



INTEGRATED LOCATION ASSESSMENT II

PART II GOVERNORATE PROFILES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The end of 2016 and the first half of 2017 saw a notable trend of spontaneous returns within Iraq. IOM estimates that more than 700,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their homes during the first six months of the year. Considering that nearly 90% of families who are still displaced are reported to be determined to return home and that the most cited obstacle is lack of security in their location of origin, in the context of recent and forthcoming security improvements, an increasing number of returns is expected in the near future.

Returning home, however, may just be the beginning of a new journey, as returnees often face new challenges. In nearly half of the surveyed locations — with peaks of 96% and 84% in Baghdad and Kirkuk respectively — most returnees are reported as unemployed; 32% returned to properties that have suffered significant to complete damage (with peaks of 57% and 53% in Diyala and Kirkuk respectively); and 60% and 43% are concerned about the poor quality of health services and of water. In addition, most of these returnees were displaced for more than three years, meaning that they return carrying the stress and financial weakening that result from long-term displacement. Although to a certain extent, the general security situation has stabilized since mid-2014, personal security continues to be a concern in daily life and episodes of domestic violence and petty crimes — and to a lesser extent sexual assaults and kidnapping — are still reported.

Whether they need to rebuild property and livelihood, regain their occupied homes or access essential services, returnee families remain a vulnerable population in Iraq and are in urgent need of assistance to ensure their choices are sustainable. The analysis conducted at location level shows how — notwithstanding the level of available resources or wealth — the fair and just governance of these resources and the righteous enforcement of law and order appear to favour social cohesion and foster re-integration, regardless of ethno-religious differences. This is undoubtedly the most important finding of the assessment, as community cohesion and the prevention of conflict are essential

to rebuild a peaceful and united society.

Other key findings of the assessment are summarized below:

- After July 2016, total number of IDPs has been in constant decline – excluding major occupied areas where military operations took place. Three areas shaped the recent trend of displacement: Al-Shirqat and Baji (Salah al-Din) and Qayara (Ninewa) as of mid-June 2016; Hawija (Kirkuk) as of August 2016; and most dramatically Mosul (Ninewa) as of October 2016.
- The central and northern governorates concentrate most of those who remain displaced, with a total 62%. Nearly one out of three families (32%) is in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), while southern governorates cumulatively host 6% of the IDP population.²
- were Return movements, which concern seven of the eight governorates but Babylon from where IDPs originally fled, are consistent with the evolving conflict dynamics. Occupied locations in Salah al-Din and Diyala were the first to be retaken, and return movements started there as early as 2015. Anbar was the governorate where most returns took place in both 2016 and 2017, followed by Ninewa in 2017.
- The analysis per ethno-religious affiliation shows that Arab and Kurdish Sunni Muslims have mostly returned home, while Turkmen Shias as well as Sunni Muslims, Yazidis, Christians and Shabak Shias remain displaced across Iraq. For over 20,000 IDP families belonging to these ethnoreligious groups "fear due to a change in ethno-religious composition of the place of origin" was cited among the top

- 1. Population figures from DTM Round 76, July 2017.
- 2. To facilitate analysis, Iraq's territory was divided in three regions: the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), including Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil; the South, including Basrah, Missan, Najaf, Thi-Qar, Qadissiya and Muthanna; and Central North including Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kerbala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Wassit.

three obstacles to return.

- Residential and infrastructure damage is widespread. Nearly one third of returnees are reported to have returned to houses that have suffered significant to complete damage, and 60% to moderately damaged residences. Regarding infrastructure, most damage appears to affect roads, followed by the public power grid and tap water networks.
- by armed conflict, although damage was also reported in Basrah, Wassit, Kerbala, Thi-Qar and Najaf thus indicating that limited reconstruction has taken place. In addition, for half or more of the surveyed locations in some districts of Diyala and Salah al-Din, and for one third of those in Makhmur district in Erbil, reportedly arable and grazing land was not accessible due to landmines or flooding.
- Generalized violence has overall decreased, and terrorist attacks and kidnapping were reported in Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Diyala and Baghdad governorates alone. The level of conflict appears to be rather low overall, and main returnee hotspots were identified only in the four districts of Kadhimia and Mahmoudiyah (Baghdad), and Al-Daur and Samarra (Salah al-Din).³
- Decreasing violence has led to more long-term concerns over economic security: 80% of IDPs and 63% of returnees cited access to employment as one of their top three needs. Therefore, the first child protection concern mentioned is child labour – which is directly linked to economic hardship and the high share of families who rely on informal labour to earn a living.
- IDPs are on average more concerned about accessing means of living than returnees; the latter rated water and health, respectively, as second and third top needs. The poor quality of both services is a cause of concern particularly in Baghdad (for 70% of families), and should be highlighted because of the wider implications for health and disease prevention.
- The share of IDPs settled in critical shelters and returnees unable to return to their habitual residence seems to have slightly increased compared to 2016. Concerning IDPs, it might be that less affluent IDPs are unable to return to their habitual shelter. Concerning returnees, the issue might be lack of legal documentation, as it was rated among the top three house, land and property (HLP) challenges in nearly

one out of four locations – i.e. for 20% of returnee families.

- Long-term intentions of IDPs are in line with last year's findings: 90% are determined to return home. Only in Basrah and Najaf are families reported as considering to locally integrate in their location of displacement. Wishing to remain in a location that is homogeneous in ethnoreligious composition is possibly the major pull factor, as those who express this intention are mostly Shias. Probably for similar reasons, Yazidi and Chaldean Christian IDPs in KRI wish to move abroad push factor.
- Short-term intentions show a significant shift towards local integration as many of those who intended to return have already done so: the share of families willing to stay has increased from 32% in 2015 to 75% in 2017. In fact, obstacles such as the lack of a shelter to return to, of services back home, and of funds to afford the trip appear to be more important than security issues in the location of origin.
- Difficulties in returning to the habitual residence may also be related to the fact that in some cases, those who remain in displacement are the poorest and most vulnerable families, strained by long years on the move. In locations where there are female-headed households, and particularly households headed by minor females, "lack of money" is consistently among the top three obstacles to return.
- Lack of funds, though, can act both as a pull factor to stay in displacement and as a push factor fostering returns. Comparing the governorates of Anbar and Salah al-Din shows that while in Anbar lack of money was rated as a top obstacle to return by intra-governorate IDPs, in Salah al-Din 40% of returns were triggered by lack of funds to stay in displacement.
 - The same trend is observed regarding the choice of the displacement destination. The main motivation for nearly 30% of families is the presence of extended family/ relatives/friends and as a community of similar ethnic-religious-linguistic background. For 25% of families, it was reportedly their only choice as they could not afford any other place (compared to 8% in 2016). When the drive for security and peace becomes less important, factors behind the choice of the displacement destination are most likely the same that keep families in displacement and inhibit or delay the return to the location of origin.

^{3.} Both in Samarra and Al-Daur the most cited parties in conflict are militias on one side and civilians and/or returnees on the other, while many key informants in Baghdad have preferred not to name any specific conflicting parties.



INTRODUCTION

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is IOM's information management system to track and monitor population displacement during crises. Composed of a variety of tools and processes, the DTM regularly and systematically captures and processes multi-layered data and disseminates a wide array of information products that facilitate a better understanding of the evolving needs of a displaced population, be that on site or en route. DTM data includes information relevant to all sectors of humanitarian assistance, such as demographic figures, shelter, water and sanitation, health, food and protection, making data useful for humanitarian actors at all levels.

In Iraq, the DTM Programme monitors population displacement since 2004. In 2014, following the worsening of the armed conflict and the increasing need for information on the displaced population, the Programme was reinforced. Currently the DTM collects data on IDPs and returnees through a system of Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs) – composed of 123 field staff present throughout the Iraqi territory – which in turn gather information through an extended network of over 9,500 key informants as well as direct visits to identified locations hosting IDPs, returnees or both (see Methodology).

DTM figures, key findings and reports are published online and available on the portal of DTM Iraq at http://iraqdtm.iom. int; and updates are recorded daily as new assessments are completed. The Emergency Tracking is the real-time component of the methodology, aiming to provide displacement and return data with a 24- to 72-hour data turnover – such as the Mosul portal – during medium- to large-scale crises. Monthly reports are the core of DTM information, as they provide a countrywide monitoring of displacement and return movements. Location assessments, on the other hand, provide a more in-depth analysis of displacement and return trends and are completed in three-month data collection cycles.

The Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) belongs to this more comprehensive category, as it provides a simultaneous and indepth profiling of both displacement and return movements in Iraq. Focusing on both populations at the same time allows to: capture overarching trends of population movements; evaluate the burden that forced displacement poses on some governorates;

and outline social and living conditions, basic needs, intentions and vulnerabilities shared by IDPs and returnees. Compared to previous assessment, conducted from May to October 2016, the current ILA is more focused on return patterns, and specifically on social cohesion issues.

The report starts with a brief description of the methodology and coverage of the assessment, followed by a first section (I) offering a thematic overview at country level. Chapters are structured around six main topics: (i) population movements, including ethno-religious composition and change thereof; (ii) infrastructure, facilities/services, residential and land damage; (iii) social conditions, including security, vulnerabilities and protection issues; (iv) social conflict and cohesion; (v) living conditions and shelter issues; (vi) intentions, reasons and obstacles to return. The second section (II) provides profiles for the 18 Iraqi governorates. Key themes identified in Section I are reviewed and discussed at the governorate and district level. Attention has been given to governorates witnessing large return movements, with context profiling and an assessment of the main issues that returnees face when returning to their home location.

The form used for the assessment can be downloaded from the Iraq DTM portal.⁴

IDPs

The DTM considers as IDPs all Iraqis who were forced to flee from 1 January 2014 onwards and are still displaced within national borders at the moment of the assessment.

Returnees

Returnees are defined as IDPs who have now returned to the location (big area or sub-district) where they used to live prior to being displaced, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or to another shelter type.⁵

- 4. http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%20Special%20Reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20II/DTM_Integrated_LA_____II_Questionnaire.pdf
- 5. The definition of returnees is not related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy of durable solutions. Displaced families who have returned to their sub-district of origin are counted as returnees even if they have not returned to their habitual address.

METHODOLOGY AND COVERAGE

The Integrated Location Assessment collects detailed information on IDP and returnee families living in locations identified through the DTM Master Lists. The reference unit of the assessment is the location, and information is collected at the aggregate level, that is, on the majority of IDPs and returnees living in a location, and not on individual families.

At the start of the cycle, the list of identified locations hosting IDPs and/or returnees in the most up-to-date Master Lists is given to the field RART and is used as a baseline. The data-collection cycle takes approximately three months and new locations identified during the implementation phase are not subject to the assessment.

Where access is possible, identified locations are visited and directly assessed by IOM's RARTs through interviews with several key informants (including members of the IDP and returnee communities) and direct observation. At the end of the visits, RARTs fill one form with the summary of the information collected and the data is then uploaded to the server and stored as one assessment.


The Integrated Location Assessment II was conducted from 11 March to end of May 2017 and covered 3,583 locations hosting at least one or more IDP and/or returnee families, reaching 279,019 returnee families and 354,976 IDP families (corresponding to 1,674,114 returnee and 2,129,856 IDP individuals). Details about the population hosted in the surveyed locations are provided in the figure below. Findings in

this report either reflect the locations where displaced and/or returned populations reside, or, whenever applicable, have been weighted according to the respective number of IDP or returnee families in these locations so that results can be projected at the level of families.

Overall coverage stands at 93%, mostly due to the progress in DTM's field capacity. It remains lower than 90% only in four governorates: Kirkuk (61%), Anbar (64%), Ninewa (71%) and Salah al-Din (89%), because of accessibility challenges mostly due to ISIL's occupation of certain areas in these governorates at the time of data collection. It should be noted, however, that an increase was recorded since the last ILA conducted in 2016, as additional areas were retaken and security conditions improved.

Although some questions specifically target IDPs and others target returnees, routinely collected core information includes:

- » Geographic location
- » Governorate of origin (IDPs) and of last displacement (returnees)
- » Wave/period of displacement and return
- » Ethno-religious affiliation
- Shelter type
- » Reasons of displacement/return and future intentions
- » Common security incidents
- » Needs and concerns associated to fulfilling living needs
- » Specific protection indicators and risks.






Figure 1. ILA Coverage

In addition to the above-mentioned information, IOM has included a specific section that reports on social cohesion, willingness of communities to work together, and levels of trust/mistrust and conflict among different groups. By incorporating this section, the DTM tool will allow humanitarian actors to know whether new ethno-religious and social tensions have arisen or whether previous tensions —which might have been among the drivers of conflict in the region—remain active.

All sections of the report, except for the most recent population trends that were extrapolated from the October 2017 Baseline (Master List Round 81), are based on the ILA dataset collected from March to May 2017. All comparisons with 2016 come from the dataset of the previous ILA I conducted from July to October 2016.

Shelter type was collected according to three categories: private dwellings (host communities, rented houses and hotels/motels); critical shelter arrangements (informal settlements, religious buildings, schools, unfinished or abandoned buildings and other formal settlements/collective centres); and unknown (applies to locations that are not accessible or when the shelter type cannot be identified). Camps were not assessed, as the ILA methodology is designed for urban and rural areas (location – fifth administrative level), while camps require a different methodology (camp profiling, formal site assessment) and are usually included in the government's records.

In June 2017, DTM organized a workshop to validate the preliminary findings with the field teams, and follow-up data cleaning at the governorate level was conducted until the end of the month. The ILA II dataset and interactive dashboards were released on the DTM portal in July 2017 (http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA2.aspx).

RETURN GOVERNORATES

GOVERNORATE PROFILE





11,147 Families 66,882 Individuals

Returnees 129,650 Families 777,900 Individuals

>200% SINCE ILA I

District	IDPs	Change since ILA I (%)	Returnees	Change since ILA I (%)
Al-Rutba		-100,0%		
Falluja	8,367	-72,8%	56,433	> 200%
Heet	1,378	-89,9%	20,157	> 200%
Ramadi	1,402	-90,8%	53,060	> 200%

TABLE 1. POPULATION PER DISTRICT AND CHANGE SINCE ILA I² (No. OF FAMILIES)

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Anbar was the top governorate of displacement in 2015 (840,360 individuals) and of return in both 2016 and 2017 (cumulatively over 450,000 and 770,000 individuals); it accounts for 25% of Iraqi IDPs and 46% of returnees. Conflict events prompted population movements,3 which in turn were shaped by the strong tribal structure of the governorate. Anbar

IDPs mostly re-settled within/in the vicinity of the governorate or where extended family was present: over 60% in north-central region, 38% in KRI and only 2% in the south. Anbar hosts only very small groups of IDPs from other governorates, mostly from Baghdad and Babylon (less than 0.5% altogether). Overall 3% of Iraqi IDPs are hosted in the governorate.









FIGURE 1. DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN 2014-2017

Returns started to grow steadily after April 2016, towards the retaken districts of Falluja, Ramadi and Heet. Most have been within Anbar, to the extent that only 12% of Anbar's IDPs remain in the governorate. Returns from Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk have also more than doubled since ILA I, with nearly 50,000 families heading home.

FIGURE 2. RETURNS TO ANBAR PER GOVERNORATE OF LAST DISPLACEMENT ILA I and ILA II

- 1. The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.
- 2. In a few cases, the locations assessed in ILA I and ILA II do not correspond, therefore the percentage change since ILA I may also reflect newly assessed IDPs and/or returnees.
- 3. Between January 2014 and March 2017, over one third of the surveyed locations was either occupied (25%) or attacked (9%) by ISIL and, as of March 2017, some areas of western Anbar were still under ISIL control. For a timeline of occupation and retaking, see Thematic overview, Maps 3 and 4.



The strong tribal structure of the governorate is reflected in its ethno-religious composition: Anbar is the least diverse governorate in the country and its IDP and returnee populations are 100% Arab Sunni. This tendency dates back to even before the 2014 crisis, with the governorate not showing major ethno-religious changes in any of its locations.

INFRASTRUCTURE, FACILITIES AND SERVICES, RESIDENCES AND LAND⁴

1.3% Infrastructure damage is quite widespread and above country average. except for the mobile network. In partic-MINED AREAS ular, the public electricity network is de-

stroyed and/or not/inefficiently functioning for over 80% of the IDP and returnee population across the surveyed locations. The shares of population living in areas where main roads, tap water and sewerage were reported as damaged are respectively 64%, 59% and 49%. Arable and grazing land is accessible everywhere and less than 1% of areas were reported as mined. Services are mostly functioning and accessible, and less than 5% of IDPs and returnees are reportedly unable to access either health or legal services or markets at the location or nearby.

Residential damage is above 99% in all districts, although damage is mostly moderate. Ramadi is the most severely damaged district: nearly 10% of houses have undergone severe damage and 40% significant damage. No occupation of residences was reported in any district.




FIGURE 4. RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

RIME FR	EQUENCY ⁵
SOMETIMES	49%
OFTEN	2%

** FORCED EV	ICTIONS
IDPs	7%
RETURNEES ⁶	29%

IN NEED OF	PROTECTION ⁷
IDPs	3%
RETURNEES	64%

Compared to ILA I, the security situation in the governorate has significantly improved - although it should be noted that western areas of the governorate were not surveyed because they were still under ISIL occupation at the time of the assessment. Neither kidnappings nor terrorist attacks were reported (the latter only affecting 0.2% of Falluja IDPs and returnees). However, personal security is a concern and domestic violence and petty crimes were reported as affecting around 90% and 60% of the population "sometimes". Forced evictions concern 7% of IDPs and nearly 30% of returnees - the highest percentage in Iraq. Both IDPs and returnees can only move freely with a special permit from the police. Anbar accounts for 64% of all returnees in need of protection in Iraq: 74% of female-headed households, 72% of minor-headed households, 69% of mothers under 18 and 41% of physically and/or mentally challenged individuals. While IDP families are nearly all united, family separations were reported for 15% of returnees.

- 4. For the definition of infrastructure damage see Thematic overview, Maps 7 and 8 and Fig.4.
- 5. Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of the IDP and returnee population hosted in locations where security incidents (excluding terrorist attacks) were reported as occurring "often" or "sometimes".
- 6. Forced evictions for returnees also include evictions that took place during previous displacement.
- 7. Individuals in need of protection include: female heads of households, minor heads of households, unaccompanied minors, physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and mothers under 18.

CONFLICT AND COHESION⁸

RETURNEE CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Falluja	0,00	0,26
Heet	0,49	-0,57
Ramadi	0,00	-0,37

Even though Anbar hosts a significant number of IDP and returnee communities, the conflict score for locations hosting returnees (with or without IDPs) was extremely low and no apparent conflict between groups was detected in all three surveyed districts of Heet, Falluja and Ramadi. Different groups seem to trust each other and sporadic individual incidents between IDPs and host community members or returnees were only detected in locations hosting 1.5% of the population. However, favoritism in aid distribution, local representation and particularly employment was reported. Cooperation between groups is overall limited; a low but positive score was recorded only in Falluja district, and, if present, mostly interests IDPs and returnees in the form of using each other's wasta (personal connections) to obtain services (62%), clearing rubble (46%, the highest percentage in Iraq) and rebuilding houses (12%).

LIVING CONDITIONS AND SHELTER ISSUES

60% OF IDPs LIVE IN CRITICAL SHELTERS

14%
OF RETURNEES NOT RETURNED TO HABITUAL RESIDENCE

Both IDPs and returnees rated health services as too expensive and ranked access to health among their top three concerns. IDPs are also worried about education provision, as schools are few, overcrowded and with poor quality infrastructure, while returnees seem more concerned

about employment, since scarcity of jobs was mentioned as a concern in locations hosting over 80% of returnees. In fact, in 43% of locations most returnees are unemployed. Main sources of income for returnees are public sector jobs and pensions, and over 55% of households also have to rely on informal commerce/irregular daily labor. Accordingly, returnees mostly need information on livelihoods and food distribution.




FIGURE 5. MOST IMPORTANT NEEDS OF IDPs AND RETURNEES

^{8.} Specific conflict and cooperation scores for IDPs were not computed, as most locations in Anbar host both IDPs and returnees.

The displaced population has experienced a significant shift towards settling in critical shelters compared to ILA I (from 26% to 60%), indicating that most IDPs previously settled in rented housing or hosted by other families have returned home, leaving less affluent IDPs behind. As well, the share of returnees unable to go back to their previous residence has increased since ILA I, highlighting how returns are occurring even when previous residences are not available: 13% of returnees were settled in occupied private residences at the time of the assessment, the highest percentage in Iraq. This finding is confirmed by the high share of returnees (50%) who need information on options/support to rebuild their house. Nevertheless, returnees in Anbar did not report HLP issues of any type.




FIGURE 6. IDPs' SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Nearly all families displaced in Anbar say that returning to their place of origin is their main intention in both the

short and long term. This finding is expected, as nearly all IDPs in Anbar are from the governorate itself; it is frequently only lack of money that prevents them from returning home, whereas lack of services and house occupied are the other top obstacles. As for IDPs originally from Anbar but displaced elsewhere, lack of security – in addition to lack of services – in the location of origin and house destroyed are still the main deterrent to returns. Just as in ILA I, most returns continue to be driven by improved security at the location of origin (87%) and the prospect to work or recreate livelihoods (57%), although the latter has proved far more difficult to achieve than expected. Yet, the great increase in returns to Anbar since ILA I has also been encouraged by community/religious leaders (42%) and/or supported by government authorities' incentives (29%).

BAGHDAD GOVERNORATE PROFILE

96% COVERAGE



INPs

∱∱∱ **50,760** Families **|**∱ **304,560** Individuals

Returnees

4,452 Families

26,712 Individuals

-17% SINCE ILA I

District	IDPs	Change since ILA I (%)	Returnees	Change since ILA I (%)
Abu Ghraib	11,558	-39%	1274	10%
Adhamia	5,553	-16%		
Al Resafa	4,526	-25%		
Kadhimia	4,180	-26%	1294	-23%
Karkh	20,503	-32%		
Mada'in	852	-52%		
Mahmoudiya	2,877	-48%	1884	-25%
Thawra1	32	68%	The second second	
Thawra2	679	-19%		

100% -

TABLE 1. POPULATION PER DISTRICT AND CHANGE SINCE ILA I¹⁰ (No. OF FAMILIES)

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

As one of the main host governorate, Baghdad is home to 14% of Iraqi IDPs (over 300,000 individuals) but only 2% of all IDPs in Iraq are from the governorate. IDPs came to Baghdad governorate mostly from Anbar and Ninewa and re-settled in the districts of Karkh, the most densely populated district with 40%

of all IDPs in Baghdad, and Abu Ghraib (30%), due to their proximity to the conflict-ravaged districts of Ramadi and Falluja. As for Baghdad's IDPs, nearly half have re-settled within the governorate, while 47% are hosted in the KRI, mostly in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil.



80%
60%
40%
Kerbala

Missan

Sulaymaniyah

Babylon

Erbil

Baghdad

FIGURE 1. **DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN** 2014-2017

At the time of the assessment, around half of IDPs who fled Baghdad in 2014 and 2015 (26,712 individuals) had gone back to their location of origin. Returns – 88% of which are internal – started after April 2016, primarily towards Kadhimia, Abu Ghraib and the retaken locations in Mahmoudiya. ¹¹ IDPs are also slowly returning from Erbil, Babylon and Sulaymaniyah.

FIGURE 2. RETURNS PER GOVERNORATE OF LAST DISPLACEMENT ILA II


ILA II

^{9.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

^{10.} In a few cases, the locations assessed in ILA I and ILA II do not correspond; therefore, the percentage change since ILA I may also reflect newly assessed IDPs and/or returnees.


^{11.} The negative increase recorded in both Kadhimia and Mahmoudiya is due to a change in coverage: areas previously accessible in ILA I were no longer accessible during ILA II.

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS **AFFILIATION** OF IDPs:



ETHNO-RELIGIOUS **AFFILIATION** OF RETURNEES:

FIGURE 3. **ETHNO-RELIGIOUS** COMPOSITION



Arab Sunnis originally from within the governorate or from Anbar, constitute the majority of the IDP population (84%). Turkmen Shias (7%), mostly displaced from Ninewa, Kurdish Sunnis and Arab Shias are also hosted in Baghdad. Arab Shias, who account for nearly one third of returnees, have mostly clustered in Baghdad, changing the ethno-religious majority in 2.4% of locations that were formerly mostly Sunni Arab.

INFRASTRUCTURE, FACILITIES AND SERVICES, RESIDENCES AND LAND¹²

Infrastructure damage is consistent with the country average in all sectors except roads, which appear to have suffered the greatest damage (roads were destroyed in locations hosting 7% of the IDP and resident population and are not efficient for 53% of the population), in particular in the districts of Abu Ghraib and Mahmoudiya. Public electricity and tap water networks are destroyed and/or not/inefficiently functioning for over half of the IDPs and returnees, while inefficient sewerage overall affects 30% of the population. Primary schools are mostly functioning and accessible; markets are not accessible at the location or nearby for around 7% of IDPs and returnees, health services for 11% and legal services for over 20%.

Residential damage was moderate in most of the surveyed districts, and significant residential damage was reported only in Abu Ghraib (3%) and Mahmoudiya (7%). Occupation of residences, however, was reported in all districts except Mada'in and particularly in Al Resafa and Thawra2 (around 20% each). Arable and grazing land is accessible everywhere and no areas marked as mined were reported in any location.




FIGURE 4. RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE




FIGURE 5. OCCUPATION OF RESIDENCES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

≈ ¥ CRIME FR	EQUENCY ¹³	** FORCED	EVICTIONS	IN NEED OF PR	OTECTION15
SOMETIMES	72%	IDPs ¹⁴	1%	IDPs	17%
OETEN	0.0%			DETIIDNEES	20/

The security situation in the governorate remains tense and both terrorist attacks and kidnappings were reported as occurring "sometimes" in locations hosting around one fourth of the IDP and returnee population. Domestic violence, petty crimes and sexual assaults were also reported as affecting respectively

^{12.} For the definition of infrastructure damage see Thematic overview, Maps 7 and 8 and Fig.4.

^{13.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of the IDP and returnee population hosted in locations where security incidents (excluding terrorist attacks) were reported "often" or "sometimes".

^{14.} Forced evictions for returnees also include evictions that took place during previous displacement.

^{15.} Individuals in need of protection include: female heads of households, minor heads of households, unaccompanied minors, physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and mothers under 18.

91%, 73% and 8% of IDPs and returnees. Most incidents were recorded in Abu Ghraib. Despite hosting the third largest IDP population in the country, forced evictions were recorded only for 1% of IDPs and around 90% of both IDPs and returnees have freedom of movement – but with a special permit. Baghdad hosts 17% of IDPs in need of protection–30% of mothers under 18, 18% of female heads of household and 17% of all physically and/or mentally challenged individuals. A total of 5% of physically and/or mentally challenged returnees are also hosted in the governorate. A total of 75% of IDP families are united, but family separations affect over 65% of returnees.

CONFLICT AND COHESION

IDP AND RETURNEE CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

IDPs	Conflict	Cooperation
Abu Ghraib	7.95	1.85
Adhamia	4.83	1.53
Al Resafa	4.65	1.19
Kadhimia	4.62	0.56
Karkh	3.71	0.32
Mada'in	1.78	0.00
Mahmoudiya	2.85	1.70
Thawra2	8.18	0.51

Returnees	Conflict	Cooperation
Abu Ghraib	2.41	-1.67
Kadhimia	7.36	1.33
Mahmoudiya	6.30	0.56

Baghdad has the highest conflict score for both IDPs and returnees (with or without IDPs) and evidence of mistrust, incidents and threats, and favoritism (especially in aid distribution and employment) were found across the surveyed locations. In particular, individual incidents, threats and frequent physical attacks were reported as affecting respectively 52%, 14% and 5% of returnees. Detecting the groups in conflict, however, proved difficult as most key informants refused to give an explicit answer or selected "other", indicating that they did not

wish to specify which group, or that there are other sources of conflict. Nevertheless, tensions between returnees and stayers were identified. Abu Ghraib and Tawra2 were detected as main IDPs hot spots, while returnees were more likely to encounter tensions of any kind in Khadimia and, to a lesser extent, Mamoudiyah. Cooperation between groups is overall limited in IDP – and particularly returnee – locations. If present, cooperation interests mostly IDPs and stayers in rebuilding damaged houses (51%). Only in Karkh was collaboration between tribes reported.

LIVING CONDITIONS AND SHELTER ISSUES

Access to employment is a top concern for both IDPs and re-


0F IDPs LIVE IN CRITICAL SHELTERS

9%
OF RETURNEES NOT RETURNED
TO HABITUAL RESIDENCE



turnees living in Baghdad. Not only are employment opportunities largely insufficient, but also, available jobs are often low paid and in a few cases inaccessible to IDPs because they are under-qualified (4%) discriminated against (4%). The employment situation in Baghdad is particularly severe: in over 95% of locations, most returnees are unemployed and in over 20% of locations government employees are not receiving their salaries. As a result, over 88% of households have to rely on

informal commerce/irregular daily labor to earn a living. The most needed information is on cash aid (92%), followed by access to health services and shelter, which were rated respectively of poor quality and too expensive by most of the population. It should also be noted that water was deemed of bad quality by nearly 75% of the returnee population.



The distribution of IDP families per type of shelter is consistent with ILA I. Overall, 5% of families are settled in critical shelters, mostly in unfinished/abandoned buildings. Compared to ILA I, where all returnees were living in their own property, 9% of returnees are now living in rented accommodation, the highest percentage in Iraq. This could be a forced but temporary choice, considering that nearly 60% of returnees need information on options/support to rebuild their properties. The most often reported HLP issues were lack of money to pay for the

replacement of documents (29%) and lack of offices to provide

assistance (25%).




FIGURE 7. IDPs' SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Voluntary (49%) or involuntary stay (26%) in the location of displacement is the main intention of families in

the short term, as the lack of a house to return to (70% house destroyed, 37% occupied) and of funds (75%) are delaying the much-wanted return (94% wish to return home in the long term). There is possibly another factor is strongly influencing the immediate will to return of IDP families in Baghdad: the presence of extended families. Over 55% of families selected this as a key motivation for choosing the destination of displacement – the highest of all choices. As for returns, the vast majority continues to be pulled by the reestablished security of the location of origin and by the possibility to work or recreate livelihoods. Encouragement by community/religious leaders (27%) and incentives provided by government authorities (17%) or humanitarian actors (6%) also played a significant role.

GOVERNORATE PROFILE







Returnees | \$\display | 33,685 Families | 102,110 Individuals

+68% SINCE ILA I

			<u> </u>	
District			Returnees	Change since ILA I (%)
Al-Khalis	1,335	-14%	11,639	18%
Al-Muqdadiya	30	> 200%	7,976	> 200%
Baladrooz	272	-32%		
Ba'quba	4,557	-16%		
Khanaqin	2,683	-51%	13,870	38%
Kifri	1,352	-20%	200	0%


100%_

TABLE 1. IDPS AND RETURNEES PER DISTRICT (NO. OF FAMILIES)

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Diyala is home to 12% of Iraqi IDPs (over 60,000 individuals), most of who (89%) are intra-governorate IDPs who fled the areas along the Salah al-Din and Baghdad borders and resettled in more central and secure areas. Around one third of Diyala IDPs also relocated outside the borders of the governorate, particularly in Sulaymaniyah. Returns started in April 2015 following the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) actions that allowed

regaining control of many areas. Like in ILA I, IDPs are returning home from within the governorate (79%) and Kirkuk (11%); but they have also started returning from Sulaymaniyah (13%). Accordingly, all districts have recorded a decrease in the number of IDPs, with Khanaqin and Al-Khalis receiving the greatest number of returns.




80% -60% _ - Sulaymaniyah 40% _ Qadissiya Kirkuk Erbil 20% _ Diyala Babylon Anbar 0 ILA I ILA II

FIGURE 1. DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN 2014-2017

FIGURE 2. RETURNS PER GOVERNORATE OF LAST **DISPLACEMENT** ILA I and ILA II

^{16.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF IDPs:



ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF RETURNEES:

FIGURE 3. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

The overwhelming majority of both IDPs and returnees are Arab Sunnis (88%), which is no surprise considering that IDPs in Diyala are mostly from within the governorate. An ethno-religious shift has been assessed in 2% of locations that were formerly mostly Kurdish Sunni or Kurdish Shia and that now are mostly Arab Sunni. Kurdish Sunnis account for 2% of IDPs and 10% of returnees, and other minority groups include Turkmen Sunni and Kurdish Shia.

INFRASTRUCTURE, FACILITIES AND SERVICES, RESIDENCES AND LAND¹⁷

30% MINED AREAS

Infrastructure damage in Diyala has been consistent with ILA I; the highest extent of damage was on roads – these were destroyed or not efficient respectively for

83% and 12% of the population across surveyed locations. The most affected districts are Khanaqin and Al-Khalis, where most returnees are settled. Public electricity and tap water networks are destroyed and/or not/inefficiently functioning for over half of the IDPs and returnees, while sewerage is practically inexistent – but it was never available in these locations.

Residential damage was reported in all surveyed districts except Baladrooz. The district of Al-Muqadiya reported the most severe damage, but significant damage was reported also in Al-Khalis, Al-Muqdadiya and Khanaqin. There was no occupation of res-

idence almost anywhere. Arable and grazing land is not accessible for respectively 33% and 21% of the population – around 30% of areas were marked as mined. As for services, the most challenging to access at the location or nearby are legal and health services (unavailable for 55% and 10% of the population).




FIGURE 4. RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE




FIGURE 5. OCCUPATION OF RESIDENCES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FRE	QUENCY
SOMETIMES	50%
OFTEN	1%

** FORCED	EVICTIONS
IDPs ¹⁹	2%
RETURNEES	2%

PIN	NEED	0F	PROTECTION ²¹
IDPs			2%
RETU	RNEES	ì	5%

The security situation in the governorate remains tense and terrorist attacks and kidnappings were reported as affecting "sometimes" around 20% of the population. Sexual assaults were also reported (2%). The incidence of petty crimes and domestic vio-

^{17.} For the definition of infrastructure damage see Thematic overview, Maps 7 and 8 and Fig.4.

^{18.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of the IDP and returnee population hosted in locations where security incidents (excluding terrorist attacks) were reported as occurring "often" or "sometimes".

^{19.} Forced evictions for returnees also include evictions that took place during a previous displacement.

^{20.} Individuals in need of protection include: female heads of households, minor heads of households, unaccompanied minors, physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and mothers under 18.

lence was below country level, although it may be under-reported when more serious incidents occur. Most security incidents were found in the three districts of Al-Mugdadiyah, Ba'quba and Al-Khalis, while Khanaqin displays on average a lower incidence of crime. IDPs and returnees are generally allowed freedom of movement although 56% and 36% respectively need a special permit from the police. Diyala hosts 2% of IDPs in need

of protection - including 5% of minor heads of household - and 5% of returnees in need of protection - including 5% of minor heads of household. Nearly all returnee families are united, while family separations were noted for 15% of IDPs.

CONFLICT AND COHESION

IDP AND RETURNEE CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

IDPs	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Khalis	2.30	2.17
Al-Muqdadiya	0.30	-2.65
Khanaqin	0.01	-1.05
Kifri	0.00	-2.00

Returnees	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Khalis	2.30	2.17
Al-Muqdadiya	0.30	-2.65
Khanaqin	0.01	-1.05
Kifri	0.00	-2.00

Overall, Diyala has a low level of tension: a low conflict score was assessed in locations hosting IDPs and there was no apparent conflict in those hosting returnees. Incidents are indeed rare (12% of locations); however, the situation at district level is more complex and tensions between groups were assessed in the two districts of Ba'quba (for IDPs) and Al-Khalis (for re-

turnees). While conflict between tribes is prevalent in Al-Khalis, IDPs and stayers, and affluent and poor, seem to be competing for resources in Ba'quba. Evidence of favoritism was reported at all levels - aid distribution, employment and political representation. Cooperation is overall limited in IDP and returnee locations, with the sole exception of Al-Khalis, where tribes cooperate in rebuilding damaged houses, cleaning rubble and fencing off mined areas.²¹

LIVING CONDITIONS AND SHELTER **ISSUES**


OF IDPs LIVE IN CRITICAL **SHELTERS**

OF RETURNEES NOT RETURNED TO HABITUAL RESIDENCE

OF RETURNEES LOST DOCUMENTS TO PROVE LAND/ PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

IDPs and returnees in Diyala share the same top three concerns, namely access to employment, shelter and household and non-food items. Therefore, the most needed information is on cash aid, food -especially NFI - distributions, in addition to options/support to rebuild their houses. This finding is quite predictable as in governorates that host large shares of intra-governorate IDPs, concerns and needs are generally consistent and shaped by similar factors. It should also

be noted that around 10% of both IDPs and returnees stated that they are prevented to access health services even when these are available. Relevant shares of both populations also highlighted the poor quality of water (around 70%) and food (around 30%).



^{21.} The simultaneous presence of both tension and cooperation in Al-Khalis may be explained by the presence of different tribes in the district. While tension reportedly occurs between some tribes, other tribes appear to cooperate.

The share of IDPs settled in critical shelters and of returnees not in their habitual shelters has halved since ILA I (from 13% to 6% for IDPs, from 27% to 14% for returnees), probably because IDPs were pushed to return by the critical conditions of their living accommodation, whereas families settled in rented housing or hosted by other families managed to remain in displacement. As for returnees, the increase in families going back to their properties is associated with a decrease in families hosted by other families; however, 14% of families are still settled in abandoned/unfinished buildings. Despite these positive indications, shelter remains a challenging issue, especially for returnees: over 45% of families are living in houses that are from significantly damaged to completely devastated, 41% need information on options/support to rebuild their properties, and 90% deemed their shelter inadequate/of poor quality. Occupation of private residences was also reported. The most reported HLP issues were respectively lack of money to pay for the replacement of documents (41%), lack of offices to provide assistance (41%) and time-consuming process (34%).



FIGURE 7. IDPs' SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Compared to ILA I, the share of IDPs who intend to return home in the long term has decreased from 100% to 93%.

Families who are still in displacement have not lost their desire to return; however, 57% are postponing it (this intention was 48% in ILA I) and 7% are starting to consider the option to locally integrate. For these families, the regained security of the location of origin per se is not a sufficient pull factor, as their house is destroyed (62%) or occupied (46%), returns are not allowed (48%), services are lacking back home (47%) or they simply lack the necessary funds to venture home (26%).²² On the other hand, factors that have guided the choice of their destination of displacement have shifted from security (33% in ILA I to 15% in ILA II) to the presence of extended family/friends (88% and 100% respectively for IDPs in Al-Khalis and Baladrooz) and no other choice (36% for IDPs in Ba'quba). These factors are also likely to keep them in displacement. As for returns, they were driven by three factors: regained security, possibility to recreate a livelihoods and lack of means to stay in displacement. Nearly all returns to Al-Muqdadiyah, Kifri and Al-Khalis were pushed by the lack of funds, while security and livelihoods account for most returns to Khanaqin.

^{22. 12%} of IDPs, mostly settled in Khanaqin, Kifri and Al-Khalis, also cited fear due to the ethno-religious change in the location of origin as an important deterrent to returns.

GOVERNORATE PROFILE





† 52,046 Families **† 312,276** Individuals

Returnees \$\disp\dec{\dagger}{1} 34,152 Families \$\dec{\dagger}{1} 5,692 Individuals

+122% SINCE ILA I

District	IDPs	Change since ILA I (%)	Returnees	Change since ILA I (%)
Choman	10	-83%		
Erbil	45,391	0%	R	
Koisnjaq	1,650	-6%		
Makhmur	49	-99%	5,692	122%
Mergasur	60	-8%		
Shaqlawa	3,522	-19%		
Soran	1,364	> 200%		

TABLE 1. IDPS AND RETURNEES PER DISTRICT (NO. OF FAMILIES)

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Due to its economic prosperity and stable security situation, Erbil has been a common destination for the displaced since the onset of the conflict and currently hosts 15% of Iraqi IDPs (over 310,000 individuals), the second largest figure after Salah al-Din. Over 90% of IDPs in Erbil arrived from Ninewa and Anbar and around 80% re-settled in the district of Erbil. Internal displacement occurred only in the western district of Makhmur, where 22 out of the 24 surveyed locations were occupied. The complete retaking of the areas took place by the end of December 2016 and is associated with the significant flows of returns recorded since ILA I (+122%). In addition to Makhmur IDPs (-75% since ILA I), many families originally from Kirkuk (-96%) and Diyala (-58%) also left the governorate, whereas returns of families originally from Salah al-Din, Baghdad and Anbar were overall more contained (-19, - 18% and - 10% respectively).







FIGURE 1. DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN 2014-2017

FIGURE 2. RETURNS PER GOVERNORATE OF LAST **DISPLACEMENT** ILA I and ILA II


^{23.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF IDPs:



ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF RETURNEES:

FIGURE 3. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION



The ethno-religious affiliation of the displaced population reflects their location of origin. Over 80% of IDPs settled in Erbil are Arab Sunnis (coming mostly from Anbar and Salah al-Din) while the 20% share of other minorities (such as Chaldean and Syriac Christians, Kurdish Sunnis, Yazidis, Turkmen and Shabak Shias) reflects the ethno-religious diversity of Ninewa and Erbil. The distinct ethno-religious composition of this significant IDP population has caused changes in the majority group in over 15% of locations. In nearly all cases, the shift has been from Kurdish to Arab Sunni (and 2% from Kurdish Sunni to Chaldean Christian). Kurdish Sunnis, on the other hand, account for 60% of all returns.

INFRASTRUCTURE, FACILITIES AND SERVICES, RESIDENCES AND LAND²⁴

10% MINED AREAS

Erbil is one of the Iraqi governorates with the most intact and functioning infrastructures in all districts. Only the public electricity network and main roads were

destroyed in a few locations (less than 1%), while inefficient functioning of tap water network, sewerage and electricity affects respectively 10%, 5% and 5% of the population across surveyed locations.

In the district of Makhmur, 53% of returnees' houses were reported as having suffered some damage. Severe damage, how-

ever, affects 25% of returnees. Occupation of residences was not reported. Arable and grazing land is not accessible for respectively 17% and 15% of the population – around 10% of areas were marked as mined. Services are available and accessible in nearly all locations or nearby, and overall, only legal services are unavailable for 30% of the population and health services for 4%.





FIGURE 4. RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE



51-75%

76-99%

100%

FIGURE 5. OCCUPATION OF RESIDENCES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY ²⁵		IN NEED OF PR	OTECTION
SOMETIMES	11%	IDPs	11%
		RETURNEES	1%

Security incidents are not recurrent in Erbil – terrorist attacks were reported only in one location in Makhmur. Domestic violence (30%) and petty crimes (14%) were occasionally reported, mostly in Shaqlawa and again Makhmur. The majority of

^{24.} For the definition of infrastructure damage see Thematic overview, Maps 7 and 8 and Fig.4.

^{25.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of the IDP and returnee population hosted in locations where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes"

^{26.} Individuals in need of protection: female heads of households, minor heads of households, unaccompanied minors, physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and mothers under 18.

Displacement Tracking Matrix | DTM

IDPs (65%) and all returnees are only allowed freedom of movement with a special permit from the police. Erbil hosts 11% of IDPs in need of protection – in particular 16% of all physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and 13% of all female heads of household. Furthermore, 5% of all physically and/or mentally challenged returnees are hosted in the governorate. All returnee families are united, while family separations were recorded as affecting 7% of IDPs.

CONFLICT AND COHESION

IDP AND RETURNEE CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

IDPs	Conflict	Cooperation
Choman		
Erbil	0.00	0.00
Koisnjaq	0.00	0.00
Makhmur		
Mergasur		
Shaqlawa	0.00	0.00
Soran	0.00	0.00
Returnees	Conflict	Cooperation
Makhmur	0.00	-1.91

Different groups in Erbil seem to coexist peacefully, although with very limited interaction. No tensions, threats, occasional incidents between different groups or favoritism towards a specific group were reported for locations hosting both IDPs and returnees (with or without IDPs). Cooperation between groups was not recorded either, but it might be because some projects included in the questionnaire, such as clearing rubble or fencing mines, were not needed in many of the surveyed communities.

LIVING CONDITIONS AND SHELTER ISSUES

1% OF IDPS LIVE IN CRITICAL SHELTERS



The top concern of Erbil returnees is education. There are not enough schools in Makhmur and they are often overcrowded; for 14% of families, schools have poor infrastructure. In addition, IDPs – and less often, returnees – are concerned about access to employment and health services. It should be noted

that Erbil recorded the highest figure for employment – most returnees don't have jobs in 38% of locations. The most needed information is on cash aid, food distribution and health care services. Nearly half of IDPs settled in Erbil would also like to have more information on the security situation in their area of origin – the third highest percentage, after Wassit and Kirkuk.




FIGURE 6. MOST IMPORTANT NEEDS OF IDPs AND RETURNEES

The distribution of shelter for both IDPs and returnees is consistent with ILA I, with 1% of IDPs settled in critical shelters and all returnees back to their habitual residence. Shelter trends in the governorate are very specific and linked to the background of the IDPs who moved to Erbil: IDPs are not hosted by other families and nearly all are settled in rented housing (98%). Although 33% of their houses were significantly damaged, returnees do not seem to need information on options/support to rebuild their houses, and the only HLP issue that was raised was about the time-consuming process of replacing documents (33%).



FIGURE 7. IDPs' SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Compared to ILA I, the share of IDPs who intend to return home in the short term has largely decreased from 80%

to 28% (notwithstanding the 97% who wish to return on the long term). These families are postponing their return mostly because of the security situation in their location of origin. Nearly half of IDP families explicitly stated that they need more information on the security situation. The destruction of their house seems to be an equally important obstacle (ascertained for 70% of families), followed closely by lack of services back home (68%). As well, families are staying in displacement because their properties are occupied (37%), they fear an ethno-religious change in their area of origin (16%), or because returns are not allowed (16%). Returns to Makhmur were triggered by the retaking of the area, associated with the possibility to recreate livelihoods. A relevant share of families was also encouraged to return by religious/community leaders (22%) and/or by incentives provided by the government (45%) and humanitarian actors (33%).

KIRKUK GOVERNORATE PROFILE





IDPs

↑ 12,696 Families **↑ 256,176** Individuals

Returnees

494 Families

2,964 Individuals

+24% SINCE ILA I

		, 		
District			Returnees	Change since ILA I (%)
Kirkuk	38,974	-6,9%	413	3,8%
Dabes	725	-8,6%		
Daquq	2,997	-61,6%	81	>200%

TABLE 1. IDPS AND RETURNEES PER DISTRICT (NO. OF FAMILIES)

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Kirkuk hosts 12% of all Iraqi IDPs (over 250,000 individuals). Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din are the governorates of origin of respectively 22%, 13% and 10% of the displaced population; yet the largest groups originate from within the governorate (53%), as the situation was and still is very tense. ²⁸ Between 2014 and the time of the assessment, around one fourth of the surveyed locations had been either attacked (21%) or occupied (3%) by ISIL. Over 30% of IDPs who fled their location of origin in Kirkuk also re-settled outside the governorate; the majority is

hosted in Salah al-Din – over 53,000 individuals, 60% of who fled after ILA I due to the military operations to retake Hawija and its surroundings.

Due to the tense security situation, only around 3,000 individuals had managed to return to their location of origin at the time of the assessment (+ 24% since ILA I). Returns were 100% internal, while all families outside the governorate remain displaced.





FIGURE 1. **DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN** 2014-2017


The governorate has a relatively high concentration of Arab Sunnis and Turkmen Shia among its IDP population; both groups have formed "hot spots", ²⁹ in some locations (2.3%), causing a change in the majority ethno-religious group (formerly Kurdish Sunni). However, newly returned families are mostly Kurdish Sunni: they account for 7% of returns (none in ILA I).





ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF RETURNEES:





- 27. The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). It should be noted that the district of Hawija, which hosted 73,686 individuals (12,281 families) ILA I, was not accessed in ILA II due to security issues. See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.
- 28. In June 2014, as ISIL launched its invasion of Iraq, Kurdish forces secured Kirkuk which lied outside the KRG₂s jurisdiction. The action led to accusations from the central government and Shia parties that the KRG capitalised on the conflict to overtake national resources Kirkuk is the centre of the north Iraq petroleum industry. These tensions were put aside and both sides agreed to focus on combating ISIL. Following the retaking of Hawija, the political battle to define Kirkuk's future administrative status re-emerged and, following the recent Iraqi Kurdish vote for independence in October 2017, the central government sent army forces to seize the city from the Kurdish Peshmerga, escalating tensions between both sides.
- 29. Hot spots are defined as areas where large numbers of IDP families of the same ethno-religious group are located, in close enough proximity to make them geographically significant. See Ethno-religious Groups and Displacement in Iraq, 2nd Report, 2016 IOM.

INFRASTRUCTURE, FACILITIES AND SERVICES, RESIDENCES AND LAND³⁰

Just as in ILA I, low coverage and low rates of returns affected the assessment of destruction/damage. Although many properties and infrastructures have indeed been damaged by military campaigns and armed group activities, they could not be assessed, either because displaced families had not come back or because of security issues. Complete damage of infrastructure was not reported and inefficient functioning/condition of roads, sewerage and tap water network affects between one fourth and one third of the population.

The rate of destroyed residences was very low in all surveyed districts, with Daquq and Kirkuk reporting mostly moderate destruction. Occupation of residences was reported only in Kirkuk (most/all houses are occupied in 6% of locations). Arable and grazing land was accessible and no areas were reported as mined – although over 15% of key informants "didn't really know".




FIGURE 3. RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE




FIGURE 4. OCCUPATION OF RESIDENCES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY31		** FORCED EVICTIONS		IN NEED OF PROTECTION33	
SOMETIMES	82%	IDPs ³²	78%	IDPs	10%
OFTEN	9%				

The security situation in the governorate remains tense and terrorist attacks were reported in all districts, particularly in Kirkuk, as affecting around 25% of the IDP and returnee population. The crime incidence is also high, with domestic violence (96%), petty crimes (82%), kidnappings (32%) and sexual assaults (6%) all reported as occurring "sometimes" – "often" in the district of Kirkuk. The highest countrywide percentage of forced evictions of IDP families was also recorded (78%) and 62% of IDPs are only allowed freedom of movement with a special permit (returnees do not need the permit). Kirkuk hosts 10% of all IDPs in need of protection countrywide, –24% of unaccompanied children and 22% of mothers under 18 – a finding that partly explains the high rate of family separations recorded among the IDP population: only 33% of families are united.

^{30.} For the definition of infrastructure damage see Thematic overview, Maps 7 and 8 and Fig.4.

^{31.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of the IDP and returnee population hosted in locations where security incidents (excluding terrorist attacks) were reported "often" or "sometimes".

^{32.} Forced evictions for returnees also include evictions that took place during previous displacement.

^{33.} Individuals in need of protection include: female heads of households, minor heads of households, unaccompanied minors, physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and mothers under 18.

CONFLICT AND COHESION

IDP AND RETURNEE CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

IDPs	Conflict	Cooperation
Dabes	0.00	
Daquq	0.71	1.34
Kirkuk	1.24	0.35

Returnees	Conflict	Cooperation
Daquq	0.00	-2.00
Kirkuk	0.00	1.36

Low coverage and low number of returns have significantly prejudiced the assessment on conflict and cohesion. In particular, the district of Hawija was not surveyed. That said, on average the district of Kirkuk displays slightly higher conflict scores than Daquq and Dabes (where no apparent sign of conflict was detected), which is understandable as it hosts nearly all IDPs in the governorate. No evidence of mistrust, incidents or threats was detected across the surveyed locations, and only favoritism in local council representation was found (according to 16% of IDPs). Conversely, limited cooperation between tribes was acknowledged in locations hosting both IDPs and returnees in the form of using each other's wasta to obtain services (67%), rebuilding damaged houses (57%) and cleaning rubble (4%).

LIVING CONDITIONS AND SHELTER ISSUES

OF IDPS LIVE IN CRITICAL SHELTERS

7%
OF RETURNEES NOT RETURNED TO HABITUAL RESIDENCE

Access to employment and good quality shelter are the two top concerns for IDPs living in Kirkuk. Not only are IDPs unable to access jobs because of the insufficient supply (60%), but they are also under-qualified (27%). As for returnees, although most of them do not have jobs in 84% of locations and have

to rely on agriculture (100%) and pensions (67%) to support their families, employment is much less a concern than accessing water (insufficient supply and poor quality) and health (insufficient supply and too expensive). For returnees, the most needed information is on health, while IDPs are mostly interested in personal documentation (84%) – the highest percentage in Iraq (country average is 20%).




FIGURE 5. MOST IMPORTANT NEEDS OF IDPs AND RETURNEES

Displacement Tracking Matrix | DTM

Compared to ILA I, the share of IDPs settled in critical shelters has decreased from 25% to 9%. However, families may have not left the governorate or their critical settlement, as the greatest share of families living in unknown shelters in ILA I was found in Hawija, but this location was not assessed in ILA II. Apparently, despite the high score of residential damage, returnees (93% of who have returned to their habitual residence) do not need information on options/support to rebuild their properties nor reported HLP issues of any sort. Again this is most likely due to the low coverage and low number of returns. Over 10% of IDPs need information on documentation/mechanisms for land and property restitution.




FIGURE 6. IDPs' SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



The extremely low share (6%) of IDPs who intend to return to their location of origin in the short term can be ex-

plained by the fact that except for IDPs settled in Daquq, (7% of all IDPs in the governorate), IDPs were not pulled to Kirkuk by its security, family/relatives or the possibility to recreate livelihoods. Over half of them were forced to displace to Kirkuk (100% of those settled in Dabes) because they could not afford any other place, and they are staying in displacement because they cannot return to their location of origin, as the security situation back home does not allow returns (91%) or their house is occupied (78%). Nearly one third of families is also prevented by government authorities – 90% of IDPs in Daquq. As a result, returns, both overall and since ILA I, have been scarce in this governorate. Reestablished security at the location of origin is the main reason of return for 86% of IDPs, encouragement by community/religious leaders for 67%, and 33% were forced by lack of means to stay in displacement.

GOVERNORATE PROFILE





↑ 32,061 Families **↑ 192,366** Individuals

Returnees 44,615 Families 267,690 Individuals -17% SINCE ILA I


District	IDPs	Change since ILA I (%)<	Returnees	Change since ILA I (%)
Akre	7814	-35%		
Al-Hamdaniya	769	> 200%	2633	> 200%
Al-Shikhan	8173	-36%		
Mosul	3504	> 200%	15965	> 200%
Sinjar	1846	18%	4468	23%
Telafar	5502	9%	15872	19%
Tilkaif	4453	1%	5677	70%

TABLE 1. POPULATION PER DISTRICT AND CHANGE SINCE ILA 110 (No. OF FAMILIES)

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Displacement movements in Ninewa are very complex. Not only has Ninewa been the theatre of dramatic events, which prompted the highest number of displacement from one single governorate (42% of all displacement in Iraq, 888,384 individuals), but also its proximity to other conflict-affected areas has attracted additional IDPs from other governorates. At the time of

the assessment, Ninewa hosted 9% of all Iraqi IDPs (192,366 individuals); however, since ILA I most extra-governorate IDP families had returned home and only tiny groups originally from Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Erbil remained in the governorate (altogether less than 1% of Ninewa IDPs).






FIGURE 1. DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN 2014-2017

Movements in Ninewa became even more complex when coalition forces started to reclaim territories besieged by armed groups: while many families continued to flee, others started to return to the retaken areas of origin. Most of the surveyed districts of Telafar and Sinjar were the first to be retaken, between December 2014 and March 2016; the retaking of Tilkaif followed in March 2017, while the fall of ISIL in Mosul only


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FIGURE 2. RETURNS PER GOVERNORATE OF LAST **DISPLACEMENT** ILA I and ILA II

occurred in July 2017. At the time of the assessment, the governorate had witnessed over 260,000 returns - nearly all from Ninewa (55%) or KRI (Dahuk, 32% and Erbil, 10%). IDPs originally from Ninewa but displaced in southern or other north-central governorates seem much less likely to return home: altogether they account for over 35% of Ninewa IDPs but only for 2% of returns.

^{35.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF IDPs:



ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF RETURNEES:

FIGURE 3. **ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION**



The ethno-religious composition of both populations is different from other areas in Iraq: the majority is Sunni Muslim and Kurdish Sunni, but several of Iraq's minority groups are also represented – i.e. Christians, Shabak, and Yazidis. Since the fall of Mosul, these groups have followed distinct displacement and return paths. This is reflected in an ethno-religious shift (in 4% of locations, mostly in Sinjar) from Kurdish Sunni to Yazidi. Ninewa's Yazidis have also clustered in bordering Dahuk,³⁶ while most Christians and Shabak Shias have not yet returned to their location of origin. It should be noted that over 20,000 families (accounting for over 13% of all families who fled Ninewa) cited "fear as a result of a change in ethno-religious composition of the place of origin" among the first three obstacles to return.

INFRASTRUCTURE, FACILITIES AND SERVICES, RESIDENCES AND LAND³⁷

Ninewa has been the theatre of war operations, and as a re-



sult the share of infrastructure that has been destroyed is above country average – tap water (12%), electricity (11%), main roads (6%), mobile network (3%) and sewerage (3%).³⁸ As a result, around

40% of the IDP and returnee population reported issues with inefficient functioning/conditions of tap water and/or electricity networks and/or main roads.

Residential damage was reported in all surveyed districts except

in Akre and Al-Shikhan. The extent of damage was particularly severe in the two districts of Mosul and Sinjar. Occupation of residences was found mostly in Telafar (most/all residences are occupied in 13% of locations and a few residences are occupied in 22% of locations) although occupation was also reported in Mosul, Al-Hamdaniya and Sinjar. Around 15% of the population (prevalently in Mosul and Al-Hamdaniya) cannot access arable and grazing fields – and 27% of the areas were reported as mined, the second highest percentage in Iraq. Difficult access to legal services, health facilities and markets was reported as affecting respectively 35%, 25% and 15% of the population.




FIGURE 4. RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE




FIGURE 5. OCCUPATION OF RESIDENCES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME	FREQUENCY39
SOMETIMES	33%
OFTEN	0.19/

** FORCED	EVICTIONS	
IDPs ⁴⁰	27%	
RETURNEES	3%	

IN NEED OF PROTECTION		
IDPs	9%	
RETURNEES	13%	

- 36. See Ethno-religious Groups and Displacement in Iraq, 2nd Report, 2016 IOM.
- 37. For the definition of infrastructure damage see Thematic overview, Maps 7 and 8 and Fig.4.
- 38. Only 71% of locations were accessed due to accessibility challenges; indicators for the governorate are supposedly much higher.
- 39. Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of the IDP and returnee population hosted in locations where security incidents such as kidnappings, sexual assaults, home violence and petty crimes were reported "often" or "sometimes". Terrorist attacks were computed separately.
- 40. Forced evictions for returnees also include evictions that took place during previous displacement.
- 41. Individuals in need of protection include: female heads of households, minor heads of households, unaccompanied minors, physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and mothers under 18.

Terrorist attacks are still taking place in the governorate and were reported in both Al-Hamdaniya and Tilkaif (as affecting 5% of the governorate population). Crime frequency and incidence, on the other hand, were both below average at the time of the assessment – except for sexual assaults, which affect 6% of the population. Most security incidents were reported in Al-Shikhan and Akre, where the presence of other controlling actors (such as militias, tribes or other unspecified groups) was also reported. Forced evictions of IDP families were recorded (27%), and around 30% of IDPs and returnees are only allowed freedom of movement with a special permit from the police. Ninewa hosts 9% of Iraqi IDPs in need of protection- in particular 11% of physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and 10% of unaccompanied children - and 14% of all returnees in need of protection – 27% of physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and 47% of unaccompanied children. This finding can be linked to the high rate of family separations recorded among IDPs – less than 50% of families are united, whereas this figure is nearly 80% for returnee families.

CONFLICT AND COHESION⁴²

IDP AND RETURNEE CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Returnees	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Hamdaniya	0.16	-1.12
Mosul	0.37	-1.36
Sinjar	2.25	-0.77
Telafar	0.59	0.29
Tilkaif	0.00	-1.26

Overall, in locations hosting returnees (with or without IDPs) there is no apparent risk of conflict. Conflict score was below 1 in all districts except Sinjar (2.25, low risk), due to tensions between the PKK and the Peshmerga. Mistrust between IDPs and returnees was found in around 7% of locations, as well

as threats (2%) and occasional individual incidents between IDPs and returnees. Evidence of favoritism was also reported, especially in terms of employment and political representation (around 30% each). Using each other's wasta to obtain services seems to be the most recurrent form of cooperation (55%), which is overall limited. IDPs and returnees and, less frequently, returnees and stayers, also cooperate in projects for rebuilding damaged houses (14%) cleaning rubble (13%) and fencing mines (9%).

LIVING CONDITIONS AND SHELTER ISSUES

19%
OF IDPS LIVE IN CRITICAL
SHELTERS

3%
OF RETURNEES NOT RETURNED TO HABITUAL RESIDENCE



Employment (68%) and affordable food (67%) are top concerns of IDPs living in Ninewa, just as information on food distribution and access to jobs is the most needed. Health (72%, too expensive and lacking services) and drinking water (63%, insufficient supply and poor quality) are the most urgent issues for returnees. Ninewa has a high share of unemployed returnees, as in nearly 70% of locations in

the governorate, most returnees do not have jobs. Returnees mostly rely on the public sector for income; a few families rely on informal labour or pensions, whereas Ninewa returnees are more likely to engage in agriculture (55%) or business (44%). It should be noted that 27% of families need information on the status of detained family members (the second highest percentage after Salah al-Din).




FIGURE 5. MOST IMPORTANT NEEDS OF IDPs AND RETURNEES

42. Specific conflict and cooperation scores for IDPs were not computed, as most locations in Ninewa do not only host IDPs, but also returnees.

Unlike the overall trend where most IDPs are living in rented housing (62%), only 37% of IDPs in Ninewa can afford this type of accommodation, while an equal share of families is hosted by other families. This finding can be linked to the high preference – voiced especially by families settled in Al-Hamdaniya, Mosul and Al-Shikhan – to relocate due to the presence of relatives and friends. Although still very high, the share of IDPs settled in critical shelters has decreased from 34% to 19% compared to ILA I, mostly due to the decrease in the number of families living in unknown shelters. Although nearly all returnees have come back to their habitual residence, families are likely to report HLP issues, such as the loss of documents (33%), destruction of government records (27%) or difficulties in understanding the process for replacing documents (20%).




FIGURE 6. IDPs' SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



In line with country average, 27% of IDPs intend to return to their location of origin in the short term and 95% in the

long term. Lack of security (73%), of services (57%) and of a house (48% destroyed, 32% occupied) in the location of origin were the most cited obstacles to return; however, there are distinct peculiarities at district level. For 100% of families settled in Al-Shikhan and 85% of those in Mosul, returns are prevented by government authorities; lack of money is the main deterrent for over one fourth of families settled in Akre and Telafar, while fear due to an ethno-religious change in the location of origin was cited by nearly 40% of IDPs in Al-Shikhan and Sinjar. Returns, which have greatly increased since ILA I (+119%), have targeted mostly Mosul and interested families who were able to check the conditions of the location before going back (80% of families in Mosul). Families who went back to Al-Hamdaniya and Tilkaif were mostly pulled by the regained security and the possibility to recreate livelihoods, while lack of means to stay in displacement pushed over half of IDP families to return to Sinjar and Telafar, while encouragement from religious/community leaders and support from government authorities respectively, pulled 20% and 10% of returns.

SALAH AL-DIN

GOVERNORATE PROFILE



54,315 Families **325,890** Individuals



Returnees 60,431 Families

362,586 Individuals

+22% SINCE ILA I

District	IDPs	Change since ILA I (%)	Returnees	Change since ILA I (%)
Al-Daur	543	>200%	9,375	3%
Al-Fares	1,541	-47%	1,055	0%
Al-Shirqat	7,529	>200%	6,273	> 200%
Baiji	880	-4%	3,508	-15%
Balad	3,654	-26%	5,096	70%
Samarra	6,960	-12%	5,741	32%
Tikrit	27,195	79%	28,523	2%
Tooz	6,013	14%	860	> 200%

TABLE 1. POPULATION PER DISTRICT AND CHANGE SINCE ILA I (No. OF FAMILIES)

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Salah al-Din is the only governorate where an increase in the overall number of IDPs was recorded since ILA I (+7%). This rise is associated with internal displacement from Al-Shirgat and Baji, and with movements from other conflict-affected areas in Kirkuk and Ninewa, such as Hawija, Qayara and Mosul. The largest increase since ILA I was recorded for IDPs original-

ly from Kirkuk (+135%, over 30,000 individuals), followed by IDPs originally from Ninewa (+45%, over 4,000 individuals). As a result, at the time of the assessment Salah al-Din hosted 15% of all Iraqi IDPs (over 325,000 individuals), the highest number in Iraq.





FIGURE 1. DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN 2014-2017







FIGURE 2. RETURNS PER GOVERNORATE OF LAST **DISPLACEMENT** ILA I and ILA II


^{43.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF IDPs:



ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF RETURNEES:

FIGURE 3. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION



IDP and returnee populations are mostly Arab Sunni (97% both). Arab Shias, the second largest group among IDPs who fled Salah al-Din, account for only 1% of returnees. Among all minority ethno-religious groups who fled Salah al-Din – such as Turkmen Sunni, Turkmen Shias, Kurdish Shias or Shabak Shias – only Turkmen Shias (2%) have found the needed security in their location of origin and gone back home.

INFRASTRUCTURE, FACILITIES AND SERVICES, RESIDENCES AND LAND⁴⁴



The governorate of Salah al-Din has been severely affected by the conflict; as a result, the share of infrastructures that have been destroyed and report inefficient conditions or functioning is above country av-

erage in all sectors. Complete destruction was mostly reported for sewerage and main roads, while inefficient functioning or poor conditions of the electricity network, roads and tap water network affects respectively 65%, 63% and 55% of the population. Balad, Baiji, Tikrit, Al-Daur, Al-Shirqat and Samarra are the worst affected districts, while land, both arable and grazing, is inaccessible only in Al-Shirqat and Al-Fares. Slightly less than 10% of areas were marked as mined. Despite the high infrastructure damage, main services are mostly accessible at the location or nearby. Critical issues were reported only for health services (as affecting 10% of the population) and legal services (72%).

Residential damage was also above average and reported in all surveyed districts. Between 20% and 50% of houses have undergone significant damage to complete devastation in Al-Daur, Al-Fares, Baiji, Samarra and Tikrit. Occupation of residences was also reported in all districts except in Al-Fares and Tooz.




FIGURE 4. RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE




FIGURE 5. OCCUPATION OF RESIDENCES SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FR	EQUENCY4
SOMETIMES	69%
OFTEN	8%

FORCED	EVICTIONS
DPs ⁴⁷	7%
RETURNEES	11%

IN NEED OF PR	OTECTION48
IDPs	12%
RETURNEES	15%

The security situation in Salah al-Din remains very tense. Terrorist attacks were reported as affecting "sometimes" 38% of the population and "often" 19% of the population (in Tikrit and Daur), and this is the worst indicator in Iraq. Crime incidence and frequency is also very high – Salah al-Din reported the high-

^{44.} For the definition of infrastructure damage see Thematic overview, Maps 7 and 8 and Fig.4.

^{45.} Only 89% of locations were accessed due to accessibility challenges; therefore, indicators for the governorate could be higher.

^{46.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of the IDP and returnee population hosted in locations where security incidents – such as kidnappings, sexual assaults, home violence and petty crimes – were reported often or sometimes. Terrorist attacks were computed separately.

^{47.} Forced evictions for returnees also include evictions that took place during previous displacement.

^{48.} Individuals in need of protection include: female heads of households, minor heads of households, unaccompanied minors, physically and/or mentally challenged individuals and mothers under 18.

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est share of kidnappings of all governorates (51% for a country average of 15%). Forced evictions were reported as affecting respectively 11% of returnees and 7% of IDPs, while for most of the population freedom of movement is only allowed with a special permit (60% of returnees and 48% of IDPs), or not allowed at all (8% of IDPs). Salah al-Din hosts 12% of IDPs in need of protection -21% of unaccompanied children and 11% of minor heads of household - and 14% of all returnees in need of protection - 49% of unaccompanied children, 18% of physically and/or mentally challenged individuals, 14% of minor heads of household and 14% of mothers under 18. These figures can be linked to the high rate of family separations recorded in the governorate, as only 44% of IDP and 67% of returnee families are united, and to the most needed information of IDPs and returnees: the status of detained family members (37% of IDPs and 25% respectively).

CONFLICT AND COHESION⁴⁹

RETURNEE CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

Returnees	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Daur	6.55	3.30
Al-Fares	0.00	-0.94
Al-Shirqat	2.04	-2.54
Baiji	0.00	-2.09
Balad	2.17	-2.24
Samarra	4.23	3.80
Tikrit	2.91	-2.00
Tooz	0.00	0.86

Salah al-Din has the second worst returnee conflict score after Baghdad. In particular, the risk of conflict was medium in both Al Daur and Samarra, due to tensions between militias on the one hand, and returnees and civilians on the other. It should be noted that the presence of militias (in sole or joint control of the location) was reported in all the districts of Salah al-Din, which is one of the factors mostly correlated with an increase of the conflict score. Mistrust, as well as threats and occasional individual incidents between IDPs and returnees and/or other

unspecified groups were reported as affecting around one third of the population. Evidence of favoritism was also reported, especially in terms of employment (55%). As for social cohesion, no cooperation was found in any district except in Al Daur and Samarra, where a positive interaction was recorded. Apparently, IDPs and returnees (and other unspecified groups) cooperate in cleaning rubble (27%), rebuilding damaged houses (13%) and fencing mines (10%).

LIVING CONDITIONS AND SHELTER ISSUES

0F IDPs LIVE IN CRITICAL SHELTERS





Access to employment, shelter and food are the top three concerns of IDPs settled in Salah al-Din, while returnees are on average more concerned about access to health, employment and drinking water. Employment figures in the governorate are above country average and most returnees have jobs in 55% of locations. Their main source of income is the public sector and 56% of families rely on agriculture. The most needed information for the IDP population is on cash aid (51%), status of de-

tained family members (37%, the highest percentage in Iraq) and food distribution (36%), while returnees are mostly in need of information on health services (38%), documentation (both personal documents and for land restitution) and the status of detained family members (25%).




FIGURE 6. MOST IMPORTANT NEEDS OF IDPs AND RETURNEES

Unlike the overall trend where most IDPs live in rented housing (62%), only 40% of IDPs in Salah al-Din can afford this type of accommodation. IDPs in the governorate seem particularly vulnerable as only 12% benefit of the hospitality of relatives/ friends. As a result, nearly half are settled in critical shelters such as unfinished/abandoned buildings and other informal settlements. This finding is in line with ILA I. As for returnees, only 89% have come back to their habitual residence, while the others have been forced to rent accommodation (6%), settle with another family (1%) or in informal shelters (4%), including occupied private residences. Accordingly, both IDPs and returnees reported shelter issues, such as overcrowding, poor quality and high prices. Returnees in Salah al-Din are also likely to report HLP issues, such as the loss of documents (47%), the destruction of government records (29%), lack of funds to pay for the replacement of documents (19%) or of a dedicated office (20%).




FIGURE 7. IDPs' SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Compared to ILA I, there has been a decrease in the IDPs' intentions to return home, both on the short term (from

72% to 42%) and long term (from 97% to 86%). In addition to lack of security in the location of origin, which is still ranked as the first obstacle by nearly 80% of IDPs, local integration may have become an option for IDPs also because returns to the area of origin are not permitted (for 100% of IDPs in Al Fares, Balad and Tooz and 75% of those settled in Samarra) or because an ethno-religious change may have occurred in the location of origin, (for over 70% of IDPs in Samarra). As for returns, Salah al-Din has been the first governorate to witness large-scale returns: by the end of July 2015, 130,000 individuals had already returned to their location of origin, mostly in the district of Tikrit. At the time of the assessment, the governorate had witnessed over 360,000 returns, nearly all from within the governorate. Most returns continue to be driven by the regained security of the location of origin (61%) and the prospect to work or recreate livelihoods (74%). Yet many have also been pushed by either the lack of means to stay in displacement (40%) or negative incentives (threat from the local authorities or withholding of salaries or aid, such as the Public Distribution System (PDS). Encouragement from community/religious leaders (25%) and/or support/positive incentives by government authorities/humanitarian actors (5%) was somewhat less important.



NON RETURN GOVERNORATES

Baghdan

Rabyion

Wassin

Ontissiya

Missai

Fm-Qar

Basrali

Muthanna

BABYLON GOVERNORATE PROFILE









	IDPs
Al-Mahawil	454
Al-Musayab	2,603
Hashimiya	992
Hilla	3,292

TABLE 1. POPULATION PER DISTRICT AND CHANGE SINCE ILA I¹ (No. Of Families)

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Babylon received a constant flow of IDPs, mostly from Ninewa, until the end of 2015. Over 30,000 individuals also fled Babylon and account for 34% of all IDPs in Babylon – and 1% of all Iraqi IDPs). The situation has been stable since ILA I and only IDPs originally from Anbar have left the governorate, while no internal returns were recorded because security forces do not allow IDPs from Babylon to go back to their areas of origin.²



FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II³

Returns to Anbar are linked to a slight decrease in the share of Arab Sunnis hosted in Babylon; Turkmen Shias are now prevalent. There are also other minority groups settled in Babylon, such as Shabak and Arab Shias.





FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

- 1. Nearly all families who fled Babylon originate from Jurf Al-Sakhar and surroundings. Government-backed Shia militias liberated the area in late October 2015, but Sunni families the majority of those who fled the city remained displaced because returns were not allowed and because of fear of persecutions. See IOM DTM Babylon Governorate profile, June–September 2015. See also UNHCR Position on Returns to Iraq, High Commissioner for Refugees, November 2016; and Musings on Iraq, More Returns Leads to Slight Decline in Displaced in Iraq, 20 September 2016, http://bit.ly/2e32daD.
- 2. The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.
- 3. Distribution of IDPs in Babylon according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Extra-governorate IDPs were attracted to Babylon because of its safety, the presence of extended family/friends and the availability of housing. Internal displacement was mostly pulled by the proximity to the location of origin. However, all IDPs in Babylon face strong obstacles to return, such as lack of security in the location of origin (80% of IDPs in Hilla and Hashimiya) and prevention by the security forces in the location of origin (90% of IDPs in Al-Musayab).



As a result, only 7% of families wish to return to their location of origin on the short term, one of the lowest percentages in Iraq. Compared to ILA I, involuntary stay has more than doubled, a finding that can be linked to returns to Anbar and to the comparatively higher share of internal IDPs hosted in the governorate (whose returns are prevented by security forces).




FIGURE 4. SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS ILA I and ILA II


FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS



Obstacles

The security situation in the governorate is stable and no major incidents were reported. Petty crimes and home violence affect nearly 70% of IDPs. Babylon hosts 2% of all IDPs in need of protection. Family separations were also recorded in nearly 20% of locations.



Security incidents Protection concerns

FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

^{4.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".


CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Mahawil	1.54	0.00
Al-Musayab	2.97	0.00
Hashimiya	1.38	0.00
Hilla	0.87	0.00

The governorate hosts few IDPs, thus no apparent conflict was detected in any of its districts, except Al-Musayab, where most IDPs are from within the governorate and occasional incidents occur between IDPs and host community members. Mistrust among residents or between local residents and those of neighboring areas was recorded. No cooperation between groups was ascertained, at any level.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Scarcity of jobs is the main obstacle preventing IDPs to access employment, their most rated concern. Household and non-food items were rated mostly as to too expensive, and housing both expensive and overcrowded. The high shares of IDPs in need of information about cash aid and rent assistance reflect these concerns. It should also be noted that water and food were rated of bad quality in locations hosting respectively 85% and 20% of the IDPs.



Concerns

FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



Shelter distribution is consistent with ILA I. However, a slight increase of families settled in rented housing was recorded at the expense of

families hosted by relatives/friends. This finding could be linked to returns to Anbar – as families from Anbar are more likely to be hosted in virtue of strong family bonds.






FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



GOVERNORATE PROFILE









	IDPs (no. of families)
Abu Al-Khaseeb	244
Al-Midaina	84
AI-Qurna	74
Al-Zubair	368
Basrah	813
Fao	14
Shatt Al-Arab	89

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Basrah is a displacement governorate. It received a constant flow of IDPs until April 2015, recording additional arrivals only sporadically afterwards. It hosts around 10,000 individuals, mostly from Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Anbar. The situation is stable since ILA I and only 2% of families have left the governorate - most of whom originally from Anbar - while a slight increase of families from Salah al-Din (+8%) was also recorded.



FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II6






FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{5.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

^{6.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Over 40% of IDPs were attracted to Basrah because of the presence of extended family/friends and nearly 25% because of its security and stability. These positive factors, coupled with the strong obstacles to return facing families (83% lack of security in the location of origin, 30% house destroyed, 26% lack of money, 17% fear due to a change in the ethno-religious composition) explain the low outflows recorded until now and the low intention to return on the short term (7%).

However, compared to ILA I, a slight increase in families who are willing to return was recorded. This may be linked to positive expectations on the future safety of the area of origin.




FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

ILA I and ILA II

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY

SOMETIMES 46%

The situation in the governorate is stable and relatively secure, and only petty crimes

were reported as affecting 46% of the IDPs. Basrah hosts 1% of all IDPs in need of protection – nearly all female heads of households. Family separations were recorded in only 2% of locations.




FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

^{7.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".


CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Abu Al-Khaseeb	0.00	0.00
Al-Midaina	0.00	0.00
Al-Qurna	0.00	0.00
Al-Zubair	0.00	0.00
Basrah	0.11	0.00
Fao		0.00
Shatt Al-Arab	0.00	0.00

The governorate hosts few IDPs, most of who are settled in the district of Basrah. Confirming the evaluation of Basrah as a secure governorate, no apparent conflict among different groups was detected in any district. However, no cooperation was ascertained, at any level.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Access to household and non-food items is the top concern of IDPs, followed closely by access to employment. Scarcity of jobs is the main obstacle preventing IDPs to access the labor market, and it should be noted that nearly all the population rated all other main needs (such as food, NFIs, shelter, health and education) as too expensive. Accordingly, they mostly need information on food and NFI distribution and cash aid.



Concerns

FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



Shelter distribution is consistent with ILA I. However, a slight decrease in families settled in informal shelters was recorded, which is re-

flected in the corresponding decrease of families settled in critical shelters.





FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



DAHUK **GOVERNORATE PROFILE**

† 1 39,088 Families **† 234,358** Individuals -41% SINCE ILA 18



	IDPs (no. of families)
Amedi	2,162
Duhok	8,912
Sumel	16,585
Zakho	11.429

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Dahuk currently hosts 234,358 IDPs (11% of all Iraqi IDPs). Families in the governorate mostly fled Ninewa (99%) - and, to a lesser extent, Anbar and Salah al-Din - in the aftermath of three security incidents: the Anbar crisis, the Mosul crisis and the Sinjar offensive. Because it shares borders with Turkey, Dahuk – especially the district of Zakho – has also become an important stop for Iraqi nationals wishing to flee abroad. Since ILA I, 41% of families have left the governorate. Most outflows were recorded among IDPs originally from Ninewa, but families originally from Anbar and Salah al-Din are also gradually leaving the governorate.




FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017

Ethnic affiliation has played an important role in attracting specific ethno-religious groups to Dahuk. Yazidis (45%), Kurdish Sunnis (32%) and also Christians (8%, altogether Chaldean, Assyrian and Syriac) have all clustered in the governorate. As a result, a change in the prevalent ethno-religious group was recorded in 2% of locations that were previously mostly Arab Shia. Compared to ILA I, more Yazidi families seem to have left Dahuk compared to other ethno-religious groups.




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II




FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{8.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Lack of security in the location of origin was the top obstacle to return of IDP families in Dahuk in ILA I. Although still relevant (46% rated it among the top three obstacles), this reason has become comparatively less important than the lack of funds and/or of a shelter to come back to (55% of current IDPs do not have enough money, 49% have had their house destroyed and 47% occupied). In fact, vulnerable families are those most likely to have stayed in displacement. Returns are not allowed for 40% of families.

As a result, a great increase in families who are voluntarily willing to stay on the short term was recorded (from 62% to 97%): no one is willing to return home shortly (it was 5% in ILA I).




FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

FIGURE 4. SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS ILA I and ILA II

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY

SOMETIMES 69% Despite some tensions between the Turkish Government and units of the armed wing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based in KRI, Dahuk has enjoyed a stable security situation since the beginning of the 2014 conflict. However, daily crimes are reported and affect significant shares of IDPs - particularly, sexual assaults were reported as affecting 33% of individuals, the highest

percentage in Iraq. Dahuk hosts 8% of all IDPs who need protection -11% of mentally and/or physically challenged inviduals and 11% of female heads of household. Family separations were recorded in 7% of locations.



Protection concerns

FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

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^{9.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".


CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Amedi	0.00	0.00
Duhok	0.21	0,00
Sumel	1.10	0.36
Zakho	0.82	0.00

No apparent risk of conflict was assessed in any district, except in Sumel, where most IDPs are hosted, which nevertheless displays a low conflict score. Apparently mistrust and tensions interest competing groups of IDPs or competing host communities. Many key informants also did not provide a definite answer. No cooperation among groups was found, other than limited cooperation between returnees and stayers. The only positive score was recorded in Sumel.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Access to food, health and shelter are top concerns for IDPs in Dahuk; these needs were all rated too expensive by the majority of the population. As for employment (top concern for nearly 60% of IDPs), jobs are scarce and low paid. Accordingly, IDPs in Dahuk mostly need information on food and NFI distributions (92% and 44% respectively) and cash aid (48%). It should be noted that nearly 30% of families need information on family reunification mechanisms.



Concerns

FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



Shelter distribution is consistent with ILA I and the most prevalent housing option for IDP families is rented housing. Compared to ILA I, no

change in the share of families settled in critical shelter was recorded, as these still account for nearly one third of families in Dahuk.





FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I/ILA II



Needed information

GOVERNORATE PROFILE

9,072 Families | 54,432 Individuals



	IDPs (no. of families)
Ain Al-Tamur	35
Al-Hindiya	3,595
Kerbala	5,442

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

IDPs in Kerbala account for 3% of the IDP population in Iraq (54,432 individuals), most of who are Turkmen Shias displaced from Ninewa after June 2014. Smaller groups also came from all the other governorates. Since ILA I, only 18% of families have left the governorate. Outflows were recorded among all families notwithstanding their origin, but in particular among IDPs originally from Ninewa and Anbar.



FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II11

The ethno-religious make-up of the governorate has been a major pull factor for IDPs since the beginning of the conflict: 98% of the population is Shia, of which 78% are Turkmen Shias who have clustered in displacement, just like in Babylon. No change in the ethno-religious composition of locations hosting IDPs was recorded.




FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{10.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.


^{11.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Kerbala has been a forced destination of displacement for nearly 45% of IDPs, who displaced to Kerbala because they had no other choice. This negative factor, coupled with the strong obstacles to return facing these families (40% of families are not allowed to return and 31% fear a change in ethno-religious composition) explain the very low desire to go back.

Compared to ILA I, fewer families are willing to return on the short term (3% versus 10%) and voluntary stays have increased. This is presumably due to the homogeneous religious background with the host community.



of origin

FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

FIGURE 4. SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS ILA I and ILA II

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS


do not allow

return



Obstacles

Just as in ILA I, domestic violence, petty crimes, harassment and kidnappings were reported in the governorate as affecting respectively 79%, 67%, 12% and 11% of the IDP population. These violent offences could be linked to the high presence of vulnerable minors. Kerbala hosts 22% of all unaccompanied children, 17% of all mothers under 18 and 13% of minor heads of household. Family separations were recorded in 26% of locations.



Protection concerns

FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

12. Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".


CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Ain Al-Tamur		
Al-Hindiya	2.99	0.15
Kerbala	1.65	0.21

Overall, a low conflict score was found and mistrust and tensions were only recorded in the two districts of Al-Hindiya and, to a lesser extent, Kerbala. The potential risk of conflict mostly stems from tensions between the affluent and poor, and only occasionally owners and occupiers, or IDPs and host communities. Cooperation, albeit limited, was ascertained between IDPs and host communities.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Access to household and non-food items, and health services are top concern of IDPs because they are too expensive. In addition to information on cash aid and food distributions – the most important information for IDPs – nearly 40% of families would like to have more information on the security situation in the area of origin and 31% on the mechanisms for land/property restitution.



Concerns

FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



Shelter distribution is consistent with ILA I with Kerbala standing out, nationwide, for the high number of IDPs who are hosted in religious build-

ings (49%, +4% since ILA I). This finding can be linked to the high share of IDPs (41%) who rated the quality of the shelter where they live as poor/inadequate; 2% of IDPs are prevented from renting.





FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



MISSAN GOVERNORATE PROFILE









Amara	630
Al-Kahla	
Al-Maimouna	3
Al-Mejar Al-Kabir	69
Ali Al-Gharbi	23
Qal'at Saleh	30

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

The number of IDPs in Missan is less than 0.2% of the countrywide number of IDPs: 4,572 individuals, nearly all settled in the district of Amara, the governorate's capital. Families arrived mostly from Ninewa and the situation is stable since ILA I, as fewer than 150 families have left the governorate.

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT



FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II14

Arab (46%), Shabak (28%) and Turkmen (11%) Shias account for 86% of the IDP population, confirming the preference of Shias to settle in the Shia-dominated south. Arab Sunnis (originally from Anbar) account for the remaining 14% share. No shift in the ethno-religious composition of locations hosting IDPs was recorded.




FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{13.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.


^{14.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Nearly 90% of families were attracted to Missan because of its security and stability, and 10% because of the presence of extended family/friends. These positive factors, coupled with the significant obstacles to return facing families – 75% lack of security in the location of origin, 40% house destroyed, 21% house occupied and, particularly, 67% lack of money – explain the low outflows recorded until now and the fact that no IDP wishes to return on the short term.

No change in the intentions on the short term was assessed compared to ILA I: all families are willing to stay. The ethno-religious affiliation of the host community is a very important factor affecting voluntary intentions to integrate.






FIGURE 4. **SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS** *ILA I and ILA II*

FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY15

SOMETIMES

32%

The situation in the governorate is stable and relatively secure –only domestic violence and petty crimes were reported

as affecting respectively 69% and 32% of IDPs. Missan hosts 1% of all female heads of households in Iraq, meaning that nearly one fourth of families are female-headed. No separations were recorded.




FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

^{15.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the IDP and returnee population hosted) where security incidents were reported as prevalence labelled as "often" or "sometimes".


CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Kahla		
Al-Maimouna		
Al-Mejar Al-Kabir	0.00	0.58
Ali Al-Gharbi	0.00	
Amara	0.08	0.76
Qal'at Saleh		

The governorate hosts few IDPs, most of who are settled in the district of Amara. Confirming the evaluation of Missan as a secure governorate, no apparent conflict among groups was detected, while limited cooperation between IDPs and host communities was ascertained.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Access to food and household and non-food items is the top concern of IDPs. Nearly all families need more information on food distribution and cash aid. Although it is a secure destination, Missan is one of the poorest governorates in Iraq. This, coupled with the fact that most IDPs in the governorate are long-term displaced (since September 2014) from distant governorates, may explain why nearly all families are having difficulties in accessing food.



Concerns

FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



The distribution of shelter is consistent with ILA I: 49% of families live in rented housing, 39% are hosted by other families and 12% are settled in critical shelters (6% in schools).





FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



MUTHANNA DIDPS 615 Families GOVERNORATE PROFILE









District	IDPs (no. of families)
Al-Samawa	359
Al-Khidhir	58
Al-Rumaitha	198

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Muthanna hosts less than 0.2% of Iraqi IDPs (3,690 individuals), mostly settled in the district of Samarra, the governorate's capital. IDPs displaced to the governorate between May and June 2015, and following October 2015. Most are originally from Ninewa and Anbar, but there are also smaller groups from other governorates. Since ILA I, around one fourth of families left the governorate, although outflows have slowed since May.



FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II17

As in Missan, Arab (13%), Shabak (35%) and Turkmen (34%) Shias account for the overwhelming majority of the IDPs, confirming the preference of Shias to settle in the Shia-dominated south. Arab Sunnis (from Anbar) account for the remaining 18%. No shift in the ethno-religious composition of locations hosting IDPs was recorded.



FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{16.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.


^{17.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.


REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Nearly all IDPs came to Muthanna in search of security and peace and all are staying in displacement for this reason (100% of families rated the lack of security in the place of origin as a top obstacle to return). The lack of a shelter to return to (because it is either occupied or destroyed) is also a deterrent for around 40% of families, while apparently no returns to the location of origin are prevented, and lack of funds is not an issue either.

Compared to 2017, there has been a remarkable shift in intentions as local integration or return on the short term is more prevalent than intention to resettle in a third location in Iraq. The uncertainty of the security situation in the location of origin is probably pushing families to postpone their decision to return, to avoid the stress of a secondary displacement.





Obstacles

FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

FIGURE 4. **SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS** *ILA I and ILA II*

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY18

SOMETIMES

55%

The security situation in the governorate is stable, but domestic violence was reported as affecting nearly all families.

Although there are comparatively few IDPs in need of protection in the governorate, family separations were recorded in nearly half the locations and this might partly explain why domestic violence is so recurrent.




FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

^{18.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Khidhir	0.00	0.00
Al-Rumaitha	0.00	0.00
Al-Samawa	0.00	0.00

Confirming the evaluation of Muthanna as a secure governorate, no apparent conflict among different groups was detected in any district. However, no cooperation was ascertained.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Access to employment and shelter are equally important concerns for IDPs, which is quite predictable considering that Muthanna is one of the poorest governorates in Iraq and IDPs have been in displacement for a long time and might therefore have exhausted their financial potential. Accordingly, nearly all IDPs in Muthanna need more information on access to employment and cash aid. It should also be noted that nearly all families would like to have more information on the mechanisms for land/property restitution.




FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



Compared to ILA I, there has been an increase in families settled in critical shelters (from 19% to 26%) and hosted by other families (from

29% to 35%) at the expense of those living in rented housing. Apparently, the more affluent families have managed to leave the governorate, leaving poor families behind -13% of families are now settled in unspecified type of settlements.





FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



NAJAF GOVERNORATE PROFILE



District	IDPs (no. of families)
Al-Manathera	322
Kufa	1,586
Najaf	10,415

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Najaf hosts 73,938 individuals (3% of all Iraqi IDPs). Most families came to the governorate before August 2014, fleeing from Falluja, Anbar; additional arrivals were recorded only sporadically afterwards, due to the armed groups' advancement in Ninewa and Salah al-Din.²⁰ The situation is stable since ILA I and only 6% of families have left the governorate – most of who are originally from Anbar.



FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II²¹

The ethno-religious make-up of the governorate has attracted many Shias, as Najaf hosts one of the most important Shia shrines in the country. In particular, Turkmen Shias (from Ninewa) have clustered in the governorate and account for 88% of the IDP population. Najaf also hosts 6% of Shabak Shias and 2% of Arab Shias, while Arab Sunnis from Anbar account for 2%.




FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{19.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

^{20.} IDPs who fled from Anbar were required to secure a local sponsor to enter the governorate. However, these requirements were not applicable to those who displaced from Ninewa.


^{21.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



For nearly half of IDP families, Najaf was a forced destination of displacement because families had no other choice. The governorate's security and the availability of housing were much less important reasons than the lack of choices (for 31% and 17% families respectively). As for obstacles to return, nearly 90% of families have had their house destroyed, 83% still deem their area of origin unsafe and 35% fear a change in ethno-religious composition.

These factors may explain the significant decrease in the intentions to return home on the short term (from 52% in ILA I to 4% in ILA II). As a result, nearly 90% of IDPs are voluntarily staying.






FIGURE 4. **SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS** *ILA I and ILA II*



FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS




FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

^{22.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Manathera	0.00	0.11
Kufa	0.46	0.12
Najaf	0.19	0.01

Confirming the evaluation of Najaf as a secure governorate, no apparent conflict among different groups was detected in any district. Tensions between IDPs and host community members were found only in the district of Kufa. Nevertheless, evidence of limited cooperation between IDPs and host community was found in the three surveyed districts (including Kufa).

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Nearly all IDPs reported issues in accessing employment and household and non-food items. The fact that IDP families are more concerned about low wages than about the number jobs may explain why household and non-food items are out of reach. Therefore, information on cash aid and NFI distribution is the most needed. It should also be noted that nearly half the population faces difficulty in accessing health services, because these services are too far away.




FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



Shelter distribution is consistent with ILA I, and around 60% of families are still settled in religious buildings, either in mosques or hussayni-

yat, informal Shia religious buildings commonly used as prayer rooms for men. This finding is closely linked to the high share of families who reported either overcrowding or poor quality of the shelter where they live.




FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



QADISSIYA



District	IDPs (no. of families)
Afaq	687
Al-Shamiya	558
Diwaniya	2,244
Hamza	487

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

There are currently 23,856 IDPs in the governorate, that is, 1% of the overall number of IDPs countrywide. As in Missan and Najaf, most IDPs arrived before September 2014 from Ninewa, Anbar and Kirkuk, with sporadic arrivals from other governorates afterwards. Most families reside in the district of Diwaniya, the governorate's capital. The situation is stable since ILA I and only 1% of families have left the governorate – most of them are from Anbar and Ninewa.




FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II24

Most of those displaced in Qadissiya are Shias (65% Arab Shia, 18% Turkmen Shia and 1% Shabak Shia), confirming the preference of Shias to settle in the Shia-dominated south. The governorate also hosts 16% of Arab Sunnis who are mostly from Anbar. No change in the ethno-religious composition of the locations was recorded.




FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{23.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

^{24.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.


REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



The presence of extended family/friends was the strongest pull factor that brought families to the governorate (46%) and this factor, coupled with the strong obstacles to return, is keeping them in displacement. Not only 72% of families have had their house destroyed, but also security forces do not allow 50% of returns.

As a result, families are increasingly willing to stay in displacement on the short term. Another factor hindering returns is fear due to a change in the major ethno-religious composition in the place of origin (reported by 15% of families).

100% -




Lack of

money


Absence of

services back

home



Reasons



30%

Obstacles

SOMETIMES

FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY25

The situation in the governorate is stable and relatively secure - only domestic violence was reported as affecting 30% of the IDPs. Qadissiya hosts 2% of IDPs who need protection - 6% of all minor heads of household. Family separations were recorded in 9% of locations.


Fear as a result

of the changed

ethno-religious

composition of

the place of origin



Unable to

return because

the security

forces in the

origin area

do not allow return

Security incidents

Protection concerns

FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

^{25.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".


CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Afaq	0.93	0.57
Al-Shamiya	0.69	0.72
Diwaniya	1.07	0.23
Hamza	0.37	0.85

Confirming the evaluation of Qadissiya as a secure governorate, no apparent conflict among different groups was detected in any district. Comparatively higher conflict scores were found in Diwaniya, where most IDPs are hosted, and Afaq, due to tensions between tribes and occasionally between IDPs and host communities. Evidence of very limited cooperation was also found in all districts. Tribes, and again IDPs and host communities, are collaborating partners.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Access to employment is the top concern of IDPs. The scarcity of jobs is the main obstacle preventing them from accessing the labor market, while other main need, such as food, NFIs, shelter, health and education were all rated as too expensive. It should also be noted that water is of poor quality for over 75% of IDPs and access to markets is problematic for over 25% of IDPs. Accordingly, information on NFI distribution and cash aid is the most needed.



Concerns

FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



Shelter distribution is unchanged since ILA I: only 38% of IDPs live in rented accommodations and 21% are hosted by other families.

Just like in Najaf, most IDPs in Qadissiya tend to be hosted in critical shelters (41%) – most of who in religious buildings. This high share of IDPs who cannot afford to rent a house may be explained by their prolonged displacement, which may have exhausted their savings.




FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



SULAYMANIYAH DPs 10Ps 11,130 Families 1 126,780 Individuals

GOVERNORATE PROFILE







District	IDPs (no. of families)
Chamchamal	1,676
Darbandikhan	666
Dokan	944
Halabja	1,325
Kalar	2,988
Penjwin	5
Pshdar	169
Rania	720
Sharhazher	105

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Sulaymaniyah hosts 6% of all Iraqi IDPs, that is 126,780 individuals. Due to its relatively stable security situation, it has received several flows of IDPs, mostly in the aftermath of three security incidents: the Anbar Crisis (January 2014), the Mosul Crisis (June 2014) and the Sinjar offensive (August 2014). IDP families in the governorate arrived mostly from Anbar, with smaller groups from Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Diyala and Baghdad, and resettled in the district of Sulaymaniyah. Since ILA I, around 20% of families have managed to leave the governorate most outflows were recorded for families originally from Salah al-Din – while a slight increase in inflows from Baghdad (+10%) and Diyala (6%) was also recorded.



FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II²⁷

The overwhelming majority of IDPs are Arab Sunni Muslims (94%), an inflow that has caused a change in the ethno-religious composition of 4% of formerly Kurdish Sunni locations. Yazidis, Kurdish Sunnis, and Shabak Shias (6% overall) were also attracted to this Kurdish area.




FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION


^{26.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

^{27.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.

REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



IDPs in Sulaymaniyah have been severely affected by the Iraqi conflict: 51% have had their house occupied and 32% destroyed; the lack of security and basic services in the location of origin is still an issue for around 70% of families. In addition, 20% of families lack funds to return, and 36% fear an ethno-religious change in the location of origin.



For these reasons, most families who came to the governorate attracted by its security and availability of jobs and housing, are postponing their return; compared to ILA I, they are increasingly determined to voluntarily stay on the short term (from 35% in ILA I to 98% in ILA II).




FIGURE 4. SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS ILA I and ILA II




return

FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY28 SOMETIMES 85% OFTEN 2%

The situation in the governorate appears relatively volatile, and sporadic terrorist attacks were reported as affecting 2% of the population. Domestic violence and petty crimes were also reported as affecting considerable shares of IDPs (94% and 87% respectively). Sulaymaniyah hosts 6% of all IDPs in need of protection - 7% of all mentally and/or physically challenged individuals and 9% of all female heads of households. Family separations were recorded in 77% of locations, one of the highest percentages in Iraq.



Security incidents Protection concerns

FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

28. Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Chamchamal	1.01	2.00
Darbandikhan	0.65	2.00
Dokan	0.38	1.89
Halabja	1.15	1.77
Kalar	0.52	1.63
Penjwin		
Pshdar	0.00	2.00
Rania	1.83	2.00
Sharbazher	0.00	2.00
Sulaymaniya	0.53	1.94

No apparent conflict was assessed in the governorate and in the district of Sulaymaniyah – where most IDPs in this governorate are hosted. Relatively higher scores were found in the two districts of Rania and Halabja. Tensions, if present, only interest IDPs and host communities. On the other hand, the assessed level of cooperation in all districts is quite high, and IDPs and residents appear to collaborate in different projects benefitting the community.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Access to household and non-food items, as well as employment, are the top concerns of IDPs. The scarcity of jobs, coupled with the prolonged displacement and the strain of paying rent, are preventing most IDPs to access food and NFIs. It should also be noted that the insufficient supply of water is affecting over 80% of the population. The most needed information on food and NFI distributions and cash aid.




FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



The distribution of shelter is consistent with ILA I: nearly all IDPs are settled in rented housing, and only 4% of families are settled in critical shelters — one of the lowest percentages in Iraq.





FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



Needed information

GOVERNORATE PROFILE

100%	COVERAGE

	IDPs (no. of families)
Al-Chibayish	18
Al-Rifa'i	174
AI-Shatra	235
Nassriya	711
Suq Al-Shoyokh	200

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

Displacement figures in Thi-Qar are rather low and the total IDP population amounts to 8,028 individuals, or 0.3% of all Iraqi IDPs. Most IDPs arrived from Ninewa and Anbar following the events of the summer of 2014, possibly attracted by the mixed ethno-religious make-up of the governorate. The situation is stable since ILA I and only 2% of families have left the governorate – most of who originally from Anbar.




FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II30

Arab Shias (64%) and Turkmen Shias (13%) originally from Ninewa account for most of the displaced population. Shabak Shias (4%) are also hosted in the governorate, confirming the preference of minorities to settle in governorates with a mixed ethno-religious composition. Arab Sunnis (from Anbar) are also present but comparatively less numerous (6%).




FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{29.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

^{30.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.


REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



Thi-Qar has the highest percentage of Iraqi IDPs who cannot return because their house has been destroyed (88%) and/or who fear to return because of an ethno-religious change in their location of origin (66%). IDPs in Thi-Qar seem particularly vulnerable, considering that 30% of families reported that they came to the governorate because they had no other choice. However, 25% of families are supported by the presence of extended family and friends, with 41% hosted by other families.


Short-term intentions have changed significantly compared to ILA I and an increase in families who intend to return on the short term was assessed (from 5% to 22%). This finding may be linked to positive expectations on the future safety of the area of origin. A shift in voluntary stay on the short term, compared to involuntary stay, was also recorded.





Reasons





Obstacles

FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

SOMETIMES 24%
OFTEN 26%

The situation in the governorate is relatively stable and domestic violence, petty crimes and kidnappings were reported as affecting respectively 74%, 51% and 3% of the IDPs. However, most episodes of domestic violence and petty crimes take place frequently. Thi-Qar hosts 1% of all IDPs in need of protection -4% of all unaccompanied children. Family separations were recorded in nearly half of locations.




FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

^{31.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Chibayish		0.00
Al-Rifa'i	0.00	0.00
Al-Shatra	0.00	0.02
Nassriya	0.00	0.00
Suq Al-Shoyokh	0.00	0.00

The governorate hosts a few IDPs, most of who are settled in the district of Nassiriya. No apparent conflict nor cooperation among different groups was detected in any district.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

Access to employment and shelter are top concerns of IDPs. Scarcity of jobs is the main obstacle preventing IDPs from accessing the labor market, while housing was rated of poor quality, too expensive and overcrowded in many locations. In addition to information on how to access jobs, over 60% of IDPs would also like to have more information on personal documentation.




FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



Shelter distribution is consistent with ILA I and only 4% of IDPs are settled in critical shelters – one of the lowest percentages in Iraq. IDPs in Thi-Qar are mostly settled in rented housing; over 40% are hosted by other families.




FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II



WASSI





	IDPs (no. of families)
Al-Azezia	660
Al-Hai	303
Al-Na'maniya	905
Al-Suwaira	485
Badra	80
Kut	1,958

TABLE 1. IDP FAMILIES PER DISTRICT

POPULATION AND MOVEMENTS

The number of IDPs in Wassit is 1% of the countrywide overall number, that is 26,346 individuals, nearly all settled in the district of Kut, the governorate's capital. Almost all families arrived from Ninewa and Anbar in two successive waves (summer of 2014 and spring of 2015) with only sporadic inflows afterwards. Since ILA I, a few families - mostly from Anbar (-7%) have left the governorate, while inflows were recorded from Ninewa, Salah al-Din and also Diyala.



FIGURE 1a. DISPLACEMENTS 2014-2017




FIGURE 1b. RETURNS ILA I and ILA II³³

Turkmen Shias make up most of those displaced in Wassit (62%) and they are so numerous that they have clustered in displacement, as they have done in Babylon, Kerbala and Qadissiya. Arab Sunni Muslims, mostly from Anbar, also account for a significant share (around 16%) of the IDP population. Shabak Shias (9%) and Arab Shias (8%) are also hosted in the governorate.




FIGURE 2. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

^{32.} The Integrated Location Assessment I (ILA I) was conducted from July to mid-October 2016. The analysis was based on the ILA I dataset except for the sections on population and movements, burden on host communities, displacement and returns and shelter type, which are based on Master List Round 60 (December 2016). See Integrated Location Assessment I, IOM, March 2017.

^{33.} Distribution of IDPs according to their governorate of origin, ILA I and ILA II.


REASONS, INTENTIONS AND OBSTACLES



The availability of housing and the security of the governorate are the top pull factors that continue to attract IDPs to Wassit. These positive factors, coupled with the lack of security in the location of origin that nearly all families are facing, account for the low outflows recorded until now. It should also be noted that, as in other governorates where Shias are prevalent among IDPs, a relevant share of families rated fear due to a change in the ethno-religious composition in the location of origin as among the top obstacles to return.


Short-term intentions are consistent with ILA I, although a slight increase in families who are willing to relocate within Iraq was recorded (+2%). This finding may be linked to the higher levels of conflict found in the governorate.















insecure/unsafe
due to ongoing conflict,
UXO, landmines, militias etc.

Obstacles


FIGURE 3. REASONS AND OBSTACLES

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

CRIME FREQUENCY34

SOMETIMES	93%
OFTEN	9%

The situation in the governorate seems relatively tense, with all kind security incidents except terrorist attacks reported. In particular, domestic violence and petty crimes affect nearly all the IDP population and sexual assaults and kidnapping affect respectively 14% and 17% of IDPs. Wassit hosts 3% of all IDPs in need of protection – in particular 4% of female heads of household, 3% of minor heads of household and 3% of mothers under 18. Family separations were recorded in 88% of locations, the highest percentage in Iraq.





Protection concerns

FIGURE 5. SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION CONCERNS

^{34.} Crime frequency is reported as the percentage of locations (weighted by the hosted IDP and returnee population) where security incidents were reported "often" or "sometimes".


CONFLICT AND COOPERATION INDEX PER DISTRICT:

	Conflict	Cooperation
Al-Azezia	4.34	0.58
Al-Hai	6.34	1.05
Al-Na'maniya	8.76	0.97
Al-Suwaira	7.94	0.80
Badra		
Kut	4.68	0.84

Wassit has one of the highest IDP conflict scores. The level of conflict is medium in all districts and high in Al-Na'maniya and Al-Suwaira. Evidence of tensions and mistrust between IDPs and host communities was reported, as well as favoritism in employment and local representation. The poor relations between IDPs and residents may be linked to the fact that most of the displaced population is of Turkic background while the host community is Arab. In addition, a relevant share of families in both Al-Na'maniya and Al-Suwaira is either female or minor headed and may feel particularly vulnerable compared to the resident population. Accordingly, cooperation is quite limited in all the surveyed districts, and IDPs and host communities only occasionally use each other's wasta to obtain services or collaborate in clearing rubble.

CONCERNS AND NEEDS

IDPs in Wassit are mostly concerned about accessing jobs, household and non-food items and shelter. In addition, it should be noted that nearly all families deemed water of bad quality and one third of families said education is too hard to access. The most needed information is on food and NFI distributions. Over half of families would also like to have more information on the security situation in their place of origin, as well as on cash assistance.



Concerns

FIGURE 5. TOP CONCERNS AND MOST NEEDED INFORMATION

SHELTER ISSUES



A slight increase in families settled in critical shelters was recorded since ILA I. This may be linked to the new inflows of families recorded since ILA I

- who were less likely to settle in with other families and more likely to reside in religious buildings. Overall, 25% of families are settled in this type of accommodation, a figure that may explain why fear of eviction is one of the most rated protection concerns of IDPs.




FIGURE 6. SHELTER TYPE ILA I and ILA II

