

IOM IRAQ

INTEGRATED LOCATION ASSESSMENT III



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ACRONYMS

DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GoI	Government of Iraq
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ILA	Integrated Location Assessment
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
NFI	Non-Food Item
PMF	Popular Mobilization Forces
PRM	United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
RART	Rapid Assessment and Response Team
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 9 December 2017 Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi publicly declared the end to the country's war against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group. The announcement, which followed the end of the operations in west Anbar to push ISIL militants out of their last stronghold, was accompanied by another significant event: for the first time since the beginning of the Iraq displacement crisis in December 2013, returns (3.2 million individuals) exceeded displacement (2.6 million individuals) across the country.¹

Key findings of the assessment are summarized below:

As of June 2018, the number of returnees topped 3,900,000 individuals. However, current rates of return to different parts of the country are quite different: 83% of internally displaced persons (IDPs) originally from Anbar have come back to their location of origin versus 68% and 55% respectively of those originally from Salah al-Din and Ninewa.²

The number of IDPs has decreased by nearly 127,000 individuals to just over 2,002,000 when compared to the Integrated Location Assessment II (May 2017). In addition, long-term intentions of IDPs show a significant shift towards local integration (from 9% to 22%). The increase in the share of those willing to stay in displacement seems mostly linked to conditions in their location of origin (41% have lost everything back home) and current economic conditions (21% have no means to return).

Evidence of unstable/temporary returns – that is, families who returned to the location of displacement after going back to that of origin – was also assessed in 6% of the locations of displacement. This instability seems mostly linked with negative push factors, such as lack of means to remain in displacement (37% of returnee locations across Iraq) as well as pressures to return from authorities, either in the location of displacement, origin or both (11%).

Unstable/temporary returns may also be linked to the difficulties many Iraqis are experiencing back home: nearly all returnees live in locations where access to employment was cited among the top concerns; 70% reported difficulties in accessing health and between 40% and 47% in accessing drinking water, food and education.

Even if there has been a general improvement in security conditions since May 2017 – incidents were reported in 40% of returnee locations versus 54% last year – the situation is hardly uniform and pockets of instability and fear remain. The situation appears particularly tense in Salah al-Din, where higher than average percentages of returnees live in locations where different security incidents take place – including arbitrary arrests (35%), abductions and kidnappings (21%) and incidents involving explosive remnants of war (ERWs), landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs); (13%).

Return dynamics can also be troubled by tensions between different population groups and unequal access to resources. Between 45% and 50% of returnees live in locations where favouritism (regarding access to employment and political representation) was reported and between 9% and 16% in locations where episodes of violence, threats and mistrust were assessed. Tribal conflicts are generally the main source of tension – only very rarely religious and ethnic hostilities were reported.³

As for practices that could ease the reconciliation process, overall nearly 80% of returnees live in locations where they can easily access offices for the replacement of personal and other documentation and/or courts for displacement-related violations only; around 45% live in locations where they can access programmes for the restoration of housing, land and property and around 15% live in locations where there are programmes for the reunification of family members separated during displacement.

¹ Population figures from DTM Round 86, December 2017.

² Five districts account for 60% of all returns recorded until now: Falluja, Heet and Ramadi in Anbar Governorate and Mosul and Telafar in Ninewa Governorate. Population figures from DTM Round 98, June 2018.

³ As in the 2017 report (ILA II), discrimination, unfair governance and/or provision of law appear to be closely associated with conflict risk. In all districts reporting a higher incidence of threats and physical violence between groups, evidence of favouritism in accessing political representation, public employment and, to a lesser extent aid, was generally assessed, together with limitation of personal freedom of returnees – such as restriction of movements, arbitrary arrests and denial to regain their previous residence. See Integrated Location Assessment II, October 2017.

- Compared to May 2017, the number of IDPs has reduced by approximately one third (-34%, 1,017,048 individuals). Decreases were recorded across all Iraqi governorates hosting IDPs, particularly in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din, but not in Sulaymaniyah.
- Among those who remain displaced, 48% are hosted within their governorate of origin, 35% in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 14% in other north-central governorates and 3% in southern governorates – nearly all in Najaf.⁴ Over half of current IDPs (54%) have been in displacement for more than 3 years, 38% between 1 and 3 years and 8% for less than one year.
- Access to employment/livelihood opportunities continues to be the main concern of IDPs in nearly all locations – and more so compared to last year. It was cited as one of the top concerns in the locations where 98% of IDPs are currently hosted compared to only 63% in May 2017.
- For IDPs, lack of access to employment/livelihoods translates into the related difficulty of accessing food (51%), household and non-food items (NFIs, 66%) and shelter (42%). In fact, basic needs were generally rated as far more important than recovery needs.⁵
- In addition, nearly three quarters of displaced families reported that they do not have a shelter to return to, around one in five do not have enough money for the journey back (mostly IDPs originally from Anbar and Baghdad) and/or are afraid to lose aid/humanitarian assistance.
- Most IDP families intend to voluntarily⁶ stay in area of displacement in the long term (12% of current IDPs) can be found in southern governorates, such as Basrah, Muthanna, Missan and Thi-Qar. Between 28% and 38% of IDPs hosted in Baghdad, Kerbala and Kirkuk, are also willing to voluntarily stay. Involuntary stay (10% at country level) is more prevalent in Babylon and Sulaymaniyah and reported, to a lesser extent, in Diyala.
- IDPs are mainly integrating in the south because of its relative safety and the presence of extended family and friends, whereas staying in north-central governorates is mostly involuntary – families have lost everything at home or have no means to return. Safety, services and job opportunities are the most important reasons to relocate in the KRI, aside for IDPs in Dahuk, mostly Yazidis and Christians, who fear the ethno-religious change at the area of origin.
- Nevertheless, compared to May 2017, more Shabaks, Christians and Kakais have returned to their place of origin (taken in total as from 1% to 5% of all returns) with the share of Yazidis steady at around 2%. The improvement in security in the location of origin is the most reported reason to return, common to all ethno-religious groups. Yazidis were also encouraged either by previous return of other family members (54%) and/or community/religious leaders (24%).
- Conditions upon return are very different among ethno-religious groups. The main issue for Arab Sunnis is freedom of movement – around 60% of returnees live in locations where they can only move with a special permit from the security actor, while minority groups are mostly concerned by the lack of a job/occupation. Yazidis are the most likely to report that they need to access to solutions for displacement-related rights violations and family reunification.
- The most frequently reported vulnerable categories are persons with disabilities, female-headed households and minor-headed households. Overall, between 53% and 72% of IDPs and returnees live in locations where the presence of at least one of the above groups was reported.
- Overall, around 70% of returnees and IDPs live in locations where the presence of working minors was assessed. In addition, around one fourth of returnees and IDPs live in locations where children are married, children are begging and/or they were born during displacement, and hence do not have birth certificates and other documents.

⁴ To facilitate analysis, Iraq's territory was divided in three regions. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil; the South: Basrah, Missan, Najaf, Thi-Qar, Qadissiya and Muthanna; The Central North: Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kerbala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Wassit.

⁵ Unmet necessities were assessed differentiating between basic/essential needs. For example, drinking water; food; Non Food Items (NFIs); Health; Shelter/housing; Education and Removal of UXO / IEDs are key in emergency scenarios. Medium-long-term recovery needs include access to: employment and livelihood opportunities, replacement of personal and other documentation, solutions for displacement-related rights violations (justice, reparations and compensation), reunification with family members separated during displacement, improved safety, security and freedom of movement (indirect security factors between groups or from security actors) and participation in public affairs on an equal basis with the resident population are key to effectively sustain the transition from emergency to stability.

⁶ Future intentions of IDPs were assessed in terms of the direction of movements (local integration in displacement or return to the location of origin), the timing of movements (short and long-term) and the voluntary or involuntary character of the intention – i.e. whether lack of means, or coercion, or insecurity, were the main reasons for staying/returning home.

INTRODUCTION

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is IOM's information management system to track and monitor population displacement during crises. Composed of a variety of tools and processes, the DTM regularly and systematically captures and processes multi-layered data and disseminates a wide array of information products that facilitate a better understanding of the evolving needs of a displaced population, be that on site or en route. DTM data includes information relevant to all sectors of humanitarian assistance, such as demographic figures, shelter, water and sanitation, health, food and protection, making data useful for humanitarian actors at all levels.

In Iraq, the DTM programme has monitored population displacement since 2004. In 2014, following the worsening of the armed conflict and the increasing need for information on the displaced population, the programme was reinforced. Currently the DTM collects data on IDPs and returnees through a system of rapid assessment and response teams (RARTs) – composed of 123 field staff present throughout the Iraqi territory – which in turn gather information through an extended network of over 9,500 key informants as well as direct visits to identified locations hosting IDPs, returnees or both.

DTM figures, key findings and reports are published online and available on the portal of DTM Iraq at <http://iraqdtm.iom.int>; and updates are recorded daily as new assessments are completed. The emergency tracking is the real-time component of the methodology, aiming to provide displacement and return data with a 24- to 72-hour data turnover – such as the Mosul portal – during medium- to large-scale crises. Monthly reports are the core of DTM information, as they provide a countrywide monitoring of displacement and return movements. Location assessments, on the other hand, provide a more in-depth analysis of displacement and return trends and are completed in three-month data collection cycles.

The Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) belongs to this more comprehensive category, as it provides a simultaneous and in-depth profiling of both displacement and return movements in Iraq. Focusing on both populations at the same time provides information that can: capture overarching trends of population movements; evaluate the burden that forced displacement poses on some governorates; and outline social and living conditions, basic needs, intentions and vulnerabilities shared by IDPs and returnees. Compared to previous assessments, the current ILA is more focused on return patterns, and specifically on social cohesion issues.

The report starts with a brief description of the methodology and coverage of the assessment. The first section offers a thematic overview at country level. Chapters are structured around five main topics: (i) population movements, including past trends, current rates of returns and forecasts on future movements; (ii) status of and accessibility to infrastructure and services; (iii) living conditions, particularly shelter/property issues, employment/livelihood and main basic and recovery needs; (iv) social cohesion and reconciliation, including feeling of safety and security and participation in civic life and (v) ethno-religious composition, change thereof, and main vulnerabilities. Figures for the returnee population are provided at national level and governorate level. Figures for the displaced population are provided at national level and for three macro areas (north-central, KRI and south), whereas indicators at governorate level are provided in the annexes.

The form used for the assessment can be downloaded from the Iraq DTM portal.⁷

The DTM considers as IDPs all Iraqis who were forced to flee from 1 January 2014 onwards and are still displaced within national borders at the moment of the assessment.

*Returnees are defined as IDPs who have now returned to the location (big area or sub-district) where they used to live prior to being displaced, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or to another shelter type.*⁸

⁷ <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%20Special%20Reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20III/Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20III%20Questionnaire.pdf>

⁸ The definition of returnees is not related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy of durable solutions. Displaced families who have returned to their sub-district of origin are counted as returnees even if they have not returned to their habitual address.

METHODOLOGY AND COVERAGE

The ILA collects detailed information on IDP and returnee families living in locations identified through the DTM master lists. The reference unit of the assessment is the location and information is collected at the aggregate level, that is, on the majority of IDPs and returnees living in a location, and not on individual families.

At the start of the cycle, the list of identified locations hosting IDPs and/or returnees in the most up-to-date master lists is given to the field RART and is used as a baseline. The data-collection cycle takes approximately three months and new locations identified during the implementation phase are not subject to the assessment.


Where access is possible, identified locations are visited and directly assessed by IOM's RARTs through interviews with several key informants (including members of the IDP and returnee communities) and direct observation. At the end of the visits, RARTs fill one form with the summary of the information collected and the data is then uploaded to the server and stored as one assessment.

The Integrated Location Assessment III was conducted from 6 March to 6 May 2018 and covered 4,177 locations hosting at least one or more IDP and/or returnee families, reaching 609,891 returnee families – of which 12,356 returned from abroad (2% of all returns) – and 248,632 IDP families (corresponding respectively to 3,659,346 returnees and 1,491,792 IDPs). Details about the population hosted in the surveyed locations are provided in Figure 1. Findings reflect the locations where displaced and/or returned populations resided at the time of the assessment. Whenever applicable, data have been weighted according to the respective number of IDP or returnee families in the location, so that findings are projected at the level of families/individuals.

Overall, coverage stands at 99%⁹ thanks to the progress in DTM's field capacity as well as the improvement in security conditions since ILA II.

⁹ 4,447 visited locations (270 of those excluded because identified as locations with zero IDP or returnee families), 73 inaccessible locations.

Figure 1: Type of Location



Although some questions specifically target IDPs and others returnees, routinely collected core information includes:

- Geographic location
- Governorate of origin (IDPs) and of last displacement (returnees)
- Wave/period of displacement and return
- Ethno-religious affiliation
- Shelter type
- Reasons for displacement/return and future intentions on short and long term
- Common security incidents
- Needs and concerns associated to fulfilling livelihood needs
- Specific protection and risk indicators

Similar to last year's ILA II report, in addition to the above-mentioned information, IOM has included a specific section that reports on social cohesion and reconciliation, that is, inter-group feelings, social threat and civic life satisfaction, to assess the degree of satisfaction with how civic matters such as work, aid and needs, are handled. By incorporating this section, the ILA tool can be used to monitor the status of the current reintegration process, including ethno-religious and social tensions that may have arisen or remain active at local level.¹⁰


All sections of the report, except for the most recent population trends that were extrapolated from the June 2018 Baseline (Master List Round 97), are based on the ILA dataset collected from March to May 2018. All comparisons with years 2016 and

2017 come from the datasets of previous ILAs conducted from July to October 2016 and from March to May 2017.

Shelter types were classified into three categories: private dwellings (habitual residence, hosted residence, rented housing and hotels/motels); critical shelter arrangements (informal settlements, religious buildings, schools, unfinished or abandoned buildings and other formal settlements/collective centres); and unknown shelters (when the shelter type cannot be identified or the locations could not be accessed).¹¹

Data cleaning was performed in June and preliminary findings were validated with the field teams. The ILA III dataset and interactive dashboards were released on the DTM portal in June 2018 and are available at <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA3.aspx>.


Map 1: General Map of Iraq



¹⁰ In order to gather a balanced assessment on social cohesion and reconciliation, the questionnaire was administered to an informant from each population group present at the location (host community, returnees and IDPs) and information obtained has been cross checked. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that findings should be carefully handled since all limitations applying to the Key Informant tool (biases, underrepresentation of less visible groups, little basis for quantification etc.) are even more relevant in this case due to the sensitive nature of the issue and the perspective of the informant.


¹¹ Within the area of shelter, camps were not assessed, as the ILA methodology is only designed for urban and rural areas (location – fifth administrative level) and a different methodology is required for camps – i.e. camp profiling, formal site assessment. Camps are usually included in the government's records. Information on camps can be found in the DTM monthly Master Lists.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN TIMELINE



THEMATIC OVERVIEW ON RETURN AND DISPLACEMENT

RETURNS, DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE



On 9 December 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi publicly declared the end of the country's war against ISIL. The announcement, which followed the end of the operations in west Anbar to push ISIL militants out of their last stronghold in the country, was greeted by another significant event: for the first time since the beginning of the Iraq displacement crisis in December 2013, the number of returnees (3.2 million individuals) exceeded that of IDPs (2.6 million individuals) across the country.¹²

As of 30 June 2018, there were 3,904,350 individuals (650,725 families) in Iraq who have returned to their location of origin (+133% since May 2017, when ILA II was conducted) and 2,002,986 internally displaced persons (333,831 families).¹³ The governorate of Ninewa accounts for 38% of overall returns (1,464,240 individuals), and it has also recorded a more than 200% increase compared to May 2017. One third of returns were to the governorate of Anbar (32%, +63% since May 2017). There was also a significant increase since May 2017 in Baghdad (+188%), Kirkuk (+ >200%) and Salah al-Din (+50%), whereas the situation remained steadier in Diyala and Erbil.

Table 1: Returns, distribution and change

	RETURNEES MAY 2017 (ILA II)	RETURNEES MAY 2018 (ILA III)	% CHANGE SINCE MAY 2017 (ILA II)	% OF RETURNS MAY 2017 (ILA II)	% OF RETURNS MAY 2018 (ILA III)	RATE OF RETURN JUN 2018
Anbar	777,900	1,264,890	63%	46%	32%	83%
Baghdad	26,712	77,046	188%	2%	2%	73%
Dahuk	0	780	-	0%	0%	100%
Diyala	202,110	221,598	10%	12%	6%	71%
Erbil	34,152	39,006	14%	2%	1%	86%
Kirkuk	2,964	293,334	>200%	0%	8%	65%
Ninewa	267,690	1,464,240	>200%	16%	38%	55%
Salah Al-Din	362,586	543,456	50%	22%	14%	68%
Grand Total	1,674,114	3,904,350	133%	100%	100%	66%


¹² Population figures from DTM Round 86, December 2017.

¹³ Population figures from DTM Round 98, June 2018 and Integrated Location Assessment II, October 2017. For more information on displacement see paragraph below: Displacement, distribution and change.

Five districts account for 60% of all returns recorded until June: Falluja, Heet and Ramadi in Anbar Governorate and Mosul and Telafar in Ninewa Governorate. While most individuals progressively returned to their location of origin in

Anbar between 2016 and 2017, the most significant recent movements in Ninewa were recorded in Mosul (top district of return both in 2017 and 2018, 767,058 returns since May 2017) and Telafar (201,624 new returns).


Figure 2: Returns to Falluja, Heet, Ramadi, Mosul and Telafar



Recent returns are also linked to the aftermath of the last offensives along the Mosul corridor – Al-Shirqat (80,220 returns since May 2017), Al-Hawiga (119,118), Kirkuk

(150,354), Al-Hamdaniya (119,514) – and in west Anbar, with the districts of Al-Ka'im, Al-Rutba, Ana, Haditha and Ra'ua recording over 100,000 new returns since May 2017.

RATES OF RETURN¹⁴



As of June 2018, rates of return are particularly high in Erbil and Anbar, where around 85% of the affected population returned to their location of origin. Nearly all families have returned to Al-Rutba, Falluja, Haditha, Heet, Erbil and Ramadi, while nearly 70,000 individuals from Ra'ua and Al-Ka'im remain displaced. In contrast, in Ninewa 55% of the affected population is still displaced, including around 400,000 individuals from Mosul, around 140,000 from Sinjar and around 125,000 IDPs from Telafar. Returns to Al-Ba'aj started in May 2015 and 35% of the affected population has returned to their location of origin.

Twelve districts in the five governorates of Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala and Salah al-Din have not yet witnessed returns as of June 2018. No returns have been recorded to Al-Musayab district in Babylon. IDPs originally from Jurf Al-Sakhar (around 30,000 individuals) are currently moving from one area to another but are not allowed to return for security reasons. No returns were recorded to Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Karkh, Mada'in, Tarmia and Thawra1 in Baghdad – where, according to KIs, most families are currently displaced in KRI or have moved abroad.

¹⁴ The affected population in each governorate was computed as the number of individuals (both returned and still in displacement) originally from that governorate. Accordingly, current rates of returns were computed by dividing the number of returnees in a specific governorate by the number of affected individuals from the same governorate.

DIRECTION AND TIMING OF RETURNS

Nearly 60% of all return movements recorded since 2015 are intra-governorate (that is, the location of last displacement is in the same governorate of that of return), with Erbil and Baghdad receiving around 90% of returns from within the governorate. In fact, the proximity of the area of origin to that of displacement not only ensures a more viable journey, but also allows families to check on the conditions of their properties and the location of origin before venturing back home. Around 80% of all returns to Diyala and 69% of all returns to Ninewa are also intra-governorate – with Mosul-induced displacement leading the trend.

As for new returns recorded since May 2017, high shares of intra-governorate returns are mostly linked with the displacement caused by the last offensives, such as in Ninewa, Diyala and Salah al-Din, whereas lower shares of intra-governorate returns, as in Anbar and Kirkuk (26% and 36% respectively), show that once safety and security conditions in the location of origin are re-established, families start returning also from locations that are further away.

Figure 3a: Direction of returns (overall)





Figure 3b: Direction of returns (per governorate)



Nearly half of all return movements occurred in 2017, one quarter in 2016 and 18% and 12% respectively in 2015 and 2018. At governorate level, Salah al-Din and Diyala exhibit higher shares of early returns; in Diyala over 40% of returnees came back in 2015 and 45% in 2016. Most movements to Anbar, Baghdad and Erbil occurred in the biennial 2016–17, whereas 82% of families returned to their location of origin in Kirkuk in the course of 2017. Returns to Ninewa are even more recent: 54% of families came back in 2017 and 33% in the first half of 2018.

Figure 4a: Year of returns (overall)





Figure 4b: Year of returns (per governorate)



RETURNEES FROM ABROAD¹⁵

Overall 74,136 individuals (12,356 families) across twelve governorates were assessed as having returned to Iraq from abroad, 77% of whom have returned to their location of origin. However, it should be noted that nearly all individuals (89%) left Iraq before 2014 – a finding that is confirmed by

the fact that they are originally from southern governorates, which have not been hit by the recent wave of displacement. Only one in ten individuals (11%) left Iraq after 2014 – most of which came back to Ninewa and Sulaymaniyah.¹⁶


Table 2: Returnees from abroad

	ORIGINALLY FROM THE LOCATION	FLED BEFORE 2014	FLED AFTER 2014	TOTAL (INDIVIDUALS)
Babylon	100%	0%	100%	24
Baghdad	100%	0%	100%	90
Basrah	69%	99%	1%	23,970
Dahuk	100%	0%	100%	120
Erbil	75%	0%	100%	72
Missan	100%	100%	0%	28,326
Muthanna	3%	98%	0%	6,012
Ninewa	68%	0%	100%	5,148
Qadisiya	100%	0%	100%	90
Salah al-Din	100%	0%	100%	150
Sulaymaniyah	94%	2%	98%	1,368
Thi-Qar	75%	94%	6%	8,766
Total	77%	89%	11%	74,136

¹⁵ A dedicated section was added in the ILA III questionnaire with the objective to start monitoring returns from abroad.

¹⁶ It should be noted that parts of Diyala districts are administered by Sulaymaniyah Governorate, therefore IDPs originally from those districts were assessed as originally from Sulaymaniyah.

DISPLACEMENT, DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE¹⁷



¹⁷ For indicators at governorate level see Annexes at the end of the report.

As of June 2018, 2,002,986 internally displaced persons (333,831 families) remain dispersed across 18 governorates, 97 districts and 3,680 locations in Iraq. Compared to May 2017, their number has dropped by approximately one

third (-34%, 1,017,048 individuals). Decreases were recorded across all Iraqi governorates except Sulaymaniyah particularly in Baghdad (-69%) and Kirkuk (-64%) and Salah al-Din (-47%).

Table 3: IDPs, distribution and change

	IDPs MAY 2017 (ILA II)	IDPs MAY 2018 (ILA III)	% CHANGE SINCE MAY 2017 (ILA II)	% OF IDPs MAY 2017 (ILA II)	% OF IDPs MAY 2018 (ILA III)
Anbar	163,980	77,196	-53%	5%	4%
Babylon	43,518	24,198	-44%	1%	1%
Baghdad	318,168	98,790	-69%	11%	5%
Basrah	10,314	8,004	-22%	0%	0%
Dahuk	388,170	350,268	-10%	13%	17%
Diyala	71,868	63,390	-12%	2%	3%
Erbil	346,086	219,468	-37%	11%	11%
Kerbala	62,142	25,632	-59%	2%	1%
Kirkuk	362,256	130,494	-64%	12%	7%
Missan	5,250	2,964	-44%	0%	0%
Muthanna	3,738	1,302	-65%	0%	0%
Najaf	77,994	29,016	-63%	3%	1%
Ninewa	626,766	614,790	-2%	21%	31%
Qadissiya	23,802	12,510	-47%	1%	1%
Salah al-Din	334,800	177,330	-47%	11%	9%
Sulaymaniyah	148,062	151,158	2%	5%	8%
Thi-Qar	8,070	4,092	-49%	0%	0%
Wassit	25,050	12,384	-51%	1%	1%
Total	3,020,034	2,002,986	-34%	100%	100%

LOCATION AND DURATION OF DISPLACEMENT

Around half of currently displaced individuals are hosted within their governorate of origin (48%); the KRI hosts around one third (35%) and other north-central governorates 14%, with southern governorates hosting only 3% of current IDPs – nearly all in Najaf. In some governorates, such as Anbar, low levels of intra-governorate displacement show how people who were forced to flee far away due to the prolonged conflict and lack of security are the slowest to return. On the other hand, higher shares of intra-governorate displacement are more closely linked to recent movements, particularly along the Mosul corridor.

Over half of all IDPs (54%) have been displaced for over 3 years; 38% between 1 and 3 years and 8% for less than one year. Nearly all IDPs hosted in Babylon, Dahuk, Diyala, Kerbala, Wassit and all southern governorates have been displaced for a long period, with Dahuk still hosting 53% of all IDPs who fled during the Sinjar crisis (summer 2014). In Anbar, 45% of IDPs have been recently displaced, following the last offensives in the western areas of the governorate. In Ninewa, 71% of current IDPs fled during Mosul operations, whereas between one fifth and one fourth of IDPs in Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Erbil fled after 17 October 2016, due to operations in Al-Hawiga and Al-Shirqat and along the Mosul corridor.

Figure 5a: Location of displacement





Figure 5b: Duration of displacement




FUTURE RETURNS AND INTENTION TO STAY IN DISPLACEMENT

In 1,055 locations (hosting 32% of current IDPs), most individuals are willing to go home in the short term (less than 6 months) and in 1,988 locations (hosting 74% of current IDPs), most individuals are willing to go home on the long term (6 months or more). Individuals hosted in north-central

governorates are the most likely to return (44%); the most significant movements in the near future are expected towards Salah al-Din and Diyala, as in around three quarters of locations hosting IDPs originally from these governorates, most individuals are willing to return home in the short term.


Figure 6a: Short term intentions of IDPs



Compared to May 2017, long-term intentions show a shift towards local integration (from 9% to 22%), which can be linked both to voluntary (12%) and involuntary intention to stay (10%). Intentional local integration is prevalent among

IDPs living in southern governorates, while in as much as 86% of locations in Sulaymaniyah, 51% of those in Babylon and 21% of those in Diyala most IDPs have no other choice but to stay.¹⁸

Figure 6b: Long term intentions of IDPs



¹⁸ This finding can be linked to the high share of IDPs originally from Baghdad and Babylon, who intend to remain in displacement because their house has been destroyed or returns are not allowed, respectively.

OBSTACLES TO RETURN AMONG IDPs


The obstacles that IDPs are still facing can explain both the difference between short- and long-term intentions (in the sense that families postpone their decision to return) and the increase in the share of those willing to stay in displacement. Three factors seem particularly important for families: a residence to return to (73%), job opportunities (54%) and security (40%).

Compared to May 2017, security/safety has lost importance (70% in ILA II) due to the general improvement in security conditions – and it is mostly families originally from Kirkuk and Salah al-Din who still outline pockets of instability at home.

On the other hand, families who remain in displacement seem more vulnerable and strained by the long absence from home: around one in five does not have enough money for the journey back (reportedly most IDPs originally from Anbar and Baghdad) and/or is afraid to lose aid/humanitarian assistance. Additionally, around one in four families are scared to return due to ethno-religious changes at the location of origin (27%).

Families originally from Kirkuk, Baghdad and Ninewa are the most likely to report this issue.¹⁹ Returns are still not allowed to some areas of Babylon, Diyala and Salah al-Din.

Figure 7: Obstacles to return




¹⁹ Returnees tend to go back to neighbourhoods under control of members of the ethno-religious background they belong to, while only very few families return to areas where they would be in a minority. For more information see the last section of the report on Ethno-religious composition and change and main vulnerabilities.

The highest percentage of families whose intention is to voluntarily stay in the long term (12% of current IDPs) can be found in the southern governorates, such as Basrah, Muthanna, Missan and Thi-Qar. As well, for between 28% and 38% of IDPs hosted in locations of Baghdad, Kerbala and Kirkuk, the main intention is to stay voluntarily. Involuntary stay (10% at country level) is prevalent in Sulaymaniyah, Babylon and reported, to a lesser extent, in Diyala. Southern areas are preferred by virtue of their safety and the presence of extended family and friends, while most IDPs staying in

north-central governorates have lost everything at home. Services and job opportunities are the most important reasons to stay in the KRI, aside for IDPs in Dahuk, who fear ethno-religious change in their area of origin.

Figure 8: Reasons to stay




REASONS TO RETURN

Most IDPs who have returned so far have done so spontaneously, when they judged that the situation back home was secure enough (93%) and/or when the conditions in displacement became unbearable (50%). Nevertheless, humanitarian assistance and/or government incentives (21%) weigh as much as encouragement from community leaders (6%) and support from friends and relatives (15%) in the decision to return. At governorate level, in addition to

the improvement in the security situation and the availability of housing, which is common to all locations of return, a high share of returns to Diyala and Ninewa were pushed by the lack of means or a worsening of the situation in displacement. Assistance and incentives were key in Anbar, the presence of family/ friends in were important in Erbil, and in Baghdad encouragement by community/religious leaders was a decisive reason to return.²⁰

Figure 9: Reasons to return




INVOLUNTARY RETURNS, BLOCKED RETURNS AND UNSTABLE RETURNS

Invuntary returns are likely to happen not only because IDPs feel that they have no alternative given their desperate economic circumstances, but also because they are pressured by institutions. Evidence of involuntary returns was found in 136 locations across Iraq (11% of all returnee locations), mostly in Baghdad (42%) but to a lesser extent in Erbil (19%) Diyala (16%) and Anbar (15%) as well. And, seemingly, involuntary returns continue from locations in Baghdad, Kerbala, Missan and Wassit.

Invuntary returns have been encouraged either by authorities in the governorate of origin (40% of locations, most of which are in Anbar) or in the governorate of displacement (35%), whereas in around one quarter of overall locations (24%) the responsible authority is respectively the Government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government. In a few locations of Ninewa and Salah al-Din, authorities in the location of origin and that of displacement have coordinated these activities.

²⁰ For more information at governorate level see the related table in the Annexes.

Figure 10a: Are returns being pushed?




If they are under pressure to return, families are quite likely to undergo secondary displacement, as they will not find adequate conditions of living or the necessary security to

resume their lives. Evidence of unstable/temporary returns – that is, families that returned to the location of displacement after going back to that of origin – was found in 6% of locations of displacement, particularly in Dahuk (20%), Kerbala (17%), Erbil (16%), Kirkuk (14%), Ninewa (10%) and Salah al-Din (10%). While the lack of security is the main reason for unstable returns for IDPs hosted in Kirkuk and Salah al-Din, in other governorates the lack of shelter and jobs/livelihood opportunities seem to be the most important factors that pushed families again into displacement.

Returns have been and are being obstructed by the governorate of origin as well. This was reported in 255 locations across Iraq (8% of locations of displacement). IDPs originally from Salah-al Din, Babylon and, to a lesser extent, Ninewa, Diyala and Anbar have faced this issue. Most of them are currently hosted within their governorate of origin, waiting for authorities to decide whether they can return. However, cases of obstructed returns were also reported among IDPs hosted in Sulaymaniyah (14% of locations).

Figure 10b: Involuntary returns



- AUTHORITY AT ORIGIN
- AUTHORITY AT DISPLACEMENT
- GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ/KRG
- COORDINATION BETWEEN ORIGIN AND DISPLACEMENT

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES AND LAND

This section assesses the conditions of infrastructure, services and agricultural land in assessed locations across Iraq. Infrastructure damage has been analysed in terms of basic structures and services in all surveyed locations, while agricultural damage was only assessed in relation to rural locations.²¹


Particular attention was given to electricity and water: both the state of the infrastructure and the quality of services was assessed. All indicators are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location where the issue was reported.

At national level, the most inefficient sectors appear to be sewerage and waste management/disposal, which exist but are only functioning in locations where around 10% of returnees and 40% of IDPs live. While these services are mostly present in KRI, the main problem in the north-central governorates seems to be the absence of both services,

whereas malfunctioning was reported in the south. The state of the roads to the district and province are also in bad conditions in locations where respectively 59% of returnees and 39% of IDPs are currently hosted – particularly in Diyala Governorate as well as southern governorates. Nearly all returnees and IDPs live in locations where the cell phone coverage is generally functioning (94% and 86% respectively).

As for agriculture, arable and grazing lands are accessible in locations where between 85% and 90% of returnees and IDPs live. High figures for damage/contamination were reported only in southern governorates and particularly Muthanna, Thi-Qar and Basrah, where irrigation water supply is also lacking in 57% of locations (where 66% of current IDPs are hosted). Lack of water for irrigation was also reported among returnees in Baghdad (43% of returnees live in such locations), whereas in around half of locations hosting returnees in Erbil, damage, landmines and lack of irrigation water supply was assessed.


Figure 11: State of infrastructures (% of IDPs and returnees living in locations where infrastructure is mostly functioning and electricity and tap water is available for 50% of residents or more)



Among governorates of return, in addition to sewerage and waste management/disposal, which are an issue in nearly all locations of return except Erbil, main criticalities were lack of roads to the district/province in Diyala (96%), absence of cell phone coverage in Diyala (37%) and Salah al-Din (52%), tap water in Baghdad (20% of returnees live in locations where


less than 25% of residents have running tap water) and electricity in Ninewa (11% of returnees live in locations where less than 25% of residents have access to public electricity network). It should also be noted that locations in Kirkuk are those more likely to report destruction to sewerage (11%) and waste management/disposal (32%) infrastructure.

Figure 12: Critical infrastructure and access to electricity and tap water in governorates of return (% of returnees living in locations where infrastructure is not present/destroyed/mostly not functioning and electricity and tap water is available for less than 25% of residents)



²¹ The state of infrastructure and services was assessed at location level. Among infrastructure, sewerage, waste management, cell phone coverage and roads to district were rated as adequate if present and mostly functioning. The provision of electricity and water was rated as adequate if at least 50% of residents at the location were connected to the public electricity network and had tap water running. Services (primary and secondary schools, hospitals, markets, places of worship, community centres, courts and police stations) were considered as adequate if present and accessible at the location or nearby. Agricultural (arable and grazing) land was assessed in terms of its accessibility, together with the presence of irrigation water supply and crop storage facilities. Residential damage was assessed on a scale ranging from 0 (intact), 1–25% (moderate), 26–50% (significant), 51–75% (severe), 76–99% (devastated), to 100% (completely destroyed). The weighted percentages of occupied private residences were calculated for returnees only.

ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY BY DISTRICT




Overall, public electricity is available to most residents in locations where respectively 96% and 85% of IDPs and returnees live – within the range of 62% in Anbar and 72% in Najaf to 100% in KRI. However, the number of hours where public electricity is available per day is quite variable, and only in

southern governorates such as Basrah, Missan, Muthanna and Thi-Qar, can residents count on the public network for around 20 hours per day. The lowest daily supply was found in Ninewa and Salah al-Din, where on average residents receive public electricity for 10 hours per day.


The most reported issue in returnee locations is poor wiring (68%) whereas overloaded circuits are the main complaint in IDP locations (53%). In around one third of returnee locations – mostly in Anbar and Diyala governorates – residents also report the lack of electricity supply. Again, the highest share of locations with no issues was found in the KRI (68% of returnee locations and 62% of IDP locations), whereas in

the north-central and southern governorates residents were more likely to have one or more issues, such as overloaded circuits, poor wiring, low and uncovered electrical points and, in general, lack of supply throughout the whole site.

Figure 13: Public electricity - main issues (returnees and IDPs)



ACCESS TO TAP WATER BY DISTRICT



Overall, tap water is available to most residents in locations where respectively 93% and 82% of IDPs and returnees live – within the range of 39% in Najaf to 100% in Erbil and other southern governorates. Again, the provision of tap water per week is quite variable and only in southern governorates,

such as Basrah, Missan, Muthanna and Thi-Qar, can residents count on the public network for at least six days per week. The lowest weekly supply was found in Ninewa and Kirkuk, where tap water is running on average for only three days per week.


Overall, services appear available at the location or nearby and this holds true for nearly all locations hosting both returnees and IDPs.

Courts (hence legal services) are the least accessible service in the assessed locations (in fact only 12% of IDPs and 8% of returnees can access them), with as many as 43% of IDPs in southern governorates and 23% of returnees to Erbil living in locations where such services cannot be accessed at all. Health is another critical issue, with as much as 56% of IDPs and 45% of returnees living in locations where there is no hospital – nevertheless most of them can access a facility nearby. It should also be noted that around 10% of IDPs and returnees in Anbar live in locations where hospitals have been closed, whereas around 15% of IDPs in Najaf

and around 10% of returnees in Baghdad and Erbil live in locations where hospitals are too far to access.

Access to primary schools is virtually universal – overall schools are available at the location (89–90%) or nearby (9–10%) for both IDPs and returnees. At governorate level, however, these are not accessible for less than 1% of returnees living in Diyala, Ninewa and Salah al-Din, 4% of IDPs living in Najaf and less than 1% of those living in Dahuk, Erbil, Muthanna, Ninewa, Qadisiya and Salah al-Din.²² Access to secondary schools is also widespread, although more families have to access them at a location nearby rather than the location they live in (25% of IDPs and 30% of returnees). In addition, 6% of returnees to Salah al-Din and 3% of returnees to Erbil live in locations where secondary schools are too far to access.

Figure 14: Provision of services



²² No access to primary schools at the location or nearby was reported in a few locations of the following districts: Al Hamdaniya, Al-Muqadadiya, Al-Samawa, Balad, Diwaniya, Erbil, Koisnjak, Kufa, Mosul, Najaf, Sinjar, Sumel, Tikrit, Tilkaif and Tooz. It should also be noted that in 40% of locations of Al-Ka'im (serving 40% of returnees and 73% of IDPs in the district) schools are currently closed; however, families are able to access primary education in the vicinity.

Table 4: Access to main services (returnees)
(% of returnees living in locations where services are accessible)

	PRIMARY SCHOOL		SECONDARY SCHOOL		HOSPITAL		MARKET		WORSHIP		COMMUNITY CENTER		COURTS		POLICE STATION	
	L	N	L	N	L	N	L	N	L	N	L	N	L	N	L	N
Anbar	90%	10%	72%	28%	37%	63%	98%	2%	100%	0%	4%	47%	7%	92%	48%	52%
Baghdad	83%	17%	31%	69%	0%	92%	69%	29%	85%	15%	0%	52%	0%	90%	0%	98%
Dahuk	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Diyala	55%	45%	40%	60%	13%	86%	43%	57%	84%	15%	1%	74%	5%	81%	30%	70%
Erbil	88%	12%	47%	50%	27%	61%	58%	42%	95%	5%	23%	61%	0%	76%	25%	66%
Kirkuk	97%	3%	85%	14%	76%	24%	91%	9%	100%	0%	45%	31%	7%	90%	25%	74%
Ninewa	92%	8%	67%	32%	54%	45%	76%	23%	88%	10%	16%	29%	12%	84%	29%	68%
Salah al-Din	95%	5%	74%	20%	50%	44%	87%	8%	94%	4%	9%	27%	10%	81%	49%	49%
Total	90%	10%	69%	30%	45%	53%	84%	15%	94%	5%	12%	39%	8%	87%	38%	61%

L At the Location N Nearby

LIVING CONDITIONS

This section is dedicated to the living conditions of the returnee and displaced population. Both basic and recovery needs (that is, mechanisms to restore or provide compensation for housing/land/property; replacement of personal and other documentation; solutions for displacement-related rights violations; reunification with family members separated during displacement etc.) were assessed. Particular attention was given to employment/livelihoods, health, education, food and health. Issues were assessed at location level and weighted by the figures of IDPs and returnees living at the location. The last part is dedicated to main sources of information – about assistance and aid for returnees and about the location of origin for the displaced population.²³


Main needs of returnees and IDPs

Access to employment/livelihood opportunities continues to be the main concern of both returnees and IDPs in nearly all locations – and more so compared to last year. In fact, it was cited among top concerns in locations where 97% of returnees and 93% of IDPs are currently hosted – the related percentages in 2017 were respectively 80% and 63%.

In addition, it should be noted that basic needs are not yet satisfied for most returnees and IDPs; hence, they are generally far more important than recovery needs. For IDPs, the impossibility to access employment/livelihoods translates into the related difficulty of accessing food (51%), household and NFIs, (66%) and shelter (42%). Returnees are more concerned about health and water (second and third top need at 71% and 47% respectively), as well as education (43%). As for recovery needs, around one third of returnees live in locations where access to a solution for displacement-related rights violations, replacement of documentation and improved safety, security and freedom of movement were mentioned among the top concerns.

²³ Indicators for IDPs are provided at overall level and more detailed information at governorate level can be found in the Annexes.

Figure 15: Basic and recovery needs for IDPs and returnees



Employment / Livelihoods

Access to employment/livelihoods was cited among the top concerns in locations where over 90% of returnees and IDPs are currently living – with the exceptions of Kerbala and Muthanna (for IDP locations, 54% and 86% respectively) and Kirkuk (for returnee locations, 78%). In fact, three fourths of returnees

(and 83% of IDPs) live in locations where the supply of jobs is “insufficient” and half of them live in locations where most individuals have no jobs – with peaks of 81% and 68% in Ninewa and Erbil respectively. IDP “employment rates” are even lower (the average is 43%, but barely reaches 13% in Diyala, 20% in Salah al-Din, 23% in Ninewa and 31% in Anbar).

TOP NEEDS
98% ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT

Figure 15a: Employment issues for returnees (overall)





Figure 15b: Employment issues for returnees (by governorate)



Even when jobs are available, they do not provide sufficient and/or regular income as reported in locations where around 10% of returnees live – especially in Kirkuk and Ninewa. This finding is confirmed by the high percentage of families who have more than one income source – the most important is the public sector (86% have paid jobs and 35% have paid pensions), but nearly half of families also rely on informal labour, 38% on farming, 36% on private business and 29% on jobs from the private sector. Other

income, such as savings, remittances from family/friends and grants support seem less important – except for families in Anbar. The situation appears precarious in Erbil, Ninewa and Baghdad, where 88%, 64% and 45% of families rely on earnings coming from informal labour. In around 20% of locations, the lack of training and/or vocational centres and/or programmes to support business also limits the livelihood possibilities of returnees.

Figure 16a: Main sources of income for returnees (overall)





Figure 16b: Main sources of income for returnees (by governorate)



Health

Access to health was cited among top concerns in locations where over 70% of returnees and 46% of IDPs were living as of June 2018, with the exception of Missan, Muthanna, Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad (for IDP locations, 2%, 2%, 14% and 17% respectively) and Kirkuk (for returnee locations, 35%). Around 40% of returnees live in locations where the supply of health services is either “insufficient”, with peaks of 100% in Dahuk and 50% in Ninewa, and/or of poor quality, with peaks of 70% in Baghdad. The lack of maternal and child services was reported in around 10% of locations in Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din, whereas in 3% of locations in Anbar and Ninewa the lack of rehabilitation services (including psycho-social support) was noted among main issues concerning health.

TOP NEEDS 
71% ACCESS TO HEALTH

In general, IDPs seem less concerned than returnees about health: high costs were reported in KRI whereas other issues were more prevalent in north-central and southern governorates.

Figure 17a: Health issues for returnees (overall)





Figure 17b: Health issues for returnees (by governorate)




Education

Access to education was cited among the top concerns in locations where 43% of returnees and 9% of IDPs are currently living, with peaks in Babylon, Sulaymaniyah and Ninewa (for IDP locations, 30%, 18% and 20% respectively) and Anbar and Ninewa (for returnee locations, 50% and 54% respectively). In fact, nearly 70% of returnees live in locations where the supply of education is “insufficient” (that is, schools/classes are lacking and/or overcrowded), with peaks of 75% in Kirkuk and 77% in Ninewa. Inadequate service was reported in around one third of locations in Diyala and Erbil, and 46% of those in Salah al-Din, whereas in around 10% of locations, particularly in Anbar and Baghdad, education is too expensive (costs of books, fees, material and uniforms). For 12% of returnees in Diyala, schools are also difficult to access.


TOP NEEDS 
43% ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Figure 18a: Education issues for returnees (overall)



In general, IDPs are much less concerned about education; nevertheless, it should be noted that schools – and education in general – were rated too expensive in most southern locations. Families in Dahuk and Wassit also mentioned language barriers.

Figure 18b: Education issues for returnees (by governorate)




The government guarantees access to education across the country and primary public schools are provided in nearly all locations where both returnees and IDPs live (overall around 90%). Closure of schools was reported in around 3% of locations, mostly in Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Anbar and Diyala.²⁴ Nevertheless, returnees and IDPs are able to access education nearby. Only in a few locations of the fifteen districts of Al Hamdaniya, Al-Muqdadiya, Al-Samawa, Balad, Diwaniya, Erbil, Koisnjak, Kufa, Mosul, Najaf, Sinjar, Sumel, Tikrit, Tilkaif and

Tooz, no schools can be found nearby. Access to secondary schools is also widespread, although more families have to access them nearby (25% of IDPs and 30% of returnees). In addition, 6% of returnees to Salah al-Din and 3% of returnees to Erbil live in locations where secondary schools are too far to access.

Humanitarian actors provide education in a few locations in Dahuk, Wassit and Salah al-Din, whereas evidence of religious schools was found Kerbala, Wassit, Baghdad and Erbil.

Figure 19: Provision of education by main regions of Iraq



Food

In general, IDPs are more concerned about access to food than returnees (51% versus 40% cited it among top concerns). Not only is food expensive (for around 80% of families) but except for KRI, food supply is also insufficient for 60% of those in southern governorates and generally unreliable for around half of IDPs hosted in north-central and southern governorates. 98% of IDPs in Missan, 94% of those in Sulaymaniyah,

70% of those in Ninewa and 62% of those in Anbar live in locations where food was cited among top concerns.

TOP NEEDS 
40% ACCESS TO FOOD

As for returnees, around 40% live in locations where the supply of food is "insufficient" – with peaks of 72% in Diyala. Food supply was also reportedly "unreliable" in around one fourth of locations – nearly 60% of those in Ninewa – whereas around 60% of returnees live in locations where food is too expensive, all of those in Erbil and Dahuk. Around 10% of returnees in Baghdad and Salah al-Din also live in locations where food is also too difficult to access.

Figure 20a: Food issues of returnees (overall)





Figure 20b: Food issues of returnees (by governorate)



²⁴ It should also be noted that in 40% of locations of Al-Ka'im (serving 40% of returnees and 73% of IDPs in the district) schools are currently closed; however, families are able to access primary education in the vicinity.

Shelter

The share of returnees unable to return to their habitual residence and IDPs hosted in critical shelters has overall decreased compared to May 2017 – IDPs settled in critical shelters were 22% in May 2017 versus 13% in 2018, while returnees unable to return to their original residence were nearly 12% versus 5% in 2018. In fact, returnees are progressively moving out of occupied residences and/or unfinished/abandoned buildings and returning to their homes (95%). Only in Baghdad, 37% of returnees live in occupied private residences. This finding is linked to the high share of houses that have suffered significant to severe damage or have been completely destroyed: in around 40% of locations in Baghdad, returnees reported not being able to return to their habitual residence due to the severe damage/complete destruction of their properties.

Figure 21a: Shelter type, returnee families





Figure 21b: Shelter type, returnee families



As for IDPs, only 13% of displaced families remain hosted in critical shelter arrangements – half of which are unfinished/abandoned buildings. The most popular option for IDPs remains rented accommodation, not only in the KRI (84%) but also for those who are currently displaced in other locations of central-north and southern governorates (63% and 65% respectively). Critical shelters are more prevalent in the south (21%), whereas 23% of IDPs are hosted by other families in central-north governorates. Only in Salah al-Din and Dahuk, unfinished/abandoned buildings host respectively 15% and 17% of IDPs – both because of a lack of alternatives and because of the availability of a high number of unfinished/abandoned constructions due to the real estate boom that took place until 2014. Just as in May 2017, Najaf and Kerbala have the largest percentage of IDPs living in religious buildings (21% and 41% respectively).

Figure 22a: Shelter type, IDP families





Figure 22b: Shelter type, IDP families



Residential damage is the main reason why returnees cannot return to their habitual residence (65%), followed by the fact that rent is no longer sustainable (19%) – confirming the returnees’ inability to recover the same living standards as before the crisis. Housing destruction is the main cause in Baghdad, Diyala and Salah al-Din, whereas returnees in Anbar struggle to pay the rent. In Kirkuk, families are back to the district of origin but do not reside in the original location.

Figure 23a: Reasons for not having been able to return to habitual residence (% of returnees living in locations where issue was reported)





Figure 23b: Reasons for not having been able to return to habitual residence (% of returnees living in locations where issue was reported)



Housing, land and property (HLP) issues are central to facilitating return movements and are among the thorniest issues complicating smooth returns. Although information is scarce, there is evidence of occupied residences in returnee locations of Anbar, Baghdad, Ninewa and Salah al-Din. When asked specifically about potential property claims, ownership issues were mentioned again in around 10% of locations of Ninewa and Salah al-Din and in fewer locations in Anbar and Diyala. In nearly all cases, returnees have lost documents to prove ownership or never had them. In Diyala, the loss of documents is aggravated by the lack of money to pay for replacement and by the fact that government records have been destroyed.

Figure 24a: Housing, land and property (HLP) issues (% of returnees living in locations where issue was reported)





Figure 24b: Housing, land and property (HLP) issues (% of returnees living in locations where issue was reported)




Recovery Issues

Access to solutions for displacement-related rights violations and replacement of personal and other documentation are the most pressing recovery issues, mostly for returnees. While only 8% of IDPs live in locations where they would like to see an improvement in the security situation (mostly in Najaf) and freedom of movement (mostly in Anbar, Diyala and Salah al-Din), overall around 30% of returnees do not feel safe at home (as much as half of returnees in Anbar and around one third of those in Baghdad, Diyala and Salah al-Din).


Access to solutions for displacement-related rights violations is the main recovery need of returnees in Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa, whereas around 65% of returnees in Anbar live in locations where replacement of personal and other documentation is the main issue. Anbar returnees are also more likely to report the need to reunite with family members separated in the course of displacement (27%).

Figure 25a: Recovery issues for returnees (overall)



Equal participation in public affairs was mentioned less overall; nevertheless, it is the main concern in around 10% of returnee locations in Ninewa.

Figure 25b: Recovery issues for returnees (by governorate)




Main Sources of Information

Television and social media are the main sources of information on the location of origin for the displaced population (56% and 50% respectively). Returnees are definitely less likely to rely on television if they wish to acquire information on aid/assistance – overall only one fourth of returnees live in locations where television was reported as a main

information source. In fact, returnees tend to privilege many different channels with no particular preference – around 30% of returnees live in locations where either mobile phones (SMS), local authorities, social media, community leaders or word of mouth were mentioned among top source of information.


Figure 26: Main sources of information for IDPs and returnees



In Diyala, most communication on aid/assistance is institutional. Nearly in all returnee locations, it occurs through local authorities and community leaders. Communication through community leaders is also very important in Baghdad and Ninewa. Use of social media is prevalent in Kirkuk and Salah

al-Din, whereas returnees to Erbil prefer to rely on word of mouth. Returnees in Anbar are more likely to rely on many and diverse different sources, with a very slight preference for social media and local authorities.

Figure 27: Main sources of information aid for returnees by governorate




Security Incidents

Overall security incidents were reported in 40% of locations, where around half of returnees and IDPs live. Personal safety continues to be the major concern in daily life and the occurrence of petty crimes was assessed countrywide – with the exception of Muthanna, Missan and Qadissiya – in locations where respectively 36% of IDPs and 27% of returnees live.

In addition, suicide attacks and/or direct and/or indirect fire attacks were reported in 1%–4% of locations. Around 6% of both IDP and returnee families are hosted in locations where

arbitrary arrests, as well as kidnappings and/or abductions, occur. Evidence of recruiting by PMF (around 5% of locations) and/or terrorist groups (1% of locations) was found; in around 3% of locations, schools and hospitals had been used by armed groups in the 3 months preceding the survey. Incidents involving ERWs/landmines/UXOs and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were also reported in 2–3% of locations, particularly in returnee locations.

Figure 28: Security incidents (% of IDPs and returnees living in locations where incidents were reported)



SECURITY, SOCIAL COHESION AND RECONCILIATION

This section assesses the level of security, social cohesion and reconciliation in IDP and returnee locations across Iraq. Particular attention was given to the factors that, according to ILA II analysis, significantly increased the conflict potential at the location (such as presence of PMF in sole or joint

control of the location, a high degree of favouritism, high number of crime and the incapability to regain previous residence by returnees).²⁵ All indicators are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location where the issue was reported.


²⁵ In the 2017 ILA II, separate composite conflict and cooperation indexes were calculated for 3,009 locations hosting IDPs only and 573 locations hosting returnees (with or without IDPs or host community). The variables of mistrust between groups, attacks between groups and fighting groups were used for the computation of a conflict score, while cooperation projects and cooperation groups were used for the cooperation index. Furthermore, a univariate general linear model (GLM) analysis was also undertaken to investigate the effect of some factors either negatively or positively associated with tension, on the conflict score. Factors that significantly increased the conflict score were a high degree of favouritism, the existence of occupied residences, the incidence of crime and the presence of PMF in sole or joint control of the location. For more details, see ILA II Questionnaire and report.

²⁶ Since the end of the war in December 2017, ISIL has moved back into the shadows and restarted asymmetric warfare across Iraq. Areas that should be monitored for signs of ISIL's rebirth include Anbar's porous borders with Syria, the hilly region between the governorates of Salah al Din, Diyala, Kirkuk and Ninewa and, in general, areas with a lack of a strong nation-state governance – such as "disputed areas" and/or areas with a tribal or warlord type of governance. Security incidents have been reported, as well as recruiting into armed groups and kidnappings as evidence of "re-supply" activities. See UNAMI, security briefs.

The situation is hardly uniform and pockets of instability and fear remain. At governorate level, the situation appears particularly tense in Salah al-Din, where a higher than average percentage of returnees live in locations where different security incidents take place – including arbitrary arrests (35%), abductions and kidnappings (21%) and incidents involving ERWs/landmines/UXOs (13%). The issue of

explosive devices was signaled in Erbil (22%), Baghdad (18%), Diyala (13%) and Ninewa (8%). Direct (6%) and/or indirect fire attacks (12–14%) – and to a lesser extent suicide attacks and abductions and kidnappings – were reported in locations in Diyala and Kirkuk. The main security issues in Anbar are attacks with knives and other non-kinetic weapons (19%).

Figure 29: Security incidents by governorate of return (% of returnees living in locations where incidents were reported)




Civic Life Satisfaction, Intergroup Feelings and Social Threats

According to the analysis conducted in 2017 (ILA II), there was no apparent conflict in around 70% of overall districts and the conflict risk was low in around another 10% of districts. After one year, the situation appears quite steady, since overall, the presence of physical incidents, threats and, in general, mistrust between different groups (host community, returnees and IDPs) was reported in 5%–15% of locations across Iraq. In addition, IDPs and returnees feel generally safe – between 80% and 90% of both populations feel mostly comfortable and/or welcome at the location where they are currently living.

Nevertheless, biased access to resources appears to be an issue: overall between 45% and 50% of returnees – and between 36% and 42% of IDPs – live in locations where favouritism regarding employment and political representation was reported. IDPs were slightly more prone to report favouritism in accessing aid (35% versus 27% of returnees), whereas biased access to education and health appears to be less of a concern for both populations (13% of returnees and 8% of IDPs).


Figure 30: Intergroup feelings and social threats (% of IDPs and returnees living in locations where the issue was reported)



IDPs living in southern governorates are the least likely to report violence and social threats, aside from a sporadic feeling of being uncomfortable and/or unwelcome at times at the location where they intend to stay. In the KRI, on the other hand, displaced individuals feel mostly safe and protected, although around 30% live in locations where favouritism

(in accessing public employment, political representation and also aid) are an issue. Only IDPs living in north-central governorates reported threats, physical violence and mistrust among groups – especially in Anbar, Babylon, Diyala, Kerbala, Salah al-Din and Wassit.


Figure 31: Intergroup feelings and social threats (% of IDPs living in locations where the issue was reported)



Returnees in Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din were the most likely to report threats, physical violence and mistrust among groups, whereas evidence of favouritism (in accessing public employment, political representation and aid) was also reported in Baghdad, Diyala and particularly Kirkuk – 60%

of Kirkuk returnees live in locations with “unfair” access to political representation. In addition, between one fifth and one fourth of returnees to Anbar, Baghdad, Ninewa and Salah al-Din live in locations where they feel uncomfortable “at times”.

Figure 32: Intergroup feelings and social threats (% of returnees living in locations where the issue was reported)



Among returnees, “hotspots,” that is, where a higher incidence of threats and physical violence between groups was assessed in most locations, were identified in the eleven districts of Al-Ka'im, Ana, Falluja, Haditha, Ra'ua, Al-Shikhan, Sinjar, Telafar, Al-Shirqat, Balad, Tikrit and Tooz. It is important to note that in all these districts, favouritism in accessing political representation, public employment and, to a lesser

extent aid, was generally reported, together with limitation of personal freedom of returnees – such as restriction of movements, arbitrary arrests and denial to regain their previous residence. As in the 2017 report (ILA II), discrimination, unfair governance and/or provision of law appear to be closely associated with conflict risk.

Table 5: Conflict “hotspots” (% of returnees living in the location)

		SECURITY		FAVOURITISM IN			RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM		
		PHYSICAL VIOLENCE	THREATS	PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT	POLITICAL REPRESENTATION	AID	NOT ALLOWED INTO THEIR RESIDENCE	RESTRICTED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	ARBITRARY ARREST
Anbar	Al-Ka'im	39%	24%	39%	49%	4%	0%	100%	39%
	Ana	18%	8%	89%	76%	23%	0%	100%	18%
	Falluja	29%	14%	51%	69%	11%	4%	100%	29%
	Haditha	33%	11%	81%	71%	10%	0%	100%	33%
Ninewa	Ra'ua	62%	0%	79%	100%	79%	0%	100%	62%
	Al-Shikhan	43%	65%	75%	75%	75%	57%	0%	43%
	Sinjar	18%	46%	81%	77%	42%	0%	0%	18%
	Telafar	48%	40%	88%	59%	57%	30%	0%	48%
Salah al-Din	Al-Shirqat	22%	26%	2%	89%	3%	0%	100%	22%
	Balad	62%	8%	100%	100%	25%	61%	100%	62%
	Tikrit	17%	9%	100%	70%	55%	23%	40%	17%
	Tooz	92%	87%	100%	94%	88%	0%	90%	92%

Regression analysis conducted in ILA II also showed that in returnee locations, the presence of the PMF in sole or joint control of the area had a great (negative) influence on the conflict level. The PMF are currently in joint control of locations where 40% of returnees and 15% of IDPs live. Evidence of individuals joining the PMF was found in around 55% of IDP and returnee locations across Iraq, with peaks among returnees in Ninewa (79%) and Salah al-Din (88%).

Figure 33: Evidence of individuals joining PMF at the location (% returnees living in the location)






Figure 34: Security actors in control of the locations



Although in around 10% of locations, and as much as 25% of locations in Anbar and Erbil, KIs chose not to respond when asked to indicate “fighting” groups involved, tribal conflicts are generally the main source of violence, threats

and mistrust. Religious and ethnic tensions were only very rarely in a few locations in Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Diyala, while tensions between IDPs and the host community were nearly only reported in Kirkuk.²⁷

Figure 35: Tensions between groups (% returnees living in the location where the issue was reported)




Reconciliation Issues and Programmes

As for practices that could ease the reconciliation process, overall nearly 80% of returnees live in locations where they can easily access offices for the replacement of personal and other documentation and/or courts for displacement-related violations only; around 45% live in locations where they can access programmes for the restoration of housing, land and property and around 15% live in locations where

programmes for the reunification of family members separated during displacement exist. IDPs are overall more disadvantaged and only around 45% are currently hosted in locations where they can easily access offices for the replacement of personal and other documentation and/or courts for displacement-related violations only.


²⁷ It should be noted that, according to the analysis conducted in ILA II, different groups hardly interacted and “no cooperation” between them was recorded in most locations – the only positive actions that implied some form of cooperation between groups were “using each other’s personal connections to request services from the government” and clearing rubble.

Figure 36: Access to reconciliation programmes (% of IDPs and returnees living in the location where the programme exists)



Access to reconciliation practices appears to be more difficult in Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil and Kirkuk, meaning that fewer families have access to courts and/or offices and programmes are mostly unavailable. The situation is better in Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din; however, less than one fifth of families live in locations where there are no programmes for voluntary reunification and between 40% and 60% of returnees live in locations where HLP issues are not addressed.

Figure 37: Access to reconciliation programmes by governorate (% returnees)



ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION AND VULNERABILITIES

This section covers issues related to the ethno-religious composition of returnees and IDPs. All indicators are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location where the issue was reported.

Ethno-Religious Composition and Change


Before the current humanitarian crisis, Iraq was home to many ethnic and religious groups – including minorities such as Christians, Shabaks, Turkmens, Yazidis and Kakais – that tended to be concentrated geographically, albeit not always in contiguous areas. Arab Sunni Muslims were predominant in central and western Iraq; Arab Shia Muslims mainly inhabited southern Iraq; Kurds – both Sunni and Shia – were hosted in the north and north-eastern regions, in the KRI and the disputed districts; while Christians and other non-Muslim minorities mostly resided in north western Iraq, particularly in Ninewa Governorate. Major cities such as Baghdad and Basrah also hosted multiple ethno-religious groups.²⁸

Since the beginning of the crisis, ethnic and religious groups have followed different displacement and return paths. IOM's analysis conducted in 2016 showed that most groups clustered in displacement to form homogeneous ethno-religious "hotspots."²⁹ For instance, Shias concentrated in the Shia-dominated south and Sunnis in the Kurdish north and

mixed Sunni-Shia central parts of the country. Kurdish areas also received various ethnic and religious groups, the only exceptions being Assyrian Christians and Turkmen Shias, who clustered respectively in mixed Shia-Sunni and predominantly Shia areas.

This trend can still be observed regarding families that are still displaced. Nearly all Sunnis can be found in north-central areas (70%) and KRI (29%). In contrast, 65% of Shias are in southern governorates and 33% in Kerbala and other mixed central areas of the country – mostly in Diyala, Baghdad and Kirkuk. Nearly all Kurds are in the KRI (79%) and north-central region (21%), whereas nearly all Turkmens can be found in Kerbala and Shia areas (24% are in Najaf) and/or other mixed Shia-Sunni governorates (such as Kirkuk, Baghdad, Salah al-Din). Most Yazidis are in Dahuk (61%) and the remaining share in Ninewa (34%) or other KRI governorates (5%); and the same goes for other minorities, such as Christians, Kakais and Shabak Shias, with some also resettling in Wassit (5%) and southern governorates (9%).

Figure 38: IDPs ethno-religious distribution



²⁸ Information is based on the shape file of Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC). Published in 2012, this data is based on the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ethno-religious maps and Izady ethnic maps, and reflect ethnic/religious majorities. See Ethno-Religious groups and displacement in Iraq, 2nd Report, IOM 2016 and Integrated Location Assessment II, IOM October 2017.


²⁹ "Hotspots" are the areas where the locations of IDPs and the associated values (the number of individuals in this case) show clustering. The clusters are detected using a hot spot analysis method, and are selected within 95% confidence interval. See Ethno-Religious groups and displacement in Iraq, 2nd Report, IOM 2016 and Integrated Location Assessment II, IOM October 2017.

Ethno-religious change has been mostly assessed where there has been ethno-religious clustering of IDPs.³⁰ In the KRI, the main shift has been from Kurdish Sunni to Arab Sunni due to the massive influx of IDPs; in Dahuk, Arab Sunnis have outnumbered Kurdish Sunnis. A similar change was observed also in some locations of Kirkuk, Diyala and Salah al-Din, which might be linked to movements in disputed areas following the handover from the Peshmerga. In some locations of Baghdad and Ninewa, some Sunni communities are now predominantly Shias, whereas in Babylon, Sunnis

from Jurf al-Shakr in the district of Al-Musayab have left and not returned. The impact of the IDP influx on ethno-religious change is evident in the three governorates of Qadissiya, Thi-Qar and Wassit, where some locations that were prevalently Shia are now mostly Sunni.

The comparison between the ethno-religious affiliation of IDPs and that of returnees shows that 81% of returnees and 67% of IDPs in Iraq are Arab Sunnis; therefore, it is prevalently the other ethno-religious groups, such as Yazidis, Christians and Turkmens that remain displaced.

Figure 39: Ethno-religious composition of IDPs and returnees




³⁰ Only changes in the prevalent ethno-religious component were assessed.

³¹ The analysis was conducted on the returnee population for the following ethno-religious groups: Arab Sunnis, Turkmens, Yazidis, Arab Shias, Kurdish and other minorities (including Christians, Kakais and Shabaks). Only locations where at least 70% of the population belongs to the related ethno-religious group were selected for the analysis.

However, compared to May 2017, when the peak of returns of Sunnis was reached, fewer Sunnis have returned home, while more Turkmens (1%–3% of all returns) and other minorities, such as Shabak Shias, Christians and Kakais, have returned to their place of origin (altogether from 1% to 5%). The share of Yazidis, on the other hand, is steady at around 2%.


Figure 40: Ethno-religious composition of returnees (2016, 2017 and 2018)



Ethno-religious groups and main issues³¹

The sub-analysis conducted on the main ethno-religious group of the returnee population shows that movements of Arab Sunnis did not take place in a specific period, as they have been displaced throughout the whole crisis. Nearly all minorities, on the other hand, fled during the summer of 2014 – Turkmens between June and August and nearly all Yazidis, Christians, Kakais and Shabaks in August. Movements of the Kurdish minority can be associated either with the August 2014 wave or with movements in the disputed territories, following the Peshmerga handover in late 2017.


Figure 41: Period of displacement by main ethno-religious group (% of returnees)



An improvement in security in the location of origin is the most reported reason to return, common to all ethno-religious groups except Arab Shias, for which the availability of a shelter to come back to was the key factor. Other reasons are more specific: for instance, Yazidis were encouraged either

by the previous return of other family members (54%) and/or community/religious leaders (24%), while a high share of returns of Shias, Sunnis and Kurdish were pushed by lack of financial means to remain in displacement.


Figure 42: Top reasons to return by main ethno-religious group (% of returnees)



Conditions upon return are very different among ethno-religious groups. Nearly all Yazidis and other minority groups are concerned by the lack of a job/occupation. Yazidis are also more likely to report the need to access to a solution for displacement-related rights violations and reunite with family members separated during displacement. Most Turkmen returnees are also struggling to access a solution for displacement-related

rights violations and around one third live in locations where unemployment, improved safety/security/freedom of movement and equal participation in public affairs is a top issue of concern. The main issue for Arab Sunnis is freedom of movement – around 60% returnees live in locations where they can only move with a special permit from the security actor. This is also the case for 12% of Kurdish returnees.

Figure 43: Conditions upon return by main ethno-religious group (% of returnees)




Vulnerabilities

The most frequently reported vulnerable categories are individuals with disabilities, female-headed households and child-headed households. Overall, between 60% and 70% of returnees live in locations where the presence of at least one of the above groups was reported to be living, although it generally affects few individuals (that is, the ratio between locations hosting few vulnerable individuals and many vulnerable

individuals is around 5 to 1). In IDP locations, persons with disabilities and female-headed households were slightly more likely to be found.

In addition, around 25% of IDPs and returnees live in locations where the presence of minor mothers was reported; around 10% and 5% in locations where the presence of separated children and unaccompanied children, respectively, was found.

Figure 44: Individuals at risk (% of IDPs and returnees living in the location where the issue was reported)



Among governorates of return, the presence of many minor-headed households, individuals with disabilities and female-headed households was more likely to be reported. Around 12% of Anbar returnees also live in locations where

the presence of many minor mothers was found, whereas around 5% of locations in Ninewa reportedly host many unaccompanied and/or separated children.

Figure 45b: Returnees at risk by governorate (% of returnees where the issue was reported as affecting respectively few individuals)






Figure 45a: Returnees at risk by governorate (% of returnees where the issue was reported as affecting respectively many individuals)



The most frequently reported vulnerability for minors is work. Overall, around 70% of returnees and IDPs live in locations where the presence of minors working was reported, although the issue generally affects few individuals (that is, the ratio between locations where the issue affects a few individuals and locations where the issue affects many individuals is around 6 to 1).

In addition, around one quarter of returnees and IDPs live in locations where children are married, children are begging and/or they were born during displacement, and hence do not have birth certificates and other documents. Other issues are very rarely reported.

Figure 46: Minors at risk (% of IDPs and returnees living in the location where the issue was reported)



At governorate level, the presence of minors working and underage marriages were more likely to be reported as affecting many individuals in Anbar and, to a lesser extent, in Ninewa. Around 30% of Kirkuk returnees and around 20% of Anbar and Erbil returnees live in locations where the presence of many children born during displacement and

therefore with no birth certificates was assessed. It should also be noted that minors in Ninewa and Salah al-Din are more likely to be affected by more than one issue – including gender-based violence, death or injuries due to landmines/UXOs, and addictions and recruitment in armed groups.

Figure 47a: Minors at risk (% of returnees living in the location where the issue was reported as affecting respectively many minors)





Figure 47a: Minors at risk (% of returnees living in the location where the issue was reported as affecting respectively few minors)



ANNEXES

Table 1: Type of location

GOVERNORATE	LOCATIONS HOSTING						TOTAL
	IDPs ONLY	RETURNEES ONLY	IDPs + HC	RETURNEES + HC	IDPs + RETURNEES	IDPs + RETURNEES + HC	
Anbar	3	164	24	10	10	16	227
Babylon	0	0	238	0	0	4	242
Baghdad	0	62	491	14	0	10	577
Basrah	1	0	71	0	0	162	234
Dahuk	1	0	127	0	0	5	133
Diyala	24	178	156	7	15	1	381
Erbil	14	19	139	0	0	2	174
Kerbala	10	0	170	0	0	0	180
Kirkuk	1	22	27	66	0	42	158
Missan	0	0	5	0	0	81	86
Muthanna	0	0	18	0	0	28	46
Najaf	0	0	99	0	0	0	99
Ninewa	42	249	131	33	125	42	622
Qadissiya	0	0	136	0	0	6	142
Salah al-Din	4	51	63	13	70	29	230
Sulaymaniyah	1	0	401	0	0	41	443
Thi-Qar	0	0	2	0	0	77	79
Wassit	1	0	123	0	0	0	124
Total	102	745	2,421	143	220	546	4,177
North-central	85	726	1,423	143	220	144	2,741
KRI	16	19	667	0	0	48	750
South	1	0	331	0	0	354	686

Table 2: Duration of displacement per governorate of displacement

	OVER 3 YEARS	3 TO 1 YEARS	LESS THAN ONE YEAR	TOTAL
Anbar	9%	46%	46%	100%
Babylon	98%	2%	0%	100%
Baghdad	68%	31%	1%	100%
Basrah	84%	15%	1%	100%
Dahuk	94%	0%	6%	100%
Diyala	89%	4%	7%	100%
Erbil	60%	27%	12%	100%
Kerbala	100%	0%	0%	100%
Kirkuk	43%	46%	11%	100%
Missan	90%	10%	0%	100%
Muthanna	89%	11%	0%	100%
Najaf	100%	0%	0%	100%
Ninewa	22%	73%	5%	100%
Qadissiya	99%	1%	0%	100%
Salah al-Din	46%	49%	5%	100%
Sulaymaniyah	62%	21%	17%	100%
Thi-Qar	95%	5%	0%	100%
Wassit	95%	5%	0%	100%
Total	54%	38%	8%	100%

Table 3: Location of displacement per governorate of origin

	GOVERNORATE OF ORIGIN									TOTAL
	ANBAR	BABYLON	BAGHDAD	DIYALA	ERBIL	DAHUK	KIRKUK	NINEWA	SALAH AL-DIN	
Intra-governorate	29%	42%	2%	59%	100%	100%	49%	51%	56%	48%
North-Central	29%	30%	8%	10%	0%	0%	25%	7%	17%	13%
KRI	41%	28%	87%	30%	0%		24%	38%	25%	36%
South	1%	1%	3%	1%	0%		2%	4%	1%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 4: Long term intentions of IDPs per governorate of displacement

	RETURN (VOLUNTARY)	RETURN (INVOLUNTARY)	STAY (VOLUNTARY)	STAY (INVOLUNTARY)	MOVE TO A THIRD LOCATION WITHIN IRAQ	GO ABROAD	OTHER / UNKNOWN	TOTAL
Anbar	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Babylon	43%	0%	6%	51%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Baghdad	51%	11%	38%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Basrah	1%	0%	81%	4%	0%	0%	14%	100%
Dahuk	66%	1%	17%	0%	0%	2%	14%	100%
Diyala	76%	0%	2%	21%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Erbil	90%	0%	10%	0%	0%	1%	0%	100%
Kerbala	65%	2%	32%	2%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Kirkuk	70%	0%	29%	1%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Missan	11%	1%	85%	4%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Muthanna	30%	0%	53%	11%	0%	0%	7%	100%
Najaf	95%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Ninewa	87%	0%	5%	1%	1%	1%	6%	100%
Qadissiya	91%	0%	9%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Salah al-Din	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Sulaymaniyah	5%	0%	10%	86%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Thi-Qar	71%	0%	28%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Wassit	81%	3%	8%	7%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Total	73%	1%	12%	10%	0%	1%	3%	100%
KRI	61%	0%	12%	21%	0%	1%	5%	100%
North-central	81%	1%	12%	4%	0%	0%	2%	100%
South	74%	0%	23%	1%	0%	0%	2%	100%
Total	73%	1%	12%	10%	0%	1%	3%	100%

Table 5: Long term intentions of IDPs per governorate of origin (only for locations where at least 70% of IDPs are originally from the governorate)

	RETURN TO THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN (VOLUNTARILY)	RETURN TO THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN (INVOLUNTARILY)	STAY IN THE CURRENT LOCATION (VOLUNTARILY)	STAY IN THE CURRENT LOCATION (INVOLUNTARILY, THEY HAVE NO OTHER CHOICES)	GO ABROAD	UN-KNOWN	TOTAL
Anbar	43%	5%	52%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Babylon	1%	0%	16%	83%	0%	0%	100%
Baghdad	0%	0%	95%	5%	0%	0%	100%
Diyala	74%	0%	26%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Kirkuk	44%	0%	55%	2%	0%	0%	100%
Ninewa	19%	0%	74%	7%	0%	1%	100%
Salah al-Din	80%	0%	18%	2%	0%	0%	100%

Table 6: Obstacles to return per governorate of displacement

	NO INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF ORIGIN	THE AREA OF ORIGIN IS INSECURE / UNSAFE	FEAR DUE TO THE CHANGED ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION	SECURITY FORCES DO NOT ALLOW A RETURN	HOUSE IS DESTROYED	HOUSE IS INHABITED		LACK OF MONEY	FEAR TO LOSE AID/HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	LACK OF DOCUMENTS/UNABLE TO REPLACE DOCUMENTS	NO JOB OPPORTUNITIES AT ORIGIN	LACK OF PUBLIC SERVICES	OTHER
Anbar	0%	9%	0%	71%	77%	0%		36%	3%	2%	48%	23%	0%
Babylon	0%	19%	20%	4%	58%	0%		34%	21%	0%	9%	0%	41%
Baghdad	9%	9%	2%	7%	90%	1%		74%	11%	1%	85%	0%	0%
Basrah	0%	0%	12%	0%	0%	0%		100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Dahuk	5%	42%	76%	11%	68%	11%		5%	22%	0%	28%	0%	0%
Diyala	1%	5%	9%	91%	87%	0%		11%	0%	0%	85%	0%	0%
Erbil	0%	37%	49%	1%	48%	2%		11%	45%	0%	40%	4%	0%
Kerbala	2%	10%	23%	0%	86%	0%		79%	14%	1%	74%	0%	2%
Kirkuk	0%	96%	3%	1%	72%	0%		16%	0%	0%	13%	0%	0%
Missan	75%	8%	0%	0%	100%	0%		0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Muthanna	0%	49%	0%	0%	88%	0%		3%	0%	0%	8%	0%	2%
Najaf	41%	14%	14%	0%	50%	0%		43%	4%	17%	27%	0%	1%
Ninewa	2%	23%	24%	6%	91%	0%		23%	6%	1%	67%	31%	0%
Qadissiya	0%	22%	5%	0%	93%	1%		36%	1%	1%	70%	0%	2%
Salah al-Din	4%	71%	8%	42%	54%	0%		0%	31%	2%	76%	7%	0%
Sulaymaniyah	0%	97%	11%	3%	65%	0%		0%	0%	0%	29%	0%	0%
Thi-Qar	5%	67%	41%	0%	82%	19%		0%	13%	0%	5%	0%	0%
Wassit	0%	80%	48%	2%	91%	1%		22%	7%	1%	36%	0%	0%
Total	3%	40%	27%	16%	71%	2%		19%	18%	1%	54%	11%	1%
KRI	2%	40%	59%	5%	56%	5%		9%	35%	0%	35%	3%	0%
North-central	3%	41%	14%	22%	78%	0%		23%	12%	1%	64%	15%	1%
South	27%	20%	13%	0%	64%	2%		37%	4%	11%	38%	0%	1%
Total	3%	40%	27%	16%	71%	2%		19%	18%	1%	54%	11%	1%

Table 7: Obstacles to return per governorate of origin (only for locations where at least 70% of IDPs are originally from the governorate)

	NO INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION AT ORIGIN	THE AREA OF RETURN IS INSECURE/UNSAFE DUE TO ONGOING CONFLICT, UXO, LANDMINES, PMF ETC	FEAR AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGED ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE PLACE OF ORIGIN	SECURITY FORCES IN THE AREA OF ORIGIN DO NOT ALLOW A RETURN	HOUSE IN PLACE OF ORIGIN IS DESTROYED	HOUSE IN PLACE OF ORIGIN IS INHABITED		LACK OF MONEY TO PAY FOR TRIP BACK HOME	FEAR TO LOSE AID / HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	LACK OF DOCUMENTS / UNABLE TO REPLACE DOCUMENTS	NO JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN RETURN AREA	LACK OF PUBLIC SERVICES	OTHER (SPECIFY)	UNKNOWN
Anbar	4%	20%	6%	17%	77%	1%		52%	11%	1%	74%	3%	4%	0%
Babylon	42%	17%	17%	100%	75%	0%		8%	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%	0%
Baghdad	0%	0%	50%	0%	50%	0%		50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Diyala	1%	2%	12%	93%	80%	0%		16%	0%	0%	86%	0%	0%	0%
Kirkuk	0%	58%	21%	9%	40%	0%		12%	21%	0%	47%	5%	5%	0%
Ninewa	3%	29%	24%	5%	78%	2%		38%	12%	2%	49%	9%	7%	0%
Salah al-Din	6%	63%	10%	40%	58%	1%		5%	21%	3%	74%	7%	0%	0%

Table 8: Reasons to stay per governorate of displacement

	THE LOCATION IS SAFE	AVAILABILITY OF HOUSING	AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES	AVAILABILITY OF JOBS	AVAILABILITY OF ASSISTANCE	PRESENCE OF EXTENDED FAMILY / RELATIVES / FRIENDS	SAME RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC OR ETHNIC COMPOSITION		ENCOURAGED BY COMMUNITY / RELIGIOUS LEADERS	THE LOCATION OF ORIGIN IS UNSAFE (PMF, CHANGED ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION)	BLOCKED RETURNS (INHIBITED BY SECURITY FORCES)	INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES TO RESETTLE	NO MEANS TO RETURN	NOTHING LEFT AT ORIGIN	MOST FAMILY / RELATIVES / FRIENDS LEFT AT ORIGIN
Babylon	10%	13%	0%	0%	0%	30%	2%		0%	5%	95%	0%	47%	13%	0%
Baghdad	14%	4%	80%	14%	1%	17%	0%		0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	84%	0%
Basrah	100%	7%	1%	1%	0%	67%	0%		0%	19%	0%	0%	1%	59%	0%
Dahuk	92%	11%	88%	1%	0%	13%	3%		0%	65%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Diyala	91%	10%	31%	0%	0%	3%	3%		1%	11%	55%	0%	0%	83%	1%
Erbil	52%	85%	59%	10%	10%	0%	0%		0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	77%	2%
Kerbala	74%	13%	1%	8%	1%	63%	41%		0%	18%	8%	1%	4%	11%	4%
Kirkuk	94%	20%	22%	0%	0%	4%	0%		0%	27%	0%	3%	74%	49%	0%
Missan	66%	77%	1%	83%	7%	38%	0%		0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Muthanna	86%	9%	0%	5%	0%	41%	7%		0%	64%	0%	0%	7%	35%	0%
Najaf	100%	36%	50%	0%	0%	0%	1%		0%	43%	0%	0%	21%	48%	0%
Ninewa	76%	52%	28%	0%	0%	24%	15%		0%	44%	0%	0%	5%	12%	11%
Qadisiya	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	62%	83%		0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	47%	0%
Salah al-Din	50%	58%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%		0%	66%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Sulaymaniyah	99%	9%	25%	3%	0%	1%	0%		0%	75%	6%	0%	3%	33%	1%
Thi-Qar	16%	15%	4%	4%	9%	9%	5%		0%	9%	0%	0%	79%	75%	77%
Wassit	100%	6%	17%	0%	0%	0%	23%		0%	71%	0%	0%	0%	77%	0%
Total	77%	18%	38%	5%	1%	11%	3%		0%	43%	9%	0%	16%	41%	1%
KRI	92%	18%	41%	3%	1%	3%	1%		0%	65%	4%	0%	2%	32%	1%
North-central	56%	17%	37%	5%	0%	18%	6%		0%	17%	17%	1%	35%	52%	2%
South	86%	23%	6%	16%	2%	48%	8%		0%	19%	0%	0%	9%	46%	6%
Total	77%	18%	38%	5%	1%	11%	3%		0%	43%	9%	0%	16%	41%	1%

Table 9: Reasons to stay per governorate of origin (only for locations where at least 70% of IDPs are originally from the governorate)

	THE LOCATION IS SAFE	AVAILABILITY OF HOUSING	AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES	AVAILABILITY OF JOBS	AVAILABILITY OF ASSISTANCE	PRESENCE OF EXTENDED FAMILY / RELATIVES / FRIENDS	SAME RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC OR ETHNIC COMPOSITION		ENCOURAGED BY COMMUNITY / RELIGIOUS LEADERS	THE LOCATION OF ORIGIN IS UNSAFE (PMF, CHANGED ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION)	BLOCKED RETURNS (INHIBITED BY SECURITY FORCES)	INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES TO RESETTLE	NO MEANS TO RETURN	NOTHING LEFT AT ORIGIN	MOST FAMILY / RELATIVES / FRIENDS LEFT AT ORIGIN
Anbar	64%	10%	36%	6%	3%	34%	2%		0%	23%	0%	0%	12%	61%	2%
Babylon	25%	7%	3%	1%	0%	41%	9%		0%	14%	79%	0%	35%	17%	1%
Baghdad	83%	33%	11%	22%	6%	33%	6%		0%	22%	6%	0%	6%	44%	0%
Diyala	91%	11%	15%	4%	0%	9%	6%		2%	35%	9%	0%	9%	37%	2%
Kirkuk	77%	29%	6%	18%	3%	62%	6%		0%	24%	0%	3%	12%	15%	0%
Ninewa	81%	18%	25%	11%	4%	30%	7%		0%	28%	0%	1%	3%	34%	4%
Salah al-Din	85%	20%	12%	17%	2%	42%	2%		0%	18%	7%	0%	0%	52%	0%

Table 10: Reasons to return per governorate of origin/return

	THE LOCATION IS SAFE	AVAILABILITY OF HOUSING	AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES	AVAILABILITY OF JOBS	AVAILABILITY OF ASSISTANCE	TO JOIN FAMILY MEMBERS ALREADY RETURNED	INCENTIVES TO RETURN BY HUMANITARIAN ACTORS	INCENTIVES/SUPPORT TO RETURN BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES		ENCOURAGEMENT TO RETURN BY COMMUNITY/ RELIGIOUS LEADERS	NO FINANCIAL MEANS TO REMAIN IN DISPLACEMENT	EVICTED (PRIVATE OWNERS)	EVICTED (GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES)	WORSENING OF SECURITY SITUATION IN DISPLACEMENT	WORSENING OF LIVELIHOOD/ SERVICES IN DISPLACEMENT	NEGATIVE INCENTIVES	OTHER
Anbar	91%	54%	33%	5%	25%	15%	4%	24%		2%	26%	0%	0%	2%	16%	0%	0%
Baghdad	98%	58%	1%	0%	8%	8%	4%	0%		35%	58%	0%	6%	2%	4%	0%	0%
Dahuk	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%		100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Diyala	92%	73%	5%	1%	1%	2%	0%	0%		12%	66%	1%	1%	4%	22%	0%	0%
Erbil	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	53%	0%	4%		9%	16%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Kirkuk	99%	76%	18%	0%	5%	7%	0%	5%		5%	37%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
Ninewa	93%	74%	25%	4%	1%	15%	0%	0%		3%	45%	1%	0%	1%	10%	0%	0%
Salah al-Din	92%	50%	3%	19%	1%	25%	3%	2%		14%	34%	0%	0%	1%	3%	0%	2%

Table 11: Critical infrastructure and access to electricity and tap water per governorate of displacement (% of IDPs living in locations where the infrastructure was destroyed/never there/mostly not functioning and/or less than 25% of residents have access to electricity and/or tap water)

	SEWERAGE	WASTE MANAGEMENT / DISPOSAL	CELL PHONE COVERAGE	ROAD TO DISTRICT / PROVINCE CENTRE	ELECTRICITY	TAP WATER
Anbar	97%	97%	14%	65%	12%	19%
Babylon	93%	77%	42%	54%	0%	0%
Baghdad	63%	69%	1%	46%	0%	2%
Basrah	97%	97%	1%	91%	0%	0%
Dahuk	27%	20%	0%	20%	0%	1%
Diyala	74%	68%	4%	78%	0%	1%
Erbil	0%	14%	0%	9%	0%	0%
Kerbala	77%	82%	13%	39%	0%	2%
Kirkuk	86%	100%	0%	36%	0%	6%
Missan	6%	100%	0%	5%	0%	0%
Muthanna	85%	78%	0%	77%	0%	0%
Najaf	91%	95%	11%	42%	1%	4%
Ninewa	55%	66%	5%	46%	4%	6%
Qadissiya	66%	80%	1%	68%	0%	0%
Salah al-Din	93%	81%	21%	56%	5%	3%
Sulaymaniyah	19%	1%	0%	35%	0%	5%
Thi-Qar	79%	74%	22%	75%	0%	0%
Wassit	79%	79%	48%	78%	0%	0%
Total	52%	54%	6%	39%	2%	3%
KRI	15%	13%	0%	19%	0%	2%
North-central	73%	76%	10%	50%	3%	5%
South	81%	90%	7%	56%	1%	2%
Total	52%	54%	6%	39%	2%	3%

Table 12: Access to main basic services of IDPs (multiple response possible)

	DRINKING WATER	FOOD	HOUSE-HOLD ITEMS OR NFI	HEALTH	SHELTER OR HOUSING	EDUCATION	REMOVAL OF UXO / IEDS	OTHER	NO NEED MENTIONED
Anbar	76%	62%	39%	59%	46%	11%	0%	0%	0%
Babylon	3%	4%	79%	43%	60%	30%	1%	0%	1%
Baghdad	11%	36%	93%	17%	58%	7%	0%	0%	2%
Basrah	0%	44%	85%	61%	79%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Dahuk	1%	44%	50%	64%	58%	9%	0%	12%	0%
Diyala	12%	35%	95%	44%	65%	5%	2%	35%	0%
Erbil	1%	16%	44%	35%	33%	3%	0%	50%	6%
Kerbala	20%	6%	63%	60%	45%	5%	0%	2%	2%
Kirkuk	10%	72%	64%	38%	43%	10%	0%	0%	3%
Missan	0%	94%	85%	2%	54%	4%	0%	39%	0%
Muthanna	54%	50%	51%	2%	53%	0%	0%	1%	3%
Najaf	29%	26%	76%	41%	75%	4%	0%	0%	1%
Ninewa	18%	70%	63%	61%	29%	20%	0%	5%	2%
Qadissiya	4%	1%	71%	88%	37%	1%	0%	11%	0%
Salah al-Din	22%	56%	69%	51%	56%	4%	0%	4%	0%
Sulaymaniyah	3%	98%	91%	14%	1%	4%	0%	71%	0%
Thi-Qar	0%	0%	95%	26%	99%	18%	0%	2%	0%
Wassit	17%	57%	96%	52%	77%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Total	12%	51%	66%	46%	42%	9%	0%	18%	2%
KRI	1%	46%	57%	40%	34%	5%	0%	41%	3%
North-central	18%	56%	71%	49%	45%	12%	0%	5%	1%
South	17%	25%	77%	50%	67%	4%	0%	5%	1%
Total	12%	51%	66%	46%	42%	9%	0%	18%	2%

Table 13: Access to main recovery services of IDPs (multiple response possible)

	ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT AND LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES	ACCESS TO AND REPLACEMENT OF PERSONAL AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION	ACCESS TO SOLUTIONS FOR DISPLACEMENT-RELATED RIGHTS VIOLATIONS	REUNIFICATION WITH FAMILY MEMBERS SEPARATED DURING DISPLACEMENT	IMPROVED SAFETY, SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH THE RESIDENT POPULATION	OTHER	NO NEED MENTIONED
Anbar	97%	67%	48%	21%	37%	0%	0%	0%
Babylon	99%	9%	58%	16%	2%	21%	0%	0%
Baghdad	99%	28%	42%	2%	10%	13%	0%	0%
Basrah	98%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Dahuk	100%	2%	16%	1%	0%	14%	7%	0%
Diyala	99%	35%	26%	4%	27%	10%	4%	0%
Erbil	99%	3%	11%	0%	0%	4%	10%	0%
Kerbala	54%	36%	39%	27%	4%	3%	1%	9%
Kirkuk	100%	28%	6%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Missan	100%	0%	3%	1%	0%	2%	50%	0%
Muthanna	86%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	7%
Najaf	100%	2%	26%	0%	52%	31%	0%	0%
Ninewa	98%	31%	56%	4%	5%	5%	2%	0%
Qadisiya	100%	4%	17%	1%	0%	20%	21%	0%
Salah al-Din	98%	23%	44%	5%	26%	3%	1%	0%
Sulaymaniyah	95%	45%	22%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Thi-Qar	94%	27%	62%	39%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Wassit	99%	44%	80%	1%	10%	16%	0%	1%
Total	98%	22%	32%	3%	8%	6%	4%	0%
KRI	99%	13%	16%	0%	0%	7%	7%	0%
North-central	97%	30%	43%	5%	12%	6%	1%	0%
South	99%	4%	21%	3%	26%	20%	7%	0%
Total	98%	22%	32%	3%	8%	6%	4%	0%

Table 14: Employment issues of IDPs

	LOCATIONS HOSTING					TOTAL	MOST IDPs ARE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE
	YES, ALL / MANY	YES MOST	NO	DON'T KNOW			
Anbar	56%	44%	0%	0%	100%	Yes	
Babylon	87%	9%	4%	0%	100%	40%	
Baghdad	86%	14%	0%	0%	100%	35%	
Basrah	4%	47%	25%	24%	100%	74%	
Dahuk	41%	50%	4%	5%	100%	9%	
Diyala	73%	15%	0%	12%	100%	33%	
Erbil	65%	32%	2%	1%	100%	17%	
Kerbala	15%	65%	15%	6%	100%	63%	
Kirkuk	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%	86%	
Missan	94%	2%	4%	0%	100%	86%	
Muthanna	10%	2%	4%	84%	100%	99%	
Najaf	8%	47%	44%	0%	100%	22%	
Ninewa	61%	35%	2%	2%	100%	50%	
Qadissiya	37%	59%	4%	0%	100%	18%	
Salah al-Din	82%	18%	0%	0%	100%	20%	
Sulaymaniyah	20%	74%	2%	4%	100%	34%	
Thi-Qar	33%	59%	7%	0%	100%	33%	
Wassit	79%	12%	8%	0%	100%	53%	
Total	61%	34%	3%	3%	100%	40%	
KRI	45%	49%	3%	3%	100%	43%	
North-central	73%	23%	2%	2%	100%	40%	
South	20%	47%	27%	6%	100%	48%	
Total	61%	34%	3%	3%	100%	34%	

Table 15: Availability and quality of food for IDPs

	FOOD IS SUFFICIENT	ACCESS TO FOOD IS RELIABLE
Anbar	79%	72%
Babylon	91%	95%
Baghdad	81%	66%
Basrah	0%	0%
Dahuk	90%	88%
Diyala	45%	46%
Erbil	100%	100%
Kerbala	27%	40%
Kirkuk	53%	47%
Missan	100%	100%
Muthanna	37%	34%
Najaf	67%	77%
Ninewa	50%	48%
Qadissiya	11%	11%
Salah al-Din	56%	56%
Sulaymaniyah	100%	100%
Thi-Qar	100%	100%
Wassit	68%	53%
Total	66%	69%
KRI	98%	96%
North-central	63%	54%
South	39%	54%
Total	66%	69%

Table 16: Shelter type of IDPs

	RELIGIOUS BUILDING	UNFINISHED / ABANDONED BUILDING	SCHOOL BUILDING	INFORMAL SETTLEMENT	OTHER FORMAL SETTLEMENT		HOST COMMUNITY	RENTED HOUSE	OWN PROPERTY	OCCUPIED PRIVATE RESIDENCE	HOTEL/MOTEL	TOTAL
Anbar	0%	0%	1%	6%	1%		84%	8%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Babylon	4%	1%	0%	4%	0%		7%	81%	0%	2%	1%	100%
Baghdad	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%		43%	55%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Basrah	0%	0%	0%	6%	2%		26%	67%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Dahuk	0%	17%	0%	8%	0%		10%	64%	0%	0%	1%	100%
Diyala	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%		22%	72%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Erbil	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%		4%	95%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Kerbala	41%	0%	0%	0%	0%		1%	57%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Kirkuk	0%	1%	0%	8%	0%		4%	86%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Missan	1%	0%	2%	6%	0%		42%	48%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Muthanna	2%	11%	0%	0%	0%		30%	58%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Najaf	21%	0%	0%	0%	0%		0%	79%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Ninewa	0%	5%	0%	1%	0%		29%	63%	0%	1%	0%	100%
Qadissiya	25%	3%	0%	0%	12%		20%	39%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Salah al-Din	0%	15%	2%	12%	3%		12%	56%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Sulaymaniyah	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%		1%	93%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Thi-Qar	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%		37%	62%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Wassit	27%	2%	0%	1%	0%		8%	63%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Total	2%	6%	0%	4%	1%		16%	70%	0%	0%	0%	100%
KRI	0%	6%	0%	4%	0%		5%	83%	0%	0%	0%	100%
North-central	2%	6%	1%	4%	1%		23%	63%	0%	1%	0%	100%
South	16%	1%	0%	1%	3%		13%	65%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Total	2%	6%	0%	4%	1%		16%	70%	0%	0%	0%	100%

Table 17: Main sources of information of IDPs (multiple response possible)

	TELEVISION	PRINT MATERIAL (BANNERS / POSTERS / PAMPHLETS)	SOCIAL MEDIA	WORD OF MOUTH	INTERNET (NEWS WEBSITES)		LOCAL AUTHORITIES	COMMUNITY LEADERS	RADIO	NEWSPAPERS	MOBILE PHONES (SMS)
Anbar	41%	0%	56%	11%	10%		29%	17%	6%	0%	31%
Babylon	26%	0%	63%	27%	26%		19%	0%	0%	0%	9%
Baghdad	7%	0%	70%	20%	2%		36%	14%	0%	0%	51%
Basrah	79%	0%	69%	3%	16%		0%	0%	5%	0%	24%
Dahuk	86%	0%	34%	6%	30%		3%	0%	0%	0%	42%
Diyala	54%	0%	43%	29%	12%		24%	18%	0%	0%	19%
Erbil	50%	0%	86%	32%	21%		0%	2%	0%	0%	10%
Kerbala	59%	9%	59%	32%	37%		2%	0%	0%	0%	3%
Kirkuk	44%	0%	65%	77%	2%		3%	9%	0%	0%	0%
Missan	100%	0%	11%	0%	19%		2%	1%	0%	0%	68%
Muthanna	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%		0%	0%	0%	0%	99%
Najaf	27%	0%	49%	50%	1%		0%	1%	0%	0%	31%
Ninewa	68%	0%	21%	29%	10%		6%	8%	2%	0%	55%
Qadisiya	45%	0%	87%	0%	9%		0%	0%	1%	1%	58%
Salah al-Din	50%	0%	59%	40%	9%		11%	13%	0%	0%	18%
Sulaymaniyah	65%	0%	40%	48%	4%		0%	0%	0%	0%	39%
Thi-Qar	13%	0%	28%	9%	1%		54%	68%	0%	0%	27%
Wassit	98%	0%	81%	3%	9%		10%	0%	1%	0%	0%
Total	56%	0%	50%	32%	13%		8%	6%	1%	0%	31%
KRI	67%	0%	56%	26%	20%		1%	1%	0%	0%	29%
North-central	51%	0%	47%	35%	9%		12%	10%	1%	0%	33%
South	40%	0%	56%	26%	6%		4%	5%	1%	0%	40%
Total	56%	0%	50%	32%	13%		8%	6%	1%	0%	31%

Table 18: At risk IDPs (% of IDPs living in locations where issue was reported)

	UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN		SEPARATED CHILDREN		MINOR-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS			MENTALLY OR PHYSICALLY CHALLENGED IDPS		FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS		UNDERAGE (UNDER 18) MOTHERS WITH BABIES	
	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW		YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW
Anbar	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.2%	27.1%	44.7%		27.1%	41.8%	28.7%	45.9%	25.2%	11.3%
Babylon	0.0%	1.7%	0.6%	21.0%	1.2%	77.0%		0.5%	55.3%	0.5%	66.3%	0.0%	20.2%
Baghdad	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%	38.4%		2.5%	43.1%	2.7%	51.9%	0.0%	10.4%
Basrah	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%	1.4%		0.0%	10.7%	1.5%	33.3%	0.0%	1.3%
Dahuk	0.0%	14.9%	0.0%	8.6%	0.0%	35.6%		13.1%	62.3%	0.0%	61.9%	0.0%	22.0%
Diyala	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.5%	21.3%	39.7%		17.0%	57.0%	10.8%	68.2%	7.0%	30.4%
Erbil	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	40.5%		1.4%	84.6%	0.0%	82.8%	0.0%	23.9%
Kerbala	0.3%	13.1%	0.0%	38.2%	0.5%	60.5%		21.8%	47.4%	25.6%	48.0%	0.4%	34.3%
Kirkuk	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%	2.2%	22.9%	66.1%		0.0%	96.5%	0.0%	90.1%	0.0%	60.6%
Missan	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	51.3%	1.2%	60.8%	0.0%	0.0%
Muthanna	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	22.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Najaf	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.9%	17.5%	16.9%		1.7%	17.6%	1.0%	25.3%	3.2%	30.4%
Ninewa	0.9%	8.6%	1.3%	8.4%	6.1%	54.1%		3.8%	62.9%	4.1%	26.9%	0.9%	8.8%
Qadisiya	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	1.6%	2.9%	57.9%		0.0%	56.5%	0.0%	33.7%	0.0%	7.7%
Salah al-Din	0.0%	11.2%	0.0%	11.4%	7.3%	79.2%		10.8%	87.1%	22.8%	64.5%	1.8%	50.8%
Sulaymaniyah	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	10.7%		0.4%	51.7%	0.0%	70.9%	0.0%	0.4%
Thi-Qar	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	12.1%	5.3%	47.3%		0.0%	33.0%	0.0%	52.2%	0.0%	1.4%
Wassit	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	56.1%		0.0%	44.4%	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	37.3%
Total	0.2%	5.6%	0.3%	6.9%	5.8%	47.4%		6.0%	66.4%	5.4%	58.3%	1.2%	23.5%
KRI	0.0%	5.5%	0.0%	4.9%	0.0%	31.5%		5.4%	68.5%	0.0%	72.3%	0.0%	17.5%
North-central	0.3%	6.0%	0.5%	8.3%	9.0%	58.6%		6.6%	67.7%	9.0%	51.8%	2.0%	27.5%
South	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	5.6%	9.9%	24.7%		0.9%	28.2%	0.8%	31.1%	1.6%	17.0%
Total	0.2%	5.6%	0.3%	6.9%	5.8%	47.4%		6.0%	66.4%	5.4%	58.3%	1.2%	23.5%

Table 19: At risk minors - IDPs (% of IDPs living in locations where issue was reported)

	CHILD WORK / LABOR		CHILD MARRIAGE		DRUG USE		ALCOHOL ADDICTION			RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED FORCES AND GROUPS		RECRUITMENT FOR BEGGING		DEATH OR INJURIES BECAUSE OF LANDMINES OR UXOS		GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TRAFFICKING, SEXUAL VIOLENCE, HARMFUL TRADITIONAL PRACTICES)		CHILDREN BORN DURING DISPLACEMENT AND BIRTH CERTIFICATE NOT REGISTERED	
	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW		YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW	YES, MANY	YES, FEW
Anbar	18.4%	53.8%	2.0%	41.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.6%	27.4%	42.8%
Babylon	5.7%	75.6%	1.6%	29.4%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	11.8%		0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	28.5%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	50.7%	0.7%	17.9%
Baghdad	1.3%	44.3%	0.0%	10.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.5%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	23.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.8%	0.0%	1.2%
Basrah	1.4%	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	1.9%		0.0%	0.8%	2.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	3.0%
Dahuk	0.0%	77.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	49.9%	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	17.8%	0.6%	10.3%
Diyala	17.8%	39.3%	7.0%	27.9%	0.0%	2.7%	0.0%	24.3%		0.0%	1.4%	1.8%	28.2%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	27.4%	11.2%	17.4%
Erbil	1.1%	41.4%	0.0%	23.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	2.1%	3.9%
Kerbala	24.7%	47.8%	21.8%	7.3%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	2.7%	4.9%	46.8%	0.0%	1.5%	0.2%	39.2%	1.9%	11.3%
Kirkuk	23.8%	71.4%	0.0%	63.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	74.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	0.2%	32.1%
Missan	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Muthanna	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Najaf	15.8%	59.0%	3.0%	24.3%	0.3%	8.2%	0.3%	2.2%		0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	63.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.5%	0.0%	20.8%
Ninewa	13.2%	55.9%	1.0%	3.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.7%	8.5%		0.0%	7.3%	8.0%	40.1%	0.0%	4.6%	0.1%	8.5%	2.6%	18.4%
Qadissiya	3.2%	74.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	38.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%
Salah al-Din	14.8%	81.1%	0.0%	33.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.9%		0.0%	5.9%	11.1%	50.0%	0.0%	2.5%	2.9%	27.8%	11.0%	67.3%
Sulaymaniyah	0.8%	72.8%	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%	17.8%
Thi-Qar	5.3%	47.1%	0.0%	15.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	20.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.0%
Wassit	54.7%	45.1%	0.7%	60.3%	0.0%	6.9%	0.0%	3.3%		0.0%	0.7%	5.2%	30.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	59.2%	0.0%	26.5%
Total	9.4%	60.7%	1.1%	17.8%	0.0%	0.7%	0.2%	7.4%		0.0%	2.5%	4.2%	35.3%	0.0%	1.5%	0.4%	12.5%	3.3%	21.0%
KRI	0.6%	62.2%	0.0%	10.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	21.7%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	7.2%	1.1%	9.6%
North-central	14.7%	60.6%	1.7%	22.7%	0.0%	0.8%	0.2%	8.0%		0.0%	4.2%	7.0%	43.0%	0.0%	2.4%	0.6%	16.3%	4.9%	28.6%
South	9.1%	49.1%	1.5%	13.1%	0.1%	4.5%	0.1%	1.3%		0.0%	0.2%	0.9%	41.5%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	3.8%	0.0%	11.2%
Total	9.4%	60.7%	1.1%	17.8%	0.0%	0.7%	0.2%	7.4%		0.0%	2.5%	4.2%	35.3%	0.0%	1.5%	0.4%	12.5%	3.3%	21.0%

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