, security, and freedom of movement
- ▶ An adequate standard of living, including at minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, health care and basic education.
- ▶ Access to employment and livelihoods.
- ▶ Access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide them with compensation.
- ▶ Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation.
- ▶ Voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement.
- ▶ Participation in public affairs at all levels on an equal basis with the resident population.
- ▶ Effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, reparations and information about the causes of violations.

Three programmatic areas support the achievement of **durable solutions**: 1) area-based multi-sectoral programmes designed specifically to support the delivery of durable solutions; 2) efforts to build a national social safety net system; and 3) initiatives to provide housing solutions in urban settings.[3]

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| **Resilience Building** | Resilience-building strategies aim to reduce the vulnerability of communities to shocks and to enhance their ability to recover from them. This can involve a range of activities, such as improving access to basic services like health and education, strengthening social networks and community-based organizations, promoting economic opportunities, and reducing exposure to hazards through improved infrastructure and land-use planning. |
| | In a humanitarian context, building resilience is essential to reducing the need for emergency response and to creating more sustainable outcomes for affected populations. By addressing the root causes of vulnerability and by supporting communities to better prepare for, withstand, and recover from shocks, resilience-building can help to break the cycle of disaster and poverty, and promote long-term, sustainable development. |

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[1] Danwadaag Durable Solutions Consortium, Somalia Local (Re)Integration Assessment, Lora 3 Endline Report: Banadir Regional Administration, Jubaland and South West State of Somalia, page 6
[2] Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. Project on Internal Displacement, April 2010.
[3] REDSS, Financing for Solutions to Displacement: Somalia Country Study, March 2021, page 24.

| **Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)** | Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human–made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement) |
|---|---|
| **Protracted Displacement Situation** | Situations where the displaced "have lived in exile for more than five years, and when they still have no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement". (UNHCR) |

# 3.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

IOM has commissioned a study to analyse the effects of investments in durable solutions on displacement dynamics. The main research question was, "*How have investments in resilience, durable solutions and development programming influenced displacement patterns?*". We summarise the **key findings** as follows:

1. **We can classify investments in the place of origin (POO) and destination based on IDPs' primary and secondary concerns**. Primary concerns relate to immediate survival and include food, shelter and water. Secondary concerns are factors such as education, healthcare, justice and livelihoods. They relate to long-term integration and are integral to achieving durable solutions.

    a. **Timely investments in immediate family needs incentivize people to remain in the POO.** Food aid and cash relief giving vulnerable households the ability to buy food and water have enabled people to stay in areas such as Bardaale, Bur Hakaba and Qansaxdheere.

    b. **Cash assistance plays a significant motivating role in influencing IDPs to remain in destination locations**. With cash assistance, IDPs' sense of autonomy and financial stability increases, which empowers them to meet their immediate and long-term needs.

    c. **Investments in income-generating activities (IGA) can encourage financial independence.** IGAs can include opening shops, house building, masonry, electrical work, or tailoring. For those who have permanently lost their livelihoods and cannot return to their previous occupations, there is a need for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET).

    d. **Investing in health services, infrastructure, and education is essential to encourage people to remain in their POO**. We should view these as holistic investments that incentivize communities and youths to stay in areas of origin and not search for better alternatives in urban hubs.

    e. **Investments in sustainable livelihoods influence people to stay in their places of origin.** These investments are a core part of enhancing rural resilience. Supporting alternative livelihood opportunities, such as the transition from charcoal production, also builds resilience amongst workforces and communities.

    f. Land ownership influences displacement decisions. It can incentivize individuals to remain at POO and is a pull factor to return to it after relocation. **Support in navigating the housing and land environment influences the decision and ability of IDPs to remain in their destinations**. Complexities surrounding land and property ownership include limited financial resources, legal complexities, competition with other groups or individuals seeking land, lack of documentation and potential conflicts or disputes over land rights. Assistance navigating these complexities reduces the risk of secondary displacement.

    g. **The availability of land for agriculture and livestock rearing at the destination impacts decisions about staying.** If individuals have access to arable land and grazing areas in the destination, it can provide them with opportunities for sustainable agriculture and livestock rearing and encourage them to stay.

h. Assistance in housing and land rights, including land restitution or compensation for property loss, could encourage the return to the POO. Navigating HLP rights is also crucial for displaced persons returning to the point of origin.

i. Psychosocial support to address trauma and promote mental well-being and community-based initiatives that foster social cohesion could encourage IDPs to return. Investments focusing on social reintegration and psychological support could make the prospect of return more feasible for IDPs.

j. Investing in community-led conflict resolution programs could aid rural resilience, decrease the need for initial displacement and encourage IDPs to return to the POO. Addressing increasing inter-clan conflict over natural resources exacerbated by prolonged periods of drought is fundamental to enhancing rural stability.

2. Security is critical for IDPs when considering a return to the POO. NGO presence is also important, but the influence of aid is not felt in places of origin if instability prevents aid worker access, highlighting that security is a prerequisite for delivering aid. **Insecurity limits investment opportunities in some rural areas, forcing people to relocate to where assistance can be offered.** The presence of Al-Shabaab weakens rural resilience and limits NGO access following climatic shocks. This has forced displacement from rural to urban areas, highlighting that improving security is critical to improving humanitarian access and rural resilience.

3. **Beyond investments in tangible assets, clan dynamics tend to influence displacement decisions**. Deciding where to go, adjusting to IDP camps and remaining in POO are shaped by clan bonds, which permeate camps and give them distinct clan-based identities.

    a. Individuals from marginalized groups with limited access to resources and services may displace to other rural areas as opposed to urban IDP camps. These individuals may have lower socio-economic status and face poverty, limited education, and healthcare challenges. They may also lack the kinship connections that afford them access to IDP camps and opportunities within camps.

4. **Urban hubs offer coping mechanisms that secondary towns cannot provide**. Owing to their size and established nature, urban hubs offer more opportunities to IDPs.

    a. Urban hubs have a significant presence of aid activities, aid organisations, security forces, opportunities for income generation, and urban public infrastructure. Rural and secondary hubs have none, or fewer, and are therefore more vulnerable to shocks and less appealing to IDPs.

    b. **Urban centres are perceived as more reliable, particularly during times of crisis**. This sentiment is influenced by the weak resilience of rural areas to climatic shocks, combined with the amount of primary and secondary services offered in urban hubs.

    c. **Better infrastructure in urban hubs eases the flow of aid and people, making displacement to these locations easier**. As with rural areas, some secondary towns lack the infrastructure, transport networks and resources to support relief efforts.

    d. **The ease of accessing housing, land and property in rural areas presents a notable difference from urban norms**. In rural regions, land has historically been more readily available and affordable, but sales often depend on informal agreements lacking a legal basis that can expose individuals.

e. Although formal land and property documentation exist in urban areas, use is not widespread. As a result, informal arrangements that empower landlords over IDPs persist. Agreements between IDPs and landlords are sometimes informal and undisclosed, with only the landlord and IDPs aware of the arrangement.

Based on these findings, we have articulated **a set of recommendations** (overarching, focused on building resilience at POO and durable solutions at destination).

**Overarching recommendations:**

1. Improve access to climate adaptation finance.

2. Integrate security considerations into the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus.

**Building resilience at POO:**

3. Invest in early warning systems to improve rural resilience against climatic and conflict-based shocks.

4. Coordinate the timely delivery of humanitarian relief to prevent displacement.

5. Support finance and insurance options to support rural producers against climatic shocks.

6. Improve access to services at origin, particularly with water and farming.

7. Encourage a shift towards sustainable and regenerative agricultural practices.

8. Promote income diversification away from agricultural-oriented and agricultural-dependent economies.

9. Encourage climate-resilient rural and urban planning.

10. Work with a match funding approach to ensure sustainable and long-lasting funding for community needs.

11. Support community-led resilience and conflict reduction efforts to minimise unrest in the POO. Given the influence of clan and religious elders, this effort should encourage their participation and include a dispute resolution remit. Marginalisation of minority clans and vulnerable groups should be addressed.

12. Invest in infrastructure to improve access to the most isolated communities.

13. Provide oversight and assistance to HLP rights.

14. Provide productive safety nets as a means of creating resilience in POO.

**Durable solutions at destinations:**

15. Support the movement of vulnerable and minority groups to IDP locations.

16. Support livelihoods and alternative livelihoods to support durable solutions.

17. Help IDPs navigate the HLP landscape at their destination and encourage government oversight.

18. Help IDPs acquire permanent and sustainable shelter in order to create durable solutions

19. Deeper research into permanent shelter preferences amongst IDPs.

20. Improve infrastructure in secondary towns.

21. Emphasise development work before crises rather than humanitarian work when crises occur.

# 4. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

## 4.A. OBJECTIVES

IOM contracted GIST in 2022 to investigate the displacement patterns between the Bay, Gedo, and Benadir regions during the 2021/22 drought thus far. The study's central finding was that the availability of humanitarian assistance guides displacement. We found that humanitarian actors work in reaction to past and present displacement patterns, whereas displaced persons state upon arrival that they came because of the humanitarian assistance available on site. Displaced persons reach out to their social networks to learn where humanitarian aid is available or receive calls from relatives and friends in locations where emergency relief programs roll out.

We can summarise the key findings of that study as follows:

▸ Displacement is not an event but is part of Somalia's socio-political fabric.

▸ Preparation for displacement differs depending on household wealth and social ties.

▸ Members of communities marginalized in urban centres are more likely to be displaced in settlements because kinship determines whether individuals become displaced or join host communities.

▸ Households seek information on two questions: what immediate support will be available in a location (for example, food, water, shelter), and what are the long-term opportunities?

▸ During droughts, men stay behind to guard property and livestock.

▸ Women and children go first for two reasons: a) they are seen as more vulnerable to hardship but more likely to receive emergency relief than men, and b) they are tasked to prepare shelter and communicate conditions before men join them.

▸ Households and individuals do not see aid as a permanent feature of any location. They know it is 'projectized' and enquire where aid is currently distributed.

▸ Secondary displacement could form a crucial part of survival strategies in the absence of long-term perspectives.

▸ Humanitarian agencies are vital employers and important pillars of local economies.

▸ Humanitarian assistance is the primary concern, whereas infrastructure, governance, and security are modifiers rather than secondary factors, and all are mediated by kinship.

▸ Politics is only perceived as salient if it directly affects access to aid and opportunity.

▸ Most households consult relatives and friends already or previously in settlements or living in potential destinations.

▸ Relatives and friends in or near settlements call rural relatives and acquaintances to inform them when humanitarian relief projects are starting.

▸ Men usually decide, but women's voices can and have been amplified.

▸ The unexpected movement to Dollow coincided with a cash-based emergency relief program, while no comparable support was available in Baidoa.

▸ The most likely reason for the shift of displacement towards Baidoa, and the one most frequently invoked by key informants, is the major Minimum Response Package (MRP) incepted in Baidoa in April and May 2022, in which IOM is also involved.

Based on the background described above, IOM has commissioned a new study to analyse the effects of investments in durable solutions on displacement dynamics.

The main research question is, "*how have investments in resilience, durable solutions and development programming influenced displacement patterns?*"

The main research question was further broken down into the following sub-questions:

1. How have investments in the place of origin, before the circumstances triggering displacement materialized, influenced decisions to leave or stay?

2. How have investments in the destination of displacement influenced decisions to stay there?

3. How have investments in the place of origin after displacement influenced decisions to return?

4. What are the differences, if any, between rural and urban areas?

5. What are the differences, if any, between main urban hubs and secondary towns?

6. What infrastructure or services appear to prevent or mitigate mass movements?

## 4.B. CONTEXT

**More than one in five Somalis are displaced within or outside the country.** Displacement in Somalia is driven by conflict and disasters, with climate-related disasters constituting the primary driver of the dramatic increase in internal displacement since 2016.[4]

**Somalia is currently facing its longest, most severe drought in 40 years.** The number of people affected by the drought doubled from 3.2 million at the beginning of 2022 to 7.8 million by October of the same year.[5] The Government of Somalia declared a drought in April 2021 and a state of emergency by November 2021. In April 2022, donors pledged nearly $1.4 billion to support a humanitarian response across the Horn of Africa.[6] However, they have secured less than half of the needed funds. Warning signs for this crisis appeared in 2020 when the March-April-May (MAM) rain performance was poor in southern Somalia. This could have triggered anticipatory action. However, it did not. Somalia has faced four consecutive failed rainy seasons, with a fifth expected in the coming months. This risks the crisis lasting well into 2023.[7]

**The environmental crisis is playing out against the backdrop of degraded levels of governance and a protracted conflict that has escalated in recent months.** The current situation has stimulated a community response in some regions, leading to a unique push-back against Al Shabab and offering a new platform for the government-led offensive. This more active conflict is increasing insecurity for local

4 REDSS, Financing for Solutions to Displacement: Somalia Country Study, March 2021, page 5.
5 Ground Truth Solutions; Rights, Information, and Predictability: Keys to Navigate a Complex Crisis, Cash Barometer, Somalia, December 2022, page 3
6 Weingärtner, L., Humphrey, A., Abdi Sheikh, M., Levine, S., Obstacles to and Opportunities for Anticipatory Action in Somalia, SPARC Issue Brief, April 2022, page 2
7 Ground Truth Solutions; Rights, Information, and Predictability: Keys to Navigate a Complex Crisis, Cash Barometer, Somalia, December 2022, page 3

communities and pushing more and more people into displacement. Conflict and drought have driven more than one million people to leave their homes in 2022.[8]

**This compounded forced displacement is also a significant driver of rapid and haphazard urbanisation**, characterised by a massive rural exodus that is met with the absence of urban livelihood opportunities and services.[9] An estimated 54% of Somalis already live in urban areas, and urbanisation is increasing at a rate of 4.3% annually. According to a UN report published in 2019, urban residents could easily outgrow rural populations in the next couple of years.[10] The World Bank projects that by 2030, Somalia will add another 4.5 million urban residents to its already constrained urban environment.[11]

**One in four city dwellers in Somalia is an IDP.**[12] As of 2021, there were about 3,400 recorded IDP sites, the vast majority of which are informal settlements built on private lands on the outskirts of urban areas, leading to widespread land tenure insecurity and large-scale evictions across the country.[13] The total number of IDPs includes a wide range of displacement experiences, from recently displaced people to those who may have been displaced for many years and may live in similar conditions to the host populations they live alongside.[14]

## 4.C. Durable Solutions and Resilience in Somalia

### 4.C.i. Durable solutions

**Durable solutions are achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs linked to their displacement.** Such persons enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement. Durable solutions can be achieved through return, local integration or resettlement, with the end goal of all three being (re)integration.[15] The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) framework provides a list of criteria that can be used to determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved:[16]

- ⯈ Long-term safety, security, and freedom of movement

- ⯈ An adequate standard of living, including at minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, health care and basic education.

- ⯈ Access to employment and livelihoods.

- ⯈ Access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide them with compensation.

- ⯈ Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation.

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8 BRCiS Position Paper, Charting a path to drought resilience in Somalia, January 2023, page 4.
9 BRCiS Position Paper, Charting a path to drought resilience in Somalia, January 2023, page 4.
10 Danwadaag White Paper, Referral Pathways: Rethinking the Nexus Approach to Advancing Urban resilience in Somalia, 8 November 2022
11 Danwadaag White Paper, Referral Pathways: Rethinking the Nexus Approach to Advancing Urban resilience in Somalia, 8 November 2022
12 Danwadaag Durable Solutions Consortium, Measuring the End of Displacement: Emerging Learning From Somalia, 2019/2020, page 4
13 Danwadaag White Paper, Referral Pathways: Rethinking the Nexus Approach to Advancing Urban resilience in Somalia, 8 November 2022
14 REDSS, Financing for Solutions to Displacement: Somalia Country Study, March 2021, page 15.
15 Danwadaag Durable Solutions Consortium, Somalia Local (Re)Integration Assessment, Lora 3 Endline Report: Banadir Regional Administration, Jubaland and South West State of Somalia, page 6
16 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. Project on Internal Displacement, April 2010.

- Voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement.

- Participation in public affairs at all levels on an equal basis with the resident population.

- Effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, reparations and information about the causes of violations.

**Reintegration is considered sustainable when**: *"Returnees have reached levels of economic self-sufficiency, social stability within their communities, and psychosocial well-being that allow them to cope with (re)migration drivers. Having achieved sustainable reintegration, returnees are able to make further migration decisions a matter of choice, rather than necessity."* This definition highlights the importance of multidimensionality (economic, social and psychosocial), incorporates a multilevel approach (individual, community and society) and poses that sustainable reintegration does not rule out remigration, nor is it linear. It responds to the needs of individual returnees and the communities to which they return in a mutually beneficial way, while also addressing the structural factors at play.[17]

Returnees or IDPs that are locally (re)integrated exercise their rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement. Local (re)integration is a complex and gradual process, comprising interrelated legal, economic, social and cultural dimensions.[18] In the Somali context, an increasing focus on return and local integration is important given the high concentration of IDPs and the extremely vulnerable conditions in which they live, which are exacerbated when what were meant to be temporary situations become effectively permanent. Focusing on return and/or local (re)integration avoids protracted displacement where IDPs endure multiple IDP displacements between temporary settlements.

**Mainstreaming sustainable integrated housing, land, and property (HLP) solutions sits at the heart of durable solution programming in Somalia**. Weak constitutional, policy, legislative and institutional frameworks for HLP have resulted in a lack of mechanisms to solve land and tenure disputes which has a disproportionately negative impact on IDPs.[19] With inadequate legal protection mechanisms providing structural barriers to durable solutions, protecting IDPs from forced evictions and an inability to legally own land and property has increasingly been mainstreamed into durable solutions programming. Other durable solutions programming considerations to consider alongside HLP, stipulate that IDP programming in Somalia should be:[20]

- **Government-led** with interventions supporting all tiers of government to play their key leadership and coordination role based on the National Development Plan and other relevant government frameworks.

- **Area-based** with interventions targeting displacement-affected communities (including IDPs, refugee returnees and host populations) in a defined area and responding to the specific living conditions, risks and opportunities of the local context to achieve coherence and greater impact through joint analysis, planning, coordination and referral pathways.

- **Collective and comprehensive** by viewing the process as a collective action (rather than mandate driven) based on an inclusive, participatory and consensus-building approach.

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17 IOM, Reintegration Handbook. Practical guidance on the design, implementation and monitoring of reintegration assistance, 2019.
18 Danwadaag Durable Solutions Consortium (2020), Local (re)integration assessment (lora) report Somalia:
Benadir Regional Administration (BRA), Jubaland and South-west state of Somalia, page ii
19 Facilitating Durable Solutions in Somalia. Experiences from Midnimo-I and the Application of Human Security Working Paper. United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, February 2020.
20 Ibid.

- ▸ **Participatory and community based** by enabling displacement-affected communities (including IDPs, refugee-returnees and host communities) to actively participate in decision making to define their own priorities and facilitate reconciliation and social cohesion through inclusive processes.

- ▸ **Rights and needs-based** with the needs, rights, legitimate interests, resources and capacities of displacement-affected communities and enable displaced persons (IDPs and refugee-returnees) to fully enjoy all their economic, legal, socio-cultural and civil-political rights without any discrimination for reasons related to their displacement.

- ▸ **Sensitive to gender, age, disabilities and marginalisation** with special attention given to the specific concerns and perspectives of women, youth, persons with disabilities and marginalised groups, and take into consideration identity dynamics and mechanisms of exclusion.

- ▸ **Sustainable** by facilitating locally led solutions by the government, civil society, private sector and communities. They strengthen the government's role through the systematic strengthening of existing community and government structures, while being conflict sensitive in order to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding and development through long-term planning, funding and adaptive programming.

**The policy and institutional environment for durable solutions in Somalia is relatively advanced.** The Somalia Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI) was launched in early 2016. Led by the FGS, it supports government-led delivery of durable solutions and provides a unifying framework for government and international partners.[21] The DSI paved the way for the integration and mainstreaming of durable solutions into relevant chapters of National Development Plans 8 (2017-2019) and 9 (2020 – 2024), and the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF). In 2019, Somalia adopted a number of new policies including the Policy on Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Returnees, National Evictions Guidelines, Social Protection Policy and an Interim Protocol on Housing Land and Property. The ratification of the Kampala Convention, moreover strengthened legislative protection for IDPs in Somalia, led by NCRI and supported by UNHCR.[22]

Although there are positive practisesand some advances in cross-government approaches to sustain durable solutions, there remain key challenges and barriers to be addressed. These include the low technical, institutional, and financial capacity of government actors, limited long-term funding streams and donor fatigue, protracted and recurring humanitarian crises, issues of perceived trust in and accountability of international aid, weak urban systems and rapid urbanisation rates, marginalisation, insecurity, and lack of access in large parts of South and Central Somalia. In an understanding that overcoming these challenges requires a long-term development approach that complements the humanitarian response, The National Durable Solutions Strategy (NDSS) was developed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2020. The NDSS should help the Government guarantee a fiscal and political space for the durable solutions agenda, develop a clear and realistic vision for durable solutions, guide implementation, and link durable solutions with other policies to achieve comprehensive outcomes. It also embeds the durable solutions agenda within a development approach that holistically addresses the multi-dimensional challenges of poverty, inequality and vulnerability in the country. Doing so is essential to continue Somalia's transition toward greater stability, economic prosperity, resilience, and human development.[23]

**Durable solutions programmes in Somalia have experimented with different models** to support the shelter needs of IDPs, including provision of rental subsidies, temporary shelter kits, and numerous

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21 ReDSS (2021), Financing for Solutions To Displacement: Somalia Country Study, page 16
22 FGS, National Durable Solutions Strategy 2020-2024, page 16
23 Ibid.

construction models, some of which were co-financed by IDPs through access to credit from community savings and loans associations. Humanitarian and durable solutions actors have also advocated effectively with government authorities to establish guidelines for lawful evictions and provided practical support to IDPs participating in lawful eviction processes. The ability to negotiate access to land with secure tenure has proved to be a major limiting factor for durable solutions consortia programmes and the need to include advocacy for land and tenure security from the earliest design stages of programmes has been an important lesson.[24]

## 4.C.ii. RESILIENCE

**Resilience in the Somali context highlights the need for sustainable development investments in preparedness and early action to address the risk of flooding, droughts, and other crises that negatively impact communities.** As opposed to durable solutions, resilience efforts focus on upstream efforts to reduce the shocks that communities and individuals experience in the face and human and natural-borne disasters. A core component of Somalia's resilience-building efforts, the Somali Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) explains that the RRF is about establishing 'a collective vision and strategy for enabling recovery and resilience building and breaking out of the cycle of vulnerability and humanitarian crises.'[25]

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24 ReDSS (2021), Financing for Solutions To Displacement: Somalia Country Study, page 28
25 Somalia Recovery and Resilience Framework, Federal Government of Somalia, June 2018.

# 5.  KEY FINDINGS

We categorise the main findings of the research based the overarching research questions:

## 5.A.  HOW HAVE INVESTMENTS IN THE PLACE OF ORIGIN, BEFORE THE CIRCUMSTANCES TRIGGERING DISPLACEMENT MATERIALIZED, INFLUENCED DECISIONS TO LEAVE OR STAY?

**Investment in Security, access to food and water, shelter, access to cash, education, healthcare, livelihoods (and alternative livelihood opportunities), critical infrastructure (roads, wells, flood resistance), and provision of assistance and aid, impact conditions in the POO and therefore influence decisions around displacement**. IDPs do not use humanitarian assistance to refer strictly to emergency relief or aid from humanitarian organisations. They use it to refer to the entire range of services, including public services like health and education as these tend to be provided by the same aid organisations. Limited funding and provision of these inputs and services, especially in inaccessible and insecure rural regions, erodes community resilience and the ability of communities to withstand shocks.

**Insecurity limits investment opportunities in rural areas, resulting in relocation where assistance is delivered.** Security is a prerequisite to the effective delivery of aid and limits resilience in rural communities controlled by Al-Shabaab. Not only does their presence threaten humanitarian groups, in some cases they have completely restricted the access of NGOs.[26] Instead of attempting to access communities in situ, NGOs often establish their operations in towns such as Bur Hakaba or Baidoa as they are a more secure environment for aid distribution to take place.[27]

**Insecurity, poor infrastructure, and limited transport options in Qansaxdheere hinder NGO access which limits investments to improve resilience**.[28] Resilience programs run by the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) in Qansaxdheere between 2017-20 included cash-for-work and unconditional cash transfers for the disabled and elderly. These interventions mitigated the need for residents to move from isolated areas but are no longer able to operate owing to the presence of Al-Shabaab.[29] ADRA also implemented Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) for villages around this area, and numeracy and literacy training to equip participants with skills to effectively manage their businesses and make informed financial decisions.[30]

**International NGOs have partnered with local NGOs to navigate access to regions like Kurte, Diinsoor and Qansaxdheere, or bypassed malign actors by issuing cash vouchers electronically via phones**.[31] The presence of Al-Shabaab restricts persistent NGO presence and the implementation of projects essential to long-term, sustainable solutions and building resilience in these areas.[32] Insecurity creates barriers to essential services, hampers economic activities, and restricts access to resources and opportunities. As a result, Qansaxdheere faces numerous difficulties regarding access to necessities, education, healthcare, and livelihood opportunities. Al-Shabaab's blockade and attacks in the area

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26 Baidoa 044.
27 Ibid.
28 Baidoa 041 and Baidoa 053.
29 Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046.
30 Buurhakaba 050.
31 Baidoa 045.
32 Baidoa 042; Baidoa 041 and Baidoa 043.

exacerbate these challenges, further isolating the community and impeding its growth and development.[33] The local administration is reliant on ATMIS forces for security.[34]

**In marginalised rural areas, Al-Shabaab's taxation and extortion is often too impactful for limited investments or flows of aid to counterbalance. Regardless of preventative measures, individuals are regularly compelled to seek refuge in areas outside of their influence.**[35] Beyond mandatory annual *zakat* payments, Al-Shabaab has introduced a new monthly fee of $20 per month for married couples, with the demand for payments increasing in line with the government's anti-Al-Shabaab operations. In Qansaxdheere, Al-Shabaab has also eroded the purchasing power of residents by elevating the cost of goods and therefore limiting access to basic necessities.[36] Limited humanitarian access to the town further degrades the economic conditions and livelihood opportunities for Qansaxdheere's residents. Compounding this situation are Al-Shabaab's restrictions of access to farmland and confiscation of 40-50% of agricultural produce.[37]

**The presence of militias in the villages surrounding Qansaxdheere also catalyses displacement.** Militias exert control over the surrounding villages and communities, sometimes resulting in human rights abuses and the violation of individual freedoms. These include forced marriages and young boys being forcibly recruited into militias. Such circumstances drive people to leave their homes in search of places where they can enjoy their basic human rights and live in a safer environment.[38]

**Relatively unrestricted NGO access to Bur Hakaba has allowed multifaceted programming to take place and encourage people to remain.**[39] The routes around Bur Hakaba do not experience the sanctions and restrictions from Al-Shabaab that routes around Qansaxdheere are exposed to. This affords NGOs better access. As a result, the living conditions in Bur Hakaba are reportedly higher than towns such as Dinssor and Qansaxdheere. Numerous local NGOs, such as GREDO, Qatar Charity and SOOS are actively implementing cash assistance, healthcare, education, water trucking, food security and livelihood support programs in Bur Hakaba[40] This NGO presence has helped to stem the flow of IDPs from Bur Hakaba to Baidoa and Mogadishu.[41] Support from the WFP was noted as being particularly effective in addressing food insecurity with its dual focus on IDPs and the host community. Further, a recently constructed well has improved access to water, although this is still prone to drying up during periods of prolonged drought. One respondent stated that the resources included educational facilities which, combined with relative stability, affords a stable lifestyle, and means that the town could be considered as a hub.[42]

**Farmers in Burhakaba attribute their ability to stay also to regular water trucking, agricultural inputs to enhance farming practices, cash transfers and food vouchers.**[43] The ability of herding and farming communities to continue with these practices in Burkahaba is aided by proximity to the fertile land of the Lower Shabelle region which aids resilience to drought during dry seasons.[44]

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33 Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046.
34 Qansaxdheere 051.
35 Baidoa 043.
36 Baidoa 053.
37 Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046.
38 Baidoa 053.
39 Bur Hakaba 052.
40 Buurhakaba 047.
41 Ibid.
42 Buurhakaba 050.
43 Bur Hakaba 052.
44 Baidoa 053.

**Clan dynamics influence people to remain in Burhakaba.** With Burhakaba predominantly occupied by the Elay there is a collective sense of loyalty and attachment to the land. This unity extends to the local administration which reportedly supports the equitable distribution of resources among the Elay sub-clans. This provides an interesting contrast to Qandaxdheere where the town is occupied by multiple sub-clans such as the Yantaar, Luwaay, Edim, Hadama, and Emid and is therefore more susceptible to inter-clan land-based conflict.[45] As wider research shows, pastoral and agro-pastoral inter-clan conflict has been exacerbated by climate-related shocks and could further explain the high outflow of IDPs from Qandaxdheere. This highlights the importance of clan connections at origin, particularly belonging to a majority clan, and accessing support which allows individuals to stay at origin. Those who cannot access kinship support or local humanitarian assistance are assessed as being more likely to migrate.

**Investments in immediate family needs, and the speed of their arrival, influence decisions to remain in the POO.** Challenges in satisfying essential needs such as security, food, water and healthcare are the primary driving force behind decisions to displace and erode resilience to withstand shocks.[46] The degradation of infrastructure such as roads, wells and dams exacerbates the impact of negative climatic events,[47] suggesting that investments in basic infrastructure to secure livelihoods and access to basic necessities influence decisions to remain. ETT data confirms this phenomenon, with almost all cases citing drought as the main reason for displacement. The Danwadaag endline report cites drought as the main reason for displacement for 40% of their sample, followed by conflict (37%). Some interventions have managed to bolster resilience. Examples include cash relief that affords vulnerable households the opportunity to purchase food and water, as well as support from organisations such as the World Food Programme (WFP) that enabled people to remain in areas such as Bardaale, Bur Hakaba and Qansaxdheere, instead of migrating to already overwhelmed locations like Baidoa.

**Investing in health services, infrastructure and education is essential to increasing resilience**. A significant amount of feedback recognized the importance of these factors and as such, they should be viewed as holistic investments that form part of the long-term incentive for communities, and youth, to remain in places of origin.[48] The importance of infrastructural improvements should not be underestimated in improving resilience. Al-Shabaab was referenced for their construction of a dam in Jamame, Jubaland State, as a means of improving resistance to droughts. The construction of a dam near Baidoa[45] (not by Al-Shabaab) which enabled the growing of crops such as sweet potato also exemplifies a successful effort to build upstream resilience[49] and mitigate the impact of climatic disasters. Such efforts negate the need for displacement and exemplify the role that resilience building plays in terms of allowing communities to endure crises without moving.

**Investments supporting sustainable livelihoods can influence people to stay in places of origin.** Repeated drought cycles have had a significant impact on the pastoralist communities that dominate the rural regions of Bay District with many having to actively hunt for alternative income-generating activity following the loss of livestock.[50] In Qansaxdheere, there was a focus on resilience and capacity-building support through the implementation of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP). However, natural resource management initiatives, specifically establishing rangelands to support weak animals, faced challenges due

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45 Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046 and Qansaxdheere 051.
46 Qansaxdheere 051, Baidoa 01, Baidoa 04, Baidoa 07
47 Baidoa 044.
48 Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046 and Baidoa 048.
49 Upstream resilience refers to the process of helping people and communities build resilience that can prevent the emergence and escalation of crises. Upstream, in this case, refers to primary prevention interventions.
50 Baidoa 042.

to limited accessibility to available land.[51] As a result, Qansaxdheere is experiencing similar stresses that wider pastoralist communities in south-central Somalia are experiencing, with widespread livestock loss forcing displacement.[52] **Beyond the agricultural sector, support for small businesses and village savings and loan associations are core components of stimulating the local economy and building resilience**.[53]

**Crop-producing farmers expressed positive sentiments towards investments in solar irrigation systems that contributed to the production of cash crops such as onions, garlic, coriander and spinach which they sold in the market in Baidoa, thereby bolstering their income generation and ability to withstand the impact of drought**.[54] The data reiterates support for such activities and praised FAO for distributing seeds and farm tools in areas around Baidoa, as opposed to giving food handouts. Other positive investments were listed as supporting farmers in smart farming, supporting pastoralists with animal vaccinations, water trucking and deworming to accompany agro-pastoralist communities before and during drought.[55] An aid worker familiar with Qansaxdheere referenced several resilience-boosting initiatives that had taken place in the area:[56]

- A Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) was established to enable group businesses and promote economic empowerment within the community.

- Grain storage drums were distributed to enhance resilience and improve food security.

- Farmers provided donkey carts to aid in their agricultural activities.

- Borehole renovation to ensure access to clean and reliable water sources for both the community and agricultural needs.

**Evidence shows that supporting alternative livelihood opportunities, such as the transition from charcoal production, is conducive to building resilience**.[57] Respondents highlighted gaps in encouraging the transition to alternative livelihoods, referencing initiatives such as vocational training, infrastructure and reliable electricity supplies.[58]

**A lack of funding targeting marginalised groups may inadvertently force these groups to remain in their places of origin**. Public transport being unable to cater for disabled individuals, families with a female as the head of the family unit, and the elderly, were all cited as groups that may not travel owing to the financial and societal barriers preventing their displacement.[59] Those without extensive kin networks, or networks that extend into IDP camps, may also be disadvantaged.

**Families may split up, with some members remaining at origin while the rest of the family migrates to a new destination to maximise livelihood opportunities or limit the financial cost of displacing.** Families that can afford to travel together, typically will. Families that cannot afford to do so, will send some members first and others later. Often the vulnerable – women, children and elderly – travel first so that they are in a place of safety, whilst males wait for resources to become available to travel later. These resources could come from the women and children at the destination, once they are receiving humanitarian support. There is a perception that women and children will always receive support at destination, so it is

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51 Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046.
52 Qansaxdheere 051.
53 Bur Hakaba 052.
54 Baidoa 041.
55 Buurhakaba 050
56 Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046.
57 Baidoa 044.
58 Baidoa 048.
59 Buurhakaba 047 and Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046.

best to send them first. Other family members join later once the pioneering members of the family have created a home at the site.[60] In other cases, the father stays behind to monitor the land/farm. This is a pragmatic approach, where the family tries to secure two-to-three income streams: one immediate income stream through humanitarian aid and jobs sourced at destination and the second and third through the family head at origin who is maintaining farms, land or livestock for long-term income streams.[61]

**The reasons to stay may vary depending on the context.** In locations in Bay where some residents remained in their location of origin, the main reasons given are a lack of funds to travel (43%) and livelihood activities (39%). In Gedo, reports cited livelihood activities (67%) and guarding property (29%) as the main reasons why people stayed behind. The presence of Al-Shabbab encourages families to travel in multiple groups, as smaller groups decrease their visibility and thereby minimise risk.[62]

**The availability of land for agriculture and livestock in rural areas influences people's decision to remain in rural POOs.**[63] Land ownership can incentivize individuals to remain in the POO, and act as a pull factor to return to the POO after relocation. Owning land in the POO can also encourage the monopolisation of aid with some family members remaining at the POO whilst others relocate to explore options of aid in IDP camps (as discussed above).

**Remittance payments from the diaspora appear to influence decisions to stay.** Financial support from relatives that have moved abroad or to other regions of Somalia can offer a source of income that provides resilience during periods of shock and allows recipients to remain.[64] Remittance also prevents IPDs from having to spend money on the journey and relocation. Anecdotally, some families have sent their eldest sons to other locations in Somalia in previous emergency situations with a view to them sending money back home to sustain families through future crises.[65] Support from diaspora also increases IDPs destination options if they want to relocate. IDPs can consider locations where they do not have a network but that have better long-term facilities and options because the support from diaspora will support them until they start receiving humanitarian aid and engaging in income-generating activity.[66] It should be noted, however, that marginalised groups and people from minority clans are often excluded from these kinds of social safety nets because they lack the family networks abroad.

## 5.B. How have investments in the destination of displacement influenced decisions to stay there?

**When IDPs choose a destination, they consider the conditions of the journey and the conditions at destination. Conditions at destination are further broken down into immediate survival needs and long-term integration needs. Aid and assistance are required for all stages, unless IDPs have other forms of support.** Inter-clan conflict and Al-Shabaab-related violence could prevent a family from leaving their home location. Furthermore, if the family is in a location that is isolated by Al-Shabaab, they may be unable to enter or leave their village, hindering their ability to travel to their desired location.[67]

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60 Baidoa 01, QD 012, Baidoa 14, QD 015, QD 17, QD 18, QD 01, QD 013, R01B, BH 01, R012B
61 QD 17, QD 19
62 BH 01, QD 01, QD 15, QD 020, Baidoa A03, QD 14
63 Baidoa 042.
64 Qansaxdheere 051.
65 Baidoa 01, Baidoa 07, QD 017, Baidoa 05
66 Baidoa 01, R11B
67 Baidoa 01, QD 01, QD 020, Baidoa A01, Baidoa 015, Baidoa 05, Biadoa female FGD

This section is broken down into two parts. We first consider the aspects that influence the decision-making processes that shape IDPs journeys, and then look at investments in the destination of displacement.

## 5.B.i. PLANNING AND TRAVEL CONSIDERATIONS

**IDP camp accessibility is a function of geography and socio-economic means**. IDPs are more likely to travel to places that are closer to their POO, usually within their home district, with the typical flow being from rural to urban areas. There are exceptions, however, as is evidenced by the ETT network and our KIIs. The mode of transport used to arrive at the destination is statistically significant, according to our regression analysis, with people more likely to travel shorter distances to places that can be reached by animal or on foot. Besides being a proxy for distance, the mode of transit used is likely also an indicator of socio-economic status, with wealthier groups being able to undertake longer vehicle journeys to Mogadishu, for example.

**When considering the availability of aid at different destinations, IDPs consider the number of organisations providing assistance on site, eligibility criteria, when aid was last delivered, and the reputation of the organisations**. This information comes from people who have already migrated, camp leaders, local authorities, and clan connections. Although the family head makes the final decision, other family members, especially children of the family who are young adults, will be responsible for information gathering. They use smartphones to conduct searches on the internet and call contacts in destination areas. Local and camp administration actively provide information and encourage IDPs to move to their locations, thus becoming a key information point.[68] Information distributed via radio and through hotlines established by NGOs was also cited.[69]

**Kinship has implications for route security to IDP camps**. Members of major clans rely upon implicit protection that can extend to mitigating threats from Al-Shabaab.[70] The route to a destination is also considered in terms of access, safety[71] and the distance to destination. If families can only afford to travel via foot or animal, this will limit their destination options to locations that are nearby. Longer distances also require greater resources, such as food and water to sustain the family throughout the journey.[72] Clan connections can facilitate a smoother journey by providing cars for transportation. Cars allow the family to consider wider destinations as they can travel longer distances quicker and allows transporting more belongings, including tools that can aid job creation at destination.[73]

**Families without strong networks look for assistance with journeys[74]** which can be provided by camp managers and local authorities to facilitate their journeys.[75] The data implies that this an informal practice whereby camp managers and local authorities attempt to attract greater numbers of IDPs to sites for a fee in payment or in kind. This dynamic has been highlighted in previous research by GIST.[76]

**There are indications that IDPs move through other IDP sites before they reach their targeted camp**. These "transit sites" are treated as resource centres, where IDPs receive necessities such as food

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68 BH 06, Baidoa 01, Baidoa 07, R019B, Baidoa H1, Baidoa 013, R02B
69 Baidoa H2, Baidoa 013
70 GIST (2022), Understanding the Key Drivers of Displacement During the 2021/2022 Drought, Gist Research.
71 Baidoa 01, QD 19, QD 020
72 QD 01, Baidoa H1, QD FGD
73 Baidoa 01, Baidoa 015, R11B
74 Baidoa 06, Baidoa 01
75 Baidoa 01, Baidoa 06
76 GIST previous research, confidential

and water.[77] This is a dynamic that has been seen before in refugee camps. Previous research has found that East African refugees moving towards Europe sometimes stop in refugee camps in Sudan to rest and re-resource.[78] This would benefit from further investigation.

## 5.B.ii. INFLUENCES ON THE DECISION TO REMAIN AT DESTINATION

**Investments in services to meet the primary and secondary needs of IDPs influence their decision to remain.** Shelter, water and food, as well as longer-term investments in healthcare, livelihood support and education can all incentivize IDPs to remain in destination locations. 77% of ETT records cite humanitarian assistance as the most common reason for which they moved to a specific location. IDPs understand that aid delivery is not consistent nor endless and that projects have a start and end dates. For this reason, they often seek locations that have current and ongoing projects running that provide benefits to IDPs.[79] If aid is not available, IDPs know that if they wait, a new project will likely be launched in the location.[80] They understand that no aid currently, does not mean no aid permanently.

**In our dataset of 150 IDP sites, 83% of sites reported some kind of educational facility**: 74% recorded a Quranic school, 44% recorded a primary school and 9% recorded a secondary school. The regression analysis also demonstrates a positive relationship between the presence of schools and the number of arrivals at a site. Despite an expectation among some IDPs that they would return to their POO, some have persevered with a split family existence whereby some members return home to rural areas to farm, whilst others remain in IDP camps. This is especially true for those who have relocated to Baidoa town, with one of the main drivers of this choice stated as the much better access to educational opportunities compared to those in rural areas.[81] Therefore, as well as acting as a pull factor, access to, and continuity of, education encourages IDPs to remain.[82]

**Cash assistance plays a significant motivating role in influencing IDPs to remain in destination**. With cash assistance, IDPs' sense of autonomy and financial stability increases, which empowers them to meet their immediate and long-term needs. As opposed to returning to a POO and irregular cash flow, IDPs opt to remain in the location in which they receive regular income.[83]

**Access to livelihoods is the most important factor for IDPs to achieve durable solutions**.[84] Once immediate survival needs have been addressed, the priority for IDPs is income generation. The analysis of secondary data during the inception period revealed that displaced people are more likely to seek out places with livelihood opportunities and specifically, land available for either agriculture or livestock rearing. Our quantitative dataset recorded arrivals at 150 unique IDP sites matched to DSA data. Of these IDP sites, 88% are in urban areas, 66% of them are near land for livestock grazing and 58% are near land for agriculture (see **Error! Reference source not found.** below).

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77 Baidoa H1, QD 015, BH 10
78 Malakooti, A. (2013), 'Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads', Altai Consulting.
79 QD FGD, QD 013
80 QD13, QD 019,
81 Ibid.
82 Qaranxdheere_060
83 Baidoa 042.
84 BH 06, Baidoa 07, R019B

Table 1: Characteristics of 150 unique IDP sites matched to DSA data.

| Characteristic | Finding |
|---|---|
| Forced eviction | Risk rated as low in 48% of these sites, moderate in 20%; and very high in 11% |
| Type of shelter | *Buul* is the most common type of shelter in 90% of cases |
| Public lighting | Available in 42% of cases |
| Access to markets | In 72% of sites, there is a market where NFIs are sold, and 80% record a food market |
| Access to water | Most sites (70%) have only one water source and IDPs usually have to walk at least 15 mins to obtain water |
| Access to health | 76% of sites have at least some form of health facility<br>Pharmacy is the most common health facility within IDP sites<br>Primary healthcare and vaccination are the most commonly available health services within IDP sites |
| Access to education | Most sites have some education facility (only 17% have none)<br>74% recorded a Quranic school<br>44% recorded a primary school<br>9% recorded a secondary school |
| Livelihoods | 66% are near land for livestock grazing<br>58% are near land for agriculture |
| Security | 24% have daytime movement restrictions and 62% have nighttime movement restrictions |
| Humanitarian assistance | Most have some form of humanitarian assistance available but 31% recorded no humanitarian assistance |

**Investments in income generating activities (IGA) encourage financial independence which is sought after by IDPs.** IGAs can include various options such as opening shops, VSLA establishment, construction, cooking, masonry, electrical work, or tailoring. In addition, there are individuals who need to engage in temporary activities, particularly during periods of no rains. These activities provide temporary income and support during challenging times. This could include collecting firewood and grass to sell on the local market, street vendor work, domestic work on the informal economy and menial labour on the informal economy. For those who have permanently lost their livelihoods and are not able to return to their previous occupations, there is a need for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET). TVET programs can equip them with new skills and knowledge in different fields, enabling them to pursue alternative income-generating opportunities and rebuild their lives.[85] This is particularly apt for the large volume of arrivals whose skills in farming and livestock are not required in urban settings.[86]

**Access to the informal economy is central to IDPs decision to move to urban hubs**. Males regularly look for jobs in construction, whilst the elderly and women visit homes in towns to find work washing

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85 Qansaxdheere_Buurhakaba 046.
86 Baidoa 053.

clothes and cleaning. Children can be sent to local markets to shine shoes or packing/moving stock.[87] These jobs supplement the family's income and sees reliance on informal employment emerging as a significant pull factor towards urban areas.

Focus box 1: Land administration in Somalia[88]

The centrality of land and its administration to Somalia's political economy is difficult to overstate. Land is stipulated as Somalia's principal resource and source of livelihood in the Provisional Federal Constitution of 2012, Article 43(1). The FGS has inherited a somewhat convoluted and selectively applied legal apparatus from Somalia's pre-1991 military government. Although the Urban Land Distribution Law rendered urban land public property, a 1980 amendment divided it between *duminyaale* – permanent ownership for individuals who finish permanent constructions within two years – and *munishibaale* – temporary ownership with a one-year timeframe to finalise permanent constructions. In Mogadishu, the most coveted urban real estate in Somalia, these were both placed under the oversight of the Mogadishu municipality. Given that it intersected with increasing patronage among governing elites in Mogadishu, this situation set the stage for further land grabs during the civil war after institutions collapse.

The current legal framework is primarily limited to Article 26 of the Provisional Federal Constitution, which affirms the right of "every person" to "own, use, enjoy, sell and transfer property," as well as granting state authorities the right to expropriate land in exchange for compensation where doing so is deemed in the public interest, whilst member state constitutions specify that 'citizens' rather than all 'persons' have the right to own, enjoy, sell, and transfer property. Following state collapse, however, the destruction of land registries and cadastre offices, duplication of title deeds, and violent seizure of land, have rendered applying the legal framework more difficult as the establishment of ownership faces many barriers.

This is exacerbated by recent land prospecting in newly recovered or intermediate recovery areas by elites located in the de facto state capitals and diaspora, who expect investment to accompany stabilisation efforts. Land registries in Kismayo and Baidoa have recently been reconstituted but do not yet operate at full capacity. The Mogadishu land registry was in large part taken to Sweden during the onset of the civil war. Copies of title deeds are now available for a fee via an office in Bakaara Market, as the holder considers the current municipal and federal authorities too unreliable to return the originals. The reconstitution of an effective land administration in Mogadishu remains subject to competition between federal ministries and Benadir regional/municipal authorities.

**Legal aid to assist with the navigation of land ownership, as well as land and property rights, influences the decision of IDPs to stay.**[89] Investments, or lack of, in housing and land, also influence the decision of IDPs to remain in destinations. Complexities surrounding land and property ownership and rental include limited financial resources; legal complexities such as the lack of legal identity, which is a requirement for renting;[90][91] competition with other groups or individuals seeking land; and potential conflicts or disputes over land rights. Bur Hakaba was highlighted as a place where there is limited emphasis on purchasing land for IDPs which can lead them to be in precarious arrangements with local landowners and at increased risk of secondary displacement.[92] The difficulty of purchasing land can be negated by purchasing land as a collective, although in the absence of certified land ownership, this still does not mitigate the risk of relocation at the whim of the landowner. Secondary data shows that resettlement efforts in Barwaqo, where the local authorities played a pivotal role in land distribution, present a positive model for offering IDPs more security and ownership of land, thus negating the desire, or need, to relocate.[93]

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87 Baidoa 01, Baidoa 07, R019B, Baidoa 14, Baidoa H1, R020B
88 GIST (2022), Political, Economic and Security/Conflict Analysis, confidential.
89 Buurhakaba 050.
90 NRC, "Who are you?": Linkages between Legal Identity and Housing, Land, and Property Rights in Somalia, 2023
91 According to the Norweigan Refugee Council, over 77% of the Somali population or close to 12 million people are estimated to lack an official proof of identity (NRC, "Who are you?": Linkages between Legal Identity and Housing, Land, and Property Rights in Somalia, 2023)
92 Buurhakaba 047.
93 Ref

Private ownership of land ceates a private economy that is open to corruption. It is also more strongly affected by supply and demand, which often works against vulnerable groups. Supporting the government itself to buy land and redistribute it to IDPs, instead of IDPs renting privately-owned land, could negate some of these adverse effects. According to the Somalia Shelter Cluster, only 10 percent of IDP sites were situated on land with government ownership in 2022.[94]

**The availability of land for agriculture and livestock rearing in the destination influences decisions to stay.** If individuals have access to arable land and grazing areas in the destination, it can provide them with opportunities for sustainable agriculture and livestock rearing, influencing their decision to stay and integrate into the local community.[95] Our regression analysis supports the importance of land for livestock grazing and agriculture. In model A of the regression analysis, the number of arrivals at a site increased where there was available land for farming. In regression model B, destinations that had land available for livestock rearing accounted for a greater share of all recorded movements from a particular POO. IDPs without their own farms or livestock may look for jobs on other people's farms, which is another benefit to being close to agricultural areas.

**Agricultural training programs (covering a wide range of topics, such as soil management, crop rotation, pest control, and water conservation),[96] the provision of farming tools, and the availability of land in the destination act as driving forces for people to stay at the destination.[97]** The first thing families sacrifice when limited for space when displaced is their farming tools, as they are heavy and cumbersome to travel with. This decision will later affect their options for livelihoods and disadvantage their prospects of integration at destination.[98]

**Beyond investments in tangible assets to improve the standard of living, the decision to remain in destinations are heavily influenced by clan dynamics**. IDPs are often invited by a camp manager from their own clan, and these camps are named after their respective villages. Examples include Bulafulay IDP Camp, Iiidaale 1, Iidaale 2, Iidaale 3 and Qansaxdheere camp. One KII reported that certain camps are headed by NGO members belonging to specific clans and that they tend to support camps predominantly inhabited by members of their own community[99] as it becomes profitable for the camp manager.[100] Recruiting IDPs in this manner creates a cycle whereby clan lineage permeates IDP camps and provides a support system within communities, ensuring social cohesion and security.[101] A reliable clan network can also help to relieve the financial and psychological stress of relocating as clan members offer temporary accommodation, provide meals, include new arrivals on the list of beneficiaries, secure locations within the IDP camp, aid integration and, in extremis, provide assistance to help sustain families.[102] These connections are also pivotal in filling the time gap that exists between IDPs arriving at a site, registering on beneficiary lists and receiving aid. Furthermore, IDPs need help navigating the landscape of benefits offered - multiple organisations provide different benefits, with different eligibility criteria. Once IDPs determine which

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94 Somalia Shelter Cluster, Dignified and Safer Living Conditions for Protracted IDPs in Somalia, May 2022, page 3.
95 Baidoa 042.
96 Qansaxdheere 049.
97 Qansaxdheere 051.
98 Baidoa 07, R019B, Baidoa 14, QD 12, QD 018,
99 Ibid.
100 Baidoa 043.
101 Ibid and P_Baidoa_048.
102 Qansaxdheere 049.

benefits they are entitled to, they need to understand how to register. Clan affiliations help in navigating this landscape.[103]

**Belonging to a majority clan can simplify the process of registration for benefits** as they have access to better information. Further, dominant clan connections may form part of local networks that make it easier to register on lists.[104] For example, if the IDP is of the same clan as the gatekeeper at the site, this will make the process of obtaining aid simpler. Gatekeepers can also fill the gap in terms of immediate needs on arrival and regularly act as informal middlemen between IDPs and NGOs.

**Gatekeepers usually provide IDPs with a plot of land in a settlement and some basic services in exchange for payment in either cash or kind. They also have the power to enable an IDP's access to humanitarian assistance.** There is little formal accountability or transparency around payments made and literature suggests that this exchange can sometimes be exploitative against the IDPs.[105] Moreover, literature describes how gatekeepers can exercise control over access to settlements for agencies and donors, in concert with local militia. Their ability to limit site access diminishes the ability of agencies and donors to provide oversight, which can allow gatekeepers to exercise social and financial control over the delivery of aid and make it is possible for aid to be channelled to specific groups within IDP sites,[106] again highlighting the importance of clan connections. Respondents repeatedly mentioned that not belonging to the majority clan can reduce one's chances of receiving aid. These links can also extend to forms of nepotism that favour family links when searching for work.[107] We know that access to land, housing, and jobs are all filtered through kinship ties. The applicable norms here are:

- ▸ *Tolnimo* (kinship obligations): Somalis are obliged to support members of their kin, including in finding income or supporting them where they do not.

- ▸ *U dashay* (right by blood): right to land by kinship association with the locally residing clans.

- ▸ *Ku dashay* (right by birth): right to land by having been born in a place.

- ▸ *Ku dhagmay* (right by citizenship): right to land by virtue of being a Somali citizen, which is the least respected and often employed by those who came to land through the violence of the civil war.

Specific clans such as the Hubeer, Geidle, Yantaar, and Luwaay have experienced significant displacement due to insecurity, drought, and conflict. The Hubeer, for example, have a dynamic called Jareer and Jilac, which refers to the majority and minority within the larger Hubeer sub-clan. The minority group consists of the Bantus. When tensions arise, the minority clan members sometimes support AS rule to gain dominance over the majority. As a result, the majority feels compelled to be displaced as they refuse to be subjugated by the minority clan.[108] The impact of this is the mass movement of one sub-clan clan, likely into one IDP site.

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103 BH 06, R019B, QD 020, R01B
104 Baidoa 01, R019B, R01B, Baidoa FGD, R11B
105 Previous research by GIST, confidential.
106 Tana Copenhagen ApS (2017), Engaging the Gatekeepers: Using informal governance resources in Mogadishu, 7
107 Ibid.
108 Baidoa 041.

## 5.C.  HOW HAVE INVESTMENTS IN THE PLACE OF ORIGIN AFTER DISPLACEMENT INFLUENCED DECISIONS TO RETURN?

**Secondary movements are prompted by the same considerations – availability of food and water, shelter, livelihoods, education, healthcare, and security – that catalyse primary displacement**. IDPs are looking for basic needs like food and water, as well as longer-term integration needs like livelihoods, education, and healthcare. The existence of aid and assistance are likely to fill the gaps and shape their decisions. If they consider these present in the POO, they may return. Access to alternative forms of aid elsewhere can trigger secondary displacements to other camps.

**Security is a key factor for IDPs when considering a return to the POO**. The sequencing of security and NGO presence was succinctly summarised by one respondent who stated that 'the presence of aid agencies is an important factor, but it is contingent upon the convenience and safety of NGOs. Safety remains a priority for these humanitarian agencies.[109] Therefore, although basic needs such as food aid, cash assistance, healthcare, and livelihood opportunities influence IDPs choice to return, the secure environment that facilitates the presence of these services is dependent on improved security at the POO. As previously noted, remote interventions by NGOs through schemes such as electronic cash transfers[110] by mobile phone, can also play a role in circumventing Al-Shabaab to incentivize return, as remote distribution prevents AS from being able to disrupt activities in situations where security has typically prevented NGOs from being able to work on the ground. It can incentivise return because it allows access to assistance in volatile settings. Naturally, such interventions play no role in ridding the physical presence of the group.

**Community bonds and ties to the land influence IDPs in their decision to return**. As with the decision to remain in IDP camps, family and clan bonds can strongly influence IDPs to return. This is especially true when families have been split between the hometown and IDP location, either through choice or because of relatives being unable to travel to IDP camps. Ties to the land can also act as an incentive to return, with some looking to return when security and rains allow them to reconnect with their animals and livelihoods.[111] Such comments indicate that investments in improving agricultural resilience could play a role in deterring displacement in the first instance. Examples given of programs that could act as pull factors to return were training programs on enhanced farming practices, restocking and education on how to market livestock – the latter is something that IOM's Deegan Bile project in Hiraan is focused on. The Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) programme has also piloted fodder production for this purpose with success. Fodder production was found to also form the building blocks for other critical value chains such as milk.

**Psychosocial support to address trauma and promote mental well-being, as well as community-based initiatives that foster social cohesion and encourage participation in decision-making processes could encourage IDPs to return**.[112] Given the socially homogenous nature of IDP camps, an incentive to stay is the clan-based social safety net that surrounds IDPs in the destination location. With time, the social safety net becomes stronger and the thought of leaving becomes increasingly unappealing. To break this inverse correlation, investments in support that focus on social reintegration and psychological support could make the thought of return less daunting for IDPs. Schemes to address the

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109 Baidoa 045.
110 Buurhakaba 050.
111 Qansaxdheere 049.
112 Baidoa 048.

underlying causes of rural insecurity such as inter-clan community-led dispute resolution could encourage rural stability and an environment conducive to return.

**Assistance in housing and land rights, including land restitution or compensation for loss of property could encourage return to the POO.**[113] Access to HLP rights is as important for displaced persons in the destination location as it is for their return. Rural regions are subject to particularly informal modes of allocating land and property tenure[114] which, given the lack of records, could disadvantage returnees.

**Comprehensive assistance for farming communities could encourage return travel to rural areas**. Farming support in the form of restocking, crop resilience and the support of animal husbandry through deworming and vaccination support, for example, could enhance rural resilience and encourage communities to return.[115] Insecurity is blamed for blocking the provision of pesticides and seeds that used to help bolster rural resilience.[116]

**Improved access to wider income-generating activities could incentivize return travel to the POO.**[117] Investments in micro-finance and VSLA could provide an allure against the perceived employment opportunities that urban hubs and secondary towns offer.[118]

## 5.D. WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES, IF ANY, BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN AREAS?

**Urban hubs have a significant presence of aid activities, aid organisations, security forces, opportunities for income generation, and urban public infrastructure**. Rural and secondary hubs have none or fewer of these and are therefore more vulnerable to shocks. Al-Shabaab compounds this issue and poses a threat to movement, blocks development, and acts as a source of extortion.

**The presence of Al-Shabaab in rural areas influenced displacement patterns by forcing rural–urban movement.** Rural communities previously mitigated the risks from inter-clan conflict by moving to other rural villages. The rise of Al-Shabaab through rural areas has impacted this coping mechanism and forced many communities to seek refuge in towns – particularly those with NGO operations.[119] An exception to this is those who are tied to rural areas by livestock and farms. They may explore moving to nearby rural regions to persevere with this livelihood and means of self-sustainability, as well as maintain ties to ancestral lands and community customs.[120] In the event of losing livestock, farmers regularly relocate to urban IDP camps.

**Owing to the presence of aid agencies, urban centres are viewed as *the* location to receive cash payments**. The predominant form of cash payments come via humanitarian assistance but by virtue of being in urban centres, IDPs also have better access to loans from private traders and financial institutions.[121]

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113 Ibid.
114 Land and Property in Somalia, Norwegian Refugee Council, United Nations Habitat, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2008.
115 Qansaxdheere 051.
116 Baidoa 053.
117 Bur Hakaba 052.
118 Ibid.
119 Baidoa 044.
120 Baidoa 043 and Baidoa 048.
121 Bur Hakaba 052.

**Individuals from marginalized communities with limited access to resources and services may displace to other rural areas.**[122] These individuals likely have a lower socio-economic status and already face challenges related to poverty, limited education, and healthcare.[123] In alignment with the findings on clan lineage, this group may also lack the kinship connections that afford them access to IDP camps and opportunities within the camp.[124] Conversely, some of those moving to urban IDP camps may be looking to exploit their relative socio-economic advantage and view an urban centre as a means of accessing improved employment and education opportunities.[125] The discrepancy between the rural poor and relatively wealthier, and/or better connected, can also deter displacement by individuals who lack the immediate support network in a destination location. This is compounded by perceptions of urban centres as exacerbating poverty due to the increased need for monetary transactions.[126]

**The ease of accessing housing, land and property in rural areas presents a notable difference to urban norms.** In rural regions, land has historically been more readily available and affordable. People would often occupy the land that belonged to their ancestors or relatives. However, with the increase in population, land for sale has become more common. Although at times this may involve a notary and official documentation, it is a largely informal practice. Housing in rural areas is often relatively inexpensive and constructed in non-permanent structures, such as 'Somali traditional houses.'[127] In urban IDP camps, houses are primarily offered for rent by and in the host community. The cost of land in urban areas is considerably higher, making it challenging for individuals or communities to afford property ownership. Access to and purchase of land (if the land is for sale), is aided by clan networks and collective purchasing, whereby resources are pooled to afford the price.

**Although formal land and property documentation exist in urban areas their use is not widespread. Informal arrangements that empower landlords over IDPs persist.** Agreements between IDPs and landlords are sometimes informal and undisclosed with only the landlord and IDPs aware of the arrangements. Consequently, when evictions occur, IDPs lack documentation proving their ownership of the land, as they bypassed legal processes such as notarization. There have been numerous cases of eviction where landlords sell the land to others, resulting in secondary displacement for the IDPs.[128]

**Urban centres are perceived as more reliable, particularly during times of crisis.** This sentiment is influenced by the inability of villages to provide basic goods, the low resilience of rural areas to climatic shocks, combined with the availability of goods and employment opportunities offered in urban centres.[129] Rural livelihoods have faced significant challenges in recent years due to unpredictable weather conditions and persistent droughts which have degraded the sustainability of agrarian and pastoral livelihoods. Drought has exacerbated the impact of deteriorating rural livelihoods by limiting access to food and water and, at times, increased the prevalence of conflict borne over access to scarce natural resources. Resilience has been further eroded by locust invasions and related crop destruction. Given that government forces control most urban spaces they are perceived as safer than rural areas subjected to clan fighting and Al-Shabaab.[130] Collectively, these perceptions feed the humanitarian trap, i.e. the rapid filling of urban hubs by IDPs allured

122 Baidoa 048.
123 Qansaxdheere 051.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Baidoa 045.
127 Baidoa 044.
128 Baidoa 041.
129 Baidoa 053.
130 Baidoa 043.

by the assumed sanctuary.[131] Beyond the obvious examples of Baidoa and Mogadishu, as previously noted, Burkhaba offers a good example of a town that offers relatively high levels of security and sanctuary in comparison to its peripheral rural villages that are dominated by Al-Shabaab.[132]

Wider examples of why IDPs relocate to rural areas include favourable rainfall in a specific area (for those with livestock), avoiding political unrest and violence in urban centres (such as the opposition and government in Baidoa) and receiving support from relatives or NGOs in a rural area.[133]

## 5.E. WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES, IF ANY, BETWEEN MAIN URBAN HUBS AND SECONDARY TOWNS?

**Moving to secondary towns is normally a choice for those who have kinship ties or cannot afford to go to main urban hubs**. Families make a multi-layered assessment of locations, for which they gather data through family and friend networks, as well as local authorities. They ask what immediate support is available and consider the wider infrastructure, including the presence of humanitarian and development actors, relative security, access to healthcare, livelihood opportunities and educational prospects. The final, and often deciding factor is how all these considerations can be aided by moving to a location with existing kinship ties.

**Better infrastructure in urban hubs eases the access of aid and people, making displacement to these locations more accessible and easier for IDPs**. In comparison to urban hubs, secondary towns lack the infrastructure, transport networks and resources to support relief efforts. Improving these aspects could help to encourage IDPs to move towards secondary towns over urban centres.

**Urban hubs typically receive primary attention from aid agencies as they serve as central locations for interventions and have a higher concentration of IDP camps.** This concept has already been identified throughout the course of this research but was reiterated in our KIIs. Aid agencies siting in urban centres appear to be reinforcing them as target destinations for IDPs. The influx of IDPs creates ever-expanding urban centres. Urban centres also receive high proportions of investments from the government which improves infrastructure, allowing the delivery of aid and feeds the perception, or reality, that the urban centres provide more opportunities.

**Urban hubs offer a span of coping mechanisms that secondary towns cannot provide**. Owing to their size and relative development, urban hubs offer opportunities to the socio-cultural and socio-economic spectrum of IDPs. By default, of the size of the local population and economy, IDPs are more likely to be able to find employment. Furthermore, children may also be more likely to find informal employment, or alternatively, continue their education as both avenues are more readily available. One community elder stated that if secondary towns offered the same support as urban centres, there would be no difference in where people were displaced. He gave priority services as cash and food aid, followed by access to water, shelter, and education.[134] Our research indicates that assistance with livelihoods and income-generating activities, as well as healthcare and accessible HLP options, are other core components needed in secondary towns.

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[131] Majid, Nisar et al. (2022). Another Humanitarian (and Political) Crisis in Somalia in 2022. Working Paper. Feinstein Center at Tufts University, University College London, Centre for Humanitarian Change.
132 Buurhakaba 050.
133 Qansaxdheere 051.
134 Baidoa 042.

## 5.F. WHAT INFRASTRUCTURE OR SERVICES APPEAR TO PREVENT OR MITIGATE MASS MOVEMENTS?

Our findings show that the following resilience-oriented aspects could help to prevent mass movements:

▸ **Sustainable water sources and access**, including piping for access, irrigation canals for sustenance, and rainwater planting to mitigate droughts and erosion. Increasing the number of water pans and availability of water trucking would provide immediate relief and access to water. In the longer term, innovative food and water storage methods could also play a pivotal role in allowing communities to withstand periods of shock.

▸ **Climate adaptation-focused infrastructural investments**. The ability to withstand climatic shocks could be significantly enhanced by assisting communities to endure prolonged droughts and heavy rain. Aspects such as reinforcing riverbanks and building housing away from flood plains form a core component of this. Mainstreaming climate adaptation (and mitigation) into village and town planning is also key. The concept of sponge cities, and other adaptive measures, are covered in the recommendations section.

▸ **Sustainable and diversified agriculture** and goods, sustainable, and integrated pastoralist practices to provide food even when droughts hit.

▸ **Roads and vehicles for transport and power** to ensure access to goods and power as much as possible. Secure and reliable route access is also a prerequisite to the delivery of assistance and aid.

▸ **Public-private partnerships to develop solar energy infrastructure and offer communities continual access to power**. A secondary aspect of this is increased internet coverage which would play a positive role in enhancing rural education and encouraging web-based entrepreneurialism and therefore diversifying economies away from a reliance on agriculture.

▸ **Training and infrastructure for local doctors and veterinarians**, including using transport infrastructure to ensure medical supplies are available.

▸ **Reliable infrastructure to allow market access** for produce and therefore prevent economic stagnation during periods of climatic shock.

▸ **Integration of security forces in communal activities** to build ties with communities and help protect investments and community members against al Shabaab.

▸ **Mobile or roaming clinics, teachers, and inclusive elder councils** to facilitate access to healthcare, education, and justice also for rural and mobile communities.

▸ **Liberation of territories from Al-Shabaab with effective holding forces and a smooth and swift handover** from stabilisation activities to durable solutions and development work to ensure that locations stabilise and can catch up. The interrelationship between peacebuilding and infrastructural development provides an interesting point of reference here and is expanded on in the recommendations.

Respondents repeatedly stressed that if a location *as a whole* exhibits more of these aspects, if households can access these via kinship/family ties, if humanitarian/development actors can work in these areas (given their role as main service provider and employer), and if households have access to (mostly monetary) social safety nets (currently via clan), households would be more likely to stay in such a location and not displace – or return to such a location if benefits outweigh staying and they can afford to.

# 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Analysis shows that IDPs are typically looking for the following when choosing where to go when displaced:

1. **A safe journey to destination:** this relates to physical but also food security for the journey. The mode of transportation available, which is dictated by socioeconomics and social networks, can affect choice of destination and ability to integrate at destination.

2. **Access to food, water and shelter immediately upon arrival:** this can come through clan, family relations, humanitarian organisations, and gatekeepers.

3. **Long-term prospects:** livelihoods, accompanied by humanitarian support that acts like a social safety net and services like health, education and justice as secondary. HLP is also an important long-term consideration.

4. **Livelihoods occupy an important place in these considerations,** as it has the ability to make or break displacement decisions. Livelihoods strategies can include leaving some members of the family at home to rebuild farms while others migrate and find jobs at destination (double income stream). Jobs at destination can include menial labour in the informal economy in urban areas.

5. **Humanitarian support is assessed according to** (1) the number of agencies on site, as more agencies implies more chances at securing aid, (2) if there are any current/new projects running and (3) one's ability to secure available aid.

6. **Social cohesion:** in this context, the ability to enjoy rights and benefits without discrimination.

**When we looked at decision-making at different levels** – what prevents people from leaving their POO, what is attracting them to a particular destination, what attracts them to return home from their place of destination, and what prompts secondary movements from destination – we found that the above-listed considerations remain static. At all levels of decision-making, IDPs are looking for the same six factors. They are not looking for particular investments or services, but a spectrum of services that relate to short term survival, as well as long term integration; durable solutions alongside resilience building.

This all unfolds within a context where displacement by natural disaster or conflict, while creating a state of emergency, is seen as a part of Somalia's socio-political fabric. Somali families experience emergency and displacement in cyclical patterns.

**Previous research by GIST**[135] **has found that drought and degenerative agriculture and pastoralism intensify conflict over resources, as well as displacement.** Somalia is grounded in a history of predominantly pastoralist, agro-pastoralist, and agricultural livelihoods. Livestock and agriculture constitute the main pillars of Somalia's economy today. Availability of water is central, be it as direct water source or to irrigate pasture and crops. However, water sources are becoming scarcer as more of the country develops into semi-arid landscape. Protracted armed conflict also destroyed or disabled much of the previously existing sustainable irrigation systems.

**At the same time, the deforestation that results from charcoal production and domestic use of charcoal and wood exposes already increasingly arid soil to direct sunlight and contributes to top-soil erosion.** Boreholes remain a regular but harmful practice because they deplete groundwater without restoring it and thereby erode the soil more deeply and irreversibly. These practices exacerbate droughts, food insecurity, and conflict over ever-scarcer water sources and pasture.

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135 GIST (2022), Political, Economic and Security/Conflict Analysis, confidential.

**The findings of this study confirm that displaced households move to places where humanitarian assistance is provided, balanced against where they have networks and contacts.** It should be noted that the fieldwork was conducted on displacement flows into and out of Baidoa, which is an area concentrated with aid and IDP settlements, and this dynamic is likely to have influenced our findings. In any case, the findings indicate that choices by international partners on where to deploy large-scale relief efforts have substantial consequences for displacement patterns, and ultimately, for the development of local economies, and of Somalia as state and society.

**Given this context, the overarching recommendation is to consider shifting the focus from flexible response to proactively building infrastructure and delivering relief where it is safe and sustainable for displaced households to move to.** This involves viewing, and assisting the locations to develop, holistically, across the many services and needs considered by IDPs when making decisions around displacement. This is then broken down into a series of sub-objectives:

## 6.A.  OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Improve access to climate adaptation-oriented climate finance.** Building climate resilience into Somalia's agricultural sector and rangelands will cost $10 billion between 2021-2030.  In 2020, Somalia received just U.S. $285 million. Only 10% of global climate finance goes towards climate adaptation. Per capita, just U.S. $2.1 reaches communities in extremely fragile states.  If the climate financing deficit continues, Somalia will not receive the technical and project-level support needed to address its short-term and long-term climate objectives. In this scenario, rural resilience will remain low and communities unprepared to anticipate and respond to immediate climate shocks and slow-onset climate risks. **We recommend**:

   ‣ Leveraging the United Nations as a partner in blended finance investments with private institutions to underwrite and de-risk climate finance investments in Somalia.

   ‣ Reducing bureaucratic and institutional barriers to investments.

   ‣ Applying for smaller sums of money and targeting multiple small-scale projects to increase the chances of securing investments.

   ‣ Educating donors on climate finance risks and opportunities in Bay, Somalia.

2. **Integrate security considerations into the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus**. Security plays a vital role in places of origin, at destination and in the decision-making process of whether IDPs return to the POO. Furthermore, security was consistently cited as the pre-requisite to humanitarian intervention. Integration of security considerations should be conducted from the grassroots-to-political levels. Community models warranting further research for their applicability include the Isha Human Rights Organisation (IHRO)[136] in Baidoa, but focus should also be given to establishment of such groups in rural regions, where insecurity consistently undermines resilience building efforts. IOM should also look to work strategically with security and stabilisation pillars at a programming level to ensure that HDP efforts are coordinated, with the local environment conducive to receiving humanitarian assistance.

   A coordinated HDP approach incorporating security would also be well placed in risk profiling, disaster needs assessments and contingency planning throughout the Bay region. This would afford all actors the ability to implement coordinated and well-timed responses to communities at particular risk of

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136 We are One Community: Building Safety and Security in Somalia, Saferworld, January, 2019.

displacement. If combined with early warning systems (see point 3), this could offer a significant step towards negating primary displacement. Outputs could include comprehensive climate change risk assessment, including mapping of risk hotspots by considering socio-economic, security and other infrastructures.[137]

## 6.B.  RESILIENCE BUILDING AT PLACES OF ORIGIN

3. **Invest in early warning systems to improve rural resilience against climatic and conflict-based shocks**. Forewarning rural producers of forthcoming climatic shocks would provide a significant step towards rural preparedness and the ability to withstand climatic shocks. Adopting lessons from IOM's transhumance tracking tool (TTT), as well as higher-level operational and strategic level platforms such as UNEP's STRATA, would provide welcome warnings to communities of predicted shocks. A first step, and cost-effective means, to protect communities against weather-based shocks could include access and education on interpreting reliable meteorological forecasts.

4. **Coordinate the timely delivery of humanitarian relief to prevent displacement**. A lack of aid at the point of origin is often a key driver of displacement. Integrating coordinated response efforts in conjunction with enhanced early warning systems could help to prevent initial displacement. A core aspect of operationalizing this approach is the ability to penetrate hard-to-access areas owing to weak/non-existent infrastructure and Al-Shabaab. Continual development of methods to circumvent Al-Shabaab, such as the use of electronic cash assistance, should be encouraged to reach those most at risk. These efforts should particularly target groups such as the elderly, disabled and those from minority groups, whose inherent resiliency and ability to displace is disadvantaged.

5. **Support finance and insurance options to support rural producers against climatic shocks.** Steps should be taken to support rural communities with formal financial services, including savings accounts, access to credit and loans, and insurance. These are all important risk management tools for farmers, herders and actors along the livestock value chain and play a significant role in bolstering rural resilience.[138] One example is Index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) is a risk management product that has been successfully piloted in Kenya and Ethiopia to protect the livestock assets of pastoralists during severe drought events. The design and implementation of IBLI involved collaboration between international organizations, local institutions, and private sector partners as part of an ambitious research-for-development agenda since 2008.[139]

6. **Improve access to services at origin, particularly in relation to water and farming**. IDPs report that improved access to services - most fundamentally, water – and the promotion of economic opportunity through assistance to rebuild farms, would allow families to stay at home. This provides a clear pathway for investments at origin. Examples of implementing this include a reliable water supply that is self-sustaining and incorporates rainwater planting methods to replenish groundwater and rehydrate lower soil levels (given the unpredictability of rains), tied into a permaculture approach for farms that includes the usage of wastewater to irrigate and shade-giving plants to protect soil against erosion.

   IGAD suggests some options to improve water accessibility: Mapping and profiling of water resources and conducting a water balance assessment and analysis of water supplies in the region, the use of

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137 IGAD Strategy for Sustainable and Resilient Livestock Development in View of Climate Change (2022-2037), IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD), August 2022.
138 IGAD Strategy for Sustainable and Resilient Livestock Development in View of Climate Change (2022-2037), IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD), August 2022.
139 Ibid.

public-private partnerships to develop surface and underground climate-proofed water storage and withdrawal facilities (e.g., dams, borrow pits, valley dams, boreholes), the development of sustainable water management plans and micro-scale irrigation programs to support agro-pastoralists.[140]

7. **Encourage a shift towards sustainable and regenerative agricultural practices**. This is not only imperative for survival but also holds the potential to enhance the overall output and nutrient density of food consumed. This has implications for both food security and conflict dynamics, two critical factors that drive displacement. Examples of enhancing sustainable agricultural practices and boosting resilience include:

   ▸ Rainwater planting and harvesting.

   ▸ Coordination with wider IOM research and programming to encourage improved rangeland management.

   ▸ Coordinate with IOM's Deegan Bile project in Hiraan to explore how producers' access to market can be improved.

   ▸ Small-scale agroecological farming, agroforestry, and permaculture.

   ▸ Training in regenerative practices.

   ▸ Controlling invasive plant species.

   ▸ Improving access to, and production of, animal feed.

   ▸ Strengthen animal disease management.

   ▸ Attracting investments in research and innovation in climate-resistant agricultural practices.

   ▸ Facilitating knowledge sharing of lessons learned and best practices.

8. **Promote income diversification away from agricultural-oriented and agricultural-dependent economies**. This aspect looks to exploit options that exist in the Bay area to see how natural resources could be integrated into the rural economy and therefore diversify rural economies that have become susceptible to the slow onset effects of climate change, as well as rapid climatic shocks. Examples include beekeeping, artisanal mining, processing gums and resin and utilising wider wild products. Reinvigorating and re-programming projects that have focused on invigorating economies, and learning lessons from their implementation should be undertaken. Learning from programs run by ADRA between 2017-20 that included Village Savings and Loans Associations and comprehensive numeracy and literacy training to teach skills to effectively manage their businesses and make informed financial decisions would be a core part of this to see what was effective. Following thorough research, designing Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) to assist with a movement away from agricultural-related incomes would offer good support to local communities.

9. **Encourage climate-resilient rural and urban planning**. A Sponge Village could be one solution for this. A Sponge Village mimics the function of a sponge: it soaks up the energy and resources flowing through it and stores them for the long-term productivity and resilience of both the land and people. A Sponge Village can be created by designing a landscape such that energy — in the form of water flows, plant debris and other organic matter — becomes trapped and breaks down into the land, thus increasing the land's capacity to retain water and nutrients long after the rains have gone.

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[140] Ibid.

Resilience design is an interdisciplinary approach to humanitarian and development programming that is primarily based on permaculture methodology. This design framework strengthens the resilience of communities and their ecological systems to shocks and stresses related to climate change, land degradation and economic factors through enhancing ecosystem services; increasing energy efficiency; increasing income; contributing to increased nutritional status; and strengthening the skill set, adaptability, and confidence of smallholder farmers. It incorporates and is informed by:

- Permaculture: an interdisciplinary, system-based design science applied to natural, built, social and economic environments and planetary systems.

- Agroecology: a farming system focused on food production that makes the best use of nature's goods and services while not damaging these resources.

- Agroforestry: the intentional integration of trees and shrubs into crop and animal farming systems to create environmental, economic, and social benefits.

- Rainwater Harvesting: the collection, storage, protection and utilization of rain, rather than allowing it to run off of a landscape.

- Ecological Restoration: the process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged, or destroyed.

- Circular Economy: a circular economy is a systemic approach to economic development designed to benefit businesses, society, and the environment. In contrast to the 'take-make- waste' linear model, a circular economy is regenerative by design and aims to gradually decouple growth from the consumption of finite resources.[141]

10. **Work with a match funding approach to ensure sustainable and long-lasting funding for community needs.**

Match funding can ensure longer-term financial sustainability and support community integration. District councils fail to operate because they have no revenue base to pay salaries and operational costs.[20] One avenue that has shown promise in Somalia has been a match-funding approach to project implementation: the community raises a set target sum, and the external implementer or donor covers the remaining difference for the project costs. Studies have found that match funding contributes to government legitimacy in Somalia, can channel the unevenly distributed but nonetheless substantial financial capacities of Somalia's diaspora, and establish fundraising committees. These committees can outlive projects and raise funds for the maintenance of structures and even the construction of new community priorities after project cycles conclude.[21] Match funding can further bolster sustainability efforts, as a project that communities contribute significant amounts of funds towards and continue to do so beyond project implementation is likely to be relevant and impactful.

Under the Better Migration Management project, Community Action Plans (CAPs) are developed through a community-based approach, referred to as community based-planning (CBP), to drive transition and recovery in displacement-affected communities. The approach uses participatory planning and is led by a Core Facilitation Team (CFT), which normally includes local authorities and community leaders. The CFTs spearhead a weeklong participatory community planning process with host community, IDPs, returnees, marginalized clans, youth, and women, among others. The focus is to map resources and risks, and then identify and prioritize community needs and their solutions.

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141 https://www.permaculturenews.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/The-Story-of-The-Sponge-Village-In-Atego.pdf.

CAPs need to have a clear identification of the problems, a vision, priorities and proposed activities/projects to attain durable solutions. Many of these priorities can be public infrastructure and vital services for both displaced and host communities. These priorities are then referred to the government, humanitarian and development actors, the private sector and diaspora, and IOM can support the resulting initiatives. The programme also supports the CFTs to carry out cultural, arts and sports events that strengthen social cohesion and promote unity of the displaced-affected communities. These events are suggested, planned and implemented by the communities themselves, bringing together different population groups to forge a common identity and counter destabilizing factors. In 2022, IOM extended this model to protection initiatives by creating counter-trafficking community action plans.

CAPs were also implemented under the Danwadaag area-based programme in Baidoa as a means to drive transition and recovery in displacement-affected communities.. One key learning that emerged from this program is that, when discussing potential projects, a clear connection needs to be maintained between needs and available or planned resources. This is in order to avoid the production of a 'shopping list', with projects that have little connection to the issues and resources identified by the community.CAPs are suggested particularly for rural IDP settlements. ETT has demonstrated that those moving to rural villages are more likely to come from places that were completely displaced (61%) than those arriving at urban neighbourhoods (44%) or IDP sites (39%). This implies that rural villages tend to be comprised of communities that migrated together, which means a strong vehicle already exists for community-based interventions. It also implies that the chances of returning to origin are slim. That is, if most of the community has been displaced, assets that remain at origin are likely to be scarce, making return very challenging. CBP allows these communities to build up their new homes according to their needs, with their participation and ownership, amongst a community that is looking for long-term solutions. The findings around origin locations indicate that there is scope to prevent displacement with more services and assistance at origin, which implies that community-based planning in locations of origin has the potential to cause returns to origin and prevent future displacement.

11. **Support community-led resilience and conflict reduction efforts to minimise unrest in the POO.** Kinship-based social safety nets, and wider community-level integration projects, have the potential to prevent displacement in the lead-up to slow-onset crises, such as droughts. Respondents noted that relatives with a stable salary and/or assets might reinforce family members financially and thereby render their displacement unnecessary. IOM and partners could explore actively encouraging the usage of such networks and even consider infusing resources via such networks to strengthen rural communities capacity to weather crises. This should be done with careful observation of conflict sensitivity procedures and close coordination with partners working in the peacebuilding and governance spaces to ensure that injecting resources on a kinship basis does not alter existing inter-clan equilibria and invite counterbalancing, including via armed violence.

    **Given the influence of clan and religious elders, this effort should encourage their participation and include a dispute resolution remit.** Community-level disputes are being exacerbated by the climate-conflict nexus. The implementation of projects that seek to eliminate inter-clan conflict and discrimination could have a significant impact on improving rural resilience. They also allow for marginalisation based on clan affiliation to be addressed. Integrated with such projects, or planned concurrently, should be psychosocial support to address trauma and support the well-being of those impacted by conflict and amrginalisation. Existing platforms and institutions already in place that foster social cohesion or civic engagement should be strengthened as means of encouraging engagement in information sharing, financial and material support, and to ensure that support for vulnerable communities and minority clans is integrated.

12. **Invest in infrastructure to improve access to the most isolated communities.** Of the one million Somali's displaced by drought since 2021, 46% live in areas with access constraints or are inaccessible. Although recent analysis shows that this theme is generating awareness, there remains strong evidence showing that this problem is not being addressed. A comparison of Bur Hakaba and Qansaxdheere exemplifies this phenomenon and is one of the key reasons why a large percentage of vulnerable persons and IDPs have chosen to remain in Bur Hakaba.

   Deeper research into this aspect would benefit from adopting lessons learned from the body of infrastructure and peacebuilding literature which explores the sequencing of infrastructure to encourage peace. Specific lessons from a counterinsurgency perspective can also be sought from Iraq and Afghanistan. In the latter, the clear, hold and build mantra provides insights into (re)building infrastructure in extremely volatile contexts. Empirical evidence from this research shows that physical access of humanitarian aid and assistance is crucial to all stages from resilience building (and the prevention of displacement) to the successful implementation of durable solutions. As with point 2 (above), this aspect has to be planned and coordinated in an integrated manner that includes actors from across the HDP, justice and security, spectrum.

13. **Provide oversight and assistance to HLP rights**. The importance of HLP rights at the point of origin should not be overlooked. Growing populations mean that even in rural areas the sale of land is becoming increasingly common. In rural areas, evidence of the sale of land is typically informal and can leave residents exposed. Countering this with formal documentation protects those prior to a crisis, as well those who return and may find their land occupied by another tenant.

14. **Provide productive safety nets as a means of creating resilience in POO.** Productive safety nets refer to social protection programs that aim to provide vulnerable populations, such as the poor and marginalized, with both short-term support and long-term opportunities for improving their livelihoods. These programs typically combine cash or food transfers with activities that enhance beneficiaries' skills, assets, and income-generating capacities. The idea is to address immediate needs while also promoting self-sufficiency and resilience over the long term. Productive safety nets could address many of the needs identified by the analysis in this report and encompass many of the recommendtions already cited, thereby building resilience at places of origin. For example:

    ‣ Immediate relief, such as cash and food assistance, to prevent displacement from origin or facilitate return by helping to meet basic needs and stabilising the situation at origin.

    ‣ Skills development to improve employability and income-generating potential and support income diversification away from agricultural-oriented and agricultural-dependent economies.

    ‣ Asset building activities such as providing livestock, seeds or tools, as a way to support sustainable livlihoods and decrese dependency on aid.

    ‣ Community infrastructure projects that build or rehabilitate infrastructure, particularly through community-based action, can contribute to immediate employment opportunities and long-term community development.

## 6.C. DURABLE SOLUTIONS AT DESTINATION

15. **Support the movement of vulnerable and minority groups to IDP locations**. Those who are socio-culturally/economically disadvantaged or physically disadvantaged are at risk of not moving to IDP camps or can be exploited by camp managers who transport them to a location as a means of exploiting a portion of their allocated aid. Ensuring that these groups are made aware of camp locations (via radio outreach, for example) and then facilitating their movement to, and integration, at a suitable camp

would limit risk of exploitation and exposure to risks on the route. This can also address the risk of minority/vulnerable groups creating self-settled camps in urban hubs where they are excluded from accessing support by camp administration and local authorities.

**Support to the movement of wider groups would also limit exposure to threats when travelling**. The planning of safe travel is a key consideration for IDPs to avoid clan and Al-Shabaab-based conflict/intimidation. Assistance with travel planning and the transportation of IDPs to locations could mitigate human security threats. As previously discussed, including security actors in such planning is crucial to ensure that current and predicted hot spots are avoided. At a practical level, assistance with travel could ensure that IDPs arrive in a location with sufficient materials to continue with income generation, as opposed to travelling with the bare minimum on livestock.

16. **Provide assistance to livelihoods and alternative livelihoods to support durable solutions**. Livelihoods were reiterated as a core component of durable solutions. The first step in programming should be a consideration of where (geographically) livelihoods can be best continued. Bur Hakaba, for example, was noted as being supportive of agro-pastoralist livelihoods for proximity to the Lower Shabele. Introducing new herding communities into IDP locations has implicit risks relating to clan conflict but thought about where camps could be placed to encourage the continuation of agrarian livelihoods is an important consideration.

   Central to this aspect is the importance of initiatives such as TVET and VSLA to support IDPs who are no longer able to exercise the skillset that provided them with a source of income. A means of facilitating this could be done by **exploring local production of basic goods drawing on locally available materials**. Rising prices for basic goods that largely rely on imports from abroad, as well as limited access to public services, are a challenge for Somali communities, whether IDPs or not. Some basic goods, such as sanitary pads for girls, can be manufactured locally with local resources. Several such initiatives already work in refugee settlements, equipping girls with manufacturing skills and forming cooperatives for the cheap sale of their products. Several other goods could be identified for local production.

17. **Help IDPs navigate the HLP landscape at destination and encourage government oversight**. Lessons learned from the Danwadaag Durable Solutions Consortium highlight the importance of centralising land tenure security at the heart of all planning. In conjunction with access to livelihoods, secure and documented housing and land rights form an essential component of durable solutions. This research highlighted that the empowerment of actors within camps, or associated with camp infrastructure, i.e. gatekeepers, landlords and clan leaders can all play a role in undermining the right of IDPs to access housing and land in a fair and equitable manner. Prior to arrival and upon arrival IDPs should not be exposed to situations whereby they are able to be exploited and disadvantaged vis-a-vis HLP rights. IOM, as well as wider stakeholders, should gain access to camps and be able to help new arrivals and explain their rights regarding housing. The importance of adhering to traceable procedures with documentation should also be reiterated to new arrivals.

   Incorporating government inclusion and oversight is another key aspect and was highlighted in lessons learned from IOM's work in Barwaqo. This allows the government to play a coordinating role in the allocation of land and by doing so IDP camps can form part of the planned design of areas in which they're sighted. Inclusion of the government also ensures that resettlement opportunities are formulated into district-level policies and planning, and therefore mobilise and allocate sufficient resources.

18. **Help IDPs acquire permanent and sustainable shelter in order to create durable solutions**. While the data has shown that addressing immediate shelter needs is a crucial factor that drives

decision-making by IDPs in displacement; in the medium-term, this needs to transition into increasingly sustainable and permanent HLP solutions in order to create durable solutions. Without greater programming around long-term housing for IDP return and local integration, there is a risk of IDPs moving from one temporary shelter to another via multiple experiences of displacement.

The shelter response in Somalia focuses on the provision of emergency shelter and Non- Food Items (NFI), which provides displaced families with immediate relief and protection. Emergency shelters are considered to be a temporary housing solution because of the short lifespan of the construction materials and because they do not provide enough safety, privacy, and dignity for IDPs. Around $20 Million is spent on the shelter response every year, of which only 5% has a durable impact, because most of the assistance is channelled to life-saving shelter and NFI assistance.[142]

While dignified and safe long term shelter includes security of land tenure, it is also more than that. Other aspects include:

▸ Safer sites including physical security and disaster risk reduction.

▸ Inclusive programming where vulnerable groups are specifically targeted and shelter design addresses the needs of vulnerable groups such as those with disabilities.

▸ GBV risk mitigation by ensuring that shelter design includes solid walls and lockable doors.

▸ Upgradeable shelter refers to affordable shelter using locally available material so that shelter can be maintained and upgraded by IDPs.

▸ Environmental sustainability achieved by using local construction materials and techniques.


19. **Deeper research into permanent shelter preferences amongst IDPs.** Deeper research into the needs and preferences of IDPs, particularly those in protracted displacement situations, in terms of long term and permanent shelter, is recommended. Understanding these preferences will allow the realisation of the previous recommendation to be founded upon the reality on the ground.

20. **Improve infrastructure around secondary towns to encourage IDPs**. Based on our research and reference to findings in section 5F, we recommend the following infrastructural improvements:

▸ Enhanced route access by main roads that is secure and affords reliable public transport access.

▸ Mainstreaming climate adaptation and mitigation in town planning efforts. This centralizes flood resistance and the aspects mentioned in recommendation 9 (above)

▸ Improved water storage facilities.

▸ Available land for building and agriculture that is leased/sold with government oversight or robust documentation.

▸ Reliable energy supplies that enhance security (via lighting) but also encourage the emergence of economic activity and continual learning through access to the internet.

21. **Emphasise development work prior to crises rather than humanitarian work when crises occur**. This should mainstream work on urban planning with partners such as UN HABITAT and the Ministries of Planning at federal and state levels. It should also be done in coordination with actors involved in supporting local governance under the Wadajir Framework, including UN JPLG, the multi-

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[142] Somalia Shelter Cluster, Dignified and Safer Living Conditions for Protracted IDPs in Somalia, May 2022, page 4.

donor Somalia Stability Fund, and the USAID-funded People-Centric Governance (PCG) programme focused on South West State. IOM via Danwadaag and the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) should have the capacity to coordinate in this space and convene partners for coordinated urban expansion. Important interfaces here are the Federal Member State administrations' own 5-year development plans, as well as the new Coordination Facility to tie stabilisation activities to development and state-building. Durable Solutions fits into development, and urban planning and is an important component in one of the world's fastest urbanising contexts. Stabilisation actors such as the USAID-funded Transition Initiatives for Stabilisation (TIS) 3 and the UK-CSSF-funded Early Recovery Initiative (ERI) tend to draw up community action plans in newly recovered areas, which should be taken up by Durable Solutions and resilience (SomReP & BRCiS) actors for activities, and by the aforementioned local governance partners to then integrate into the oversight and management functions of the district administrations they build. SSF and PCG have explicit political settlement and (re)conciliation components. Durable Solutions, and especially HLP interventions, should be embedded in this coordination across working strands with an explicit focus on urban planning to build up secondary locations and render work in primary locations more sustainable. This coordination and convening is explicitly within the mandate of ReDSS and the new Coordination Facility. IOM Durable Solutions should gear its programming towards this and push for this coordination to happen.

# 7. METHODOLOGY

The main research question is, "*how have investments in resilience, durable solutions and development programming influenced displacement patterns?*". The main research question was further broken down into the following sub-questions:

1. How have investments in the place of origin, before the circumstances triggering displacement materialized, influenced decisions to leave or stay?

2. How have investments in the destination of displacement influenced decisions to stay there?

3. How have investments in the place of origin after displacement influenced decisions to return?

4. What are the differences, if any, between rural and urban areas?

5. What are the differences, if any, between main urban hubs and secondary towns?

6. What infrastructure or services appear to prevent or mitigate mass movements?

The methodology for this study is based on four modules of research, all of which are described in the subsections below. The four modules are:

1. Analysis of secondary data (existing structured data sets)

2. Literature Review

3. Qualitative interviews with experts

4. Qualitative interviews with IDPs, IDP camp managers, local and state authorities, and implementers.

## 7.A. SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS

The research process began with the analysis of structured datasets based on historical data across the Somali territory.

### 7.A.i. DATA SETS

**We based the analysis on a review of datasets on displacement on the one hand and investments in durable solutions and resilience on the other.** We reviewed datasets previously identified during a mapping exercise with an emphasis on those that provide location-level data within the regions of interest. We list the datasets reviewed in Table 2.

Table 2: Datasets analysed

| Dataset | Time | Coverage | Granularity | Source |
|---------|------|----------|-------------|--------|
| **Displacement** | | | | |
| DTM Emergency Trend Tracking | Feb 2022 - Jan 2023 | Bay, Gedo | Location-level | Shared by IOM |
| UNHCR PRMN[143] Displacement Dataset | Jan 2016 - Dec 2022 | South West, Jubaland | District-level | UNHCR |

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[143] Protection and Return Monitoring Network

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCCM Displacement Dataset | Feb 2022 - Dec 2022 | National | Location-level[144] | CCCM |
| **Investments** | | | | |
| Shelter Cluster 5W Dataset | 2017-Dec 2202 | National | Location-level | Shared by UNHCR |
| CCCM IDP Site Master List | Updated Q3 2022 | National | Location-level | CCCM |
| CCCM Detailed Site Assessment (DSA) | Dec 2021 | National | Location-level | CCCM |
| CCCM Priority Assessment Matrix | Feb 2022 | National | Location-level | CCCM |
| FAO SWALIM Strategic Water Sources | Updated Dec 2022 | National | Location-level | FAO SWALIM |
| UN OCHA School Master List | Updated Aug 2022 | National | Location-level | UN OCHA |
| UN OCHA Health Facility | Updated Jun 2021 | National | Location-level | UN OCHA |

## 7.A.ii. APPROACH

**We adopted the Emergency Trend Tracking (ETT) data of IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) as the main source of displacement data** since it has the most detailed coverage of the areas of interest. We narrowed the focus to data from Bay (rounds 1-15, Sep 2022 to Jan 2023) and Gedo (rounds 1-45, Feb 2022 to Jan 2023) and then combined them into one single dataset. There are a total of 11,718 observations in the working dataset, with each observation representing a movement from A to B, recorded at B.

**The research team cleaned the place names in the working dataset so that they could be geolocated with UN OCHA's Settlement Master List and the Camp Management Coordination Cluster (CCCM) IDP Site Master List**. We prioritised the CCCM data for the destination so that IDP site data could be included in the analysis. A total of 6,439 records were geolocated at the POO and 8,467 records were geolocated at the destination.

**We then merged the ETT data with the Detailed Site Assessment (DSA) data at the destination.** CCCM's DSA data and CCCM's Priority Assessment Matrix were adopted for this purpose. The Priority Assessment Matrix is based on DSA data to evaluate priority needs at the site-level. A total of 3,938 records were matched to DSA data.

**We included additional datasets to give information on access to services and key infrastructure at the POO**, since DSA data can only be reliably matched at the destination, and there is no similar dataset for non-IDP settlements or villages, Specifically:

-   Nearest functional water point (FAO SWALIM)

-   Nearest health facility (UN OCHA)

-   Nearest school[145] (UN OCHA)

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[144] Only district-level for area of origin

[145] Including nearest IDP school at the destination.

**The dataset was then collapsed to summarize the total number of arrivals recorded along each route.** The results are as follows:

- 6,737 unique routes

- 2,792 routes geolocated at POO

- 4,731 routes geolocated at destination

- 2,083 routes geolocated at both origin and destination

- 1,117 matched to DSA data

**Finally, we ran a series of regression models against the working dataset** using different sets of variables, with the ultimate aim of understanding how different factors affect migration decisions in displacement. We tested three main types of models using different dependent variables:

- Model A: Number of movements along route

- Model B: Route score (number of arrivals per location per origin / total departures from that origin)

- Model C: Distance travelled between origin and destination (in km)

The results of the regression analysis are presented in Annex 1.

## 7.A.iii. LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES

A few limitations characterized the analysis of quantitative data:

▸ **The main challenge for secondary data analysis was that areas of origin were recorded manually in the ETT,** which meant that many records could not be geolocated. This also introduces the risk of some records being incorrectly matched.

▸ We obtained GPS coordinates for IDP sites from the CCCM IDP site master list. However, CCCM uses different naming conventions than the ETT data, which prevented a seamless cross analysis between the two data sets. This required the analysis team to spend some time cleaning the data and standardising names across the two. IOM may want to consider standardizing place names with CCCM, including the use of unique identifiers for IDP sites.

▸ **While ETT data asks for the main area of origin, sometimes more than one location is given.** To sort the issue, we adopted the first location that we could locate in a list. This introduces some bias into the findings though it is mitigated by the fact that settlements with missing coordinates are likely smaller with less of an impact on the overall findings. Indeed, we managed to geolocate most of the locations reporting the highest number of displaced people.

**The secondary data analysis will did provide unequivocal findings** due to potential data gaps and challenges in isolating the relevant variables from other factors that influence displacement patterns and decisions. For example, locations A and B may have received similar investments but show different displacement patterns. Local conflict, politics, perceptions, and beliefs may have played roles in forming decisions, which would not transpire from analysing these datasets. However, the cross-analysis provided data that was used to design the second phase of the research by grounding the questions on the facts of investments and displacement.

## 7.B. LITERATURE REVIEW

**This task built upon the thorough review of literature that was already conducted for Task 28.** We studied additional reports during this round that included perspectives on durable solutions, resilience, and anticipatory action. These studies are listed below:

- BRCiS Position Paper, Charting a path to drought resilience in Somalia, January 2023.

- Danwadaag White Paper, Referral Pathways: Rethinking the Nexus Approach to Advancing Urban resilience in Somalia, 8 November 2022.

- Danwadaag Durable Solutions Consortium, Measuring the End of Displacement: Emerging Learning From Somalia, 2019/2020.

- Danwadaag Durable Solutions Consortium, Somalia Local (Re)Integration Assessment, Lora 3 Endline Report: Banadir Regional Administration, Jubaland and South West State of Somalia.

- Ground Truth Solutions; Rights, Information, and Predictability: Keys to Navigate a Complex Crisis, Cash Barometer, Somalia, December 2022.

- IOM, Reintegration Handbook. Practical guidance on the design, implementation and monitoring of reintegration assistance, 2019.

- REDSS, Financing for Solutions to Displacement: Somalia Country Study, March 2021.

- REDSS, Solutions Analysis Update 2019: Case Study On Lessons Learnt And Practices To Support (Re)Integration Programming – Mogadishu, Baidoa And Kismayo, 2019.

- Weingärtner, L., Humphrey, A., Abdi Sheikh, M., Levine, S., Obstacles to and Opportunities for Anticipatory Action in Somalia, SPARC Issue Brief, April 2022.

- Syn, J., Cunial, L., "WHO ARE YOU?" Linkages between Legal Identity and Housing, Land, and Property Rights in Somalia, Norwegian Refugee Council, November 2022.

## 7.C. EXPERT INTERVIEWS

A total of six expert interviews were conducted, as detailed in the table below.

Table 3: Expert interviews

| # | Name | Position | Institution |
|---|------|----------|-------------|
| 1. | Anders Djurfeldt | DS Working Group and Social Protection Working Group Lead | European Union |
| 2. | Laura Bennison | Danwadaag Consortium Coordinator | IOM |
| 3. | Makiko Watanabe | Senior Urban Specialist in the Global Practice for Social, Urban, Rural, and Resilience | World Bank |
| 4. | Perrine Piton | Chief of Party | BRCiS |
| 5. | Peter Chonka | Professor, Global Security Institute | Durham University |
| 6. | Jutta Bakonyi | Professor, School of Government and International Affairs | Durham University |

## 7.D. Qualitative Data Collection

### 7.D.i. Locations

Figure 1: District-level movements vs. investments in shelter in 2022 (PRMN data; 5W shelter data; ETT data)[146]



**Using the structured data sets, we did geospatial analysis to assist in the selection of target locations.** Since the ETT dataset does not cover displacement into Banadir, we used the 2022 UNHCR PRMN dataset, aggregated at the district-level, to assess displacement across districts. We then overlaid these flows onto a map of investments in shelter. Finally, we included the coordinates of the areas of origin and destinations identified from the ETT data for additional detail. The results of this analysis, shown in Figure 1, confirm large-scale movement from Bay into Banadir[147]. In fact, the Qansax Dheere-Banadir and Diinsoor-Banadir routes were the most heavily trafficked of those departing from within Bay or Gedo in 2022. More generally, there is a flow from rural areas into major urban centers, as well as to the border regions with Kenya and Ethiopia. This is apparent from the locations mapped based on the ETT data – the places of origin are dispersed while the destinations are highly clustered. Finally, the data on investments in shelter highlights the concentration of investment flows, specifically in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Dollow.

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[146] In the absence of location-level data, inter-district flows are shown as links between district centres. Investments in shelter are measured in terms of number of beneficiaries assisted throughout 2022.

[147] See Annex 1 for additional data on displacement flows including district-level flows from both PRMN and ETT data, as well as a map presenting the most frequented routes at the location-level as per ETT.

**Whereas investments in Gedo are distributed across many different hotspots, those in Bay are heavily concentrated in Baidoa** despite Qansax Dheere also receiving a large influx of IDPs, indicating a possible gap in investment. This analysis serves as the basis for the selection of target locations for the present study.

**Given the findings that emerged from the geospatial analysis, we decided to narrow in on one district.** As we still have data from the previous study, we used this study as an opportunity to narrow the focus. We foucsed on Baidoa and the displacement flows into Baidoa and out of Baidoa. In terms of movements into Baidoa, we focused on the districts of Qansax Dheere and Buur Hakaba. Qansax Dheere represented the biggest number of arrivals into Baidoa, and out of the most common routes, Buur Hakaba represented the least number of arrivals. The combination of these two locations, therefore, allowed for an understanding of different origin conditions. Within each district, interviewers selected locations through a snowballing approach.

## 7.D.ii. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

This study relied primarily on interviews with key informants. Initially, we planned for one round of primary data collection. We found that the data from this first round did not differentiate sufficiently between types of investments, making it challenging to respond to all the research questions. We then decided to deploy another researcher, independent from the first collection team, to target respondents based on the same collection plan in each location. This was to have an alternative source of information and triangulate the data. The second round of primary data collection produced 20 additional KIIs across the three locations.

Table 4: Key informant categories, rounds 1 and 2

| Key Informant Category | Total # | Baidoa | Qansax Dheere | Bur Hakaba |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adult female displaced person | 16 | 7 | 4 | 5 |
| Adult male displaced person | 17 | 8 | 5 | 4 |
| Young female displaced person | 7 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Young male displaced person | 6 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Community leader/elder | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Local authorities | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| State authorities | 2 | 2 | | |
| Humanitarian Agency/Organization Staff (non-IOM) | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| **Total** | **60** | **30** | **15** | **15** |

When analysing the data, we still found that respondents did not respond equally to all the research questions and had challenges in differentiating between the different types of investments. We first coded the data on Atlas.ti inductively, using the research questions as codes and highlighting the evidence for each question and sub-question. Given the gaps, we also used a deductive approach, to understand what themes emerged from the data collected, independently from the research questions. This resulted in the first draft report submitted to the Client.

The Client found that the report did not answer equally well all the research questions and highlighted the gaps. We decided to deploy a third independent researcher, to target additional respondents in the same locations, and add an additional senior analyst to the research team to provide an alternative path of analysis

of the primary data, under the supervision of the Team Leader. We developed a new collection tool for the purpose, more adherent to the collection plan originally proposed in the inception report, which had been changed for the first round of data collection on request of client. We kept revising the collection tool and prioritising some questions over others throughout this last round of collection, to focus on filling the gaps.

It appeared to the research team that IDP respondents were not able to think within the categories created by the research questions and that conducting more interviews with key informants who were familiar with the programming landscape and resilience and durable solutions in the Somali context, would allow us to better interpret and frame the information coming from IDPs. The third field researcher interviewed 20 individuals, of which ten in Baidoa, four in Bur Hakaba and six in Qansaxdheere. These included:

- Five aid workers
- Two elders
- One community activist
- One female IDP, aged 51
- One businessman
- One civil servant
- Two female leaders
- One female farmer
- Two male IDPs, (aged 55 and 77)
- One male community leader
- One male member of a community group
- One male media professional
- One camp manager

This second draft of the report is the result of this process, building on a total of 80 KIIs and four FGDs collected independently during three collection rounds, and the secondary data. We conducted the interviews in Somali language, resulting in handwritten notes in Somali language that we then translated into English language.

**Most respondents were displaced persons**, who are, of course, the main authorities on what they and their peers considered prior to displacement. There is no singular, monolithic, or even streamlined approach to decisions, but likely several parallel or similar ones. We therefore retained a substantive and diverse sample of displaced persons, including heads of households and non-heads of households.

**We also interviewed community leaders, settlement managers, and humanitarian staff as key informants** – for three reasons: on the one hand, they can help triangulate and contextualise information provided by other interviewees, given the multitude of displaced persons they support. On the other hand, they may themselves play a role in discussions with persons and households about to face displacement. Finally, it is of interest to contrast IDPs' own description of their decision-making processes with the understanding of such processes – or lack thereof – among the persons most directly responsible for their support and shelter.

**Other interviewees include elders from both majority and more marginalised communities, to capture clan- and caste-based differences, and staff from organisations and agencies other than IOM,** who are supporting displaced persons in the area.

### 7.D.iii. FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

**Focus groups are sources of information both by direct question and answer and via observation.** Discussions allow facilitators and note-takers to observe group dynamics: who dominates, who is more cautious, which opinions are expressed with trepidation, which contributions elicit non-verbal expressions of doubt or disagreement, and which views may be expressed in social settings but contradicted in individual interviews. Accompanying KIIs with FGDs can help triangulate and validate findings, as well as provide insight into social dynamics within decision-making processes – who is likely to be more dominant, whose priorities outweigh others, and where decision-making processes differ sufficiently to spark disagreement among participants.

**The focus groups targeted members of groups especially vulnerable because of their identity other than that of displacement** – and thus those less likely to actively participate in shaping the final decision, or those who are more constrained in their options. Those who are already dominant are covered among IDP household heads in KIIs. Young women are less likely to have an important voice, but face additional risks from sexual and gender-based violence, as well as sanitary needs. Men from minority clans and ethnically or occupationally marginalised groups may face discrimination and violence, and are less likely to have kinship ties to locally powerful groups.

**We conducted a total of four FGDs across the three locations, which comprised a total of 20 IDP respondents.** The discussions were conducted in Somali language, resulting in handwritten notes in Somali that were translated into English. Each focus group comprised 5 respondents.

Table 5: Focus group demographics

| Key Informant Category | # FGD | # ppl. | Location |
|---|---|---|---|
| Young women (18-30, mixed clan background) | 1 | 5 | Baidoa |
| Men (18-65, minority clan or marginalized group background) | 1 | 5 | Baidoa |
| Young women (18-30, mixed clan background) | 1 | 5 | Bur Hakaba |
| Men (18-65, minority clan or marginalized group background) | 1 | 5 | Qansax Dheere |
| **Total** | **4** | **20** | |

## 7.E. QUALITY ASSURANCE

**With informed consent by respondents, the researchers recorded interviews and discussion notes with a Dictaphone or an equivalent smartphone app.** Where this was not possible, they took notes throughout. At the end of each day, the researchers entered the notes into MS Word to be coded by the Task Lead and a Research Assistant via Atlas.ti. The notes were then stored in a password-protected document repository by GIST, but the coded segments can be made available to IOM on request.

**The Research Team Lead reviewed researcher notes as the first line of quality assurance.** After conducting the first two interviews, researchers paused, wrote-up notes, forwarded them to the Research Team Lead for review, who in turn shared them with the Task Lead for feedback. This was to ensure that all subsequent interviews and notes were carried out with the research purpose and data analysis needs in focus. Researchers did not conduct more than two interviews per day to ensure adequate time to establish trust with the interviewee, adequately inform interviewees of the research purpose and research ethics, and take first notes with the interview situations still fresh in memory.

## 7.F. RESEARCH ETHICS

The usual research ethics apply, specifically:

‣ **Qualified and informed consent:** We informed respondents of who is funding the research, who was collecting the data, the research's purpose, the topics covered, how we would use their information, and how they can provide feedback or complaints. We also informed respondents that they have the right to refuse to participate, to refuse to answer any specific question they are not comfortable with, that they can break off the interview and leave at any point, and ask any questions to the research team. The interviews only started after we had recorded their informed consent.

‣ **Do no harm:** Recently displaced individuals are among the most vulnerable communities to destitution and harm and are likely to have undergone significant trauma. Researchers therefore did their utmost not to compromise the respondents' safety and integrity, and avoid retraumatizing them.

‣ **Data protection:** GIST protects the confidentiality of the respondents' identifiable information. We do not share any personal information, including with IOM, that would allow linking specific respondents to information reported in the research products. The team anonymized any data shared with IOM, which then is the property of IOM. We stored the data on a password-protected platform.

# 8. ANNEXES

All annexes are available in a separate folder, delivered with the report.

▸ **Annex 1 –** Results of the Regression Analysis.