



International Organization for Migration (IOM)  
The UN Migration Agency

# ENABLING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MIGRATION FLOWS (AND ITS ROOT-CAUSES) FROM SOMALIA TOWARDS EUROPE

## DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX (DTM)

MAY 2018



© IOM 2018

A study funded by



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the  
Netherlands

International Organization for Migration

Geneva, Switzerland

May 2018

**INTERNAL FINAL REPORT (DEVELOPED FOR MINBUZA AND ITS GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS): ENABLING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MIGRATION FLOWS (AND ITS ROOT-CAUSES) FROM ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA, SOMALIA TOWARDS EUROPE.**

*This report is part of the outputs of the last phase of IOM's project implementation on data collection to enable a better understanding of migration flows from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia towards Europe, a collaborative effort by the DTM support team and relevant IOM field missions funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.*

**For further information, please contact:**

DTM Support Team: [dtmsupport@iom.int](mailto:dtmsupport@iom.int)

# CONTENTS

- LIST OF FIGURES ..... 6
- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... 8
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..... 9
  - Thematic area 1 – Migrant Profiles ..... 9
  - Thematic Area 2 – Migration Drivers & Decision Making ..... 9
  - Thematic Area 3 – Vulnerability Factors ..... 10
  - Thematic Area 4 – The Role of Intermediaries ..... 11
  - Thematic Area 5 – Migrant Perceptions Towards Europe ..... 11
  - Thematic Area 6 – Migrant Choices & Options ..... 12
- 1. INTRODUCTION ..... 14
  - 1.1 Problem statement, research questions and objectives ..... 14
  - 1.2 Background on migration from Somalia ..... 15
  - 1.3 Methodological Framework ..... 16
    - 1.3.1 Limitations ..... 17
  - 1.4 Structure of the study ..... 18
- 2. THEMATIC AREA 1 – MIGRATION PROFILES ..... 18
  - 2.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country ..... 19
  - 2.2 Somali nationals in Sudan ..... 19
  - 2.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya ..... 20
  - 2.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece ..... 21
  - 2.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands ..... 22
  - 2.6 Somali returnees ..... 23
- HIGHLIGHTS: Profiles of Somali migrants ..... 25
- 3. THEMATIC AREA 2 – MIGRATION DRIVERS AND DECISION MAKING ..... 25
  - 3.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country ..... 25
  - 3.2 Somali nationals in Sudan ..... 28
  - 3.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya ..... 31
  - 3.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece ..... 34
  - 3.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands ..... 36
  - 3.6 Somali returnees ..... 39

HIGHLIGHTS: Migration drivers & decision making among Somali migrants .....	42
4. THEMATIC AREA 3 – CHALLENGES AND RELATED VULNERABILITIES .....	43
4.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country .....	43
4.2 Somali nationals in Sudan.....	44
4.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya .....	45
4.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece .....	47
4.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands.....	48
4.6 Somali returnees.....	49
HIGHLIGHTS: Vulnerabilities and risks faced by Somali migrants.....	51
5. THEMATIC AREA 4 – THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES .....	52
5.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country .....	52
5.2 Somali nationals in Sudan.....	53
5.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya .....	55
5.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece .....	56
5.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands.....	58
5.6 Somali returnees.....	59
HIGHLIGHTS: The role of intermediaries for Somali migrants .....	60
6. THEMATIC AREA 5 – MIGRANT PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS EUROPE.....	61
6.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country .....	61
6.2 Somali nationals in Sudan.....	65
6.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya .....	69
6.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece .....	72
6.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands.....	75
6.6 Somali returnees.....	78
HIGHLIGHTS: Perceptions of Europe among Somali migrants.....	81
7. THEMATIC AREA 6 – MIGRANT CHOICES AND OPTIONS .....	84
7.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country .....	84
7.2 Somali nationals in Sudan.....	85
7.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya .....	86
7.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece .....	87
7.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands.....	88
7.6 Somali returnees.....	89
HIGHLIGHTS: Migration choices & options for Somali migrants.....	91

CONCLUSION.....	92
Thematic area 1 – Migrant Profiles .....	92
Thematic Area 2 – Migration Drivers & Decision Making.....	92
Thematic Area 3 – Vulnerability Factors.....	94
Thematic Area 4 – The Role of Intermediaries.....	95
Thematic Area 5 – Migrant Perceptions Towards Europe .....	95
Thematic Area 6 – Migrant Choices & Options .....	96
REFERENCES .....	98

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Education levels of Somali potential migrants, in per cent .....	19
Figure 2: Education levels of Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent .....	20
Figure 3: Education levels of Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent .....	21
Figure 4: Education levels of Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent .....	22
Figure 5: Education levels of Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent .....	23
Figure 6: Countries of return for Somali returnees, in per cent .....	24
Figure 7: Return types of Somali returnees, in per cent.....	24
Figure 8: Education levels of Somali returnees, in per cent .....	24
Figure 9: Reason 1 for Somali potential migrants to leave origin country for Europe, in per cent .....	26
Figure 10: Main triggers for the migration of Somali potential migrants, in per cent .....	27
Figure 11: Reason 1 for Somali nationals transiting in Sudan to leave origin country for Europe, in per cent.....	29
Figure 12: Main triggers for the migration of Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent.....	30
Figure 13: Reason 1 for Somali nationals transiting in Libya to leave origin country for Europe, in per cent .....	32
Figure 14: Main triggers for the migration of Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent .....	33
Figure 15: Reason 1 for Somali nationals transiting in Greece to leave their origin country for Europe, in per cent.....	35
Figure 16: Main triggers for the migration of Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent .....	35
Figure 17: Reason 1 for Somali nationals in the Netherlands to leave their origin country for Europe, in per cent.....	37
Figure 18: Main triggers for the migration of Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent.....	38
Figure 19: Reason 1 for Somali returnees to leave their origin country for Europe, in per cent.....	40
Figure 20: Main trigger for the migration of Somali returnees, in per cent .....	40
Figure 21: Expected primary problem among Somali potential migrants, in per cent .....	44
Figure 22: Primary reported problem among Somalis in Sudan, in per cent .....	45
Figure 23: Primary reported problem among Somalis in Libya, in per cent .....	46
Figure 24: Primary reported problem among Somalis in Greece, in per cent .....	48
Figure 25: Primary reported problem among Somalis in the Netherlands, in per cent .....	49
Figure 26: Primary reported problem among Somali returnees, in per cent .....	50
Figure 27: Intention to use a migration facilitator among Somali potential migrants, in per cent .....	52
Figure 28: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali potential migrants, in per cent.....	53
Figure 29: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent.....	54
Figure 30: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent.....	54
Figure 31: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent .....	55
Figure 32: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent.....	56
Figure 33: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent.....	57
Figure 34: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent.....	58
Figure 35: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent.....	58

Figure 36: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali returnees, in per cent.....	59
Figure 37: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali returnees, in per cent .....	60
Figure 38: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali migrants (across stages), in per cent .....	61
Figure 39: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali potential migrants, in per cent.....	62
Figure 40: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somali potential migrants, in per cent .....	63
Figure 41: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent .....	66
Figure 42: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somalis in Sudan, in per cent .....	67
Figure 43: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent .....	70
Figure 44: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somalis in Libya, in per cent .....	71
Figure 45: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent .....	73
Figure 46: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somalis in Greece, in per cent .....	74
Figure 47: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent .....	76
Figure 48: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somalis in the Netherlands, in per cent .....	76
Figure 49: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali returnees, in per cent ...	78
Figure 50: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somali returnees, in per cent.....	79
Figure 51: Expected support received from host government among Somali migrants, in per cent .....	83
Figure 52: Knowledge of asylum procedure among Somali migrants (across stages, in per cent).....	83
Figure 53: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali potential migrants, in per cent..	85
Figure 54: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent.....	86
Figure 55: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent.....	87
Figure 56: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent.....	88
Figure 57: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali returnees, in per cent .....	89
Figure 58: Reasons for return among Somali returnees, in per cent .....	90
Figure 59: Intention to migrate to Europe again among Somali returnees, in per cent .....	90

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

4MI	Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative
CMFS	Comprehensive Migration Flow Surveys
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPAM	European NGO Platform on EU Asylum and Migration Policy
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro (€)
FMP	Flow Monitoring Points
FMS	Flow Monitoring Surveys
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPPR	Institute for Public Policy Research
MEDMIG	Unravelling the Mediterranean Migration Crisis
NBIC	National biometric identity card
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
RMMS	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UK	United Kingdom
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States
USD	United States Dollars (\$)



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the main findings extrapolated from the analysis of data relating to the characteristics and experiences of Somali migrants before, in, on their way to, or upon return from Europe. The data was collected within the framework of IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). Specifically, the present analysis focused on six thematic areas: (1) socio-demographic profiles of migrants; (2) migration drivers and decision-making; (3) migrant challenges and related vulnerabilities in origin, transit, and destination countries; (4) the role of intermediaries; (5) migrants' perceptions of Europe; as well as (6) migrants' choices and options. These thematic areas were investigated at different stages of the migration journey of Somali migrants and in different country contexts: in Somalia before migration, in transit countries (Sudan, Libya, Greece), in a destination country (the Netherlands), and in Somalia upon return from Europe.

### Thematic area 1 – Migrant Profiles

With regards to the socio-demographic profiles of Somali nationals in their origin, transit, and destination countries as well as upon return, the following observations can be made. The majority of the Somali migrants were male, while more balanced sex distributions were observed amongst Somali migrants in Greece and those in the Netherlands. When comparing marital status across the different migration phases, it is found to be statistically significant that Somali potential migrants are more likely to be single than their counterparts in other stages of the migration journey. However, Somalis in the Netherlands were more often in a relationship and Somalis in transit are significantly most likely to be married or in a civil union. The average age of Somali migrants varies between 25 years and 33 years. This study found that Somali migrants most often had an intermediate level of education.

In terms of household characteristics, Somalis who were intending to migrate were less likely to have children than Somalis in transit and upon return. At the time of the survey, the timeframe for respondents planning to leave Somalia varied between three and four weeks or two to three months. Somali returnees mostly returned from Italy, Germany, or Norway via self-arranged return.

### Thematic Area 2 – Migration Drivers & Decision Making

Somali respondents in all parts of their migration journey reported on a wide range of drivers for migration that influenced their decision-making; personal, household, and community challenges faced pre-migration, reasons for leaving their origin country, employment status and income, having social networks in Europe, previous experiences with international migration and internal displacement.

Somali migrants faced several challenges in the six months prior to their migration to Europe like unemployment, lack of sufficient income, lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities, financial problems and debt. Respondents, especially transit migrants in Libya and Greece, also reported facing pressure from their families and communities to migrate. Somali migrants in the Netherlands, reported security challenges such as security threats and lack of rule of law at the community level, but at the personal and household level as well.

In line with these challenges, economic factors (e.g. lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities, absence of economic growth and prosperity) are cited as the main reasons for migration. Security reasons were also reported to varying degrees. Reasons of war and conflict at the country-level were most common amongst

transit migrants in Libya, while reasons of personal- and family-level insecurity as well as security threats were more often stated by Somalis transiting in Greece and the Netherlands. There is also statistically significant evidence that transit migrants were more likely to cite war and conflict as a reason to leave Somalia than their counterparts in other parts of the migration journey. Social influence (e.g. joining family or friends in Europe) is also occasionally stated as a reason for migration, particularly by Somalis in Greece.

Rather than a specific event, the migration of Somalis was triggered by a combination of economic factors (e.g. unemployment, loss of job), social influences (e.g. accompanying friends who are migrating, family wanted them to migrate), as well as security threats (e.g. security incident). In this regard, Somalis transiting in Libya and Greece commonly cited familial or social pressure. Similarly, for respondents in the Netherlands, in addition to family pressure a security incident, was also commonly reported.

Comparatively, Somali returnees reported to have been previously internally displaced than their counterparts. Potential migrants were generally more likely to have engaged in prior international migration for a period of at least six months. Furthermore, Somali returnees were significantly more likely to have had family than friends in Europe (before their initial migration to Europe) in comparison to respondents in transit and potential migrants. Somali migrants mostly made their migration decision independently and were less likely to discuss their migration with others. When they did discuss their migration decision with others, they mostly consulted their family and friends (who generally supported the migration decision). The importance of social media and communication for Somali migrants is observable through their indicated primary information sources on which they based their migration decisions.

### **Thematic Area 3 – Vulnerability Factors**

Within the context of this report, it should be noted that different ways of travelling (e.g. alone, with friends, with family members) entails different vulnerabilities. Somali potential migrants generally planned to travel to Europe with friends (42.8% of all answers given) or alone (26.8% of all answers given). Moreover, transit migrants, returnees, and migrants in the Netherlands most often reported travelling with a group, with friends, and/or alone. It is also observed that those in transit significantly more often indicated to travel with a group in comparison to their counterparts in other parts of the migration journey.

The majority of the Somali respondents reported to have a smartphone with them while traveling to Europe, which they mainly used for communicating with their friends and family at home and in Europe as well as to finding information about the journey. However, only about 15 per cent of the Somali migrants in the Netherlands reported to have had a smartphone with them while traveling to Europe. The main apps used by Somalis during their migration journey were Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, and Internet browsers.

Between almost 50 per cent (those transiting in Greece) and 83 per cent (those in transit in Libya as well as returnees) of the respondents expressed that they faced problems during their migration to Europe. However, only 40 per cent of migrants in the Netherlands reported to have faced problems during their migration to Europe. The most common problems expected amongst potential migrants included hunger and thirst, problems at sea, lack of shelter and a place to sleep. However, the problems their counterparts

actually faced were mostly hunger and thirst, health problems, detention<sup>1</sup>, problems at sea, physical violence, biometric registration<sup>2</sup>, forced labour, and financial shortages. There is also statistically significant evidence to conclude that respondents in transit more often experienced health problems in comparison to others; respondents in Greece, who did not mention health problems to a great degree, are an exception. The most common problems that transit migrants expected to face while migrating onwards to Europe included problems at sea, detention, as well as hunger and thirst.

When observing the cross-tabulations for what problems migrants faced, where they faced these problems, the observations are diverse. Considering all Somalis in transit collectively, respondents mostly experienced hunger and thirst, health problems, and detention whilst traveling to Europe. Hunger and thirst was mostly experienced in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Libya and attributed to migration facilitators or other migrants. Somali transit migrants mostly faced health problems in Somalia, Sudan, and Libya.

#### **Thematic Area 4 – The Role of Intermediaries**

Across the different stages, most of the Somali respondents planned to use or used a migration facilitator during their journey to Europe. Almost three-fourths of the Somali potential migrants planned to make use of a migration facilitator when leaving Somalia. Similarly, eight out of ten respondents in Sudan as well as returnees reported use of a migration facilitator while migrating to Europe. Approximately all respondents in Libya, Greece, and the Netherlands reported the same. Also, the average number of migration facilitators used by Somali respondents ranged between two and six facilitators. The Somali migrants contacted their facilitator primarily through family and friends in Somalia or family in Europe.

In preparation for their migration journey, Somali migrants mostly collected information on the costs, transportation, and routes of migration as well as on the job market and access to health care. They commonly reported to rely on savings, to borrow money, and sell land to finance their migration to Europe. It is, however, observed that, among Somali respondents, there is a great variance in actual and expected costs of migration between the different stages. Somali potential migrants expected an average cost of more than 20,000 USD to reach Europe, while total costs to reach final destination under this sample were around 6,500 USD as reported by Somalis in the Netherlands or upon return. Somali potential migrants and Somalis in transit in Sudan mostly expected to make or made payment in instalments, while Somalis in Libya and Greece, those in the Netherlands and upon return mostly used other forms of payment, such as full payment before departure or after arrival.

#### **Thematic Area 5 – Migrant Perceptions Towards Europe**

The intended destination countries among Somali migrants were diverse and included Sweden, Germany, the UK, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Reasons to choose an intended destination country were also varied. The most important main reason for Somali in all migration stages was social networks in the

---

<sup>1</sup> Detention by official authorities is legitimate part of the migration management. From the migrants' perspective, detention may be the deprivation of liberty based on their migration status and without committing any crime as such. Since this report provide data and research on migrant perception it is presented here as a 'problem'.

<sup>2</sup> The collection of biometric information and registration is part of the Dublin Agreement whereby biometric information is collected at the first port of entry. However, from the perspective of Iraqi migrants it may be viewed as coercive because Iraqi migrants are aware that registering their biometric information in transit, (but technically their first port of entry to Europe) may hinder the asylum processes in their preferred destination country. Hence, from the migrants' perspective it was reported as a problem encountered in the journey.

selected destination country. Other factors included economic reasons (e.g. availability of jobs), the supposed ease of access to asylum procedures, the safety of the country, education, circumstantial, or based on the migration facilitator. In this regard, the supposed ease of asylum procedures was cited significantly more often by Somali returnees than their counterparts.

Somalis generally reported that, upon arrival to Europe, their main priorities would be to apply for asylum, find work, apply for nationality, learn the local language, reunify with family and friends, and seek housing. Following that, the most commonly reported secondary support expected included receiving legal permit to stay in the country, free housing, healthcare, education, support in family reunification and financial support. The problems Somalis most commonly expected to face in Europe included deportation, rejection of their asylum claim and being unable to attain nationality, lack of financial support, being unable to bring family members, xenophobia, and a lack of jobs. In this regard, 31 per cent of Somalis in the Netherlands and 51 per cent of Somali returnees did not receive their main expected form of support, namely legal support to stay in their destination country.

Furthermore, this study found that the overall knowledge of the asylum procedure was very low amongst the Somali respondents. This was the lowest in Libya (5.5 %) and among potential migrants (14.2%). While this may point towards a lack of knowledge on the procedure itself, there was a general awareness of the importance of the asylum procedure for legally staying in Europe.

Regarding the main sources of information, Somalis primarily based their perceptions of Europe on word of mouth, Facebook, WhatsApp, the Internet, and television. The main channels for word of mouth were verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook and/or Skype) and written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) with friends and family in Europe. Somalis in transit used the television significantly more often as their source of information than their counterparts. Somali returnees were significantly more likely to use the Internet.

While Somali returnees are significantly less likely than other Somalis to advise others to migrate, they did advise others to migrate in a legal manner. Reasons cited by Somalis to advise others to migrate to Europe included perception of good jobs in Europe, a lack for hope for a future in Somalia, as well as perceived safety and security in Europe. Reasons for Somalis to discourage migration of others to Europe included difficulties and dangers along the migration route, life in Europe not being as expected, as well as xenophobia and discrimination in Europe. Transit migrants significantly more often than other Somalis discourage such migration because of dangerous nature of the travel route. Similarly, Somali potential migrants are significantly most likely to discourage the migration of others specifically based on too many difficulties along the way.

### **Thematic Area 6 – Migrant Choices & Options**

The main reasons for Somali migrants to choose migration to Europe over regional migration were economic- (e.g. lack of jobs and livelihood in region, better access to jobs in Europe, higher incomes) and security-related (e.g. respect for human rights, offerings of safety, Europe is safer). Other reasons for deciding against regional migration included perceptions of better life and social services in Europe as well as having social networks there.

Somalis generally reported that, if given the opportunity to work or study in their region, they would still consider migrating to Europe. Somali migrants in Greece and in the Netherlands are an exception to this, as only a small minority would consider not migrating to Europe if provided with opportunities within their region.

Respondents across migration stages were also asked about legal options for migration. Of Somali potential migrants and transit migrants, the majority planned to claim asylum, as also indicated as a first priority upon arrival in Europe. The awareness of legal options to migrate to Europe was varied amongst Somalis in the different stages of their migration journey. In this regard, 53 per cent of Somali potential migrants, 40 per cent of Somalis in Sudan, 56 per cent of Somalis in Greece, and 53 per cent of the returnees reported having this knowledge. However, none of the Somalis in the Netherlands reported being aware of the legal options to migrate. The most commonly reported legal option to migrate to Europe among Somalis was the Schengen visa. Somali transit migrants were significantly more likely than their counterparts to be aware of business visa and family reunification as legal options to migrate to Europe.

The vast majority of Somali respondents across the migration stages planned to stay in their destination country if they received legal status. Accordingly, only a small minority of the Somalis in the Netherlands reported an intention to return to Somalia. However, Somali returnees reported finding a job or an income-generating activity and negative reactions to returns from family and friends as primary challenges faced upon return. More than half of the returnees expressed no desire to migrate to Europe again.

# I. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Problem statement, research questions and objectives

Migration is a historical phenomenon that continues to shape Europe in different ways. Legal protection, employment and education are some reasons for migration to in recent decades. The International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is a system to track and monitor displacement and population mobility. It is designed to regularly and systematically capture, process, and disseminate information to provide a better understanding of the movements and evolving needs of displaced populations. Initially conceptualized in 2004 for the assessments of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and monitoring exercises, the DTM has been continuously refined and enhanced through years of operational experience in different countries in both conflict and natural disaster settings. This system provides primary data and information on displacement and mobility on the individual, household, community, national, and regional levels. Currently, a variety of activities are implemented under the DTM operations to monitor migration flows from various continents to Europe.

To arrive at a better understanding of migration flows from Somalia to Europe as well as the drivers of such migration movements, this project aims to answer ten research questions using data collected within the framework of the DTM. This study is based on six thematic areas identified by DTM, which in turn represent the core chapters of this report:

1	2	3	4	5	6
Migrant profiles (socio-demographic)	Migration drivers and decision making	Migrant vulnerabilities in origin, transit, and destination countries	The role of intermediaries	Migrant perceptions towards Europe	Migrant choices and options

These six thematic areas, moreover, serve as the framework to answer the ten research questions:

- **Q1.** What contextual factors on national and regional level drive Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali nationals to make a decision to migrate to Europe?
- **Q2.** What contextual factors on European level drive Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali nationals to make a decision to migrate to Europe?
- **Q3.** What particular individual, household or community level “events” and circumstances trigger Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali nationals to make a decision to migrate to Europe?
- **Q4.** What are the socio-demographic profiles of (potential) migrants to Europe from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia?
- **Q5.** How do migrants from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia prepare for migration to Europe?
- **Q6.** What role do “intermediaries” play in facilitating (irregular) migration to Europe for Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali nationals?

- **Q7.** What challenges and vulnerabilities do Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali nationals face before and during migration to Europe?
- **Q8.** How do migrants from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia select a final destination country in Europe, what influences this decision, and why do they select “that” particular final destination country?
- **Q9.** What perceptions and/or knowledge do (potential) migrants from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia have on potential risks and vulnerabilities migrants could face during migration to and in Europe?
- **Q10.** What perceptions and/or knowledge do (potential) migrants from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia have of Europe, and what are their sources of information? What is the view of Ethiopian, Nigerian and Somali (irregular) migrants on socio-economic opportunities in Europe and what knowledge do they have of European asylum procedures?

## 1.2 Background on migration from Somalia

With a population of 14.3 million as of 2016, Somalia is in the Horn of Africa and shares borders with Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya (World Bank, 2016c). With Mogadishu as the capital city, Somalia is *de facto* divided into three district administrative areas, namely Somaliland, Puntland, and Southern and Central Somalia (IOM, 2017c). Somalia can be characterized as one of the most ethnically and culturally homogenous countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region (Avis & Hebert 2016; EASO, 2014; IOM, 2014a; Lindley, 2013). The population of Somalia is highly affected by poverty, with 73 per cent of the population falling beneath the international poverty line (IOM, 2017c). These conditions put a strain on other aspects of life in the country (such as health, education, and sex equality) and place the country at the bottom of many human development indicators. Due to the country’s ongoing conflict situation and environmental challenges, Somalia has one of the largest and widespread diaspora communities worldwide (IOM, 2014a).

To situate Somalia’s migration history, it should be noted that the country gained its independence from United Kingdom in 1960. The Somali Democratic Republic was established nine years later following a military coup. The pursuant long-drawn conflict resulted in a liberation movement between the Somali National Movement and Somaliland between 1987 and 1991, civil war in 1991, and the eventual overthrow of the autocratic military regime. In the aftermath of these events, the country was left mostly without a central government, until the Islamic Courts Union took control of the southern parts of the country where it restored some stability. Somalia’s civil war resulted in the collapse of the state and the fragmentation of institutions, which led to the country being declared a “fragile state.” In addition, the events caused more than half a million refugees who fled to Ethiopia, as well as the internal displacement of thousands more Somalis (IOM, 2014a; ICG, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007).

Prior to the 1991 civil war, migration from Somalia was characterised by sea-men relocating to the UK as well as students and professionals moving to the European country due to the colonial ties. An earlier migration pattern emerged in the 1970 and 1980s due to the military regime in Somalia and saw Somali nationals moving to the Gulf States (Lindley, 2009). A decade later, until 1991, half a million Somali

refugees ended up in Ethiopian refugee camps and around 100,000 remained internally displaced within Somalia. The continuous violence in Somalia led another half a million nationals to seek refuge in Ethiopia and Djibouti between 1991 and 1992 (IOM, 2017c). Another notable refugee situation was triggered in 2011 due to conflict, government stagnation, drought, and famine, which resulted in 297,000 Somalis fleeing to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen (IOM, 2016a). In conclusion, most of the migration from Somalia in the last 25 years is a result of continuous conflict, extreme poverty, famine, chronic insecurity, and the lack of a functioning central government (RMMS, 2016).

Currently, around 18 per cent of Somalia's population is living outside of the country's borders, which accounts for a diaspora of about two million Somalis. Both historically and currently, the majority of Somali refugees have sought asylum in neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa – Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen – whereas the rest have primarily joined existing communities in the Middle East, North America, and Europe (IOM, 2014a; Elmi, 2010). Moreover, the estimated number of Somali IDPs varies between 1.1 million to 2 million in 2017. The country's ongoing conflict situation, unemployment and a lack of livelihood opportunities, accompanied by limited political, economic, and social rights, and unpredictable natural events are expected to continue impacting Somalia's migration situation (UNHCR, 2015; IOM, 2017c).

### **1.3 Methodological Framework**

The methodological framework of this project is based on the collection of primary data, which provides information on migration flows towards Europe from Somalia whilst focusing on the six thematic areas described above: (1) migrant profiles, (2) migration drivers and decision making, (3) migrant challenges and related vulnerabilities, (4) the role of intermediaries, (5) migrant perceptions towards Europe, and (6) migration choices and options. The data DTM collected was based on three tools, each surveying a different target group; data was collected on potential migrants, migrants en route to Europe, migrants in their final destination country (the Netherlands), and migrants that returned to their countries of origin. Potential migrants from Somalia were interviewed under Tool 1. Tool 2 covered Somali migrants surveyed in Sudan, Libya, and Greece, while migrants in the Netherlands were questioned under Tool 3. Somalis who had returned from Europe to their country of origin were included under Tool 4. Due to the nature of the target groups, respondents for these surveys were sampled using basic random sampling in combination with snowball sampling in main target locations (e.g. migrant assistance centres and seashore support houses). Sample sizes were as follows:

- **Somali nationals**
  - Tool 1, potential migrants: 1,497 respondents
  - Tool 2, Sudan: 403 respondents
  - Tool 2, Libya: 579 respondents
  - Tool 2, Greece: 142 respondents
  - Tool 3, the Netherlands: 55 respondents
  - Tool 4, returnees: 254 respondents



The data collection took place in the origin countries (for potential migrants and returnees) Somalia; in the transit countries, Sudan, Libya, and Greece; as well as in one main destination country, the Netherlands. The output of the data collection was mainly quantitative via surveys; however, one descriptive question (i.e. *What is an asylum procedure?*) was also included in the surveys. This qualitative analysis complements the quantitative outcomes of this study. Quantitative analysis has been based on cross tabulations as well as means comparison analyses (t-tests). The different phases of the migration journey – intending to leave (Tool 1), transit migration (Tool 2), destination country (the Netherlands, Tool 3), and return migration (Tool 4) – have been analysed to observe statistical mean differences in variables of interest between the studied migration trajectories. Significance levels were based on t-test with independent samples; where significant outcomes were noted within the report, this indicates a significance level of  $p \leq 0.10$ .

In this report, an extensive literature review was also conducted in order to situate and provide context to the statistical analysis of the DTM data, and to gain a better understanding of the migration journeys of Somali nationals to Europe including their migration routes; the roles of intermediaries and the diaspora; the challenges and risks migrants face pre-migration, along the route, and in their destination and upon return; as well as the factors influencing their decision-making factors.

### **1.3.1 Limitations**

Please find below a concise list of data limitations to keep in mind when reading this report and considering its findings.

- Owing to low number of female migrants, the available data exhibits a low representation of females. This is a limitation means that the findings of this report mainly provide insights into the perspective of male Iraqi migrant population.
- It has been observed that the populations sampled often share similar characteristics, which may be a consequence of snowball sampling. When interpreting results, it is important to recognise that the findings of this report are limited to the studied Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali migrants. One should be cautious when generalising to the Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali migrant populations as a whole.
- Sample sizes should always be considered, and observations less than 30 ( $N < 30$ ) are also generally indicated within the report. This is important to note as small sample sizes come with a higher margin of error and lower statistical power that makes drawing definite conclusions difficult. These findings can provide an interesting indication of observed trends within the studied population, but these are not necessarily generalizable to the broader Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali migrant populations

- This report presents problems and vulnerabilities from the perspective of migrants, as a result legal and regulatory processes such as detention and biometric registration are cited as problems. It is important to note that these are the perspective of migrants.
- While the distinction for terminology for categories such as ‘migration facilitators’, ‘smugglers’ and ‘intermediaries’ are clear in the literature, respondents in this study do not distinguish between these categories. Although this study does not equate these actors, it uses the term ‘migration facilitator’ to encapsulate and present migrant perspectives.

Even though these findings cannot be considered representative for the Ethiopian, Nigerian, and Somali migrant populations in totality, they provide key insights on migration processes across different migration stages of those surveyed. They also allow for the identification of important elements to inform policy and decision-making in Europe, as well as in transit countries and in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia.

#### **1.4 Structure of the study**

This study is divided into six thematic areas, wherein each section focuses on the different parts of the migration trajectory. First, Thematic Area 1 looks at the general migration profile of Somali nationals leaving their home country, those in transit, in the destination country (in Europe), and those that have returned to their country of origin. Thematic Area 2 follows by researching the factors that have caused Somali nationals to migrate to Europe. These include challenges at the individual, household, and community level. It also assesses the decision-making process and the actors involved in this process. Thematic Area 3 then looks at migrant challenges and related vulnerabilities in origin, transit, and destination countries. More specifically, it looks at what and where problems were faced and with whom they are associated. Following that, Thematic Area 4 looks at the role of intermediaries in the migration process and the preparations for undertaking the migration journey. Thematic Area 5 focuses on migrant perceptions towards Europe. This includes, among other things, their impressions of Europe, their intended destination country, expected support upon arrival, and the channels and sources used to gather this information. Lastly, Thematic Area 6 looks at migrants' choices and options for migrating to Europe rather than regional migration, their legal options for migration, as well as how migrants (planned to) obtain permission to stay. The report summarizes the findings in the conclusion and “highlight boxes” (presented in blue) are provided throughout the report to give an overview of the main findings of each thematic area.

## **2. THEMATIC AREA I – MIGRATION PROFILES**


To gain a better understanding of the movements of Somali migrants, this section presents a migration profile of Somali migrants across migration stages. Since socio-demographic characteristics of Somali migrants may differ depending on the stages of migration (country of origin, transit, or destination) all three profiles are discussed separately.

## 2.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country

In this study, 1,497 (potential) migrants in Somalia were surveyed. Of this, respondents planned to leave their origin country at different points: 22 per cent were planning to leave within one to two months, 18 per cent within two to three months, and 15 per cent within three to four weeks. Only 13 per cent did not know when they would leave their country of origin.

In terms of the demographic and socio-economic profiles of the Somali (potential) migrants, 71 per cent of the respondents were male. It is, however, observed by the DTM desk review report that the overall Somali migrant stock is more balanced (46% female and 54% male) (IOM, 2017c). The average age among respondents in this study was approximately 25 years, which is slightly older than the average age range of 15 to 24 years found in Majidi's study (2016) and the under 25 age categorisations noted by Vever et al. (2016) (see also IOM, 2017c). With regards to education, most of the surveyed Somalis reported having either secondary education (41.2%) or a Bachelor's degree (27.7%) (see Figure 1). While 88 per cent of respondents reported being able to read and write, only 9 per cent reported having no education.

Figure 1: Education levels of Somali potential migrants, in per cent



Furthermore, 70 per cent of the respondents were single and approximately 21 per cent were in a relationship and 29 per cent of the respondents reported being the head of a household.<sup>3</sup> There is statistically significant evidence that Somali potential migrants are more likely to be single and less likely to have children than their counterparts in transit and upon return. The average household size was around seven members, yet most respondents reported not having children.

## 2.2 Somali nationals in Sudan


A total of 403 Somali nationals were surveyed while transiting in Sudan, most of whom left their home country before 2014 (14.6%), between January and February of 2017 (15.6%), or between April and May of 2017 (13.2%). Before their migration to Europe, Somalis transiting in Sudan mostly came from Woqooyi Galbeed (14.4%) or Awdal (11.9%).

Like Somali potential migrants, 67 per cent of Somali respondents in Sudan were male. This study found that the average age among respondents was approximately 27 years. As shown in Figure 2, 42 per cent

<sup>3</sup> Household: Within this study the term 'household' refers to a group of family members that live in the same house and share a meal on a daily basis.

of respondents reported having either secondary education and 19 per cent had a Bachelor’s degree. Slightly less than 10 per cent of the Somalis in Sudan reported having no education. Of those without education, 84 per cent reported being able to read and write.

**Figure 2: Education levels of Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent**




Considering their household characteristics, 60 per cent of the Somalis in Sudan reported being single, while 23 per cent were in a relationship (namely married, engaged, or in a civil union). Though most respondents reported not having any children, the average household among Somalis in Sudan still consisted of approximately eight members. In this regard, the household was slightly larger than that reported by Somali potential migrants. More than 25 per cent of the respondents were the head of a household.

### 2.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya

A total of 579 Somali nationals were interviewed while in transit in Libya, 44 per cent of them left their home country between July and September of 2017. This differs from Somalis in Sudan, who reported leaving Somalia before 2014. Before their migration to Europe, Somali migrants in transit in Libya lived in Bakool (14.3%), Gedo (11.9%), or Bari (11.4%). Like respondents who were still in Somalia and those in Sudan, 86 per cent of Somali respondents in Libya were male.

The average age among respondents was approximately 25 years. As shown in Figure 3, 49 per cent of the respondents had primary education, 20 per cent had secondary training, 9 per cent had vocational training and 4 per cent had a Bachelor’s degree. Of the 10 per cent of respondents without any education, 65 per cent still reported being able to read and write.

**Figure 3: Education levels of Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent**




More than half of the respondents reported being single (56.0%) and 37 per cent reported being in a relationship. Even though 66 per cent of respondents reported having no children, the average household still consisted of seven members. This is a similar case of the (potential) migrants in Somalia. Nearly 20 per cent of the respondents did report having children that were living with them in Libya. Moreover, 33 per cent were heads of household.

#### **2.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece**

A total of 142 Somali nationals were interviewed while transiting in Greece. The largest proportion of these transit migrants left their home country between January and July of 2016 (41.6%). Another 16 per cent (N=22) left between October and December of 2016 and 17 per cent (N=24) between January and March of 2017. Somali migrants in Greece were from Banaadir (40.1%) and Bakool (14.1%, N=20). In contrast to figures from the Somali potential migrants and Somalis in transit, 56 per cent of the Somali respondents in Greece were male. The average age among respondents was 25 years.

In terms of education, 82 per cent of the respondents completed primary education (Figure 4). None of the respondents had a Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, or a PhD. Another 6 per cent (N=9) had no education; however, 89 per cent (N=8) of those without education reported being able to read and write. With regards to household characteristics, 94 per cent of the Somalis surveyed in Greece reported being single. Respondents also mostly reported not having children (93.7% of all answers given), and only 3 per cent (N=4) were the head of a household. The average household size was reported to be approximately eight persons, a similar size to that reported by Somalis in the other stages of migration.

**Figure 4: Education levels of Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent**




## 2.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands

This section is based on data obtained through surveys conducted with 55 Somali nationals in the Netherlands. Of whom, 44 per cent left Somalia for Europe before 2014 (43.6%, N=24) and 16 per cent left between July and December of 2015. Many of the respondents (23.6%, N=13) also arrived in the Netherlands in the third and fourth quarters of 2015 while 11 per cent (N=6) arrive in the Netherlands in the third quarter of 2017. Somali migrants surveyed in the Netherlands were from Banaadir (58.2%) and Shabelle Hoose (9.09%, N=5).

Like the Somali respondents in Greece, the sex distribution of the Somalis in the Netherlands was relatively equal between males (52.7%, N=29) and females (47.3%, N=26). In contrast, figures from Eurostat (2017) suggest the presence of more male (62%) than female Somali asylum seekers in Europe and that the majority are between the ages of 18 and 34 (see also IOM, 2017d). This study found the average age of respondents was 32 years, making them the “oldest” of the Somalis surveyed across the different stages of migration.

Diversity is observed in terms of education, as seen in Figure 5. In this regard, 13 per cent (N=7) of the respondents had primary education and 16 per cent (N=9) had secondary education. Interestingly, religious schooling and education was the most common (41.8%, N=23). Some Somalis in the Netherlands had attended religious school, 65 per cent of whom were from Banaadir. Another 13 per cent (N=7) reported having no education, however, 57 per cent (N=4) of those with no education were still able to read and write.

**Figure 5: Education levels of Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent**




With regards to household characteristics, 53 per cent of the were in a relationship and 33 per cent (N=18) were single. Many Somalis in the Netherlands had no children (45.5% of all answers given, N=25), while 24 per cent of respondents reported that they had children who were living with them. Moreover, 82 per cent of the respondents reported being the household head, and the average household was reported to consist of three members. This figure is much lower than that of Somalis in transit or in their home country, yet comparable to that of Ethiopian and Nigerian migrants in the Netherlands. As such, this demonstrates a consistent and observable reduction in household size for migrants in Europe among the three nationalities.


## **2.6 Somali returnees**

A total of 254 Somali returnees were surveyed, of whom 20 per cent had returned from Italy, 13 per cent from Germany, 11 per cent (N=27) from Norway, and 9 per cent (N=23) from Finland (see Figure 6). As shown in Figure 7, 54 per cent of the Somali returnees returned to Somalia via self-arranged return. A return to Somalia was most common in the first (16.5%) and second (16.5%) quarters of 2017. More than half (54.7%) of the respondents reported that they still had family members living in Europe. Considering their initial migration, most respondents left for Europe before 2014 (29.1%), in 2014 (18.5%), or between January and June of 2015 (11.4%, N=29).

**Figure 6: Countries of return for Somali returnees, in per cent**




**Figure 7: Return types of Somali returnees, in per cent**



Most of the Somali returnees were male (70.5%). Like respondents in the Netherlands, the average age among respondents from Somalia was also 33 years. Moreover, the majority were either single (46.9%) or in a relationship (39.8%) and did not have children (54.7%). The average household size reportedly consisted of eight members, and 43 per cent of the respondents were the head of household. With regards to education, 40 per cent of returnees reported having secondary education and 25 per cent had a Bachelor's degree (see Figure 8). While 7 per cent (N=17) had no education 65 per cent (N=11) were still able to read and write.

**Figure 8: Education levels of Somali returnees, in per cent**





## HIGHLIGHTS: Profiles of Somali migrants

- When comparing the marital status of respondents across the different migration phases, it is found that Somali transit migrants tend to be single. Somalis in the Netherlands, on the other hand, are most often married or in a civil union.
- Somalis who were intending to migrate were less likely to have children than Somalis in transit or Somali returnees.
- The majority of the Somali migrants were male, while more balanced sex distributions were observed amongst Somali migrants in Greece and amongst those in the Netherlands.
- Most Somali migrants across migration stages had obtained an intermediate level of education.
- At the time of the survey, the timeframe for respondents planning to leave Somalia varied between three and four weeks and between two to three months.
- Somali migrants mostly returned from Italy, Germany, or Norway via self-arranged return.

## 3. THEMATIC AREA 2 – MIGRATION DRIVERS AND DECISION MAKING

The drivers of migration are often complex and interlinked. The causes for migration are not necessarily equivalent to the ultimate factors that prompt individuals to leave at a specific point in time. The discussion of the pre-migration challenges, the reasons for leaving the country, and the specific trigger event in this section shed light on various stages of the migration decision-making process for Somalis across migration stages.

### 3.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country


A total of 65 per cent of the Somali potential migrants reported facing challenges at a personal level in the last six months prior to their departure. Respondents also reported facing household challenges (55.4%) and community challenges (50.3%). At the personal level, the first challenge was associated with unemployment (39.3%) and a lack of sufficient income (28.5%). Similarly, secondary challenges were insufficient income levels (24.1%), financial problems and debt (19.6%). Another 13 per cent reported facing only one challenge at the personal level. At the household level, the first challenge was associated with a lack of sufficient income (44.1%), a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (23.4%).

Similarly, the second challenges included a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (19.0%), a lack of financial means to access education (18.7%), and insufficient income levels (13.1%). In addition to this, the first challenge at the community-level included both a lack of jobs and livelihood (43.6%) and security threats (27.8%). The secondary community challenge was the absence of education opportunities (16.3%) and a lack of health care (13.4%). Such findings correspond to the literature which suggests that insecurity,

poor economic conditions, a lack of educational opportunities, as well as insecurity and extremism are factors that significantly contribute to the migration of Somali migrants (UCDP, 2017; Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon & Sigona, 2016; Marchand et al., 2016). The country further has one of the highest unemployment rates in the region, especially among youth, and that migration for economic reasons is a common way for Somali nationals to cope with such challenges (IOM, 2017d).

In terms of the primary reason for migration (see Figure 9), many Somali potential migrants cited factors related to financial difficulties such as: a lack of jobs and livelihood (44.8%) coupled with poor economic growth and prosperity in Somalia (18.1%). Similar factors were also cited by as the secondary reason for migration, poor economic growth and prosperity at the country-level (24.1%), a lack of jobs and livelihoods (11.1%), as well as corruption (13.4%). It should be noted, in comparison to the existing literature, corruption is reported less often.


**Figure 9: Reason 1 for Somali potential migrants to leave origin country for Europe, in per cent**



With regard to employment status, 33 per cent of the potential Somali migrants were unemployed, 20 percent were students and 16 per cent were self-employed. These figures contradict Vever et al. (2016), who report that Somali students, rather than the unemployed, are more likely to migrate. The average personal income among respondents was 490.77 USD/month. Consequently, 64 per cent of the respondents stated that their personal average income was not enough to meet their monthly expenses.

Rather than a specific event that triggered their decision to migrate, 28 per cent of Somali (potential) migrants cited that their overall economic situation and unemployment and 20 per cent stated losing their job (see Figure 10).

**Figure 10: Main triggers for the migration of Somali potential migrants, in per cent**



Considering the vulnerabilities of formerly displaced persons as an influencing factor for their current migration, almost 63 per cent of the respondents had previously migrated across international borders for a period of more than six months, and most of the previous migrants had migrated within Africa (51.2%), to Europe (25.9%), or to the Middle East (13.7%). However, 9.2 per cent of respondents reported having been internally displaced in the past. Of Somali potential migrants that reported having experienced previous internal displacement, about two-thirds are male, 35 per cent had secondary education, and 28 per cent a Bachelor's degree.

In investigating whether social networks and Somali's culture of migration as described by Majidi (2016) played a role in the decision of Somali potential migrants to migrate, 77 per cent of respondents had relatives in Europe and 82 per cent of respondents (81.7%) reported having friends in Europe prior to migration. However, 89 per cent of the Somali respondents still made the decision to migrate on their own. Of those, 90 per cent were between the ages of 26 and 35 years and 88 per cent were between 18 and 25 years. In this regard, males (90%) were slightly more likely to make the decision to migrate themselves than females (85.2%). Marital status does not seem to be an indicator for whether individuals made their own migration decision 90 per cent of single respondents (89.6%) and 84 per cent were married/in a civil union (84.4%) made migration decision independently.

Other respondents reported their parents (29.3%) and relatives (25.3%) made their migration decision for them. Still, of those that made the decision to migrate on their own, almost half of the respondents (49.1%) discussed their potential migration with other individuals. Interestingly, Somali potential migrants were more likely to discuss their decision to migrate with friends than with family. Somali respondents had these discussions with friends in Somalia (36.7% of all answers given) and in Europe (23.3% of all answers given), 85 per cent of whom were supportive of the migration decision. Considering the second contact, Somalis reported mainly contacting friends in Europe (25.3% of all answers given), 81 per cent of

whom were supportive of the migration decision. Another 23 per cent of all answers given suggest that respondents discussed their migration with only one external party.

Social media and the Internet are important sources of information for the migration decisions of Somali potential migrants. The primary channels on which respondents based their decision to migrate to Europe were television (24.3%), Facebook (26.3%), and word of mouth (17.8%). Facebook (24.8%), WhatsApp (14.9%), and the Internet (14.3%) were reported as secondary channels. Another 18 per cent of respondents reported only one source of information on which they based their decision to migrate to Europe.

With regards to word of mouth as a source of information, the main channels were verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) (35.1%) as well as written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media, 15%) with friends and family in Europe. While 22 per cent of the respondents reported having only one channel for word of mouth as a source of information, secondary channels for word of mouth were – again – written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) with family and friends in Europe (15.9%) as well as social events and activities (e.g. weddings, restaurants, sports clubs, 19.9%).

### **3.2 Somali nationals in Sudan**


Migration drivers for Somali migrants in transit through Sudan appear to be more related to economic factors. Like Somali potential migrants, the majority (75.9%) of Somalis in Sudan reported facing challenges on a personal level in the six months prior to their departure to Europe. Respondents also reported facing household (56.6%) and community (58.8%) challenges. At the personal level, the primary challenges were related to not receiving sufficient income (27.1%) and being unemployed (26.5%). A lack of sufficient income (22.6%) – in addition to depression (14.4%) as well as financial problems and debt (14.45%) – was also reported as the most common secondary challenge at the personal level.

At the household level, primary challenges were insufficient income levels (43.4%), lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (15.4%). The same factors – a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (16.2%) and a lack of sufficient income (15.4%) – were cited as secondary household challenges too. It should be noted that 15 per cent of the respondents reported that their household faced only one problem before their migration to Europe. At the community level, a lack of jobs and livelihood (36%) along with insecurity and security threats in the region, district, and/or community (28.1%) are reported as being primary challenges. While 25 percent of the respondents reported only one community challenge, secondary community challenges were associated with a lack of jobs and livelihood (19.6%, N=30) and the absence of rule of law (15.0%, N=23).

When asked about reasons for leaving Somalia, a large proportion of Somalis transiting in Sudan cited factors related to financial difficulties as primary drivers of their migration: a lack of jobs and livelihood (34%) and poor economic growth and prosperity at the country-level (15.4%) (see Figure 11). It is important to note that the prevalence of these economic conditions is closely tied to the ongoing conflict and insecurity in Somalia. In this context, the poor economic growth and prosperity at the country-level (15.6%) and a lack of jobs and livelihood (9.93%), in addition to a lack of hope for the future (14.6%), were secondary reasons for migration. It should be noted that while economic factors are mostly cited as drivers for migration of Somalis in Sudan, insecurity is reported by 30 per cent of the respondents, and (mental) health such as depression are noted to a lesser extent. This pattern is also supported in the literature by


UCDP (2017), Carter & Rohwerder (2016), Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon & Sigona (2016), as well as Marchand et al. (2016).

**Figure 11: Reason 1 for Somali nationals transiting in Sudan to leave origin country for Europe, in per cent**



A closer look at the pre-migration economic condition of the Somali potential migrant highlights the role of economic drivers for migration. With regards to their employment status before migration, 34 per cent of the respondents were either unemployed and 29 per cent were students. Of the Somalis transiting in Sudan, students came from diverse provinces, though much of the sample (25%) comes from Woqooyi Galbeed. Of this, 70 per cent of the respondents were male, and 90 per cent were single. The average personal income among respondents was reported to be 146.18 USD/month, a much lower income than that reported by Somali potential migrants. Relatedly, 61 per cent of respondents reported that their personal average income had not been sufficient to meet monthly expenses. Another 16 per cent of respondents did not know what their personal average income had been before their migration to Europe. In this regard, 23.0 of the respondents pointed to unemployment as the specific event that triggered their migration (see Figure 12).

**Figure 12: Main triggers for the migration of Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent**



Previous internal displacement and international migration may be related to the vulnerabilities of affected populations, among other things. However, such patterns are also related to the propensity of individuals to engage in future migration. Before migrating to Europe, 43 per cent of the respondents had previously engaged in international migration for a period of at least six months, 65 per cent of this migration was regional within Africa (65.0%). Of the Somalis in Sudan that migrated before, about 70 per cent were male and almost 40 per cent reported having secondary education. A slightly smaller percentage of individuals (34%) reported having experienced previous internal displacement. In this regard, Somalis in Sudan were slightly less likely than potential migrants to experience either previous migration or previous internal displacement. Specifically, Somalis from Banaadir were most likely to experience previous internal displacement, while Somalis from Woqooyi Galbeed more often experienced previous international migration.

Considering the role of social networks in the decision-making process that accompanies migration, 74 per cent of Somalis transiting in Sudan had friends (74.0%) and 64 per cent had relatives in Europe. Still, 89 per cent of the Somalis in Sudan reported having made their migration decision independently. Males were slightly more likely to make the decision to migrate themselves (91.0%) than females (85.9%). Single respondents were slightly more likely to make the decision to migrate independently (91.3%) than those who were married or in a civil union (80.8%). Most of the Somali respondents between the ages of 18 and 25 years as well as between 26 and 35 years made the decision to migrate themselves (87.8% and 91.3%, respectively).

Other respondents reported that their spouse (30.8%, N=12), sibling (20.5%, N=8), parent (12.8%, N=5), or uncle/aunt (12.8%, N=5) had made their migration decision for them. Of those that made the decision to migrate on their own, more than 60 percent of the respondents still discussed their potential migration with other parties. The primary party consisted mainly of family in Somalia (32.9% of all answers given)

and friends in Somalia (28.3% of all answers given); they were largely supportive of the respondents' migration decisions (88.1%). The second party consisted mainly of family in Europe (18.1% of all answers given), friends in Somalia (19.0% of all answers given), friends in Europe (19.4% of all answers given), and family in Somalia (19.8% of all answers given); they were also supportive of the respondents' migration decisions (83.6%). Another 20 per cent of the answers given indicate that respondents did not discuss their migration with more than one contact.

The Somalis respondents in Sudan also revealed that they based their decision to migrate to Europe primarily on information from word of mouth (31.5%), Facebook (26.3%), television (16.6%), and the Internet (14.4%). Word of mouth (23.6%), Facebook (19.4%), and the Internet (15.1%) were also stated as secondary source of information, though 18 per cent of the respondents cited having only one such source of information. With regards to word of mouth, the main channels were verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with friends and family in Europe (48.2%); family at home (8.56%); as well as social events and activities (e.g. weddings, restaurants, sports clubs) (8.11%). Secondary channels for word of mouth were written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) with friends and family in Europe (12.2%, N=27); family and friends that returned to Somalia from Europe (12.6%, N=28); as well as social events and activities (e.g. weddings, restaurants, sports clubs) (9.46%, N=21). Another 18 per cent of the respondents reported having only one channel for word of mouth.


### **3.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya**

Like Somali potential migrants, the combination of economic problems and insecurity were prominent reasons for the migration of Somali migrants transiting Libya. Almost all the Somali respondents in Libya (97.8%) reported facing challenges on a personal level during the six months prior to their departure to Europe. Again, a clear majority of the Somali respondents also reported facing household challenges (95.7%) and community challenges (92.4%). In this regard, Somalis in Libya experienced personal, household, and community challenges at greater rates than Somalis in Sudan and Somali potential migrants. At the personal level, the primary challenges were associated with insufficient income levels (53.5%), unemployment (31.1%), and personal security threats (6.01%). Community and family pressure to migrate (26.9%), a lack of sufficient income (15.9%), as well as financial problems and debt (13.1%) were reported as main secondary challenges at the personal level.

At the household level, challenges were similar. Almost half (48.4%) of the Somali respondents in Libya reported that their household lacked sufficient income. A lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (32.1%) in addition to regional-, district-, and community-level insecurity (9.03%) also contributed to these challenges. Secondary challenges at the household level were, again, a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (23.5%) and regional-, district-, and community-level insecurity (12.8%) in addition to discrimination and xenophobia against household members (12.6%). Similarly, at the community level, lack of jobs and livelihood (36.5%), insecurity (40.4%), as well as an absence of rule of law (13.5%) were primary problems. Secondary community-level challenges included, again, an absence of rule of law (28.2%) as well as a lack of healthcare (21.9%). While the literature also highlights insecurity, economic-related factors, a lack of educational opportunities, and extremism as factors contributing to the migration of Somalis (UCDP, 2017; Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon & Sigona, 2016; Marchand et al., 2016), this research reveals that xenophobia and racism are also important drivers of migration that are missing in the literature.

In terms drivers for migration to Europe (Figure 13), 51 per cent of the Somali respondents transiting in Libya suggested that their primary reasons for migration included a lack of jobs and livelihoods and 26 per cent noted war and conflict at the country-level. Secondary reasons varied, they included poor economic growth and prosperity (17.8%), personal- and family-level insecurity (14%), and absence of rule of law (10.7%) taking priority. For 10. per cent of the respondents another secondary reason for migration was reunification join family or friends in Europe. These reasons elucidate the prevalence of the migration as a mechanism amongst Somali respondents to overcome their challenges. (IOM Libya, 2017; Majidi, 2016).

**Figure 13: Reason 1 for Somali nationals transiting in Libya to leave origin country for Europe, in per cent**




Furthermore, with regards to the economic conditions of Somalis in Libya pre-migration, 28 per cent of the respondents were unemployed, 27 per cent received daily wages, and 17 per cent were self-employed. The average personal income among respondents was reported to be 60.77 USD/month, an income lower than the one reported by both Somali potential migrants and those in Sudan. It should be noted that 11 per cent of the Somalis surveyed in Libya did not know what their personal average income had been before migrating.

Nonetheless, 85 per cent of Somali respondents in Libya reported that their personal average income had not been sufficient to meet their monthly expenses. Considering the trigger for migration, 19 per cent of Somalis surveyed a joined their social networks who were migrating (19.3% of all answers given) and 20 per cent family decision. Furthermore, this decision should also be viewed in conjunction with the 18 per cent of Somali respondents in Libya that cited unemployment as a trigger for migration (see Figure 14).



**Figure 14: Main triggers for the migration of Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent**



To understand current migration flows, it is important to consider the influence of previous migration and international displacement history on the individuals' propensity to engage in further migration. In this vein, approximately 30 per cent of the Somali respondents in Libya had previously engaged in international migration for a period of at least six months, 90 per cent this migration was regional within Africa, and 36 per cent were previously internally displaced. Somalis from Bari, Hiraan, or Juba Dhexe were most likely to experience previous internal displacement or international migration. Of the Somalis in Libya that migrated before, about 90 per cent were male and 60 per cent had primary education.

The support gained from social networks and Somalia's culture of migration apparently influenced the decision of respondents to migrate to Europe (Majidi, 2016). In fact, 46 per cent of the Somalis surveyed in Libya reported having family in Europe before their own migration, while 80 per cent said the same about friends. Still, 66 per cent of the surveyed Somalis in Libya reported having made the decision to migrate independently. Males were more likely to make the decision to migrate themselves (69.8%) than females (47.6%). Further still, the percentage of Somali migrants in Libya making the decision to migrate themselves is higher within the 26 to 35 years age group (86.5%) than within the 18 to 25 years age group (60.2%). Interestingly, the proportion of single respondents (63%) that made their own migration decision is lower than the one of those that were married or in a civil union when they took the decision (71.5%).

That said, 46 per cent reported that their parent, sibling (20.7%), and spouse (19.2%) made their migration decision for them. However, of those who made the decision to migrate independently, 78 per cent of the respondents still discussed their potential migration with other parties. The primary party consisted mainly of family (49% of all answers given) and friends (34.3% of all answers given) in Somalia; they were largely supportive of the respondents' migration decisions (95.3%). The second party consisted mainly of friends in Europe (30.7% of all answers given), family in Somalia (27.3% of all answers given), and friends in Somalia (20.7% of all answers given); they were also supportive of the respondents' migration decisions (90.3%).


Regarding their information sources, Somalis based their decision to migrate to Europe primarily on information from media sources, namely the Internet (28.2%), WhatsApp (24.4%), and television (21.1%). Word of mouth (35.2%), the Internet (15.5%), and Facebook (11.7%) were reported as secondary sources of information on which respondents had based their decision to migrate to Europe. Considering the role of transnational networks for information, the primary channels for word of mouth were diverse, with verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with family and friends in Europe (60.3%) taking priority. Contact at social activities and events (11.2%) as well as contact with friends and family that had returned from Europe to Somalia (6.44%) were also frequently reported. The most reported secondary channels for word of mouth were similarly diverse, with social events and activities (37.3%), mediated contact with somebody that had left (7.46%, N=22), and mosques, churches, and religious centers (17.6%) being most common.

### **3.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece**

Like the case of Somali potential migrants, the majority of the Somalis interviewed in Greece reported facing challenges on a personal (59.9%), household (54.9%), and community (52.8%) level in the six months prior to their departure to Europe. At the personal level, the primary challenges were overwhelmingly related to a lack of sufficient income (82.4%). Financial problems and debt (21.2%) as well as pressure from family and community to migrate (60%) were reported as the most common secondary challenges at the personal level. At the household level, financial problems were also common, with a lack of sufficient income (75.6%) being most prominent. Financial problems and debt also appeared as the secondary household problem for 78 per cent of the respondents. At the community level, a lack of jobs and livelihood (56.0%) as well as a lack of rule of law (21.3%) were primarily challenges. Insecurity, security threats, and opposition groups (22.7%), as well as a lack of rule of law (61.3%), were recurrent secondary problems at the community level.


In terms of primary reasons for migration, Somalis interviewed transiting in Greece had various responses (Figure 15), namely personal- and family-level insecurity or security threats (29.6%); poor economic growth and prosperity at the country-level (26.8%); and a lack of human rights (9.86%). The secondary reason for migration was closely associated with an absence of rule of law (21.8%); a lack of human rights (21.1%, N=30); or reunification family or friends in Europe (19.7%, N=28). Considering the relative emphasis placed on Somali's lack of human rights, it is also observed in a DTM desk review report that the country ranks low in comparison to others with regards to civil and political rights. As a result, within this context common occurrences also include arrests, corruption, trafficking, as well as discrimination (IOM, 2017c).

**Figure 15: Reason 1 for Somali nationals transiting in Greece to leave their origin country for Europe, in per cent**



In terms of main triggers for making the decision to migrate, 37 per cent reported family decision/pressure and 32 per cent cited reunification with family or friend in Europe (see Figure 16). Moreover, prior to their migration to Europe, many of the respondents were either publicly employed (45.8%) or unemployed (47.2%). The average personal income among respondents was reported to be 39.35 USD/month, the lowest income among all Somali migrants. In this regard, 56% of the respondents reported that their personal average income had not been sufficient to meet monthly expenses. Another 44per cent of the respondents did not want to answer if their personal average income had been enough to cover their expenses.

**Figure 16: Main triggers for the migration of Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent**



Considering the former experiences with voluntary or involuntary migration, 57 per cent of Somali respondents in Greece had previously engaged in international migration for a period of at least six

months, much greater proportions reported by Somalis in both Sudan and Libya. It should be noted that almost all this migration was to the Middle East (95.1%). From the data, it can be noted that Somali respondents from Banaadir or Bakool were most likely to have engaged in previous international migration for a period of at least six months. Almost all respondents (97.2%) reported having never experienced internal displacement.

The importance of social networks is particularly relevant for Somalis transiting in Greece, as the clear majority had friends (97.9%) and relatives (68.3%) in Europe before their migration. Still, 75 per cent of the Somalis in Greece made their migration decision independently, with rates of decision-making being similar between males and females (26.6%, N=21 and 23.8%, N=15, respectively). Considering their age, it may be expected that only 10 per cent of the respondents between the ages of 18 and 25 made the decision to migrate themselves. It is, however, unexpected that few single respondents (24.8%) made their own migration decision. Others primarily reported their father/mother (70.8%) having made their migration decision for them.

Of those who made the decision to migrate on their own, almost all (97.2%) of the respondents still discussed their potential migration with other parties. The primary party consisted mainly of family in Somalia (91.4% of all answers given); they were always supportive of the respondents' migration decisions (100%). The second party included family in Europe (85.7% of all answers given, N=30), a group that was also always supportive of the respondents' migration decisions (100%).

The Somali migrants in Greece also relied heavily on communication apps and the Internet to make their decision to migrate to Europe. Many revealed that they based their decision to migrate primarily on information from WhatsApp (37.3%), the Internet (23.2%), and word of mouth (14.8%). Word of mouth (47.9%), the Internet (16.2%), and Facebook (14.1%) were commonly reported as the main second sources of information. With regards to word of mouth, the main channels were verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with friends and family in Europe (69.7%). The most common secondary channels for word of mouth were family at home (62.9%) as well as social events and activities (e.g. wedding, restaurants, sports clubs) (10.1%).


### **3.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands**

The focus of migration drivers for Somali nationals in the Netherlands is also directed from economic to security concerns. In this regard, 73 per cent reported facing challenges at the personal level in the six months prior to their migration to Europe and 64 per cent reported the same for the household level. An even greater proportion (80.0%) reported that their communities had faced challenges during the period in question. At the personal level, primary and secondary challenges were especially associated with personal security threats (60%, N=24; 10.0%, N=4). Another 15.0 per cent (N=6) of the Somalis in the Netherlands described their Challenge 1 at the personal level as 'other,' which related to gender inequality (e.g. pressure from the ex-husband's family, forced female genital mutilation, marriage without approval from community and accompanying threats) and security issues related to al-Shabaab. While more than half (55%, N=22) of the respondents reported facing only one personal challenge, discrimination and xenophobia based on ethnicity and religion were also reported as a secondary challenge by nearly 8 per cent (N=3) of the surveyed Somalis.

At the household level, regional-, district-, and community-level insecurity (40.0%, N=14) as well as security threats against household members (17.1%, N=6) were the greatest primary challenges. It is observed that 17 per cent (N=6) of the Somalis in the Netherlands described their Challenge 1 at the household level as ‘other.’ Responses in this regard were especially related to consequences of political opposition (e.g. family killed by al-Shabaab, father killed by militia). This form of insecurity (11.4%, N=4) was also mentioned as a secondary challenge for households. Another 26 per cent (N=9) of the respondents described their Challenge 2 at the household level as ‘other,’ which was primarily related to killing and abduction by al-Shabaab and, to a lesser extent, by Houthis. In the six months before their migration, Somali respondents in the Netherlands also suggested that their communities faced challenges, primarily with insecurity (79.6%) and an absence of the rule of law (13.6%, N=6). An absence of the rule of law (15.9%, N=7) was again noted as a secondary community problem, though more than half of the respondents (59.1%, N=26) reported facing only one community problem.

When asked about their reasons for wanting to leave Somalia for Europe (see Figure 17), respondents suggested that the primary reason that contributed to their decision to leave Somalia was especially associated with personal- and family-level insecurity (56.4%) as well as war and conflict on the country-level (27.3%, N=15). War and conflict was also reported by 33 per cent of respondents (32.7%, N=18) as a secondary reason for migration. This emphasis on insecurity being characteristic of both the challenges and reasons for migration amongst Somalis in the Netherlands corroborates the literature that describes the role of the terrorist organisation al-Shabaab in shaping Somalia’s insecurity (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon & Sigona, 2016; IOM, 2014a).

**Figure 17: Reason 1 for Somali nationals in the Netherlands to leave their origin country for Europe, in per cent**




In terms of the economic status of Somalis interviewed in Netherlands, 42 per cent (N=23) of the respondents received daily wages, 22 per cent (N=12) were unemployed and 20 per cent were students prior to migration. Students generally came from Banaadir (54.5%, N=6) and were single (63.6%, N=7). The average personal income was reported to be 242.52 USD/month. This figure differs, again, from incomes reported by migrants reported in other stages of migration, and 60 per cent (N=33) of the Somalis

in the Netherlands did not know what their personal average income had been before their migration to Europe.

Nonetheless, financial factors may have also influenced migrant decision to leave Somalia, as slightly over half of the respondents reported that their personal average income was not enough to meet their monthly expenses. Another 18.2 per cent (N=10) of the respondents did not want to answer when asked if their personal average income had been sufficient in this regard.

When asked about the specific event that triggered the decision to leave Somalia, the majority suggested that there had been a security incident (49.3% of all answers given) or that their family had wanted them to migrate (17.9% of all answers given) (see Figure 18). This finding is, again, in line with literature which emphasizes the role of insecurities as migration drivers in Somalia (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon & Sigona, 2016; IOM, 2014a). It also reflects a shifting importance of security concerns as a challenge before migration as well as reasons for migration among Somalis in the Netherlands. This pattern perhaps also indicates a concentration of Somali respondents in the Netherlands originating from especially conflict-prone areas. Additionally, 15 per cent (N=10) indicate that respondents also reported ‘other’ trigger for migration, which were generally described as security incidents, forced marriage, and terrorism.

**Figure 18: Main triggers for the migration of Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent**



The higher percentages of former exposure to migration faced by Somali nationals in their country of origin than by other Somali migrants confirms the complex and interlinked nature of challenges faced. More than 25 per cent of the respondents (27.3%, N=15) reported having ever been internally displaced and, like the Somalis in Greece, more than half (54.6%, N=30) of the respondents reported having previously engaged in international migration for a period of at least six months. Of those, almost all the migration was either to destinations within Africa (50.0% of all answers given, N=15) or to destinations in the Middle East (46.7% of all answers given, N=14).

Fewer Somali respondents reported that they had relatives (49.1%, N=27) and friends (25.5%) living in Europe prior to their migration. In this context, it is observed that having markedly weaker social ties in

Europe than Somali migrants in Greece. While more than 75 per cent of the Somali respondents in the Netherlands (78.2%) reported having made the decision to migrate independently, 55.8 per cent (N=24) of these respondents still reported having discussed their potential migration with other parties. The primary party consisted mainly of family in Europe (50.0% of all answers given, N=12) and in Somalia (37.5% of all answers given, N=9); 100 per cent (N=24) supported the respondents' migration decisions. Beyond this, 75 per cent (N=18) of all answers given suggest that respondents did not discuss their migration with more than one party. Others, on the other hand, reported that their father/mother (50.0%, N=6) or uncle/aunt (33.3%, N=4) had made their migration decision for them.

Unlike Ethiopian and Nigerian migrants who arrived in the Netherlands, this group of Somali migrants relied less on intermediaries as their information sources. Nonetheless, word of mouth, was still the most prevalent primary (60%) and secondary (9.09%, N=5) source of information. Other responses included advice from family members in the Netherlands and in Europe as well as from migration facilitators; others reported that they had relied on their own experience. Of the respondents, 75 per cent reported having used only one source on which they based their migration decision. The primary channels for word of mouth included contact with family at home (42.1%, N=16) as well as verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with family and friends in Europe (21.1%, N=8). Social events and activities (15.8%, N=6) and family at home (7.89%, N=3) were the main secondary channels for word of mouth among respondents. Most of the respondents (65.8%, N=25) reported having only one such secondary channel.

### **3.6 Somali returnees**


More consistent with transit and potential migrants (and less with Somali migrants in the Netherlands), Somali returnees were mainly concerned with difficult economic conditions prior to their departure for Europe. Most Somali returnees reported facing challenges at the personal (61.8%), household (53.5%), and community (52.8%) levels six months prior to their initial departure. These rates of personal, household, and community challenges are like those reported by Somali potential migrants. At the personal level, the primary challenge included unemployment (35%) and a lack of sufficient income (35%). Similarly, secondary challenges were closely associated with financial problems and debt (21%), a lack of sufficient income (17.2%, N=27), and unemployment (12.1%, N=19).

At the household level, the primary challenge was a lack of sufficient income (39.7%) and a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (20.6%, N=28). Similarly, the second challenges were reported to be a lack of financial means to access education (21.3%, N=29) and lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (18.4%, N=25). Another 13 per cent (N=18) of the Somali returnees reported having faced only one household challenge. At the community level, in addition to a lack of jobs and livelihood (35.8%) the primary challenge as also included insecurity and security threats (25.4%). The secondary community challenge was the lack of education opportunities (17.2%, N=23) and a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (14.2%, N=19). In this regard, 31 per cent of the Somali returnees cited that their community had faced only one challenge in the six months prior to their departure to Europe.

Many of the surveyed returnees stated financial difficulties as the main drivers of their migration: a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (36.2%), poor economic growth and prosperity at the country-level

(21.3%) and, to a lesser extent, insecurity and security threats at the personal- and family-levels (11.8%, N=30) (see Figure 19). Similar factors were cited by many of respondents as their secondary reason for migration: poor economic growth and prosperity at the country-level (13.8%); a lack of jobs and livelihoods (10.6%, N=27); financial problems and debts (10.2%, N=26); corruption (9.84%, N=25); as well as insecurity and security threats at the personal- and family-levels (8.66%, N=22).


**Figure 19: Reason 1 for Somali returnees to leave their origin country for Europe, in per cent**



Prior to migration, 33 per cent of returnees were unemployed and 22 per cent were self-employed. The personal average income among respondents was reported to be 242.69 USD/month and 55 per cent cited that their personal average income was not enough to meet their monthly expenses. While there was no specific event that triggered migrant decision, many Somali returnees (26.8% of all answers given) cited unemployment and loss of their job as the trigger for their migration (14.8% of all answers given) (see Figure 20).

**Figure 20: Main trigger for the migration of Somali returnees, in per cent**





Like respondents in Greece and in the Netherlands, about half of the respondents (50.8%) reported having migrated previously to an international destination for at least six months. Respondents generally noted that the destinations of their previous migration had been within Africa (42.8%) and to some extent in Europe (25.5%). A slightly larger percentage (57.1%) reported having been internally displaced in the past. In this regard, Somali returnees were significantly more likely to report previous internal displacement than Somali transit migrants and potential migrants.

Of the Somali returnees that previously experienced internal displacement, 60 per cent were male. Considering their previous education, almost 34 per cent of these individuals had obtained secondary education while almost 22 per cent had a Bachelor’s degree. In line with these characteristics, previous IDPs of the Somali returnee population share characteristics with Somali potential migrants who also experienced internal displacement.

The majority of Somali returnees had friends (87.0%) and relatives (83.1%) in Europe before their migration. Considering these percentages, there is statistically significant evidence showing that Somali returnees were more likely than other Somali transit and potential migrants to report having family in Europe prior to migrating. Still, 84 per cent of the Somalia returnees made the decision to migrate independently. Respondents between the ages of 26 and 35 years (85.8%) were most likely to have made their own migration decision. Single Somali returnees were also more likely to make the decision to migrate themselves (89.1%) than those who were married or in a civil union (79.4%). Males (86%) were also more likely to make their migration decision independently than females (77.3%).

Half of the respondents that made their own migration decision still reported having discussed their potential migration with other parties, mainly friends in Europe (29.3% of all answers given) and in Somalia (34% of all answers given); 90 per cent of whom supported the migrations decisions. Beyond this, 21 per cent (N=22) of all answers given reveal that respondents did not discuss their migration with more than one party. Other respondents also reported having discussed their migration with friends in Europe (25.5% of all answers given, N=27) as a second contact. Others, however, reported that their father/mother (35.9%, N=14) or wife/husband (25.6%, N=10) had made their migration decision for them.

In examining the sources of information on which respondents had based their decision to migrate, it was found that their primary channels were television (34.7%), Facebook (26.0%), and word of mouth (17.3%). Facebook (25.6%), WhatsApp (16.9%), and the Internet (9.84%) were reported as secondary channels, though 24 per cent of respondents had only one such source of information. With regards to word of mouth as a source of information, the main channels were verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with friends and family in Europe (36.1%, N=22) as well as interaction with friends and family that had returned to Somalia from Europe (16.4%, N=10). Secondary channels for word of mouth included – again – written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) with family and friends in Europe (16.4%, N=10) as well as social events and activities (e.g. weddings, restaurants, sports clubs) (11.5%, N=7). It should also be noted that 30 per cent (N=18) of the respondents reported having only one channel for word of mouth as a source of information.

### **HIGHLIGHTS: Migration drivers & decision making among Somali migrants**

- Somali migrants face several challenges in the six months prior to their migration to Europe. These include economic factors such as unemployment, insufficient income levels, lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities, financial problems and debt. In addition, security challenges (e.g. security threats, lack of rule of law) were also reported as primary reasons by respondents at the community level, but also at the personal and household levels by Somali migrants in the Netherlands.
- Respondents, particularly transit migrants in Libya and Greece, also reported facing pressure from their families and communities to migrate.
- Reasons associated with war and conflict at the country-level were most commonly reported from transit migrants in Libya, while personal- and family-level insecurity as well as security threats were more often stated by Somalis transiting in Greece and the Netherlands.
- There is also statistically significant evidence that suggests war and conflict as a reason to leave Somalia was more often reported by transit migrants (collectively) than by their counterparts in other stages of the migration journey.
- Social influence (e.g. joining family or friends in Europe) was also cited as a reason for migration, especially by Somalis in Greece.
- Although there was no specific event, a combination of economic factors, social influences, as well as security threats that can be seen to have triggered migration.
- In this regard, Somalis transiting in Libya and Greece commonly mentioned being asked by friends to migrate with them or their family wanting them to migrate. This family pressure to migrate, in addition to security incidents, was also commonly mentioned by respondents in the Netherlands.
- Somali returnees more often reported to have been previously internally displaced in comparison to their counterparts, while potential migrants were generally more likely to have engaged in prior international migration for a period of at least six months.
- Somali returnees were also more likely to have had family than friends in Europe (before their initial migration to Europe) in comparison to respondents in transit and potential migrants.

- Somali migrants also indicated to mostly make their migration decision independently and less often discussed their migration with other individuals. When they did discuss their migration decision with other individuals, they mostly consulted their family and friends (who generally supported the migration decision).
- The importance of social media and communication as primary sources of information is notable in shaping Somali migrant decisions.

## 4. THEMATIC AREA 3 – CHALLENGES AND RELATED VULNERABILITIES

This chapter provides an overview of the different challenges and vulnerability factors migrants from Somalia face during their migration journey. To provide a comprehensive overview of such characteristics, the vulnerabilities of Somali migrants are considered in their countries of origin, transit, and destination.<sup>4</sup>

### 4.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country


Nearly half of the Somali potential migrants planned to travel with friends (42.8% of all answers given) or alone (26.8% of all answers given). Males (31.0%) were more likely to travel alone than females (27.5%). Considering information sources used by Somali potential migrants, most of the respondents (74.5%) reported having a smartphone primarily used for apps such as Facebook (76.6%), WhatsApp (61.5%), and Viber (22.8%).

Of the total Somali potential migrant respondents, more than 60 per cent expected to face problems along the migration journey to Europe. This expectation was almost equally shared by males (67.6%) and females (63.3%). When considering the potential of problems during the onward migration journey, respondents particularly noted hunger and thirst (33.5%) and problems at sea (22.0%) as the most likely primary problems (see Figure 21). A lack of shelter (16.2%) was also reported as an expected primary problem. These expectations of Somali respondents of potential problems at sea en route to Europe, particularly the dangers involved in crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea is also reiterated in the existing literature. (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; Malakooti, 2015; Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014; Reitano, Adal & Shaw, 2014).

---

<sup>4</sup> The structure of this chapter is reflective of the structure of the IOM desk review reports (see IOM, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c).

**Figure 21: Expected primary problem among Somali potential migrants, in per cent**



Regarding the expected primary problems, hunger and thirst were equally expected among females (33.6%) and males (33.7%). On the other hand, females (21.5%) were more likely than males (14.2%) to expect a lack of shelter, while males (24.3%) were more likely than females (15.7%) to expect problems at sea.


The expected secondary problems were a lack of shelter and place to sleep (21.7%, N=215), problems at sea (13.2%, N=131), hunger and thirst (11.0%, N=109), as well as physical violence (11.0%, N=109). Similarly, the expected tertiary problems were financial shortages (11.9%, N=116), health problems (10.8%, N=105), a lack of shelter and place to sleep (7.98%, N=78), hunger and thirst (7.98%, N=78), as well as injury (7.57%, N=74).

#### **4.2 Somali nationals in Sudan**

Somalis transiting in Sudan mostly reported travelling either with a group (35.1% of all answers given), with friends (29.0% of all answers given), and/or alone (23.4% of all answers given). Of the respondents travelling alone, most were between 26 and 35 years old (33.8%) and between 18 and 25 years old (24.4%). A relatively similar percentage of males (29.1%) and females (29.6%) travelled alone. Though to a lesser degree than Somali potential migrants, slightly more than half (56.6%) of the respondents reported having a smartphone. Of those that had a smartphone, the majority used their phones to communicate with friends and family at home (45.4% of all answers given) and in Europe (21.4% of all answers given). The most commonly used apps were WhatsApp (87.3%), Facebook (86.4%), and Viber (48.2%).

More than half (59.1%) of Somali respondents in Sudan reported facing problems en route to Europe. Of this, nearly the same proportion of males and females experienced problems en route to Europe (59.0%) and (59.3%) respectively. Respondents reported hunger and thirst (38.7%) as their primary problem alongside health problems (10.9%) and physical violence (9.2%), as shown in Figure 22.

**Figure 22: Primary reported problem among Somalis in Sudan, in per cent**



Regarding Problem 1, relatively more males (43.0%) than females (30.0%) reported facing hunger and thirst; this reflects the overall pattern of males being more likely than females to experience problems en route. These problems were mostly experienced in Ethiopia (55.9%) and in Sudan (21.9%) and attributed to migration facilitators (41.2%) and other migrants (16.0%). Health problems were most common in Sudan (38.5%, N=10) and not associated with one specific actor.

Hunger and thirst (15.1%), physical violence (12.2%, N=29), and a lack of shelter or place to sleep (11.8%, N=28) were also reported as secondary problems. While 40 per cent (N=85) of the respondents reported facing only two problems en route to Europe, the tertiary problems reported were primarily rape and sexual abuse (8.45%, N=18) and general injuries (7.04%, N=15). These problems were generally associated with migration facilitators (43.0%) and other migrants (16.4%, N=21). While challenges such as hunger and thirst, physical and sexual abuse and health problems – also at the hands of migration facilitators in Sudan, Libya, and Ethiopia are mentioned within the DTM desk review report (IOM, 2017c).

Somali respondents also shared the problems that they expected to face during their onward journeys from Sudan to Europe. The first problems associated with the onward journey included problems at sea (31.5%) and hunger and thirst (14.1%). Similarly, problems at sea (17.8%), detention (13.7%), and health problems (9.8%) were cited as secondary problems expected by respondents en route to Europe. Another 16 per cent of the respondents did not expect to face any (more) problems during their onward migration to Europe.


### **4.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya**

More than half of the Somali respondents in Libya reported traveling either with friends (54.9% of all answers given) and/or with a group (45.3% of all answers given). Like respondents in Sudan, 55 per cent of the Somali respondents in Libya reported having a smartphone with them during the journey. Respondents used their smartphones primarily for finding information about the journey (54.1% of all

answers given), as well as communicating with family and friends in Somalia (41.5% of all answers given) and in Europe (36.4% of all answers given). WhatsApp (87.3%), Viber (81.6%), and Internet browsers (40.8%) were the most commonly used smartphone apps among respondents.

Somali respondents in Libya also reported on the challenges and related vulnerabilities they had faced along the migration route, of which 83 per cent had faced problems en route to Europe. More females (91.5%) than males (82.1%) reported facing problems during their journey so far. Like Somali potential migrants, as well as those in Sudan and Libya, respondents particularly noted hunger and thirst (26.5%) as primary problems. This was followed by health problems (21.1%) and being robbed (11.8%) (see Figure 23).

**Figure 23: Primary reported problem among Somalis in Libya, in per cent**



In relation to the primary problems reported above, slightly more males (27.2%) than females (22.7%, N=17) faced hunger and thirst. On the other hand, females (29.3%, N=22) were more likely than males (19.6%) to report facing health problems. These problems were encountered in Libya (28.4%), Sudan (15.5%), Somalia (12.2%), and other locations (18%). Hunger and thirst were most common in Libya (32.8%) and Sudan (27.3%) and associated migration facilitators in both cases (66.7% and 51.1%, respectively). Health problems were most commonly experienced in an 'other' location described as en route (42.2%) and associated with other migrants (95.4%). Being robbed, on the other hand, was typically experienced in Libya (43.9%) by migration facilitators (48.0%).

Secondary problems included: facing detention (28.8%), physical violence (11.6%), and robbery (9.94%). Detention<sup>5</sup> was primarily faced in Libya (92.1%) and physical violence, on the other hand, was experienced in Libya (39.3%, N=22) and Sudan (42.9%, N=24) and mostly associated with migration facilitators (69.6%). Slightly over one-third of the respondents reported facing only two problems. Robbery was also mainly experienced in Libya (41.7%, N=20) and generally associated with other migrants (35.4%, N=17). Tertiary

<sup>5</sup> Detention reported in Libya by 92.15% of the respondents in the sub sample was mainly linked to migration facilitators or fellow migrants or paramilitary groups.

problems were described as problems at sea (31.1%) and detention (11.8%); mostly occurring in Libya<sup>6</sup> (35.6%) and at sea (46.4%). The problems experienced by respondents in Libya and Sudan are also cited in the literature and existing DTM desk review report, with particular emphasis on detention, physical violence, hunger and thirst, as well as robbery (IOM, 2017c; IOM Libya, 2017). Health problems experienced by respondents, one of the primary challenges identified is presently absent in the literature.

That said, only 13 per cent of Somalis reported facing one challenge, and 34 per cent reported facing two challenges. Considering the possibilities of a Mediterranean crossing from Libya as exemplified in the literature (Malakooti, 2015; Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014; Reitano, Adel, & Shaw, 2014), findings from Somali respondents in Libya align with problems identified in the literature. This includes problems at sea (39.9%) and detention (13.3%) as being expected during their onward journey to Europe. Further still, these two problems, in addition to deportation (14.1%), were also reported as potential secondary problems for during the onward journey. Problems at sea, for example, is considered the most dangerous part of the onward journey from Libya to Europe (IOM, 2017c; Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014); migrants often travel in boats overloaded by migration facilitators with insufficient food, water, and fuel, on journeys that can often last up to ten days (IOM, 2017c; Reitano, Adal & Shaw, 2014).

#### **4.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece**

Like the respondents in Libya, the majority of Somalis transiting in Greece reported either travelling with friends (61.6% of all answers given) and/or with a group (29.8% of all answers given). Of this, 89 per cent of the respondents reported having a smartphone. In this vein, Somalis in Greece were more likely to report having a smartphone than respondents in their origin country, in Sudan, or in Libya. Of those that had a smartphone, the majority used their phones to communicate with friends and family at home (48.1% of all answers given) and in Europe (29.1% of all answers given). The most commonly used apps were Facebook (71.7%), Skype (70.1%), and Viber (69.3%). Another 34.7 per cent of the respondents reported 'other' as their most used smartphone app. Of the 35 per cent of the Somalis in Greece that reported that they had primarily used an 'other' smartphone app en route to Europe, the majority (86.4%) referred to Messenger.


Somali respondents in Greece also reported facing challenges along the migration journey, with 48 per cent faced problems en route to Europe. Males (49.4%) were slightly more likely than females (46.0%, N=29) to have faced problems en route to Europe. Another 30 per cent of the respondents did not want to answer when asked about if they had faced such problems. Respondents associated Problem 1 with detention<sup>7</sup> (79.4%), experienced in Turkey (85.2%), and attributed to migration facilitators (97.8%) (see Figure 24).

---

<sup>6</sup> Detention reported Libya by 41.7% of the respondents in the sub sample (N=20) was mainly linked to migration facilitators or fellow migrants or paramilitary groups.

<sup>7</sup> Detention reported Turkey by 79.4% of the respondents in the sub sample was largely linked to migration facilitators (97.8%).

**Figure 24: Primary reported problem among Somalis in Greece, in per cent**



Interestingly, it should be noted that – as also supported in existing literature – Turkey is generally only reached via air route from Mogadishu, after which a sea route is used to reach Greece. As a result, it is perhaps surprising that Somalis in Greece did not report encountering problems at sea between the two transit countries (Malakooti, 2016). However, this varies in comparison to respondents in Sudan, Libya, as well as Somali potential migrants, who all reported hunger and thirst as being most characteristic of their Problem 1. However, in the case of Somalis in Greece, it is observed that almost the same proportions of males (79.5%) and females (79.3%, N=23) faced detention.

Problem 3 was primarily experienced in Greece (92.6%) and involved financial shortages (46.9%, N=30). Somali respondents also shared the problems that they expected to face during their onward journeys from Greece to Europe. The first challenge associated with the onward journey included problems at sea (39.4%) and detention<sup>8</sup> (35.2%). The second expected challenge included biometric registration (18.1%, N=25), financial shortages (19.6%, N=27), and injuries (17.4%, N=24).

#### **4.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands**


Unlike migrants in the previous stages of migration, Somali respondents in the Netherlands mostly reported (80.0% of all answers given) having travelled alone in their journeys to Europe. Only 15 per cent (N=8) of the Somali respondents in the Netherlands reported having had a smartphone with them during their migration, a much smaller percentage than that reported by respondents in transit and by potential migrants. Respondents reported using their smartphones primarily to communicate with family and friends in Somalia (87.5% of all answers given, N=7) and in the destination country (75.0% of all answers given, N=6). Viber (75.0%, N=6), WhatsApp (62.5%, N=5), and Facebook (62.5%, N=5) were the most commonly used apps for these purposes.

<sup>8</sup> Detention by official authorities is legitimate part of the migration management. From the migrants' perspective, detention may be the deprivation of liberty based on their migration status and without committing any crime as such. Since this report provide data and research on migrant perception it is presented here as a 'problem'.



Somali respondents in the Netherlands, 40 per cent (N=22) of whom reported facing problems en route to Europe, were asked to describe their top three problems. As shown in Figure 25, hunger and thirst (31.8%, N=7) as well as detention (18.2%, N=4) were described as Problem 1, reflecting a mix of the answers provided by Somali migrants in transit and potential migrants.

**Figure 25: Primary reported problem among Somalis in the Netherlands, in per cent**



Given the low number of absolute observations, no one location stands out as being more prominent with respect to problems with hunger and thirst or detention individually, nor is one actor particularly associated with any of the problems. In this regard, 32 per cent (N=7) of the respondents reported ‘not applicable’ when asked with whom they associated Problem 1. Overall though, these problems were experienced in Libya (22.7%, N=5) and Greece (18.2%, N=4). While there is little existing evidence with regards to the risks and vulnerabilities faced by Somalis in Greece, migrants in the literature as well as in previous DTM desk review reporting are frequently subjected to challenges, such as dehydration, starvation, detention, as well as physical and sexual abuse in Libya and Sudan (IOM Libya, 2017; RMMS, 2017; Malakooti, 2016; Lutterbeck et al., 2015).

Though 27.3 per cent (N=6) of the respondents reported facing only one problem, respondents again cited detention (13.6%, N=3) in addition to physical violence (31.8%, N=7) as characterizing Problem 2. Finally, Problem 3 was described as equally involving detention (12.5%, N=2), deportation (12.5%, N=2), and being robbed (12.5%, N=2). These problems were encountered in Libya (50%, N=6) However, 25 per cent (N=4) of respondents reported facing only two problems.


#### 4.6 Somali returnees

Like Somalis in Libya and Greece, most of the Somali returnees had travelled either with friends (36.3% of all answers given) and/or with a group (22.7% of all answers given). Over two-thirds (69.7%) of the respondents reported having had a smartphone with them during the journey to Europe; this reported

rate of smartphone possession is like Somali potential migrants and those transiting in Sudan and Libya. Most respondents had used Facebook (68.4%), WhatsApp (58.8%), and Viber (24.9%) on their phones; respondents used these apps primarily to communicate with family and friends in Somalia (43.6% of all answers given) and in Europe (26.6% of all answers given).

Somali returnees also reported on challenges faced along the migration journey. In this regard, the 85 per cent of the respondents reported facing problems en route to Europe, a significantly greater percentage than reported by Somalis in transit and potential migrants. Slightly more females (89.3%) than males (82.7%) reported facing problems en route. When asked about their three main problems, Problem 1 was mainly described as involving hunger and thirst (35.4%), like Somali potential migrants, Somalis in Sudan and Libya, as well as Somalis in the Netherlands (see Figure 26).

**Figure 26: Primary reported problem among Somali returnees, in per cent**



Considering their top concern for Problem 1, more males (40.5%) than females (23.9%, N=16) faced hunger and thirst. Problems at sea (20.0%) and a lack of shelter or place to sleep (13.5%) were also used to describe Problem 1. Hunger and thirst were particularly prevalent in Sudan (34.2%) and Libya (27.6%), and both were associated most commonly with migration facilitators (38.5% and 38.1%, respectively). Problems at sea, on the other hand, were most common in Libya (55.8%) and associated with migration facilitators (12.5%).

The prevalence of Libya and especially Sudan as the sites for problems, such as hunger and thirst, is expected based on existing reporting (IOM, 2017c). In the literature, problems at sea are also associated with Libya given that the country is often the starting point for many migrants when making their departure across the Mediterranean Sea (Malakooti, 2015; Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014; Reitano, Adel, & Shaw, 2014). Problem 2 – also mostly experienced in Libya (38.2%) and Sudan (24.4%) – included problems at sea (16.7%, N=36), a lack of shelter or place to sleep (16.7%), as well as hunger and thirst (10.7%, N=23). Lastly, Problem 3 was experienced in Libya (36.2%), Italy (18.4%), and Sudan (14.4%, N=25) and involved problems at sea (12.9%, N=26), a lack of shelter or place to sleep (11.0%, N=22), as well as hunger and thirst (8.96%, N=18). It is not surprising that Italy is mentioned as a location of such challenges considering that the country may have been a transit location or even host country for several returnees.

## HIGHLIGHTS: Vulnerabilities and risks faced by Somali migrants

- Somali potential migrants planned to migrate to Europe in groups (42.8% of all answers given) or alone (26.8% of all answers given). Transit migrants, returnees, and migrants in the Netherlands most often reported travelling with a group, with friends, and/or alone. However, those in transit more often indicated traveling with a group in comparison to their counterparts in other parts of the migration journey.
- Most Somali respondents reported having a smartphone which they mainly used for communicating with their friends and family at home and in Europe as well as for information about the journey.
- Only 15 per cent of the Somali migrants in the Netherlands reported having had a smartphone with them while traveling to Europe.
- The main apps used by Somalis during their migration journey were Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, and Internet browsers.
- Almost 50 per cent (those transiting in Greece) and 83 per cent (those in transit in Libya as well as returnees) of the respondents reported to face problems during their migration to Europe. Only 40 per cent of migrants in the Netherlands reported facing problems during their migration to Europe. The likelihood for facing problems were similar between returnees (84.7%) and respondents in Libya (84.4%).
- The most common problems expected amongst potential migrants included hunger and thirst, problems at sea, and a lack of shelter and a place to sleep. Comparatively, the problems their counterparts experienced were the same and included health problems, detention, physical violence, biometric registration, forced labor and financial shortages.
- There is also statistically significant evidence to conclude that respondents in transit more often experienced health problems in comparison to others, except for respondents in Greece.
- Similarly, transit migrants expected to face problems such as problems at sea, detention, hunger and thirst during their migration journey.
- When analyzing the cross-tabulations for migrant problems, almost all Somalis in transit experienced hunger and thirst, health problems and detention while traveling to Europe.
- Hunger and thirst were mostly experienced in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Libya and attributed to migration facilitators or other migrants.


# 5. THEMATIC AREA 4 – THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES

To understand the migration flows from Somalia to Europe more comprehensively, it is also important to look at the role of intermediaries in this journey. Within this study, the general term migration facilitator, or intermediary<sup>9</sup>, refers to anyone that is involved in the facilitation of migration services (irregular and regular) via air, land, or sea routes. Those services can reach from consultative services for visa applications and acquiring (fraudulent) documents, to transportation arrangements, to the facilitation of border crossings. The definition used acknowledges the differences in services themselves and the often used terms for those persons providing the migration services.

## 5.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country

As seen in Figure 27, almost three-fourths (73.6%) of the Somali potential migrants planned to make use of a migration facilitator in leaving their origin country for Europe. More males (75.9%) than females (67.7%) intended to make use of a migration facilitator for their journey. Of the respondents that did not plan to use a facilitator, more than half (54.0%) planned to do so in another stage of their migration journey. While it may not always be the case that migrants use a facilitator to leave Somalia, the relatively high expectations of respondents to use a facilitator in the continuation of their journey may correspond with recent reports that highlight the increase in Somali migrants using irregular migration facilitators – either *magafes* or business people from the Puntland region – to reach Libya (Marchand, Reinhold & Dias e Silva, 2017; Majidi, 2016).

Figure 27: Intention to use a migration facilitator among Somali potential migrants, in per cent




Of the respondents that planned to use a facilitator to leave Somalia, 24 per cent of respondents expected to contact the facilitator through friends and 18 per cent through family (18.2%) in the home country, while 18 per cent had not found a migration facilitator (see Figure 28). According to Somali potential

<sup>9</sup> Intermediary: Within this study the term ‘intermediary’ refers to a person that makes arrangements between people that do not deal with each other directly.

migrants the average expected costs for their journey to their final destination was 22,790.62 USD, even though 15 per cent of the respondents did not know what they expected to pay to reach their final destination. In fact, payment to the migration facilitator was, for the most part, expected to be made in instalments through the hawala system (30.5% of all answers given) or in instalments through an official money exchange (e.g. Western Union) (20.7% of all answers given).

**Figure 28: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali potential migrants, in per cent**




To finance their migration journey, 30 per cent of respondents reported to sell assets such as land and 14 per cent borrowed money from family and friends in Somalia. Other common preparations included obtaining a passport (33.4% of all answers given), while 23 per cent of respondents also reported not making other preparations.

Somali potential migrants sought information, firstly, on the costs (39.0%) and routes (13.8%) of migration and, secondly, also on the routes (28.4%) and costs (17.0%) of migration. Information on migration routes (9.38%), transportation (31.0%), and amount of financial support from the host government (9.75%) was reported as the third type of information sought out by respondents.

## 5.2 Somali nationals in Sudan


As Figure 29 shows, 79 per cent of the Somalis transiting in Sudan had used an average of three migration facilitators en route to Europe. This figure corresponds to the findings of the IOM report on the region (IOM Libya, 2017). The percentage of males that had made use of a migration facilitator (81.7%) was somewhat higher than the percentage of females that had done so (74.1%). Of the respondents that had not yet used a facilitator, 41 per cent planned to do so in another stage of their migration journey.

**Figure 29: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent**



Reflecting the importance of social networks in the migration strategy, many of the respondents that had used a facilitator encountered the facilitator through friends in Somalia (27.9%). Another 15 per cent made contact through people travelling with them, while, 16 per cent of the Somalis in Sudan also reported contacting their migration facilitator through social networks in Europe.

**Figure 30: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent**



Somalis transiting in Sudan reported having used approximately three migration facilitators so far en route to Europe. Payment to the intermediary was, for the most part, made in instalments through the hawala system (50.5%), as was also the case of Somali potential migrants. Others also paid through a third party (21.0%) or in full prior to departure (8.25%). Respondents reported that the average cost for the journey to Sudan was 2,189.61 USD, while the average expected total cost to reach the final destination was 5,501.39 USD. Showing great variation, these expected costs are less than 30 per cent of what Somalis still in their origin country expected to pay for their journey to Europe.


For financing their journeys to Europe, respondents reported borrowing money from family and friends in Somalia (23.9%) as well as in Europe (17.8%), selling assets such as land (13.9%) cars, furniture (11.2%) or savings (16.2%).

Other preparations included obtaining a passport (16.6% of all answers given) and informing friends and family in Europe (16.6% of all answers given), though some respondents (46.1% of all answers given) also reported not making other preparations. Somali respondents in Sudan suggested that prior to departure, they sought out information primarily on costs (59.3%) and routes (10.2%). Respondents collected information on routes (30.6%), transportation (11.9%), and the job market (10.4%) as a second priority as well as on transportation (16.3%), the job market (9.04%), and education opportunities (9.04%) as a third priority. For the Somalis surveyed in Sudan, preparations for migration to Europe mainly took between one and two months (29.0%), between five and six months (15.9%), and more than six months (11.9%).

**5.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya**


Almost all the Somali respondents (96.7%) reported making use of a migration facilitator, like respondents in Greece (see next section). On average, Somalis in transit in Libya had used six migration facilitators in their journey so far. Such rates of facilitator use among this group of respondents are to be expected, especially considering increases in irregular migration facilitator use by Somalis to reach Libya is reported in the literature (Marchand, Reinold & Dias e Silva, 2017). According to this literature, high use of multiple irregular migration facilitators is due to the disaggregated nature of the migratory routes (Sahan Foundation & IGAD Security Sector Program, 2016; Malakooti, 2016). The percentage of males that used migration facilitators is (97.2%) somewhat higher than females (93.9%).

**Figure 31: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent**



In comparison to Somali migrants in Sudan, Somali respondents in Libya are more likely to have used a greater number of facilitators in their journeys. Furthermore, this is in conjunction with the higher percentage of respondents in Libya that reported the use of a facilitator. Of those that had not yet made use of a migration facilitator, another 30.0 per cent (N=3) reported planning on doing so in the continuation of their journey while 70.0 per cent (N=7) did not know if they would do so. As illustrated in Figure 32, 41 per cent of respondents encountered migration facilitators primarily through existing networks, 18 per cent through family (17.9%) in Somalia and 10 per cent through social networks in Europe (9.82%).

**Figure 32: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent**



Payment to the intermediary was made in full prior to departure (44.1% of all answers given), through instalments in cash (34.1% of all answers given), or a third party (17.7% of all answers given). Such payment patterns differ from Somalis in their origin country and in Sudan, who reported to rely mainly on instalments through the *hawala* system to pay their facilitator. The Somalis surveyed in Libya reported to have paid an average of 4,071.95 USD to reach Libya, while the remaining expected total costs to reach the final destination in Europe approximately 3,316.64 USD.

These expected costs are more in line with what was reported by Somalis in Sudan than by potential migrants. It should be noted, however, that the unusual nature of the discrepancy between actual costs to reach the current location and the expected costs to reach the final destination (with the former being greater than the latter) could perhaps be explained by variations amongst the responses to both survey questions. Nonetheless, the costs mentioned by respondents to reach their current location – approximately 4,000 USD – are in line with the literature that suggests costs needed to reach Libya from Mogadishu range between 1,500 and 4,500 USD (IOM, 2017c).

For Somalis respondents in Libya, preparations to leave Somalia mainly took between one and two months (34.9%). To finance their journey, transiting Somalis either relied on their own savings (37.3% of all answers given) or – like potential migrants in Somali or Somalis in Sudan – had borrowed money from their family and friends in their home country (57.0% of all answers given). While some respondents reported having not made any other preparations for their journey (55.4% of all answers given), others (57.7% of all answers given) informed family and friends in Europe. Somali respondents in Libya also reported that, prior to departure, they sought information primarily on costs (76.9%), as second priority they collected information on routes (47.5%) and the job market (26.5%), access to healthcare (21.2%), and transportation (17.0%) as a third priority.


#### **5.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece**

Almost all the Somalis transiting in Greece had used a migration facilitator en route to Europe, a greater proportion than reported by Somali potential migrants as well as Somalis in Sudan and Libya. The use of an irregular migration facilitator to travel from the Horn of Africa to northern parts of Africa and to continue onwards to Europe requires navigating around militia groups en route as well as making the



dangerous Sahara crossing requires advance planning (IOM, 2017c). Most respondents encountered migration facilitators through family in Europe (60.6%) and in Somalia (31.0%) (see Figure 33).

**Figure 33: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent**



Like the Somali respondents in Sudan, Somalis transiting in Greece reported using approximately two migration facilitators route to Europe. Payment to the intermediary was, for the most part, expected to be made after arrival in Europe (51.0% of all answers given); this form of payment was less common among the respondents in Sudan and in Libya as well as among potential migrants. Respondents reported that the average cost for the journey to Greece was 1,923.33 USD. Like reports by the respondents in Libya, the expected average costs to reach the final destination were 3,844.36 USD. However, 26 per cent of the respondents did not know how much they expected to pay to reach their final destination.


To finance their journeys to Europe, the respondents reported borrowing money from family and friends in Somalia (19.4% of all answers given) – also common among respondents in Sudan and Libya as well as among potential migrants – and working along the migration route (19.8% of all answers given). As previously mentioned, the literature also details that it is common for migrants to work en route to Europe if they are faced with financial difficulties or unexpected journey costs (Reitano, Adal & Shaw, 2014). By ‘other’ means (64.8%), Somalis in Greece indicated their reliance on family assistance for financing (e.g. payments made by family); This is not uncommon.

Other preparations included obtaining a passport (35.9% of all answers given) and informing social networks in Europe (29.1% of all answers given), additionally, 31 per cent reported not making other preparations. Somali respondents in Greece also reported that prior to departure they sought information primarily on costs (57.0%) and the job market (16.2%). Respondents collected information on routes (50.7%) and the amount of financial support from the host government (17.6%) as a second priority as well as on transportation (47.2%) and routes (21.8%) as a third priority. For the Somalis surveyed in Greece, preparations for migration to Europe mainly took between five and six months (28.2%) or more than six months (47.2%).

## 5.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands


Like transit migrants in Libya and Greece, 96 per cent of Somali respondents in the Netherlands reported using a migration facilitator. On average, they used two migration facilitators in their journey from Somalia to Europe.

Figure 34: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent



As illustrated in Figure 35 below, 43 per cent of the respondents encountered the migration facilitator through friends and 21 per cent through family (20.8%, N=11) in Somalia. On average Somali respondents reported the cost to reach their final destination was 6,528.57 USD; these actual costs most closely aligned with the expected costs of reaching Europe reported by Somalis in Sudan. Payment was generally made in full prior to departure (33.3%, N=20). It is also observed that 35 per cent of the respondents (N=19) did not know how much they paid to reach the Netherlands.

Figure 35: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent




Like Somalis in all stages of their migration journeys, Somalis surveyed in the Netherlands primarily reported that they had borrowed money from family and friends in Europe to finance their migration journey (21.5% of all answers given, N=17). Other common preparations included informing family and friends in Europe (9.09% of all answers given, N=5).

Prior to departure, respondents also reported collecting information on costs (21.8%, N=12), secondly on costs (20.0%, N=5) and routes (24.0%, N=6), and to a lesser extent, on educational opportunities (12.5%, N=2). In general, preparations for the journey took less than a month (60.0%).

### 5.6 Somali returnees


Seventy-eight per cent of the Somali returnees used a migration facilitator en route to Europe; this proportion of facilitator use is similar to Somali respondents in Sudan and, at the same time, much lower than was reported by Somali respondents in Libya, Greece, and the Netherlands (see Figure 36). Slightly more females (78.7%) than males (77.7%) made use of a migration facilitator in their journeys to Europe.

**Figure 36: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali returnees, in per cent**



Of the respondents that had used a facilitator, a large proportion encountered the facilitator through friends in Somalia (23.7%) and in Europe (21.2%) and 19 per cent reported that they had been approached by the migration facilitator (see Figure 37). Somali returnees reported using approximately three migration facilitators during their journey. Payment to the migration facilitator was, for the most part, made in instalments through the hawala system (36.2% of all answers given) or in instalments through an official money exchange (e.g. Western Union) (18.5% of all answers given), as was also reported by Somali respondents in Sudan and Somali potential migrants. The average cost for their journey to their final destination was 6,788.07 USD; these actual costs most closely aligned with the expected costs of reaching Europe reported by Somalis in Sudan, Libya, and the Netherlands.

**Figure 37: First contact with the migration facilitator among Somali returnees, in per cent**




To finance their migration journeys, Somali returnees sold assets such as land (23.5% of all answers given) cars, or furniture (17.3% of all answers given) and relied on savings (16.1% of all answers given). As such, Somali returnees were less likely than migrants in other stages of their journeys to report borrowing money from family and friends to cover migration costs. With regards to their migration preparations, the surveyed returnees reported that prior to their departure, respondents primarily collected information on costs (45.3%) and transportation (11.8%, N=30); secondarily on routes (26.0%) and costs (13.2%); thirdly on transportation (24.4%), amount of financial support from host government (12.7%, N=26), and education opportunities (9.76%, N=20). Other common preparations included obtaining a passport (31.8% of all answers given), though 30per cent of returnees also often reported not making other preparations. In general, preparations for migration took between one and two months (28.7%) or between three and four months (36.2%).

## **HIGHLIGHTS: The role of intermediaries for Somali migrants**

- As shown in Figure 38, almost 75 per cent of the Somali potential migrants planned to make use of a migration facilitator when leaving Somalia. Similarly, eight out of ten respondents in Sudan as well as returnees reported the use of a migration facilitator while migrating to Europe. Approximately all respondents in Libya, Greece, and the Netherlands reported the same.

**Figure 38: Use of a migration facilitator among Somali migrants (across stages), in per cent**



- The average number of migration facilitators used by Somali respondents ranged between two and six facilitators.
- In preparation for their migration journey, Somali migrants collected information on the costs, transportation, routes of migration, job market and access to health care.
- Somali migrants reported relying on savings, borrowing money, and selling assets like land to cover migration costs.
- Among Somali respondents, there is a variance in actual and expected costs of migration across the different migration stages. Somali potential migrants expect an average cost of more than 20,000 USD to reach Europe, while total costs to reach final destination were approximately 6,500 USD as reported by Somali respondents in the Netherlands or upon return.
- Somali potential migrants and Somali respondents in transit in Sudan mostly expected to make or made payment in instalments, while Somalis in Libya and Greece as well as those in the Netherlands and upon return, mostly used other forms of payment, such as full payment prior to departure or after arrival.


## 6. THEMATIC AREA 5 – MIGRANT PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS EUROPE

### 6.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country

The most common intended destination countries among the Somali respondents were Sweden (15.4%), Germany (14.0%), and the UK (12.2%). These choices of destination country are perhaps not surprising considering that Sweden and the UK are amongst the European countries with the largest Somali diaspora

(IOM, 2017c). The primary reasons for choosing a specific Europe destination country were based on the existing network of friends and family there (41.8%). This aligns with the finding that Somalis often have one or more relatives or friends living abroad (IOM, 2017c). The supposed ease of access to asylum procedures compared to other EU countries (21.5%) is also commonly reported (see Figure 39). Secondary reasons for the choice of destination countries among Somali potential migrants were more varied: perceived availability of jobs (28.5%), the supposed ease of access to asylum procedures compared to other EU countries (9.75%), access to schools (9.31%), or migration facilitator’s preference (9.38%) being most common.

**Figure 39: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali potential migrants, in per cent**




Reasons for Somali potential migrants to want to migrate to Sweden as their preferred destination were transnational social networks (i.e. having family and friends in the country), perceived job availability, and the supposed ease of access to asylum procedures. The same can be said in the case of Germany and the UK, although educational opportunities and the supposed ease of access to asylum procedures were also common main or secondary reasons in both cases.

As explicated in Thematic Area 2, Somalis that intend to migrate do so because of a lack of jobs and livelihood and low economic growth and prosperity. When assessing the overlaps between the reasons why migrants choose their intended destination country, the two main observations are mostly linked to relative(s) and/or friend(s) in the destination country (45.5% and 41.0%, respectively) and the ease of access to asylum procedures (23.4% and 16.6%, respectively). This refers to the importance of transnational social networks and perceived accessibility of the asylum system in the intended destination country.

When asked about their first two priorities upon arrival to Europe, Somali potential migrants reported that their first priority would be to claim asylum (40.1%) and obtain nationality in their destination country (18.0%), as is shown in Figure 40. Obtaining nationality (29.9%) and finding work (18.8%) were reported as secondary priorities. In this regard, the majority of the Somali potential migrants expected to obtain nationality (29.9%), receive free housing (12.7%), and obtain support to bring other family members to Europe (11.5%) from their host country (see Figure 40). Reported secondary expectations – again –

included free housing (17.0%) and support in family reunification (14.9%). Similarly, the literature also suggests that Somalis, as well as Ethiopians, have positive perceptions of family reunification in Europe (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016).

**Figure 40: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somali potential migrants, in per cent**



Expectations of receiving nationality, however, may also be based on the common perception by Somalis that migrants are able to gain a foreign passport over time (IOM, 2017c). Expectations of nationality were mostly related to migrant networks (i.e. having family and/or friend(s) in the intended destination), as well as expected ease of access to asylum procedures. In this context, IOM (2017c) suggests that these ideas of receiving nationality are likely driven by misunderstandings of European migration policies. On the other hand, when Somali potential migrants expected support in the form of free housing, they mostly chose their intended destination country based on their transnational links and the job availability at the destination. These overlaps refer to the importance of transitional networks, the availability of jobs, and the expected procedural ease of asylum in the intended destination.

With regards to their priorities upon arrival and their expectations of support from the host country, nearly 40 per cent (39.4%) of the Somali respondents did not expect to face problems upon arrival in their destination country. Another 19 per cent expected to face only one problem in their final destination. The first main challenge expected in the destination country was the rejection of their asylum claim (20.5%), while the second main challenge was failure in family reunification (16.5%) or obtain nationality (14.9%).

Somali potential migrants also reported using the Internet (24.1%), Facebook (22.2%), and word of mouth (16.2%) as their primary source of information; the Internet (19.6%) was again reported by respondents when asked about their secondary sources of information. Another 24 per cent reported having only one source of information on which they based their impressions of life in Europe. The main channels of word of mouth were verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with friends

and family in Europe (40.3%), while written contact (via communication apps and/or social media) was secondary (28.9%). It is also observed that 24 per cent of the respondents only reported having one channel of word of mouth. The sources of information available to and used by prospective migrants can play important roles in the decision-making process, as well as the journey, and even in the destination itself. Use of social networks, like Facebook, could indicate access to migration networks that are potentially larger than those solely based on friend and family relations.

Based on their existing perceptions of Europe, 63 per cent of the Somali potential migrants reported that they would advise others to migrate to Europe because of the lack of a future in Somalia (25.0%) combined with the perception of good jobs in Europe (26.5%). This high proportion of individuals that would advise migration of others (especially in comparison to their counterparts in Sudan, in the Netherlands, and upon return) is a reflection of these respondents still being in the earliest stage of migration and perhaps not yet knowing about problems they might encounter en route or in Europe. The main reasons for respondents to discourage migration included the difficulties along the migration journey (35.4%), and dangerous travel route (46.5%). Somali potential migrants are significantly more likely than their counterparts to discourage the migration of others specifically based on too many difficulties along the way.

It is observed that females were more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe than males (74.1% as compared to 58.7%, respectively). Somali potential migrants would less often advise others to migrate to Europe if they expected problems while travelling en route (64.3%). This is in comparison to the 80 per cent of respondents that expected problems en route but would still advise the migration of others. Moreover, respondents were more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe if they had family living in Europe (65.0%, as compared to 58.7% who did not have family living in Europe). However, Somalis with friends living in Europe were somewhat less likely to advise others to migrate to Europe than those that did not have friends living in Europe (62.9% as compared to 65.4%, respectively).

Considering the emphasis on asylum accessibility, it should be noted that only 14 per cent of the Somali potential migrants reported knowing what an asylum procedure was while 74 per cent reported being unaware. From the qualitative analysis, the understanding of the asylum procedure among potential migrants in Somalia is mixed. A few potential Somali migrants suggested that the asylum procedure was about asking the host government for (documents that provide the) permission to stay. Moreover, they suggested it was about citing their country's lack of security and development or safety reasons (e.g. war, conflict, famine, threats from al-Shabab). Some suggested that applying for asylum required going to a European country and going to a refugee camp. Many respondents also associated the asylum procedure with free healthcare, housing, education; access to jobs; seeking political asylum; or the asylum system alone.

“Asylum is about asking a permission to stay that host country with a visa or passport and also giving free health care, free housing, and free education and, of course the freedom to live” (Somali potential migrant in Somalia)

“Draft paper which means to you staying as a refugee and giving you free housing, free education, and so on” (Somali potential migrant in Somalia)

“I don't know the full procedure, but it is a procedure that the person asks protection from the country they migrate to” (Somali potential migrant in Somalia)



“[I]t is a procedure where the person goes to a European country and asks for protection” (Somali potential migrant in Somalia)

Other respondents also attributed the ideas of community, a future, safety, and the freedom to live with the asylum procedure. Respondents also associated the asylum procedure with going to another country without a visa or receiving a paper that means one is a refugee. While a respondent noted that the asylum procedure would also allow them to return to their home country or engage in family reunification, some respondents associated asylum with citizenship or gaining a visa and passport.

“I know asylum is way that you ask the government to give you nationality and accept living in country” (Somali potential migrant in Somalia)

“Asylum is a process that [I] tell the government [I] need to get peace, health, job, and also [I] told them my country have not security and development. So [I] ask the government to give citizenship”


## 6.2 Somali nationals in Sudan

Like Somali potential migrants, 16 per cent of the respondents that did not intend to stay in Sudan reported their intended destination countries as Sweden, 15 per cent as Germany, 8per cent as Norway, and 8per cent as Belgium. In addition to Sweden, Norway also has a sizeable Somali diaspora in comparison to other European countries (IOM, 2017c), indicating that this choice of destination country (especially for reasons of having family and friends there) is not arbitrary.

In considering their perceptions of Europe, Somali respondents in Sudan primarily based their choice of a specific European destination country on existing network of family and friends (36.0%), and on the availability of jobs there (20.9%) (see Figure 41). The availability of jobs (19.8%), the access to the education system (14.9%), the availability to obtain citizenship (12.7%), as well as the respect for human rights (9.49%) were also described as Reason 2 in their choice of destination country. Somalis in Sudan most often chose Sweden as their main intended destination country based on their existing social network, perceived job availability and education opportunities. Likewise, social networks and the perceived number of jobs available were the main reasons in the cases of Germany and Norway. It is also observed that 2 per cent (N=9) of the Somalis in Sudan also reported an ‘other’ reason linked to shifting transnational connections (e.g. family/friends that live in or moved to another country), the difficulty of the local language, as well as the newly chosen destination being economically well-developed.

Comparing the primary reason for choosing a destination country with the original reason for migration, it is observed that Somalis in Sudan cite both existing network of family and friends in the country and perceived job availability at similar rates regardless of whether the respondent left for economic or non-economic reasons.


**Figure 41: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent**



It should also be noted that before selecting their intended destination country, 17 per cent of the respondents had planned on going to another country. In this regard, Denmark (10.9%, N=7), Germany (9.38%, N=6), the UK (9.38%, N=6) as well as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway (each 6.25%, N=4) were most frequently reported. For respondents, the main reasons for changing their destination countries included travel costs being too high (18.9%, N=17) and difficulties in getting asylum in the country (18.9%, N=17).

Somali respondents in Sudan suggested that, once arriving in Europe, their first priorities would be to apply for asylum (28.0%), obtain nationality (21.3%), and find work (19.4%) (see Figure 42). Secondary priorities were associated with finding work (35.5%), learning the local language (15.1%), and obtaining nationality (15.1%). Like the potential migrants, 28 per cent of Somali migrants transiting in Sudan expected to obtain nationality. As shown in Figure 42, 15 per cent expected to receive refugee status (14.6%), 12 per cent expected free housing, and 11 per cent expected support in family reunification from the host government in their destination country.

**Figure 42: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somalis in Sudan, in per cent**



Secondary expectations varied between receiving support for family reunification (17.1%), obtaining free education (16.4%), free housing (12.5%) and gaining nationality (13.5%). Respondents also reported expecting to face problems in their destination country; as shown in Figure 42, these expected problems were primarily related to deportation (15.1%) and being unable to obtain nationality (13.9%). Somali respondents transiting in Sudan also expected to face deportation (16.2%) and the rejection of their asylum claim (15.0%) as secondary problems. It should be noted that more than one-third (34%) of the respondents expected to face no problems in their destination country, and 20 per cent expected to face only one problem.

When assessing the overlap between expected support and choice of intended destination,

Information sources play an influential role not only in migrants' decision making but also over the course of the journey in developing their perceptions of their future host country. The Somali respondents in Sudan reported relying on television (30.5%) and word of mouth (24.1%) as their primary source of information. The Internet (21.3%), word of mouth (17.9%), and Facebook (16.1%) were the main secondary sources of information. Another 17 per cent of respondents reported having only one source of information. Word of mouth, included verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with friends and family in Europe (36.1%) and contact with friends and family that returned from Europe to Somalia (14.8%, N=25). Contact with friends and family that had returned from Europe to Somalia (12.4%, N=21) – in addition to social events and activities (10.7%, N=18) – was again reported as the main secondary channel for word of mouth. Another 23 per cent of the respondents only had one such channel of information. While singular reliance on information from the Internet may, for example, indicate a lack of access to migration networks, having access to sources within potential countries of destination (e.g. word of mouth, contact with contact in Europe) may give migrants a more comprehensive and realistic impressions of what to expect, further encouraging or discouraging different decisions. Moreover, contact with those that returned from Europe – as reported by the current respondents – often leads potential

migrants to see these individuals as role models for their own migration, especially since migrants are often seen to have better jobs upon return. Additionally, Somali migrants also tend to base their perceptions of Europe on the information received from returned friends or family members (IOM, 2017c).

Based on their existing perceptions of Europe, 58 per cent of the Somali respondents surveyed in Sudan reported that they would advise others to migrate to Europe. Somalis in Sudan were only slightly less likely than potential migrants to advise the migration of others; this is not surprising considering that Somalis in Sudan are in one of their first transit countries en route to Europe. Unlike the Somali potential migrants, however, males transiting in Sudan were a bit more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe (59.7%) than females (55.6%). In this context, the notion of a bleak future in Somalia and perceived availability of good jobs were cited as factors among respondents to advise the migration of others. The main reasons for respondents to discourage migration included the dangerous nature of the travel route to Europe and the difficulties along the way.

Of the respondents that had faced problems en route to Europe, 68 per cent of them would not advise others to migrate to Europe, as compared to the 54 per cent that would. It is also observed that the respondents with relatives living in Europe prior to migration were slightly more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe (60.7%) than those that did not have relatives in Europe (55.4%). Similarly, those that had friends living in Europe (59.7%) were also more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe than those that did not (56.4%).

Approximately 20 per cent of the Somalis in Sudan – a slightly higher percentage than Somali potential migrants – reported knowing what an asylum procedure is. Based on the qualitative analysis, Somalis transiting in Sudan described the asylum process as applying for permission to live and work in a country and justifying a need for safety and a safe living environment. Reasons for applying for asylum included unsafe conditions (e.g. persecution, inhumane treatment, danger, war) in the home country. Many respondents also associated the asylum procedure with receiving free housing and a stipend. One respondent thought that they would receive the decision of their asylum application within a period of three months.

“When you can't back your country such war and conflicts and other country gives sheltering, safe and good place, and respected you in order to know your country is very dangerous that is called asylum procedure” (Somali national in Sudan)

“If you [give a] good reason for persecution or inhuman treatment or because it is unsafe to return to their country because of war” (Somali national in Sudan)

“The protection that is given for refugees” (Somali national in Sudan)

In general, Somalis in Sudan reported several steps as being part of the asylum procedure: taking a boat to Italy, going to an immigration office, a refugee camp, or the national police; registering their personal information and providing details on their history; participating in an interview; being biometrically registered; as well as waiting for an asylum decision and refugee ID card.

In this regard, several respondents also implied that they would hire a migration facilitator in Libya to help them with their onward journey to Italy and, more generally, Europe. Other respondents reported planning to contact friends in Austria and Italy for help during the asylum process. After applying for

asylum, some Somalis in Sudan also reported planning on going to Norway to try another asylum process or moving on to their final destination. It should also be noted that a few Somalis incorrectly associated the asylum process with receiving nationality, often after many years.


### **6.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya**

Unlike Somali respondents in their origin country or in Sudan who primarily intended to migrate to Sweden, for Somalia respondents in Libya, Italy (44.9%) and Germany (14.0%) were the most commonly intended destinations. Reflecting the pattern of other migrants to Europe in the literature that have Europe as a broad destination rather than aiming to reach a specific country (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016), another 15 per cent of the respondents in the current study wanted to reach Europe in general.

For the Somali nationals surveyed in Libya, the primary driver for choosing a specific destination country in Europe was linked to existing network of family and friends there (42.2%). Other primary reasons included safety of the country (17.4%) and job availability (15.0%) (see Figure 43). Secondary reasons were like primary reasons and included existing network of family and friends in the country (20.7%) and the availability of jobs in the country (20.1%). While 10.0 per cent of the respondents chose based on their migration facilitator's preference. Showing the mixed reasons for migration, Somalis transiting in Libya primarily aimed to travel to Italy because of existing network of family and friends there, safety, and job availability. The same is generally true for those wanting to move to Germany, however ease of access to asylum procedures and the perception that migrants received free housing were also prominent reasons.

In the case of Somalis in Libya, there is little indication of overlap between migration causes and choice of one destination country over another. However, existing network of friends and family in a destination and job availability are key motivations both for economic and non-economic motivated respondents. That said, the share of respondents citing safety in the destination country is exceptionally high for those who moved due to general war/conflict.


**Figure 43: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent**



It is also observed that 19 per cent of the respondents – when asked if they first wanted to go to another country – did not know which country they wanted to go to before choosing their intended destination country. Before selecting their intended destination country, only 5 per cent of the respondents had planned on going to another country. In this case, the UK (30.8%, N=8), Germany (15.4%, N=4), Denmark (7.69%, N=2), and Italy (7.69%, N=2) were most frequently reported. Another 8 per cent (N=2) of the respondents reported not knowing their first intended destination and that they wanted to reach Europe more generally. For respondents, the main reasons for changing their choice of countries included high travel costs and information about other countries from other migrants.

Considering their main priorities, Somali respondents transiting in Libya reported that once arriving in Europe, they would first claim asylum (37.3%), find work (27.3%), and reunify with friends and family (26.3%) (see Figure 44). In the literature, Somalis, as well as Ethiopians, have positive perceptions of family reunification (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016). Finding work (30.1%) and obtaining nationality (21.9%) were reported by respondents as their secondary priorities. As shown in Figure 44, the expectations of Somalis respondents of their destination were diverse and included obtaining refugee status (33.0%) and accessing free healthcare (29.4%) and housing (12.1%) primarily.

**Figure 44: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somalis in Libya, in per cent**



Comparing the migrants' expected support at their destination with their reasons for choosing their destination country, Somali respondents in Libya predominately expected to obtain refugee status regardless of the main motivating factor to move to the destination. Free housing and healthcare were expected for those moving because of their existing network of family and friends in the country.

The expectations for secondary types of support overlapped: obtain refugee status (36.4%), free housing (17.1%) and receive monthly living stipend (12.9%). While respondents in Somali named applying for asylum as their main priority like respondents in their origin country and in Sudan, they were less likely than the others to expect nationality as a form of support from their host country. Only 15.7 per cent of the Somali respondents did not expect to face any problems upon arrival in their final destination country. As can be seen in Figure 44, deportation (19.7%), rejection of asylum claim (19.0%), and xenophobia (15.9%) were expected as primary problems. In addition to detention (16.8%) and xenophobia (22.1%), a lack of jobs (16.2%) was also expected by Somalis in Libya as a secondary problem at their final destination.

Access to information sources and the nature of such platforms and channels are important factors in the migration process. Somali respondents in Libya reported the Internet (45.9%), word of mouth (16.2%), and television (11.4%) as the primary source of information. Word of mouth (36.3%) and television (13.6%) were also reported as secondary sources of information. Slightly over 16 per cent of the respondents reported having only one information source for their perceptions of Europe. Word of mouth included written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) with friends and family in Europe (43.8%); verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with family and friends in Europe (13.8%); as well as contact at social events and activities (10.5%, N=29) were primary channels. While contact with family at home (43.4%) was the main secondary channel for word of mouth.

Like respondents in their origin country and in Sudan, 70 per cent of the Somali respondents in Libya reported that based on their existing perceptions of Europe, they would advise others to migrate to

Europe. Males were a bit more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe than females (70.6% as compared to 65.9%, respectively). The notion of a bleak future in Somalia (48.2% of all answers given), as well as the perceived safety and security (40.3% of all answers given) and respect for human rights (24.4% of all answers given) in Europe were the main reasons for advising others to migrate. This aligns closely with the reasons for migrating among Somalis in Libya, which included war and conflict, a lack of jobs and economic prosperity, no rule of law, as well as personal- and family-level insecurity. On the other hand, the main reasons for respondents to discourage migration included the travel route to Europe being too dangerous (70.5% of all answers given), difficult nature of the journey (34.1% of all answers given), and xenophobia and discrimination in Europe (44.3% of all answers given).

Of the Somali respondents in Libya that faced problems en route to Europe, 90 per cent would not advise others to migrate to Europe, a greater proportion than those that would advise the migration of others while having faced problems en route (82.0%). However, respondents were more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe when they had relatives living in Europe prior to migration (74.1%) as compared to those that did not have relatives living in Europe (66.3%). On the contrary, those that had friends living in Europe pre-migration were less likely to advise others to migrate (68.3%) than those that did not have friends living in Europe (76.7%).

Notably, only 6 per cent of the Somalis transiting in Libya reported being aware of what an asylum procedure is. As such, respondents in Libya report being less knowledgeable about asylum than potential Somalis migrants and those in Sudan. Among these respondents, descriptions of the asylum procedure are varied. Several respondents suggested that war in Somalia as well as Somalia's presence on a UN "list" were reasons enough for applying for asylum. Respondents reported a biography, passport, and CV as being necessary for the asylum procedure. In this regard, some respondents reported having a yellow card from the UN, while others described several steps involved in the asylum procedure:

"Bring my full personal information, CV, passport and reason to come to Europe" (Somali national in Libya)

"General legal procedures such as passport, identity card, nationality and reason to come to Europe as far as I know" (Somali national in Libya)


#### **6.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece**

Like respondents in their origin country, and in Sudan, Sweden (26.7%), Belgium (18.3%, N=26), Denmark (9.15%, N=13), and Germany (7.75%, N=11), were the most common intended destinations amongst Somali respondents in Greece. Somalis in Greece based their choice on existing network of family and friends there (91.1%) and the perceived availability of jobs (6.67%, N=9) (see Figure 45). Considering the choice of Sweden as the primary intended destination, respondents particularly made their choice based on existing transnational social networks in the country, with the perceived availability of jobs as a secondary reason. Social networks were the main reasons for choosing Sweden, Belgium, Denmark and Germany, whereas other secondary reasons include safety and supposed ease of access to asylum procedures.



Comparing the main drivers of migration with the reason for choosing an intended destination, it is observed that most Somali respondents in Greece regardless of the initial reasons for migration, chose their destination country based on existing social networks s.


**Figure 45: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent**



It should be noted that, before selecting their intended destination country, only 2 per cent (N=2) of the respondents had planned on going to another country. In this case, the UK (50.0%, N=1) and Sweden (50.0%, N=1) were the two reported countries. Another 8 per cent (N=2) of the respondents reported not knowing their first intended destination but wanted to reach Europe more generally. The sole reason reported for changing their destination countries was high travel cost.

Somali respondents in Greece cited their first priority as reunification with friends and family (47.9%) and asylum (52.1%) (see Figure 46) upon arrival in Europe. Family reunification was a much greater priority among respondents in Greece than in Libya, Sudan, or Somalia (potential migrants). While 40 per cent of the respondents reported only one such priority, 48 per cent reported claiming asylum (47.9%) as a secondary priority. While 70 per cent of Somali migrants transiting in Greece primarily expected to receive refugee status– as did Somalis in Libya – in addition to a monthly living stipend (15.5%), as illustrated in Figure 46.

**Figure 46: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somalis in Greece, in per cent**



Expectations for a monthly living stipend (28.2%) and support with family reunification (29.6%) were also reported as secondary expectations, though 22 per cent of the respondents did not expect more than one type of support. As shown in Figure 46, more than half (57.0%) of the respondents expected to face rejection of their asylum claim as a primary problem. Moreover, 45 per cent expected to face only one problem.

Based on their perceptions of Europe and migration experiences, 64 per cent of the Somali respondents surveyed in Greece reported that they would advise others to migrate to Europe because of the notion of a bleak future in Somalia. Moreover, males were slightly more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe than females (65.8% as compared to 61.9%, respectively). The main reasons for respondents to discourage migration included the gap between expectation and reality of life in Europe and that the travel route to Europe was too dangerous. Another 20 per cent (N=28) of the respondents did not want to answer when asked if they could advise the migration of others to Europe.

Majority of the Somali respondents in Greece reported relying on WhatsApp (50.0%) and word of mouth (28.9%) as their primary source of information. Word of mouth (54.9%) was reported as the main secondary source of information. While 32 per cent of respondents reported only one source of information on which they based their impressions of life in Europe. Word of mouth included verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) (31.1%, N=37) and written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) (26.9%, N=32) with friends and family in Europe. Mediated contact with someone in Europe (26.9%), written contact (again via smartphone apps and/or social media) with friends and family in Europe (21.1%, N=25), and contact with family at home (16.8%, N=20) were the main secondary channels reported for word of mouth.

Despite having faced problems en route to Europe, 67 per cent of Somali respondents in Greece would advise others to migrate to Europe in comparison to 30 per cent that would discourage migration. The respondents were also more likely to advise others to migrate when they had relatives living in Europe (70.1%), in comparison to those that did not have relatives in Europe (51.1%).

Approximately 33 per cent of the Somali respondents reported knowing what an asylum procedure is, revealing that they were more knowledgeable about asylum than respondents in Somalia (potential migrants), Sudan, and Libya. Somali respondents transiting in Greece described the asylum procedure as involving: biometric registration, being interviewed, and receiving documents to stay in the host country. In general, respondents described the asylum procedure to seek protection or permission to stay in the host country.

“My friends told me that the country will protect me” (Somali national in Greece)

“As refugee, they must accept my application for asylum” (Somali national in Greece)

“As I am refugee, they will accept me to stay in the country” (Somali national in Greece)

Many Somali respondents in Greece were also unclear about the details of applying for asylum and faced challenges in keeping up with changes to asylum policies.

“I thought that I knew [what the asylum procedure is] but now the rules for asylum is too complex” (Somali national in Greece)

“Yes I knew [what the asylum procedure is] but after so long that I stay in Turkey to work to save money for the trip all the rules change in EU about the asylum” (Somali national in Greece)


## **6.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands**

In terms of intended destinations, 38 per cent of Somali respondents in the Netherlands (38.2%, N=21) did not have a specific destination but wanted to reach Europe more generally. Others cited that the Netherlands (27.3%, N=15) and the UK (20.0%, N=11) had been their intended destinations. In this regard, respondents in the Netherlands were less likely to have had a specific intended destination in mind than Somali respondents in transit and in their origin country. The Somali respondents in the Netherlands chose a specific European destination country, based on existing social network there (63.6%, N=21) (see Figure 47). The main secondary reason for choosing a specific country was associated with its safety (21.2%, N=7). More than half of the respondents (54.6%, N=18) reported only one reason for choosing their intended destination, and almost all the respondents (96.4%) reported intending to stay there once receiving status.

It should be noted that 63per cent (N=12) of the Somalis reported reaching the Netherlands by coincidence. This unplanned and dynamic nature of migration is also highlighted in the literature whereby some migrants have reported reaching in Europe unexpectedly, or in an unintended destination country,


at the hands of their smuggler (Merkle, Reinold, & Siegel, 2017; Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016).

**Figure 47: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali nationals in the Netherlands, in per cent**



Like migrants in Greece, Somali respondents in the Netherlands reported that, prior to their arrival to Europe, their primary priorities had been to claim asylum (49.1%, N=27) and reunite with family and friends (21.8%, N=12) (see Figure 48). In relation to this, it should be noted that responses to the qualitative question asking respondents about knowledge of the asylum procedure could not be analysed for Somalis in the Netherlands due to inadequate data.

**Figure 48: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somalis in the Netherlands, in per cent**



Secondary priorities were associated with obtaining nationality from the host country (25.5%, N=14), reuniting with family and friends (21.8%, N=12), and finding work (16.4%, N=9). As can be seen in Figure 48, most respondents had expected to obtain nationality (49.1%, N=27) and refugee status (14.6%, N=8) from the government in their destination country. Obtaining free education (20.4%, N=10) and support for family reunification (20.4%, N=10) were equally cited as the main forms of secondary support that respondents expected to receive from their host governments. Another 23 per cent (N=11) of respondents only expected one form of support.

Upon their arrival, 31 per cent (N=15) of the respondents reported receiving their primary expected support and 24 per cent (N=9) received the secondary. Based on cross-tabulations between forms of expected support and their receipt, Somalis in the Netherlands mostly expected to receive a legal permit to stay in the country (either via nationality or refugee status) or support to bring their family members to the Netherlands. However, the literature also suggests that there may be gaps between a migrant's perceptions of their destination and the realities there (Ystehde & Fosse, 2016). This study has found this to be the case for Somalis in the Netherlands, who most often did not receive nationality (60.0%, N=18) as expected from the government of their host country. Despite this, 31 per cent (N=17) of the Somali respondents in the Netherlands did not face any problems. Still, 26 per cent (N=14) were faced with the rejection of their asylum claim as their primary problem, and 16 per cent (N=6) suggested that their secondary problem was difficulty in family reunification. Another 24 per cent (N=9) of the respondents reported only one problem.

In terms of sources of information, Somali respondents in the Netherlands reported their word of mouth (50.9%, N=28; 10.9%, N=6) and television (10.9%, N=6; 5.45%, N=3) as the primary and secondary sources. Slightly less than three-fourths (74.6%) of the respondents, however, reported only one source of information. Moreover, the primary channels of word of mouth varied among Somalis in the Netherlands, with contact with family at home (38.2%, N=13); verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with friends and family in Europe (29.4%, N=10); as well as contact with family and friends that returned from Europe (14.7%, N=5) being most frequently stated. Another 15 per cent (N=5) reported that contact with family in Somalia was their main secondary channel of word of mouth.


Based on their existing perceptions of and experiences in Europe, 29 per cent of the Somali respondents in the Netherlands reported that they would advise others to migrate to Europe. Respondents particularly advised others to migrate based on the perception of Europe's safety and security (47.6%, N=10); these are lower percentages than those reported by Somali respondents in all transit countries. This proportion reveals that migrants in the Netherlands were less likely (by a factor of more than two) to advise migration than Somalis in transit and still in their origin country. On the other hand, the main reasons for respondents to discourage migration included in the gap between expectation and reality of life in Europe (24.1%, N=13) and the difficulties nature of the migration route (33.3%, N=18). Nonetheless, slightly more females (30.8%) than males (27.6%) would advise others to migrate. Also, those Somali migrants in the Netherlands with relatives living in Europe pre-migration were more likely to advise others to migrate (33.3%) than those that did not have relatives living in Europe (25.0%).

## 6.6 Somali returnees

Many of the returnees reported that, in their initial migration to Europe, they had chosen Sweden (17.3%), Germany (10.2%), and Finland (12.6%) as an intended destination country. However, 8 per cent of the respondents reported that they had no specific intended destination but wanted to reach Europe more generally. Their primary reasons for choosing a specific destination country were based on existing networks of family and friends (37.2%) and ease of access to the asylum process in comparison to other EU countries (30.7%). In this regard, the ease of asylum procedures was cited significantly more often by Somali returnees than their counterparts (see Figure 49). Secondary reasons choosing their destination country by Somali returnees were linked to the migration facilitator's preference (21.7%) and the supposed availability of jobs in the country (23.8%).

For Somali returnees, the top three intended destination countries were Sweden, Germany, and Finland, all for reasons of an existing social network and perceived job availability. Moreover, a total of 49 per cent of the respondents reported returning to Somalia from their initially intended destination country in Europe. Of those that had not done so, it was generally reported that travel costs had been too high to reach their initially intended destination (24.5% of all answers given).


Figure 49: Reason 1 for choice of intended destination country among Somali returnees, in per cent



As illustrated in Thematic Area 2, main drivers for migration for Somali returnees mainly included a lack of jobs and livelihood and low economic growth and prosperity in their country. When observing the overlap with drivers of migration and choice of intended destination country, the main observations are linked existing social network and to the perceived ease of access to the asylum process. This refers to the importance of transnational networks and the accessibility of asylum in the intended destination country.

When asked about their first two priorities upon arrival in Europe, Somali returnees reported that their first priorities were to claim asylum (41.3%) and to obtain nationality in their host country (24.8%) (see Figure 50). Obtaining nationality (22.8%), finding work (20.9%), and asking for housing from the host government (14.2%) were reported as secondary priorities. Like Sudan and Somali potential migrants, many of the Somali returnees expected to obtain nationality (38.6). They also expected to receive free housing (14.6%) and obtain refugee status (14.2%) from their host country. In terms of expected form of support from the host government in their final destination country, half (50.9%) of the respondents reported that they had not received expected support. Secondary expected forms of support – again – included obtaining nationality (20.2%) and obtaining free housing (16.3%); of which only 38 per cent of the respondents reported receiving their secondary expected forms of support.

**Figure 50: Priority 1 upon arrival + Support 1 expected from host government + Expected Problem 1 in the destination among Somali returnees, in per cent**



When assessing the overlaps between the main expectations of support and the reasons for choosing a destination country, Somali returnees primarily chose their intended destination country based on their existing networks and the supposed ease of access to asylum processes. Moreover, considering the overlaps between expected forms of support and their receipt, it should be noted that Somali returnees most often expected legal support to stay in their previous destination country, such as by obtaining nationality, a visa, or refugee status. In addition, support for family reunification, free education, and a monthly stipend were expected.

Most often they did not receive any legal support – nationality (60.2%) or refugee status (11.0%, N=13) – nor support to bring their family members to their previous destination country (18.1%, N=17). However, respondents reported receiving support in terms of free education, free housing, and a monthly stipend in their previous destination country.

In addition to facing problems en route to Europe, Somali returnees also cited the challenges they faced upon arrival in their European destination country. In the destination country, respondents mostly faced rejection of their asylum claim (43.7%), and the inability to obtain nationality (18.5%) (see Figure 50). Secondary problems in this regard were associated with family reunification (19.1%) and obtain nationality (16.4%). Another 14 per cent of the respondents reported facing only one challenge in their destination country.

The Somali returnees reported using word of mouth (26.4%), Facebook (18.9%), and the Internet (16.5%, N=42) as their primary source of information; the same sources – namely word of mouth (13.0%, N=33), the Internet (11.8%, N=30), and Facebook (10.6%, N=27) – were also reported as secondary sources of information. In this regard, Somali returnees were significantly more likely to base their perceptions of Europe from the Internet. Another 34 per cent reported only one source of information. Word of mouth included verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook, and/or Skype) with family and friends in Europe (54%) was primary, while written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) with friends and family in Europe (40%) was secondary. In this context, it should also be considered that – just as access to information sources, or lack thereof, can influence a migrant’s decision making in terms of the route and potential destination country – it can also facilitate a return. As can also be seen in the discrepancies between expected and received forms of support, a lack of reliable information may skew a migrant’s impressions of and expectations for life in their chosen destination. Knowledge of an improving situation in a migrant’s origin country may also influence the decision to return.

Despite these challenges, 43 per cent of the Somali returnees reported that they would advise others to migrate to Europe, especially via regular means, because of the lack of a future in Somalia (12.9% of all answers given) combined with the perception of good jobs in Europe (22.2% of all answers given).

Of the Somali return migrants, 59 per cent of females reported that they would advise others to migrate to Europe while only 37 per cent of males reported the same. The main reasons for respondents to discourage migration was the dangerous and difficult nature of the travel route to Europe (37.3% of all answers given) and in the gap between expectations and reality of life in Europe (30.3% of all answers given). While Somali returnees are significantly less likely than other Somalis to advise others to migrate, predominantly advise others to migrate in a legal manner.

However, Somali returnees were more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe, rather than not, even when having faced problems while travelling en route (89.1% as compared to 83.0%, respectively). Considering the role of family and friends in advising the migration of others, Somali returnees with relatives living in Europe prior to migration were more likely to advise others to migrate to Europe (45.0%) than those that did not (36.6%). This was also the case for Somali return migrants that had friends living in Europe (45.2%) as compared to those that did not (37.0%).

It needs to be emphasized that –like most Somalis transiting in Sudan – only 22 per cent of Somali returnees reported knowing what an asylum procedure is. Returnees to Somalia described the asylum procedure as a process through which one asks the host government for permission to stay in that country. Other suggested that the asylum procedure involved applying for and being granted refugee status, interacting with government officials, as well as leaving their country due to insecurity. Other suggested that applying for asylum required going to a European country.



“Asylum is process [through which] you ask the government to give you permission to stay [in] that country” (Somali returnee)

“The protection granted by a nation to someone who has left their country as a political refugee” (Somali returnee)

“It is a procedure used for people who immigrated from their country due to insecurity” (Somali returnee)

Respondents also suggested that, as part of the asylum process, asylum seekers receive free housing and education, a stipend, as well as a job. In general, many Somali returnees also attributed opportunities for a better life, a future, and safety with the asylum process. On the other hand, one Somali returnee described the asylum procedure as involving problems at sea, hunger, and health problems. Another respondent acknowledged that the asylum procedure is associated with a waiting time. It should also be noted that some of the Somalia returnees incorrectly associated asylum with citizenship and business.

“Is a process that ask the government to give permission to life [sp] and work and give the nationality for that country” (Somali returnee)

## **HIGHLIGHTS: Perceptions of Europe among Somali migrants**

- The main intended destination countries among Somalis migrants include Sweden, Germany, the UK, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
- Reasons to choose an intended destination country were diverse. The most important reason for Somali migrants in all migration stages was existing social network in the destination country. Other factors included economic reasons (e.g. availability of jobs), political (the ease of access to asylum procedures compared to other EU countries), security (the safety of the country), social (the ability to go to school), or circumstantial (being told by their migration facilitator that they could be brought to a specific country). However, the perceived ease of asylum procedures was cited significantly more often by Somali returnees than their counterparts.
- As described in Thematic Area 2, Somali migrants in transit mainly wanted to migrate because for economic reasons such as lack of jobs and livelihood, and security reasons such as the prevalence of war and conflict in Somalia.
- When migrants reported their driver for migration as lack of jobs and livelihood, their choice for intended destination country based on transnational connections (i.e. relative(s) and/or friend(s) are there) and the availability of jobs. Similarly, when citing migration drivers as war and conflict, respondents choose their intended destination country due to their existing networks in the intended

destination and the country's safety. These overlaps clearly reflect that causes for migration, migrant choices and destinations are not arbitrary but correspond.


- The problems Somalis most commonly expected to face in Europe included deportation, rejection of their asylum claim and nationality, a lack of financial support, failure in family reunification, xenophobia, and a lack of jobs.
- Somalis primarily based their perceptions of Europe on word of mouth, Facebook, WhatsApp, the Internet, and television. The main channels of word of mouth were verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook and/or Skype) and written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) with friends and family in Europe.
- In this regard, it is observed that Somalis in transit use television significantly more often as their source of information than their counterparts, while Somali returnees are significantly more likely to use the Internet.
- Somali respondents were likely to advise migration based on the perceived availability of good jobs in Europe, a lack of hope for a future in Somalia, as well as perceived safety and security in Europe.
- Somali returnees, however, are significantly less likely than other Somali respondents to advise others to migrate. They mostly advised others to migrate in a legal manner. This comparison excludes Somalis in the Netherlands due to limitations in the data.
- Somali transit migrants, on the other hand, are significantly more likely than others to advise migration based on perceived availability of good jobs in Europe.
- Reasons for Somalis to discourage the migration of others to Europe included difficulties and danger along the migration route, life in Europe not being as expected, and xenophobia and discrimination in Europe.
- Transit migrants significantly more often than other Somalis discourage such migration because of the dangerous nature of the travel route. Somali potential migrants are significantly more likely to discourage the migration of others specifically based on too many difficulties along the way.
- Somalis generally reported that, upon arrival in Europe, their main priorities would be to apply for asylum, find work, apply for nationality, learn the local language, reunite with family and friends, and seek housing.
- The most commonly reported forms of support expected from the host country included legal status to stay in the country, free housing, healthcare, and education, support in family reunification and a monthly stipend. It is observed that many Somalis in the Netherlands (30.6%) and Somali returnees (50.9%) did not receive their main expected form of support, namely legal support to stay in their destination country. Figure 51 shows that, overall, receipt of the expected forms of support was low.
- Somali migrants in transit mostly expect to obtain nationality, refugee status or free health care from the host government of their intended destination country.
- There is no overlap between the type of support migrants expect to get from the host government in the destination country and the main reason why migrants chose their intended destination country. Expectations of obtaining nationality and refugee status were mostly related to migrant networks and job availability. On the other hand, when Somalis in transit expected support in the form of free health care, they mostly chose their intended destination country based on their transnational links and the country's safety.

**Figure 51: Expected support received from host government among Somali migrants, in per cent**



- Overall, knowledge of the asylum process was very low amongst the Somali respondents (see Figure 52). This is lowest in Libya (with only 5.5% of the respondents knowing) and among potential migrants (with 14.2% knowing). This may point towards a lack of knowledge on the procedure itself, but there exists a general acknowledgement and awareness of the importance of asylum for legally staying in Europe.

**Figure 52: Knowledge of asylum procedure among Somali migrants (across stages, in per cent)**



## 7. THEMATIC AREA 6 – MIGRANT CHOICES AND OPTIONS

Aside from migrant perceptions that migrants of Europe, this thematic area focuses on the different migration choices and options that are available to Somali migrants in their own region and Europe. This section also focuses on the different factors that motivate migrants to migrate to Europe (or opt for regional migration instead), as well as the knowledge of migrants on these topics, it should be noted that some of these themes have been touched upon in the previous thematic areas.


### 7.1 Somali nationals leaving their home country

Among the Somali potential migrants, the primary reasons for choosing migration to Europe over regional migration were the lack of jobs and livelihood in the region (31.1%) and the perception of better employment opportunities (26.2%) in Europe. In terms of secondary reasons, the perception of better access to jobs in Europe (23.8%) and the perception of higher incomes in Europe (reported by 20.2 per cent of the respondents) topped the list. Some respondents suggested that, had they been given the opportunity to work (40.5%) or study (37.5%) in Africa, they would have considered not migrating to Europe, under certain conditions.

Seventy-one per cent of Somali potential migrants who reported that they would have considered not migrating to Europe if provided an opportunity to work in the region were male. The respondents in this cross-section seem to be highly educated: 45 per cent reported secondary education and 26 per cent a Bachelor's degree. These respondents specified that they would not migrate to Europe only under certain conditions, namely access to a good job, quality education, safety, good human resources, and a salary that can be equated to what is earned in Europe.

When asked how they would obtain permission to stay in their destination country, 26 per cent of respondents planned to ask for a national passport and 23 per cent planned to claim asylum. Another 28.4 per cent did not plan on obtaining any permission to stay in their future host country. In this regard, under half (46.8%) of respondents reported being aware of legal options to migrate to Europe, especially of Schengen visas (44.9%) and claiming asylum (33.0%) (see Figure 53).

**Figure 53: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali potential migrants, in per cent**



## 7.2 Somali nationals in Sudan

Like Somali potential migrants, the primary reasons for Somalis in Sudan to choose migration to Europe over regional migration were a lack of jobs and livelihood in the region (16.1%), as well as the perceptions of better life (16.9%), better access to jobs (19.6%), and higher incomes (16.4%) in Europe. The perceptions of better standard of life (22.1%), better access to jobs (9.93%), better social services (9.68%), and higher incomes (12.7%) in Europe were also reported as secondary reasons for choosing Europe over regional migration.

Considering these factors, a significant fraction of respondents suggested that, had they been given the opportunity to work (36.5%) or study (32.0%) in Africa, they would have considered not migrating to Europe. In this regard, it should be noted that 15.6 per cent of these respondents indicated they would have considered not migrating to Europe only given certain conditions in Somalia, including security, peace, and stability, as well as sufficient income.


The majority of the Somali respondents in Sudan who reported that they would have considered staying if provided an opportunity to work in the region were male (70%) and relatively highly educated, with 43 per cent of respondents completed secondary education and 25 per cent obtained a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree. Moreover, of the Somalis in Sudan who reported that they would have considered not migrating to Europe if provided an opportunity to study in the region (given certain conditions), 59 per cent of the respondents were male and 72 per cent were single. Respondents primarily had either secondary education (59%) or a Bachelor’s degree (19%). Not surprisingly, respondents reported free and good education, and to a lesser extent, a lack of security threats as the conditions they would need when staying in the region for work.

Somali respondents in Sudan primarily planned on obtaining permission to stay in Europe by claiming asylum (23.3%) and asking for a national passport (14.9%). Another 44 per cent reported that they had not yet thought about how they would obtain such permission. A little over half (53.4%) of respondents reported being aware of legal options to migrate to Europe. In this regard, respondents were aware of various legal options to migrate to Europe, with family reunification (57.7%), tourist visas (26.0%), student

visas (26.0%), and business visas (25.1%) being most commonly reported (see Figure 54). Respondents in Sudan were much less likely than potential migrants to report knowing legal migration options such as the Schengen visa.

Of the Somalis in Sudan that were aware of family reunification as a legal option for migration to Europe, 59 per cent were male, with 42 per cent completed secondary education and 23 per cent holding a Bachelor’s degree. In the context of family reunification, it is perhaps surprising that only 23 per cent of the respondents reported being married or in a civil union. Moreover, as females tend to apply for family reunification after their male partner had migrated, it would also have been expected that more females knew of this legal pathway. This was not found to be the case.

**Figure 54: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali nationals transiting in Sudan, in per cent**




### 7.3 Somali nationals in transit in Libya

Somali nationals in Libya cited lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities in the region (35.4%) and the perception that Europe was safer (25.7%) as their primary reasons for choosing migration to Europe rather than regional migration. Somalis in Libya were more likely than the potential migrants and those in Libya to report safety as a reason for deciding against regional migration. This highlights the worsening conditions in Libya as an incentive for migrants to continue their journey towards Europe. This issue has been discussed widely in the literature (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon & Sigona, 2016). Secondary reasons for preferring migration to Europe were more diverse, with having social network in Europe (25.4%), the perception that access to jobs is better in Europe (15.9%), as well as the perception that incomes are higher in Europe (13.0%) being most frequently cited. Despite these considerations, some respondents suggested that, had they been given the opportunity to work (37.3%) or study (34.4%) in Africa, they would have considered not migrating to Europe.

Like the respondents in Sudan, the majority of the Somalis surveyed in Libya (72.9%) planned on obtaining permission to stay in Europe by claiming asylum. However, a smaller proportion of respondents (39.7%) reported being aware of other legal options to migrate to Europe. Of those that reported having this knowledge, respondents were most knowledgeable about the Schengen visa (78.3%) – as were Somali potential migrants – in addition to applying for business visas (36.5%) and claiming asylum (33.9%) (see Figure 55).

**Figure 55: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali nationals transiting in Libya, in per cent**




#### 7.4 Somali nationals in transit in Greece

Like Somalis surveyed in Libya, the primary reasons for Somali respondents transiting in Greece to choose migration to Europe over regional migration were associated with the perception that Europe provided more safety (41.6%) and higher incomes (23.2%). Prospects of better social services (27.5%), higher incomes (23.9%), and improved access to jobs (16.9%) in Europe were also reported as secondary reasons for choosing Europe over regional migration. Some respondents suggested that, had they been given the opportunity to work (6.34%) or study (8.45%) in Africa, they would have considered not migrating to Europe – though in much smaller percentages than for Somali potential migrants as well as Somali migrants in Sudan and Libya. This pattern perhaps also reflects the shift from economic-based reasons (as seen for Somali potential migrants as well as those in Sudan and Libya) to more security-based reasons for choosing migration to Europe over regional migration.

Like respondents in Sudan and Libya, the majority of Somali respondents in Greece planned on obtaining permission to stay in Europe by claiming asylum (86.6%). Like Somalis transiting in Sudan, 56 per cent of respondents in Greece reported being aware of legal options to migrate to Europe, with Schengen visas (77.4%) and claiming asylum (17.5%) being most commonly cited. This knowledge of Schengen visas is similar to the trends shown by Somali potential migrants and Somalis in Libya (see Figure 56). Thirty-eight percent of Somalis in Greece did not want to answer when asked if they were aware of legal options to migrate to Europe.

**Figure 56: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali nationals transiting in Greece, in per cent**



### 7.5 Somali nationals in the Netherlands

Like Somalis in Libya and Greece, the majority of Somalia respondents in the Netherlands made their choice primarily based on the notion that Europe was safer (52.7%, N=29) and that the standard of life was better in Europe (16.4%, N=9). The chances for a better standard of life in Europe (21.8%, N=12) were again cited as the main secondary reason for choosing migration to Europe over regional migration. Another 22 per cent (N=12) of respondents reported only one reason for deciding against regional migration. Only a very small percentage of the respondents suggested that, had they been given the opportunity to work (3.64%, N=2) or study (5.45%, N=3) in Africa, they would have considered not migrating to Europe; these figures, while smaller, are somewhat like those reported by Somalis in Greece. In general, Somalis in the Netherlands who would have considered not migrating to Europe if provided an opportunity to work in the region, generally provided conditions of peace and safety from al-Shabaab to do so.

The majority of the Somali respondents in the Netherlands had claimed asylum (76.4%) in order to obtain permission to stay in Europe, as was also planned by the majority of respondents in Sudan, Libya, and Greece. Surprisingly, unlike any respondents in transit or in their origin country (potential migrants), none of the respondents in the Netherlands reported being aware of legal options to migrate to Europe.

Somali respondents in the Netherlands were also asked whether they intended to return to Somalia. Only 1.82 per cent (N=1) expressed the interest to do so. The lack of safety in Somalia (51.2% of all answers given, N=21) and that lack a future in the home country (19.5% of all answers given, N=16) were the primary reasons given for not returning home. Moreover, most suggested that they would only consider returning to Somalia if there was an end to the conflict and violence (33.7% of all answers given, N=3-) or if the security situation (19.1%, N=17) or the rule of law (12.4% of all answers given, N=11) improved in the country. The majority of respondents in the Netherlands who wished to return to Somali (50% of all answers given) wanted to return because of the rejection of their asylum application. Those wanting to return to Somalia reported that, upon their return to their home country, their primary need would be to find a job or income-generating activity (100%).




## 7.6 Somali returnees

The primary reasons for which Somali returnees had chosen to migrate to Europe instead of opting for regional migration were the lack of jobs and livelihood in the region (24.0%), the belief that incomes would be higher in Europe (22.8%), as well as the perception that the standard of life in Europe was better (12.6%). The hopes of better access to jobs (17.7%), higher incomes (14.5%), and better standard of life (20.5%) in Europe were reported by respondents as secondary reasons.

Some respondents suggested that, had they been given the opportunity to work (55.9%) or study (45.3%) in Africa, they would have considered not migrating to Europe. The share of Somali returnees who indicated that they would have considered not migrating to Europe were similar to the that of Somali potential migrants as well as Somali respondents in Sudan and Libya, but much higher than those reported by Somalis in Greece and in the Netherlands. The Somalis returnees who reported not migrating to Europe if provided an opportunity to work in the region (given certain conditions, e.g. good job, enough money) were generally male (88%). This cross-section of individuals, like their counterparts, also reported being highly educated: 41 per cent of the returnees reported secondary education and 35 per cent a Bachelor's degree.


When asked about how they had obtained official permission to stay in Europe, 23 per cent of Somali returnees reported that they had claimed asylum and 24.8 per cent had asked for a national passport. Another 39 per cent of the respondents reported that they had not obtained any type of official permission to stay. Nonetheless, over half of returnees (52.8%) reported that, before their migration to Europe, they had been aware of legal options to migrate to Europe. Like Somali potential migrants and Somalis in Libya and Greece, Schengen visas (47.8%) were the most frequently reported legal path to Europe reported by Somali returnees. Claiming asylum (33.6%), student visas (20.1%), and business visas (19.4%) were also reported. Another 19 per cent of the respondents reported knowing about family reunification (see Figure 57).

**Figure 57: Known legal options for migration to Europe among Somali returnees, in per cent**




Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 58 it should be noted that – when asked about their reasons for returning to Somalia from Europe – the majority cited that their asylum claim had been rejected or that they had been informed by their host government that they did not have official permission to stay in the country.

**Figure 58: Reasons for return among Somali returnees, in per cent**



Upon returning to Somalia, one primary challenge faced by returnees was finding a job or income-generating activity (35.4%) or dealing with the negative reactions from family and friends (11.0%). The secondary challenge was also related finding a job or income-generating activity (13.4%, N=29) and dealing with the negative reactions toward return from family and friends (10.7%, N=23). However, 15 per cent of respondents cited not facing any problems, while 20 per cent suggested that they had only faced one challenge upon return. A little over half (52.0%) of Somali returnees did not want to migrate to Europe again (see Figure 59).

**Figure 59: Intention to migrate to Europe again among Somali returnees, in per cent**



## HIGHLIGHTS: Migration choices & options for Somali migrants

- The main reasons for which Somali migrants chose migration to Europe over regional migration were economic (e.g. lack of jobs and livelihood in region, better access to jobs in Europe, higher incomes) and security-related (e.g. respect for human rights, greater safety in Europe). Other reasons for deciding against regional migration included perceptions of better life and social services in Europe as well as having social networks there.
- Somalis generally reported that, if given the opportunity to work or study in their region, they would still consider migrating to Europe.
- Somali migrants in Greece and in the Netherlands are an exception to this, as only a small minority said they would have considered not migrating to Europe when provided with opportunities within their region.
- Awareness of legal options to migrate to Europe was varied between Somalis at different stages of migration. In this regard, 53 per cent of Somali potential migrants, 40 per cent of Somalis in Sudan, 56 per cent of Somalis in Greece, and 53 per cent of the returnees reported knowing of legal options. None of the Somalis in the Netherlands reported being aware of such legal options.
- The most commonly reported legal option to migrate to Europe among Somalis was the Schengen visa. Somali transit migrants were significantly more likely than their counterparts at other stages of the journey to be aware of business visas and family reunification as legal options to migrate to Europe. The student visa was also well-known, especially among Somali potential migrants, returnees, and respondents in Libya, as a legal option for migration.
- Only a small minority of Somalis in the Netherlands intended to return to Somalia, but 52 per cent of returnees had no intention to migrate to Europe again
- The primary challenges faced by returnees upon their return to Somalia were finding a job or an income-generating activity and dealing with negative reactions toward return from family and friends. More than half of the returnees expressed no desire to migrate to Europe again.

# CONCLUSION

This report presented outcomes from DTM data analysis of Somali migrants towards Europe, carried out on six thematic areas: (1) socio-demographic profiles of migrants; (2) migration drivers and decision-making; (3) migrants' vulnerabilities in origin, transit, and destination countries; (4) the role of intermediaries; (5) migrants' perceptions of Europe; (6) as well as migrant choices and options. Surveys were conducted in the country of origin (and return) (Somalia); in transit countries (Sudan, Libya, and Greece); and in a destination country (the Netherlands). To better address the thematic areas and to provide a more comprehensive answer to this report's research questions, the data analysis was, when possible, complemented with the existing literature on migration from Somalia to Europe. The main findings of the report, presented below, should be taken with a certain level of caution due to limitations in the methodology.

## Thematic area 1 – Migrant Profiles

With regards to the socio-demographic profiles of Somali nationals in their origin, transit, and destination countries as well as upon return, the following observations can be made. The majority of the Somali migrants were male, while more balanced gender distributions were observed amongst Somali migrants in Greece as well as those in the Netherlands. When comparing marital status among the different migration phases, it is found to be statistically significant that Somali potential migrants are more likely to be single than their counterparts in other stages of the migration journey. However, Somalis in the Netherlands were more often in a relationship and Somalis in transit are significantly most likely to be married or in civil union. The average age of Somali migrants varies between 25 years and 33 years. The age, gender, and marital status distributions of this study also confirm previous findings that irregular migrants from Somalia are frequently characterized as young, single males (Abdel Ati, 2017; IOM, 2017a; IOM Libya, 2017; Majidi, 2016; Vever et al., 2016; Malakooti, 2015; UN DESA, 2015). It has, furthermore, been observed that Somali migrants most often had an intermediate level of education.

With regards to their household characteristics, Somalis intending to migrate were less likely to have children than Somalis in transit and upon return. At the time of the survey, the timeframe for respondents planning to leave Somalia varied between three and four weeks to between two to three months. Somali returnees mostly returned from Italy, Germany, or Norway via self-arranged return.

## Thematic Area 2 – Migration Drivers & Decision Making

Somali respondents in all parts of their migration journey reported on a wide range of factors that influenced their migration drivers and decision-making: personal, household, and community challenges faced pre-migration, reasons for leaving their origin country, employment status and income, having social networks in Europe, previous experiences with international migration and internal displacement, and more.

In terms of challenges faced by Somali migrants in the six months prior to their migration, unemployment, insufficient income levels, lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities, financial problems and debt are most commonly cited. Respondents, particularly transit migrants in Libya and Greece, also reported facing

pressure from their families and communities to migrate. This suggests the role of social networks and the culture of migration in Somalia in driving an individual's migration decision (IOM Libya, 2017; Malakooti, 2015; Carling, 2006). Somali migrants in the Netherlands also cited challenges such as security threats and lack of rule of law at the community level and at the personal and household level as well.

In line with these challenges, economic factors (e.g. lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities, absence of economic growth and prosperity) are cited as the main reasons for migration. Security reasons were also mentioned, though to varying degrees. Reasons of war and conflict at the country-level were most common amongst transit migrants in Libya, while reasons of personal- and family-level insecurity as well as security threats were more often stated by Somalis transiting in Greece and the Netherlands. There is also statistically significant evidence that war and conflict as a reason to leave Somalia was more often reported by transit migrants (collectively) than by their counterparts in other parts of the migration journey. Social influence (e.g. joining family or friends in Europe) is also sometimes reported as a reason for migration, especially by Somalis in Greece.

Such presented challenges have been supported by previous literature, that indicates that migration from Somalia has been based on a mix of factors, of which economic-related factors, insecurity-related factors, as well as social and cultural factors (e.g. social networks, culture of migration) are some (IOM, 2017a; IOM, 2017b; Marchand, Roosen, Reinhold & Siegel, 2016; Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016). The mix of the faced challenges on the different levels also indicates the complexity of the political and socioeconomic situations in the origin country as well as of the migration decision-making and preparation process. These outcomes also show that challenges are interlinked across different levels of society but are primarily experienced on the personal or household level -the same level where migration decision are made.

The specific event that triggered Somalis to leave their country of origin also reflects a combination of economic factors (e.g. unemployment, loss of job), social influences (e.g. friends were migrating to Europe and asked them to join, family wanted them to migrate), as well as security threats (e.g. security incident). In this regard, Somalis transiting in Libya and Greece commonly mentioned being asked by friends to migrate with them or their family wanting them to migrate. This family pressure to migrate, in addition to a security incident, was also commonly reported by respondents in the Netherlands.

Somali returnees significantly more often indicated to have been previously internally displaced in comparison to their counterparts. Potential migrants were generally more likely to have engaged in prior international migration for a period of at least six months. Furthermore, Somali returnees were significantly more likely to have had family than friends in Europe (before their initial migration to Europe) in comparison to respondents in transit and potential migrants. Nonetheless, Somali migrants also indicated to mostly make their migration decision on their own but, less often, discussed their migration with others. When they did discuss their migration decision with others, they mostly consulted their family and friends (who generally supported the migration decision). The importance of social media and communication for Somali migrants is observable through their indicated primary information sources on which their migration decisions were based.

### Thematic Area 3 – Problems and Related Vulnerabilities

Within the context of this report, it should be noted that different ways of travelling (e.g. alone, with friends, with family members) entails different vulnerabilities. Somali potential migrants generally planned to travel to Europe with friends (42.8% of all answers given) or alone (26.8% of all answers given). Moreover, transit migrants, returnees, and migrants in the Netherlands most often reported travelling with a group, with friends, and/or alone. It is also observed that those in transit significantly more often indicated to travel with a group in comparison to their counterparts in other parts of the migration journey.

The use of smartphones during the journey is an important source of information that migrants can use to inform themselves of the risks and challenges possibly associated with their migration journey along certain routes. The majority of the Somali respondents reported to have a smartphone with them while traveling to Europe, which they mainly used for communicating with their friends and family at home and in Europe as well as to finding information about the journey. However, only about 15 per cent of the Somali migrants in the Netherlands reported to have had a smartphone with them while traveling to Europe. The main apps used by Somalis during their migration journey were Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, and Internet browsers.

Between almost 50 per cent (those transiting in Greece) and 83 per cent (those in transit in Libya as well as returnees) of the respondents expressed that they faced problems during their migration to Europe. However, only 40 per cent of migrants in the Netherlands reported to have faced problems during their migration to Europe. The most common problems expected amongst potential migrants in Somalia included hunger and thirst, problems at sea, as well as the lack of shelter and a place to sleep. The problems their counterparts actually faced were with hunger and thirst, health problems, detention, problems at sea, physical abuse, biometric registration<sup>10</sup>, forced labour, and financial shortages. It is observed in the literature that, especially considering the migration journey through the desert, that starvation and dehydration are common problems in Sudan and Libya (Marchand, Reinold, & Dias e Silva, 2017; Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016; Malakooti, 2016; Sahar Foundation & IGAD Security Sector Program, 2016). There is also statistically significant evidence to conclude that respondents in transit more often experienced health problems in comparison to others; respondents in Greece, who did not mention health problems to a great degree, are an exception. The most common problems that transit migrants expected to face while migrating onwards to Europe included problems at sea, detention, as well as hunger and thirst.

When observing the cross-tabulations for what problems migrants faced and where they faced these problems, the observations are diverse. Considering all Somalis in transit collectively, respondents mostly experienced hunger and thirst, health problems, and detention whilst traveling to Europe. Hunger and thirst were experienced in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Libya and attributed to migration facilitators or other migrants. Somali transit migrants mostly faced health problems in Somalia, Sudan, and Libya.

---

<sup>10</sup> The collection of biometric information and registration is part of the Dublin Agreement whereby biometric information is collected at the first port of entry. However, from the perspective of Iraqi migrants it may be viewed as coercive because Iraqi migrants are aware that registering their biometric information in transit, (but technically their first port of entry to Europe) may hinder the asylum processes in their preferred destination country. Hence, from the migrants' perspective it was reported as a problem encountered in the journey.

#### **Thematic Area 4 – The Role of Intermediaries**

Across the different stages, most of the Somali respondents planned to use or used a migration facilitator during their journey to Europe. Almost three-fourths of the Somali potential migrants planned to make use of a migration facilitator when leaving Somalia. Similarly, eight out of ten respondents in Sudan as well as returnees reported use of a migration facilitator while migrating to Europe. Approximately all respondents in Libya, Greece, and the Netherlands reported the same. Also, the average number of migration facilitators used by Somali respondents ranged between two and six facilitators. These figures generally support the patterns in the literature, which suggest that smugglers are involved in the majority of migration practices in sub-Saharan Africa (IOM Libya, 2017). The Somali migrants contacted their facilitator primarily through family and friends in Somalia as well as family in Europe.

In preparation for their migration journey, Somali migrants mostly collected information on the costs, transportation, and routes of migration as well as on the job market and access to health care. They, furthermore, commonly reported to rely on savings, to borrow money, and sell land to finance their migration to Europe. It is, however, observed that, among Somali respondents, there is a great variance in actual and expected costs of migration between the different stages. Somali potential migrants expect an average cost of more than 20,000 USD to reach Europe, while total costs to reach final destination lie around 6,500 USD as reported by Somalis in the Netherlands or upon return. Somali potential migrants and Somalis in transit in Sudan mostly expected to make or made payment in instalments, while Somalis in Libya and Greece as well as those in the Netherlands and upon return mostly used other forms of payment, such as full payment before departure or after arrival.

#### **Thematic Area 5 – Migrant Perceptions Towards Europe**

The main intended destination countries among Somali migrants were diverse and included Sweden, Germany, the UK, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Reasons to choose an intended destination country were also diverse. The primary choice of Sweden as the destination country is perhaps not surprising considering that Sweden is amongst the countries in Europe with the largest Somali diaspora (IOM, 2017b). The most important main reason for Somali in all migration stages was having social networks in the selected destination country. Other factors included economic reasons (e.g. availability of jobs), the ease of access to asylum procedures compared to other EU countries, the safety of the country, the ability to go to school, coincidence, or being told by their migration facilitator that they could be brought to a specific country. In this regard, the ease of asylum procedures was cited significantly more often by Somali returnees than their counterparts.

Somalis generally reported that, upon arrival to Europe, their main priorities would be to apply for asylum, find work, apply for nationality, learn the local language, reunify with family and friends, and ask for housing. Following, the most commonly cited forms of support expected from the host country included receiving legal permit to stay in the country, free housing, healthcare, and education as well as support to bring other family members to Europe and a monthly stipend. The problems Somalis most commonly expected to face in Europe included deportation, rejection of their asylum claim and being unable to attain nationality, lack of financial support, failure in family reunification, xenophobia, as well as a lack of jobs. In this regard, it is observed that 31 per cent of Somalis in the Netherlands and 51 per cent of Somali returnees (50.9%) did not receive their main expected form of support, namely legal support to stay in their destination country. As is also supported in the literature, however, there is often a gap in migrant's

perceptions of Europe (or their expectations therefrom) as well as the realities they then face in their destination country upon arrival (Ystehde & Fosse, 2016).

Furthermore, it is observed that overall knowledge of the asylum procedure was very low amongst the Somali respondents. This is lowest in Libya (with only 5.5 per cent of the respondents knowing) and among potential migrants (with 14.2 per cent knowing). This may point towards a lack of knowledge on the procedure itself. Nonetheless, a general acknowledgement of the importance of this form of documentation for legally staying in Europe exists.

Regarding the main sources of information, Somalis primarily based their perceptions of Europe on word of mouth, Facebook, WhatsApp, the Internet, and television. The main channels for word of mouth were verbal contact (via phone, Viber, Facebook and/or Skype) and written contact (via smartphone apps and/or social media) with friends and family in Europe. In this regard, it is observed that Somalis in transit use television significantly more often as their source of information than their counterparts. Somali returnees are, however, significantly more likely to use the Internet.

While Somali returnees are significantly less likely than other Somalis to advise others to migrate, they mainly advise others to migrate in a legal manner. Reasons cited by Somalis to advise others to migrate to Europe included the perception of good jobs in Europe, the notion of a bleak future in Somalia, as well as perceived safety and security in Europe. Reasons for Somalis to discourage the migration of others to Europe included difficulties and danger along the migration route, life in Europe not being as expected, as well as xenophobia and discrimination in Europe. Transit migrants significantly more often than other Somalis discourage such migration because of dangerous nature of the travel route. Somali potential migrants are significantly most likely to discourage the migration of others specifically based on the many difficulties along the way.

### **Thematic Area 6 – Migrant Choices & Options**

The main reasons for Somali migrants to choose migration to Europe over regional migration were economic- (e.g. lack of jobs and livelihood in region, better access to jobs in Europe, higher incomes) and security-related (e.g. respect for human rights, offerings of safety, Europe is safer). Other reasons for deciding against regional migration included perceptions of better life and social services in Europe as well as social networks there.

The literature also suggests that worsening conditions in transit countries, such as Libya, are also a coercion for migrants to continue their journey towards Europe (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon & Sigona, 2016). In line with these considerations, Somalis generally reported that if given the opportunity to work or study in their region, they would still consider migrating to Europe. However, it was observed that Somali migrants more often would indicate to not consider migrating to Europe. Somali migrants in Greece and in the Netherlands are an exception to this, as only a small minority would consider not migrating to Europe when provided with opportunities within their region.

Respondents across migration stages were also asked about how they had obtained permission to stay in Europe or how they planned to do so. Of Somali potential migrants and transit migrants, the majority planned to claim asylum, as also indicated as a first priority upon arrival in Europe. Nevertheless, it is observed that awareness of legal options to migrate to Europe was varied amongst Somalis in the different



stages of their migration journey. In this regard, 53 per cent of Somali potential migrants, 40 per cent of Somalis in Sudan, 56 per cent of Somalis in Greece, and 53 per cent of the returnees reported this knowledge. None of the Somalis in the Netherlands reported being aware of the legal options to migrate. This is in line with the literature, which indicates that migrants often lack information of legal channels for migrating to Europe (Huddelston, Karacay & Nikolova, 2014). The most commonly reported legal option to migrate to Europe among Somalis was the Schengen visa. Somali transit migrants were significantly more likely than their counterparts to be aware of business visa and family reunification as legal options to migrate to Europe.

The vast majority of Somali respondents across the migration stages planned to stay in their destination country once receiving legal status. Accordingly, only a small minority of the Somalis in the Netherlands reported an intention to return to Somalia. However, those Somalis that did return reported finding a job or an income-generating activity and dealing with negative reactions from family and friends as the primary challenges faced upon return. More than half of the returnees expressed no desire to migrate to Europe again.

## REFERENCES

- Abdel Ati, H. A. (2017). *Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Eastern Sudan*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6325-human-smuggling-and-trafficking-in-eastern-sudan.pdf>
- Addis, E. (2014). "Chapter 4: International Migration in Ethiopia: Challenges and Opportunities." In B. Assefaw, *International Migration and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa*. Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA).
- Adejumoke, A., Ikwuyatum, G., & Abejide, O. (2008). *Dynamics of International Migration in Nigeria*. Ibadan: African Perspectives on Human Mobility Programme, University of Ibadan.
- Assaminew, E., Ahmed, G., Aberra, K., & Makonnen, T. (2010). *International Migration, Remittances and Poverty Alleviation in Ethiopia*. Ethiopian Economics Association / Ethiopian Economics Policy Research Institute (EEA/EEPRI).
- Avis, W., & Hebert, S. (2016). *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Somalia*. GSDRC, University of Birmingham. Retrieved from: [http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Fragility\\_Migration\\_Somalia.pdf](http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Fragility_Migration_Somalia.pdf)
- Bilgili, O., Kuschminder, K., & Siegel, M. (2017). Return migrants' perceptions of living conditions in Ethiopia: A sexed analysis. *Migration Studies*.
- Black, B., Kniveton, D., Skeldon, R., Coppard, D., Murata, A., & Schmidt-Verkerk, K. (2008). Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends and their Policy Implications for Migration. *University of Sussex*.
- Carling, J. (2006). *Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute/International Organization for Migration.
- Carter, B., & Rohwerder, B. (2016). *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Ethiopia*. GSDRC/University of Birmingham.
- Crawley, H., Düvell, F., Jones, K., McMahon, S., & Sigona, N. (2016). *Destination Europe?: Understanding the dynamics and drivers of Mediterranean migration in 2015*. MEDMIG Final Report.
- Crawley, H., Düvell, F., Jones, K., & Skleparis, D. (2016). *Understanding the dynamics of migration to Greece and the EU: drivers, decisions and destinations*. MEDMIG Research Brief No2.
- Cummings, C., Pacitto, J., Lauro, D., & Foresti, M. (2015). *Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends of migration to Europe*. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Retrieved from: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10157.pdf>
- DAI Europe & EuroTrends (2015). *Context assessment to prepare the project "Addressing mixed migration flows in Eastern Africa"*. Brussels: European Commission.
- de Haas, H. (2006). *International migration and national development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in countries of origin - The case of Nigeria*. Nijmegen: Working papers Migration and Development series.

- de Haas, H., & Flahaux, M. (2016). African migration: trends, patterns, drivers. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 4(1), n.p.
- Elmi, K. (2010). *Distant voices and the ties that bind - identity, politics and Somali diaspora youth*. Retrieved from: [http://www.c-r.org/downloads/accord%2021\\_31Distant%20voices%20and%20the%20ties%20that%20bind\\_identity,%20politics%20and%20Somali%20diaspora%20youth\\_2010\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/downloads/accord%2021_31Distant%20voices%20and%20the%20ties%20that%20bind_identity,%20politics%20and%20Somali%20diaspora%20youth_2010_ENG.pdf)
- European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2014). *Country of Origin Information report: South and Central Somalia - Country overview*. European Asylum Support Office.
- European Commission (2015). EMN Inform: Challenges and good practices in the return and reintegration of irregular migrants to Western Africa. Retrieved from: <http://www.emncz.eu/files/books/120.pdf>
- Eurostat (2017). *Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded)*. Retrieved from: <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>
- Fargues, P., & Bonfanti, S. (2014). *When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean and what Europe is doing about it*. Migration Policy Centre; Policy Briefs, 2014/05.
- Fentaw, A. E. (2017). Ethiopian returnee women from Arab countries: challenges of successful reintegration. *African and Black Diaspora*, pp. 1-18.
- Frontex (2017). *Migratory Flows in 2017 – Pressure Eased on Italy and Greece; Spain saw record numbers*. Retrieved from: <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/migratory-flows-in-2017-pressure-eased-on-italy-and-greece-spain-saw-record-numbers-8FC2d4>
- Frouws, B. (2014). *Going West: contemporary mixed migration trends from the Horn of Africa to Libya & Europe*. Kenya: Regional Mixed Migration Secretary (RMMS)/Danish Refugee Council.
- Global Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Support Team (2017). *Maps on routes from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia to Europe*. Geneva.
- Hamood, S. (2006). *African transit migration through Libya to Europe: the human cost*. Cairo: FMRS, AUC.
- Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (2014). *Diaspora Return to Somalia: Perceptions and implications*. Retrieved from: [http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/HIPS\\_Policy\\_Brief\\_007-2014\\_ENGLISH.pdf](http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/HIPS_Policy_Brief_007-2014_ENGLISH.pdf)
- Hernández-Coss, R. & Egwuagu Bun, C. (2007). *The UK-Nigeria Remittance Corridor*. World Bank Working Paper No. 92. Retrieved from: [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/3965111146581427871/UKNigeria\\_Remittance\\_Corridor.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/3965111146581427871/UKNigeria_Remittance_Corridor.pdf)

- Horst, C. (2015). *Back in Business? Diaspora Return to Somalia*. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Policy Brief 05 | 2015. Retrieved from: [https://files.prio.org/Publication\\_files/prio/Horst%20-%20Back%20in%20Business,%20PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%205-2015.pdf](https://files.prio.org/Publication_files/prio/Horst%20-%20Back%20in%20Business,%20PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%205-2015.pdf)
- Huddelston, W., Karacay, A. B., & Nikolova, M. (2014). *Study on Smuggling: Case Study 4: Nigeria-Turkey - Bulgaria*. Brussels: European Commission, DG Migration & Home Affairs European Migration Network.
- Ikuteyijo, L. (2012). *Illegal Migration and Policy Challenges in Nigeria*. AfricanPortal, 21, 1-9.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008). *Somalia: to move beyond the failed state*. Retrieved from: [http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais\\_74/documentos/147\\_somalia\\_\\_\\_to\\_move\\_beyond\\_the\\_failed\\_state.pdf](http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_74/documentos/147_somalia___to_move_beyond_the_failed_state.pdf)
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2017). *Ethiopia IDP Figures Analysis*. Retrieved from: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/ethiopia/figures-analysis>
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2014a). *Dimensions of Crisis on Migration in Somalia: Working Paper February 2014*. Retrieved from: <https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/Dimensions-of-Crisis-on-Migration-in-Somalia.pdf>
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2014b). *Displacement Dynamics: IDP Movement Tracking, Needs and Vulnerability Analysis*. Retrieved from: <https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/IOM-Afghanistan-IDP-Survey-Herat-Helmand-Summary-Final.pdf>
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2016a). *Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 345,440; Deaths at Sea: 4,655*. Rome: Press Release. Retrieved from: <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-345440-deaths-sea-4655>
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2016b). *Migration in Nigeria: A Country Profile 2014*. Retrieved from: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mp\\_nigeria.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mp_nigeria.pdf)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2017a). *Enabling a better understanding of migration flows and (its root-causes) from Ethiopia towards Europe - Desk-Review Report - Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)*. International Organization for Migration.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2017b). *Enabling a better understanding of migration flows and (its root-causes) from Nigeria towards Europe - Desk-Review Report - Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)*. International Organization for Migration.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2017c). *Enabling a better understanding of migration flows (and its root causes) from Somalia towards Europe*. Desk Review Report – Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM).
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Ethiopia (2016). *Internal Displacement Update*.

- International Organization for Migration (IOM) Libya (2017). *LIBYA 2016 - MIGRATION PROFILES & TRENDS - DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX | LIBYA*. International Organization for Migration.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) DTM Nigeria (2017). *Nigeria - Round XIV Report*. Retrieved from: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3CEvcVlpFxORmU4TDILcEtBemM/view>
- Isiugo-Abanihe, U., & International Organization for Migration (IOM) Nigeria. (2014). *Migration in Nigeria: A Country Profile*. Retrieved from: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mp\\_nigeria.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mp_nigeria.pdf)
- Kastner, K. (2010). Moving relationships: family ties of Nigerian migrants on their way to Europe. *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal*, 3(1), pp. 17-34.
- Kuschminder, K. (2013). *Female Return Migration and Reintegration Strategies in Ethiopia*. Retrieved from: [https://www.merit.unu.edu/training/theses/kuschminder\\_katie.pdf](https://www.merit.unu.edu/training/theses/kuschminder_katie.pdf)
- Kuschminder, K., Andersson, L., & Siegel, M. (2012). *Profiling Ethiopian migration: A comparison of characteristics of Ethiopian migrants to Africa, the Middle East and to the North*. Crossing African Borders: Migration and Mobility. Retrieved from: [https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt/bitstream/10071/4524/1/KUSHCHMINDER\\_ANDERSSON\\_SIEGEL\\_Profiling\\_Ethiopian.pdf](https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt/bitstream/10071/4524/1/KUSHCHMINDER_ANDERSSON_SIEGEL_Profiling_Ethiopian.pdf)
- Kuschminder, K., & Fransen, S. (2009). *Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects*. Maastricht Graduate School of Governance.
- Kuschminder, K., & Koser, K. (2016). The role of migration-specific and migration-relevant policies in migrant decision-making in transit. United Nations University – MERIT.
- Kuschminder, K., & Siegel, M., (2014). *Migration & Development: A World in Motion – Ethiopia Country Report*. United Nations University – MERIT.
- LandInfo. (2017). *Report – Somalia: Relevant social and economic conditions upon return to Mogadishu*. Retrieved from: [https://landinfo.no/asset/3570/1/3570\\_1.pdf](https://landinfo.no/asset/3570/1/3570_1.pdf)
- Lilleor, H. B., & Van den Broeck, K. (2011). Economic Drivers of Migration & Climate Change in LDCs. *Global Environmental Change*, 21, pp. 70-81.
- Lindley, A. (2009). *The early-morning phonecall: remittances from a refugee diaspora perspective*. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Working Paper No. 47, University of Oxford. Retrieved from: [https://www.compas.ac.ox.uk/media/WP-2007-047-Lindley\\_Refugee\\_Diaspora\\_Remittances.pdf](https://www.compas.ac.ox.uk/media/WP-2007-047-Lindley_Refugee_Diaspora_Remittances.pdf)
- Lindley, A. (2013). *Questioning 'drought displacement': environment, politics and migration in Somalia*. FM-Review. Retrieved from: <http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/crisis/lindley.pdf>
- Loschmann, C., Kuschminder, K. and Siegel, M. (2017). "The Root Causes of Movement: Exploring the Determinants of Irregular Migration from Afghanistan" in Eds. McAuliffe, M. and K. Koser. *A long way to go: Irregular migration patterns, processes, drivers and decision making*. ANU Press: Canberra.

- Lutterbeck, D., Breines, M., Collyer, M., Mainwaring, C., Mainwaring, D., & Monzini, P (2015). *Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries – Case Study 2: Ethiopia – Libya – Malta/Italy*. European Commission, DG Migration & Home Affairs.
- Madote (2015). *European Union admits “prevalent” Eritrean asylum fraud*. Retrieved from: <http://www.madote.com/2015/08/european-union-admits-prevalent.html>
- Majidi, N. (2016). Afghan and Somali (post-)conflict migration to the EU. *Forced Migration Review, 51*, 32-33.
- Malakooti, A. (2015). *Irregular migration between West Africa, North Africa and the Mediterranean*. Altai Consulting for the International Organization for Migration.
- Malakooti, A. (2016). *Assessing the Risk of Migration Along the Central and Eastern Mediterranean Routes: Iraq and Nigeria as Case Study Countries*. International Organization for Migration.
- Malakooti, A., & Davin, E. (2015). *Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots*. Altai Consulting for the International Organization for Migration.
- Marchand, K., Roosen, I., Reinold, J., & Siegel, M. (2016). *Irregular Migration from the and in the East and Horn of Africa*. Report commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in the framework of the EU-funded Better Migration Management (BMM) Programme.
- Marchand, K., Reinold, J., & Dias e Silva, R. (2017). *Study on Migration Routes in the East & Horn of Africa*. Report commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).
- Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., and Taylor, J.E. (1993). Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal. *Population and Development Review, 19*(3): pp. 431-466.
- Mberu, B., & Pongou, R. (2010). *Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant>
- McMahon, S., & Sigona, N. (2016). *Boat migration across the central Mediterranean: drivers, experiences and responses*. MEDMIG Research Brief No3.
- Menkhaus, K. (2007). *Governance without government in Somalia. Spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping*. International Security.
- Merkle, O., Reinold, J., & Siegel, M. (2017). *A Sex Perspective on Corruption Encountered during Forced and Irregular Migration*. Report commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Anti-Corruption and Integrity Programme, on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).
- Mixed Migration Platform (MMP) (2016). *Women and girls on the move: A sex analysis of mixed migration from the Middle East to Europe*. Retrieved from:

- [http://www.mixedmigrationplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/MMP\\_Briefing-Paper\\_Womens-migration-to-the-EU\\_December-2016.pdf](http://www.mixedmigrationplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/MMP_Briefing-Paper_Womens-migration-to-the-EU_December-2016.pdf)
- Onokerhoraye, A. G. (2013). Return migration patterns and characteristics in rural communities of Nigeria's Niger Delta Region: Implications for rural development policy. *CPED Policy Paper Series No. 3*.
- Pennington, J. & Balaram, B. (2013). *Homecoming: Return and reintegration of irregular migrants from Nigeria*. Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR). Retrieved from: [https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2013/04/Homecoming\\_irregular\\_migrants\\_Nigeria\\_Apr2013\\_10661.pdf](https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2013/04/Homecoming_irregular_migrants_Nigeria_Apr2013_10661.pdf)
- Reitano, T., Adal, L., & Shaw, M. (2014). *Smuggled Features: The dangerous path of the migrant from Africa to Europe*. Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime series on Human Trafficking.
- Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) (2014). *Blinded by Hope Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian migrants*. Retrieved from: [http://regionalmms.org/images/ResearchInitiatives/Blinded\\_by\\_Hope.pdf](http://regionalmms.org/images/ResearchInitiatives/Blinded_by_Hope.pdf)
- Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) (2016). *Country Profile Ethiopia*. Retrieved from <http://www.regionalmms.org/index.php/country-profiles/ethiopia>
- Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) (2017). *Country Profile Somalia/Somaliland*. Retrieved from: <http://www.regionalmms.org/index.php/country-profiles/somalia>
- Sahan Foundation and IGAD Security Sector Program (2016). *Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route*. Sahan Foundation and IGAD Security Sector Program.
- Samuel Hall (2015). Summary report - Returns to Somalia: Setting Protection and Livelihood Standards. Commissioned by Danish Refugee Council Somalia, funded by the Government of Norway/UDI. Retrieved from: <https://drc.ngo/media/2568305/drc-avrr-external-report-final.pdf>
- Schapendonk, J. (2012). Turbulent Trajectories: African migrants on Their Way to the European Union. *Societies*, 2, pp. 27-41.
- Shimeles, A. (2010). Migration Patterns, Trends and Policy Issues in Africa. *African Development Bank: Working Paper Series*.
- Tasse, A. (2007) 'Ethiopian migration: Challenging traditional explanatory theories', in L. Dominelli (ed.) *Revitalising Communities in a Globalising World* (Hampshire: Ashgate).
- Tegegne, A. D., & Penker, M. (2016). Determinants of rural out-migration in Ethiopia: Who stays and who goes?. *Demographic Research*, 35(34), pp. 1011-1044.
- Timmerman, C., De Clerk, H.M.-L., Hemmerechts, K., & Willems, R. (2014). Imagining Europe from the Outside: The Role of Perceptions of Human Rights in Europe in Migration Aspirations in Turkey, Morocco, Senegal and Ukraine. In: *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 220 – 247.

- Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (2017). *Department of Peace and Conflict Research – Home Page*. Retrieved from: <http://ucdp.uu.se/>
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). (2015). *International Migration Stock 2015*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml>
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). (2016). *International Migration Report 2015: Highlights*. Retrieved from: [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015\\_Highlights.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (n.d.) *Human Development Reports – Ethiopia*. Retrieved from: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH>
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2010). *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. Retrieved from: <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2015). *Population Statistics*. Retrieved from: [http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons\\_of\\_concern](http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern)
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2017a). *Border fences and international border controls in Europe*. Retrieved from: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/55249>
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017b). *Operational Portal - Refugee Situations: Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger / IDPs in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria*. Retrieved from: <https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/situations/nigeriasituation?id=502>
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2017). *Ethiopia: Humanitarian Response - Situation Report No. 09*. UNOCHA. Retrieved from: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/unocha\\_-\\_drmtwg\\_situation\\_report\\_-\\_january\\_-\\_february\\_2017\\_issue.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/unocha_-_drmtwg_situation_report_-_january_-_february_2017_issue.pdf)
- Vever, F., Le Coz, C., Malakooti, A., & Dillais, M. (2016). *Youth, unemployment, and migration in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa*. IOM & Altai Consulting. Retrieved from: <http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/IOM-Youth-Employment-Migration-9Feb2016.pdf>
- World Bank (2016a). *Population, Ethiopia*. Retrieved from: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ET&view=chart>
- World Bank (2016b). *Population, Nigeria*. Retrieved from: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/Nigeria>
- World Bank (2016c). *Population, Somalia*. Retrieved from: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/Somalia>



- Ystehde, P., & Fosse, M. (2016). *Nigerian migrants risk their lives for the European dream*. University of Oslo. Retrieved from: <http://sciencenordic.com/nigerian-migrants-risk-their-lives-european-dream>
- Zimmerman, S.E. (2009). Irregular Secondary Movements to Europe: Seeking Asylum Beyond Refuge. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 22(1), p