


A REGION ON THE MOVE 2022: EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA



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This publication was made possible through support provided by the European Union-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa (EU-IOM JI), the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), the United States Department of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), and the IOM Migration Resource Allocation Committee (MiRAC). The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the United States or IOM.

Publisher: International Organization for Migration
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This publication was issued without formal editing by IOM.

Design: We2 – www.we2.co

Copy editing: Zeina Wairoa

Required citation: International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2023. *A Region on the Move 2022: East and Horn of Africa*. IOM, Nairobi.

ISBN 978-92-9268-657-4 (PDF)

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A REGION ON THE MOVE 2022: EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA



Project funded by the European Union
Project implemented by IOM



MiRAC
MIGRATION RESOURCE
ALLOCATION COMMITTEE



FOREWORD

Migration has brought about remarkable positive contributions to the East and Horn of Africa region, including the transfer of skills, knowledge and remittances, and the creation of diverse and vibrant communities. However, the migratory landscape of this region is one of continuously shifting challenges, dynamics and needs. In the past year, drivers such as unsettled conflicts, unprecedented drought conditions and socioeconomic difficulties continued to fuel high levels of internal displacement and cross-border movements, further exacerbating vulnerabilities and inequalities. The recent humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Sudan has dramatically impacted the stability of the whole region, pushing millions of individuals – Sudanese and third-country nationals – to flee within and outside the country. The complexity of the East and Horn of Africa context contributes considerably to defining this region as a conflict, climate and hunger hotspot that will require much-needed attention and careful monitoring through 2023 and beyond.

While migration and humanitarian needs in the East and Horn of Africa have increased in recent years, traditional funding sources have become scarcer and their requirements more stringent. A lack of assistance could lead to heightened protection risks and vulnerabilities of the affected populations. Decreased assisted voluntary return support may push migrants to continue their unsafe migratory journeys or return spontaneously along dangerous migration routes, and aggravate tensions with host communities, and as such, stigma, discrimination and xenophobia may rise. Meanwhile, communities affected by climate change will likely be forced to search for humanitarian assistance or alternative livelihoods, and the competition over scarce resources may exacerbate tensions and give rise to localized conflicts. More can be achieved through the collaboration of humanitarian and development actors, with the participation of affected populations.

The region has also witnessed growing collaboration and exchange between governmental actors and partners to promote migrant protection and strengthen response mechanisms, facilitate cross-border collaboration, design a stronger dialogue on labour migration governance and regional integration, and advance a common position on the importance of human mobility in the context of climate change. Strengthening an evidence base on migration and mobility was also part of such joint efforts. Recently, both the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) published their first migration statistics reports – two milestones in shaping a common understanding of regional migration dynamics to inform sound policies, programmes and advocacy. In addition, IOM and other stakeholders gained an expanded understanding of the Southern Route towards South Africa – a corridor that has systematically received less attention in migration dialogues – in the hope of promoting consultation and cooperation across States and enhancing migrant protection services.

In this setting, the mobility dimension of regional integration is one of the most transformative forces of development on the African continent and its subregions. By facilitating the free movement of goods, services and people, regional integration has the potential to catalyse socioeconomic opportunities, move households out of poverty, promote shared prosperity and allow Member States to tackle joint challenges. I am convinced that a more systematic evidence-based analysis of this complex mobility landscape, such as the *A Region on the Move* report series, will be instrumental for advancing coordination and advocacy for the most vulnerable groups, while promoting a regional migration narrative that sheds light on the transformative potential of migration for the socioeconomic development of the region.



Mohammed Abdiker

Regional Director

IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication was written by the Regional Data Hub team at the IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa: Maxwell Aderoh, Davide Bruscoli, Naomi Burnett, Zineb Homman Loudiye, Daniel Ibañez Campos, Chiara Lucchini Gilera, John Muindi Kinuthia, Paul Mburu Kinuthia, Melissa Magalhães, Robert Muthui, Amalraj Nallainathan, Olta Ndoja, Laura Nistri, Benard Onyango Ooko and Iris Perigaud-Grünfeld.

The authors would like to extend special thanks to Mohammed Abdiker, Regional Director for the East and Horn of Africa, and to Justin MacDermott, Senior Regional Policy and Programme Coordinator for the East and Horn of Africa, for their continuous support and guidance. The authors would also like to acknowledge the following IOM colleagues for their valuable inputs and constructive feedback: Merna Abdelazim, Tsion Tadesse Abebe, Hodayi Acar, Waqas Ahmed, Laura Bartolini, Michael Batista, Julia Black, Eliza Clark, Andrea García Borja, Zerihun Hurissa, Nimo Ismail, Genevieve Lavoie, Lisa Lim Ah Ken, Pekka Marjamaki, Mingizem Maru, Benson Mbogani, John McCue, Anne-Laure Mésenge, Khellia Munezero, Nicholas Ochieng, Irene Schoefberger and Asfand Waqar.

The authors are also grateful to Pablo Rojas Coppari and the IOM Research Unit (RES) as well as to Valerie Hagger and the IOM Publications Unit (PUB) for their contribution in finalizing this publication.

ABOUT THE REGIONAL DATA HUB

Established in early 2018 at the IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, the Regional Data Hub (RDH) supports evidence-based, strategic and policy-level discussion on migration through a combination of initiatives. In particular, the RDH uses multiple tools and processes to investigate the migration narrative in the region and gain a more in-depth understanding of the actors, dynamics and risks of migration. These initiatives aim to fill existing gaps by strengthening the regional evidence base on migration, which will further improve policymaking and programming. The RDH strategy is in line with the objectives of the IOM Migration Data Strategy. For more information on the RDH strategy and publications, see <https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/regional-data-hub>.



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GLOSSARY¹

assisted voluntary return and reintegration

Administrative, logistical or financial support, including reintegration assistance, to migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country or country of transit and who decide to return to their country of origin.

asylum-seeker

An individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum-seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every recognized refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.

bilateral labour migration agreements

Agreements concluded between two States, which are legally binding and are essentially concerned with inter-State cooperation on labour migration.

displacement tracking matrix

System to gather and analyse data to disseminate critical multilayered information on the mobility, vulnerabilities, and needs of displaced and mobile populations that enables decision makers and responders to provide these populations with better context-specific assistance.²

flow monitoring registry

A component of the displacement tracking matrix that captures quantitative data about the volume and basic characteristics of populations transiting during observation hours at selected flow monitoring points, such as nationality, gender, age, place of origin, planned destination and key vulnerabilities.³

forced return

The act of returning an individual, against his or her will, to the country of origin, transit or to a third country that

agrees to receive the person, generally carried out on the basis of an administrative or judicial act or decision.

internally displaced persons

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

international migrant

Any person who is outside a State of which he or she is a citizen or national, or, in the case of a stateless person, his or her State of birth or habitual residence. The term includes migrants who intend to move permanently or temporarily, and those who move in a regular or documented manner as well as migrants in irregular situations. For statistical purposes, international migrants refer to the foreign-born population present in a country (or to foreign citizens in cases data on the place of birth were not available and data on the country of citizenship were used instead). Several countries host large refugee populations that are not always covered by population censuses, and in these cases, the international migrant stock includes the number of refugees and asylum-seekers present in a country as reported by international agencies.⁴

irregular migration

Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination.

labour migrant (or migrant worker)

A person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.

1 Definitions of terms in this glossary were taken from the IOM Glossary on Migration (2019), except as noted.

2 Displacement Tracking Matrix Methodological Framework Second Edition (2022).

3 Definition provided by the authors, based on the Displacement Tracking Matrix Methodological Framework Second Edition (2022).

4 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Methodology Report International Migrant Stock 2020 (2020).

mixed migration (or mixed movements)

A movement in which a number of people are travelling together, generally in an irregular manner, using the same routes and means of transport, but for different reasons. People travelling as part of mixed movements have varying needs and profiles and may include asylum-seekers, refugees, trafficked persons, unaccompanied/separated children, and migrants in an irregular situation.

net migration

Net number of migrants in a given period, that is, the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants.

refugee

A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.⁵

remittances

Personal monetary transfers, cross-border or within the same country, made by migrants to individuals or communities with whom the migrant has links.

return migration

In the context of international migration, the movement of persons returning to their country of origin after having moved away from their place of habitual residence and crossed an international border. In the context of internal migration, the movement of persons returning to their place of habitual residence after having moved away from it.

smuggling (of migrants)

The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the irregular entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.

spontaneous return

The voluntary, independent return of a migrant or a group of migrants to their country of origin, usually without the support of States or other international or national assistance.

trafficking in persons

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

transhumance

Seasonal movement of people with their livestock between pastures (typically between mountain and lowland pastures) often over long distances, and sometimes across borders. The term is often used as a synonym of pastoralism.

voluntary humanitarian return

Form of assisted return which is applied in humanitarian settings and often represents a life-saving measure for migrants who are stranded or in detention. Voluntary humanitarian return is accompanied by vulnerability and medical screenings to ensure appropriate safeguards are put in place throughout the whole return and reintegration process.⁶

5 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1 A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol.


6 IOM Return and Reintegration Key Highlights (2021).



Two teenage friends in Kassala in the Sudan who fled from their families in Eritrea to try to cross to Europe. © IOM 2023 / Sari Omer


DATA AT A GLANCE

10 COUNTRIES IN THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA REGION





MAIN MIGRATION CORRIDORS


(950,000 TOTAL MOVEMENTS TRACKED IN THE REGION)




INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS



DISPLACED PERSONS



PEOPLE IN NEED



Source: African Union Institute of Statistics Migration database (25 February 2022); DESA, 2021a; Eurostat, 2023a; Eurostat, 2023b; IDMC, 2023; IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023); IOM Missing Migrants Project database (24 May 2023); IOM Returns from Saudi Arabia database (10 May 2023); IOM, 2022a; IOM, 2022b; IOM, 2023a; IOM, 2023b; IOM, 2023c; UNHCR, 2023; UNOCHA, 2022a; UNOCHA, n.d.a; UNOCHA, n.d.b; UNOCHA, n.d.c; UNOCHA, n.d.d; UNOCHA, n.d.e.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. IDP data for Somalia were the latest available data endorsed by the Somalia National Bureau of Statistics on behalf of the Government as of March 2021. Data on forced returns to Somalia were provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Directorate of Somalia.

INTRODUCTION

Across Africa, most migration takes place *within* the continent, and this is particularly true for sub-Saharan Africa.⁷ In 2022, the migratory landscape in the East and Horn of Africa (EHoA) region remained largely fluid and complex in nature.⁸ While forced migration continued to drive the main movement trends within and across countries, the overall drivers of mobility have become more mixed and inextricably intertwined. By the end of the year, the region hosted a very large population of internally displaced persons (IDPs – 9.6 million) and refugees and asylum-seekers (3.8 million) due to widespread conflict and violence, political persecution, human rights violations, climatic events and harsh environmental conditions.⁹

Most of the international migrant stock hosted in the region is constituted of refugees and asylum-seekers, with refugee movements primarily taking place within the region. As a result, the EHoA hosts a slightly higher number of female than male migrants, which is a unique characteristic compared to other parts of the continent and to global trends. Women and girls tend to represent the largest share of the refugee population, while men and boys tend to dominate labour migration dynamics. Well-established formal and informal labour migration corridors are present across the region, wherein labour demand in destination countries remains the key structural determinant of the mobility landscape. Saudi Arabia, together with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, continues to attract large volumes of migrants, mostly female domestic workers, including through formalized recruitment channels, whereas men are mainly engaged in agriculture and herding and move in an irregular manner. Meanwhile, South Africa continues to shape the migration aspirations of people in search of the “Southern Dream” through an established economic system with successful diasporas that act as both catalyser and safety net for the migrant population. While the full extent of the COVID-19

impact on international migration is still unclear, the EHoA is predicted to have more individuals emigrating from the region than individuals immigrating to the region in the coming years. International migration will continue to affect population growth, yet its contribution will not lead the growth process, which will still be driven by natural change (or the balance of births over deaths).

One of the major events leading global headlines in 2022 was the longest and most severe drought critically affecting parts of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Largely impacting agropastoral communities, the drought devastated their main sources of livelihood and strained their resilience to climate change. New and varied mobility patterns were adopted to cope with this climate shock, including split-household arrangements whereby some members of the same household stayed in the country of origin and some migrated, often at short distance. These new patterns also included involuntary immobility for those with depleted livelihood assets who were unable to move elsewhere. The large-scale impact of the drought was so profound that internal displacements (or flows) caused by disasters in the region more than doubled in the past year, moving from contributing to around 20 per cent of all displacements in 2021 to 50 per cent in 2022.¹⁰ By the end of 2022, 36.6 million people were affected by drought, 2.7 million were displaced and 5.7 million IDPs were living in affected areas.¹¹

In parallel with climate events, conflict and violence also persisted in different parts of the region, mainly across Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan. The signing of the northern Ethiopia peace deal in early November 2022 has brought new hope for reduced tensions and unhindered humanitarian access to the conflict-affected regions of Tigray, Amhara and Afar.¹² Despite this step towards peace and stability, tensions continued in other

7 de Haas et al., 2020.

8 IOM defines the EHoA as the region covering the 10 countries of Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.

9 IDMC, 2023; IOM, 2022a; IOM, 2022b; IOM, 2023a; IOM, 2023b; IOM, 2023c; UNHCR, 2023. IDP data for Somalia were the latest available data endorsed by the Somalia National Bureau of Statistics on behalf of the Government as of March 2021.

10 IDMC, 2023.

11 IOM, 2022b; IOM, 2022c; IOM, 2022d; IOM, 2023a; IOM, 2023b; IOM, 2023d; IOM, 2023e; UNHCR, n.d.a.

12 United Nations, 2022a.

parts of Ethiopia while national and localized conflicts were widespread in Somalia and South Sudan, fuelling displacement and driving humanitarian needs through 2022. The volatility of the conflict environment in the region and in neighbouring countries characterizes the EHoA as a critical humanitarian context where compounding crises are making resources scarcer to meet the needs of the affected populations. In 2022, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in the region reached 43.8 million, a record high that represents 28 per cent of the corresponding regional population.¹³

Conflict and climate events, along with the macroeconomic challenges faced by the region, have not reduced the will to migrate. On the contrary, in 2022, a major shift characterized by the full resumption of mixed migration trends across key migratory routes in the region was observed, thus marking the end of the impact of COVID-19 on mobility. Significant flows resumed along the Eastern Route – from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula – which also saw substantial forced and spontaneous returns, mostly to Ethiopia and Somalia. More importantly, data pointed to how climate shocks and persistent conflict and violence across the region are also affecting extraregional migration dynamics, as highlighted by the increase in these drivers across the Horn and upon arrival in Yemen. While still predominantly economic in nature due to widespread unemployment, land shortages and lack of opportunities at home, migration drivers along the Eastern Corridor became increasingly mixed and intertwined in 2022. Protection concerns were still high along this route, as well as along the Southern and Northern Corridors, given that migrants continued to use multiple smuggler networks with limited awareness of the risks that these perilous journeys entail, while often being deceived about their length and costs. Nonetheless, despite a misconception that most people in this region move irregularly, migration from Africa is largely regular and comparatively little migration from the continent is via irregular channels towards Europe or GCC and Middle Eastern countries.¹⁴

The *A Region on the Move* report series for the EHoA, which has been the regional flagship publication since 2017, aims to improve the regional migration evidence base for good migration governance in support of sustainable development and effective humanitarian action. Over the years, the report series has illustrated the main humanitarian situations, with a focus on internal displacement and mixed migration flows along the major migration corridors of this region. *A Region on the Move 2022*, the tenth report in the series, features limited updates from official data sources, such as estimates on international migrants, labour migration statistics and data on trafficking in persons, which were still being consolidated at the global and continental level at the time of writing this report. However, this edition provides new insights into population estimates, net migration, and return and reintegration, while expanding on the deaths and disappearances of people on the move.

This report provides an advanced understanding of the main migrant groups and the environment in which mobility takes place; therefore, Chapter 1 opens with an overview of regional data and trends on international migrants and continues with a discussion of specific migrant groups – including refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs and migrant workers – as well as trends on international remittances. Given the predominant humanitarian nature of the EHoA migratory landscape, Chapter 2 delves deeper into the subject of internal displacement, which is largely driven by conflict, violence and climate shocks. Finally, Chapter 3 examines mixed movement trends along the main migration corridors in this region, which are generally irregular, with particular attention to migrants' varying needs, profiles, challenges and vulnerabilities, including an analysis of assisted return trends and reintegration challenges. The report concludes with the Migration Outlook where the main drivers shaping future mobility trends are discussed to provide an indication of the most likely scenario for the region in the short and medium term.

13 DESA, 2021a; UNOCHA, n.d.a; UNOCHA, n.d.b; UNOCHA, n.d.c; UNOCHA, n.d.d. The number of people in need in the region (43.8 million) covers Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan, which have a combined population of 154 million. See [Chapter 2](#) for a more detailed humanitarian overview.

14 de Haas et al., 2020. See [Chapter 3](#) for more details on irregular trends.

TIMELINE OF MAIN EVENTS IN THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA

(JANUARY–DECEMBER 2022)



JANUARY

The Sudan: Abdalla Hamdok, the Prime Minister of the Sudan, resigns amid pro-democracy protests.

Rwanda / Democratic Republic of the Congo / Uganda: Rwanda announces it will no longer receive refugees fleeing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo due to persistent tensions between the two countries. A few weeks later, following improved diplomatic relations with Uganda, Rwanda reopens their shared eastern border that had seen restricted movements for the past three years.



MARCH

Ethiopia: The Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front declare an indefinite ceasefire to hostilities in the north of the country shortly after Ethiopia lifts the six-month nationwide state of emergency.



APRIL

Somalia: The 15-year African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ends its mandate in the country as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), aimed at handing over security interventions to the Government of Somalia, takes its place.



MAY

Somalia: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the former president of Somalia (2012–2017), is sworn in and re-takes office as president.



JULY

East and Horn of Africa: National leaders sign the Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Climate Change and Environment on 29 July 2022 to harmonize response efforts to human mobility driven by disasters.

Rwanda / Democratic Republic of the Congo: Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo declare a ceasefire, with a view to de-escalate tensions between the two countries and improve bilateral relations.



AUGUST

Horn of Africa: The first ship carrying Ukrainian grain to drought-affected Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, including to the conflict-affected regions of Ethiopia, arrives in the Horn of Africa.

South Sudan: Leaders in South Sudan agree to extend the transition period for an additional 24 months to meet the targets of the 2018 peace deal.



SEPTEMBER

Uganda: Uganda declares an outbreak of Ebola virus on 20 September 2022.

Kenya: Kenya swears in William Ruto as its fifth president.



OCTOBER

Yemen: An overcrowded boat transporting irregular migrants from the Horn of Africa to Yemen capsizes in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, claiming the lives of 28 people.

Malawi: Authorities discover the bodies of 29 Ethiopians, whose deaths were attributed to asphyxiation during migration, in a mass grave in Mzimba, Malawi and in the surrounding Mtangatanga Forest Reserve along the Southern Corridor.



NOVEMBER

Ethiopia: The Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front sign a permanent peace deal, ending the violent conflict that has affected northern Ethiopia for two years and paving the way for disarmament, renewed services and restoration of humanitarian access.

Kenya / South Africa: The Government of South Africa announces visa-free travel for Kenyan nationals, allowing for greater ease of movement between the two countries.



DECEMBER

Zambia: The bodies of 27 Ethiopians who died during migration due to extreme hunger and exhaustion were discovered along the road in Chongwe Ngwerere in outer Lusaka, Zambia.



CHAPTER 1

**MIGRATION
OVERVIEW:
EAST AND HORN
OF AFRICA**



Young Ethiopian woman and her baby in the streets of Bossaso. © IOM 2023 / Ismail Osman

1.1 INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS

The latest official estimates on international migration for the EHoA region remain as of mid-2020.¹⁵ The lack of more up-to-date data has restricted the possibilities for a timely comparative analysis between the pre- and post-pandemic era. Nonetheless, the migratory landscape of the EHoA has not changed considerably since 2021 and can still be characterized as mostly


humanitarian in nature.¹⁶ Refugees and asylum-seekers continued to represent almost two thirds (61%) of the international migrant population, which is slightly more than the share reported in 2021 (60%), while the region continued to host a very large internally displaced population.¹⁷

15 DESA, 2021a.

16 See Figure 1. See also IOM, 2022e.

17 Ibid.

Figure 1. Latest estimates on international migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons in the East and Horn of Africa




Source: IDMC, 2023; IOM, 2022a; IOM, 2022b; IOM, 2023a; IOM, 2023b; IOM, 2023c; DESA, 2021a; UNHCR, 2023.


Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. The latest available estimates were as of mid-2020 for international migrants (DESA, 2021a), as of mid-2022 for refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR, 2023) and as of December 2022 for IDPs (IDMC, 2023; IOM, 2022a; IOM, 2022b; IOM, 2023a; IOM, 2023b; IOM, 2023c). IDP data for Somalia were the latest available data endorsed by the Somalia National Bureau of Statistics on behalf of the Government as of March 2021.

Figure 2. Immigrants and emigrants in the East and Horn of Africa, 2020

IMMIGRANTS



EMIGRANTS





TOP 3 COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION IN 2020




TOP 3 COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN IN 2020




INTRA AND EXTRAREGIONAL MIGRATION



TOP 10 COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY CORRIDORS IN 2020



EMIGRANTS BY INCOME LEVEL



Source: DESA, 2021a.

Note: DESA estimates are provided for the midpoint (1 July) of each year. It is important to highlight that many emigrants, especially the ones who emigrated before the last census, are not included in the population data and subsequent DESA estimates of the countries of origin.

As of mid-2020, the EHoA was home to 6.2 million international migrants (or immigrants), representing nearly a quarter (24%) of all the international migrants living on the African continent (25.4 million).¹⁸ With 331 million people living in the EHoA, international migrants equated to 1.9 per cent of the regional population, which is similar to the corresponding proportion across Africa (1.9%) but lower than the corresponding proportion globally (3.6%). Compared to other regions in Africa, the EHoA hosted more female than male immigrants in 2020 (50.4% and 49.6%, respectively), while prior to 2020, male immigrants repeatedly outnumbered female immigrants. Notably, the number of female and male immigrants followed a similar gradual increase between 2010 and 2020, but the growth in female immigrants was stronger than that of male immigrants (+86% versus +80%). These findings make this region an exception as the international migrant population in Africa and at the global level is typically male dominated. This unique fact can be attributed to the prevailing forced migration dynamics in this region whereby women and girls account for the largest share of refugees and asylum-seekers while labour migration remains dominated by men and boys.¹⁹ The top three countries hosting the largest numbers of international migrants were Uganda (1.7 million), Ethiopia (1.1 million) and Kenya (1.1 million).

The immigrant population increased by 80 per cent from mid-2000 (3.5 million), whereas the emigrant population grew even more rapidly in the span of a decade; the estimated number of emigrants in mid-2020 (9.1 million) was more than double the number estimated in mid-2000 (4.4 million). With two of the largest refugee populations in the region, South Sudan and Somalia were the origin countries of more than half (51%) of all emigrants from the region, with 2.6 million and 2 million emigrants, respectively. Similarly, the largest country-to-country migration corridors mirrored the largest refugee movements in the region, which were of South Sudanese nationals seeking refuge in Uganda (1.2 million) and the Sudan (868,000), and

of Somali nationals fleeing conflict and climate shocks but also seeking better economic opportunities in Kenya (425,000) and Ethiopia (411,000). Overall, most EHoA emigrants lived in low-income countries (53%), such as Uganda (1.2 million), the Sudan (1.2 million) and Ethiopia (1 million), or in high-income countries (28%), such as the United States of America (714,000), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (452,000), Canada (171,000) and Saudi Arabia (164,000).²⁰

When looking at intraregional migration in the EHoA, 67 per cent of immigrants originated from countries within the EHoA (compared to 33% who came from outside the region), while 46 per cent of emigrants resided in the region (compared to 54% who lived outside the region). The estimates of the volume of intraregional migration differ depending on the shares considered, either from the perspective of immigrants or that of emigrants. In both calculations, this share amounted to 4.1 million people (67% of 6.2 million immigrants or 46% of 9.1 million emigrants). In terms of extraregional migration, roughly 68 per cent of emigrants from the EHoA region (or 6.2 million) lived in a country in Africa outside the EHoA region.

Population change and international migration

Although the latest data on international migrants were available as of mid-2020, the United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs (DESA) published, in July 2022, revised population estimates up until 2022 and projections up until 2100.²¹ While the full extent of the COVID-19 impact on international migration is still unclear, the assumption is that net migration at the global level was halved during 2020 and 2021.²² International migration has an impact on population trends and net migration helps illustrate how international migrants are contributing to population change.²³ However, because international migration trends can change rapidly and significantly due to economic, social, political and environmental factors, and because data on past

18 Figures for this section were taken from DESA, 2021a. See IOM, 2022e for a more detailed analysis of international migrant statistics.

19 DESA, 2021b.

20 The income level classification used in this section is that of the World Bank.

21 DESA, 2022a.


22 Ibid. Net migration refers to the balance between the number of immigrants coming into a given area and the number of emigrants from that same area. A projected negative net migration translates to having more individuals emigrating from a given area than individuals immigrating to that same area, whereas positive net migration indicates the opposite.

23 The components of population change are fertility, mortality and international migration.

trends are usually sparse and incomplete, international migration remains the component of population change that is the most difficult to project and these projections were made assuming a continuation of the migration trends observed in previous years. In the region, net migration is projected to be negative between 2021 and 2030, which would translate to having more individuals emigrating from the EHoA than individuals immigrating to EHoA countries.²⁴ In the five-year period covering 2021–2025, the EHoA is expected to experience a

net outflow of -1.1 million individuals, while these projections will decrease to -900,000 individuals in the 2026–2030 period, gradually reducing the difference between immigration and emigration. While most countries in the EHoA are driving negative net migration trends, Djibouti and Burundi will experience a net inflow of migrants (positive net migration) from 2022 onwards. Overall, in the span of 10 years (2021–2030), emigration from the EHoA is projected to surpass immigration to the EHoA by over 2 million individuals.

Figure 3. Contributions of natural change and net migration to total population change in the East and Horn of Africa, 2000–2050 (millions)



Source: DESA, 2022b.


Note: Data were compiled using the standard projections of net migration with a medium fertility variant as of 1 January. Natural change refers to the balance of births over deaths. Net migration refers to the balance between the number of immigrants coming into a given area and the number of emigrants from that same area.

24 Figures for this section were taken from DESA, 2022b. Although net migration projections were provided up until 2100, 2030 was chosen as the cut-off year because net migration changes in the post-COVID-19 era are harder to predict and, therefore, these projections stagnate after 2030.

In low-income countries, such as countries in the EHoA region, net migration changes will indeed affect population growth. However, the contribution of international migration will not exceed the balance of births over deaths in the future; by contrast, the opposite scenario will be the case for high-income countries where population growth will be solely driven by international migration. With the highest fertility rate in the world (4.6 births per woman in 2021, which is double the global average of 2.3), sub-Saharan Africa will continue to experience rapid population growth and is projected to become the most populous geographic area by 2060 (3.4 billion), surpassing Asia. Globally, the world's population is projected to reach 8.5 billion in 2030, 9.7 billion in 2050 and 10.4 billion in 2100; in general, the global population will continue to grow but at a slower pace than in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁵

Moreover, two countries in the region – Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania – were among the eight countries where over half of the projected increase in the global population up to 2050 will be concentrated, alongside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Philippines. Ethiopia's population is projected to nearly triple by 2100 (from 122 million in 2022 to 323 million in 2100), while the Tanzanian population is projected to nearly quadruple by 2100 (from 65 million in 2022 to 244 million in 2100). These two countries will drive the population growth in the region, which is expected to be nearly three times larger in 2100 (985 million) than in 2022 (346 million). In addition, Uganda's population is planned to surpass Kenya's population by 2100 (132 million compared to 113 million).

Figure 4. Population projections in the East and Horn of Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the world, 2022–2100



Source: DESA, 2022b.


Note: Data were compiled using the standard projections of total population with a medium fertility variant as of 1 January.

1.2 REFUGEES AND ASYLUM-SEEKERS

International migration in the EHoA is mostly driven by forced movements (61%).²⁶ Refugee movements in the EHoA are concentrated between South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Kenya, with countries simultaneously acting as major origin and major hosts of refugees and asylum-seekers, a characteristic unique to the region.²⁷ The complex refugee landscape of the EHoA largely stems from years of climate shocks and prolonged conflict in Somalia and South Sudan as well as renewed violence in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2022, 4.8 million refugees and

asylum-seekers worldwide originated from the EHoA, while the region itself hosted 3.8 million intraregional refugees and asylum-seekers.²⁸ These populations remained similar in size to those of 2021, recording increases of roughly 1 per cent, respectively. In all, 70 per cent of people seeking refuge and asylum in the EHoA were from one of its 10 countries, while 55 per cent of EHoA refugees and asylum-seekers moved to another EHoA country, demonstrating how refugee flows primarily occur within the region.

Figure 5. Countries in the East and Horn of Africa by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022 (millions)



Source: UNHCR, 2023.

Note: Data for 2022 were available up until midyear at the time of writing this report. “Hosted” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country, while “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers from that country who are outside of their origin country.

26 See Figure 1.

27 See Figure 5.


28 Figures for this section were taken from UNHCR, 2023. Data for 2022 were available up until midyear at the time of writing this report.

Of the 8.3 million refugees and asylum-seekers hosted in Africa, nearly half (46%) were hosted in the EHoA. Despite a slight decline from 2021 to 2022, Uganda (1.5 million) continued to be the top host country of refugees and asylum-seekers in the region, followed by Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania. As in 2021, Uganda was also the top refugee-hosting country in Africa, followed by the Sudan (1.1 million) and Ethiopia (870,000). At the global level, Uganda and Ethiopia were among the top 10 host countries. Although Uganda ranked third globally in 2021, following Türkiye and the United States of America, the country ranked fifth in 2022, surpassed by Germany (2.5 million) and Pakistan (1.6 million). Meanwhile, in Kenya (555,000), which primarily hosts Somali (52%) and South Sudanese (26%) refugees, the Kakuma and Dadaab camps that were slated to be closed in 2022 remained operational and planning is underway to transition the sites into settlements.

Of the 3.8 million refugees and asylum-seekers living in the EHoA in 2022, 70 per cent were from countries

within the region, namely South Sudan (39%), Somalia (16%), Burundi (7%), Eritrea (5%), Ethiopia (2%) and Rwanda (1%). Significant populations from the neighbouring countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (741,000) and the Sudan (372,000) have also found refuge in the EHoA. Overall, most people seeking refuge and asylum in the EHoA were nationals of South Sudan (39%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (19%), Somalia (16%), the Sudan (10%) and Burundi (7%). The total number of refugees and asylum-seekers in the region has ballooned over the past 10 years, with a more than twofold increase since 2012, the most significant increase occurring in Uganda (+577%). This trend can be largely attributed to enduring conflicts in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo that have driven many to seek refuge in Uganda; people from these two countries comprised 89 per cent of Uganda’s refugee population in 2022.

Figure 6. Refugees and asylum-seekers by top five host countries in the East and Horn of Africa, 2012–2022 (millions)




Source: UNHCR, 2023.

Note: Data for 2022 were available up until midyear at the time of writing this report.

In 2022, over half (53%) of the 9 million African refugees and asylum-seekers originated from the EHoA. Over a quarter (26%) of refugees and asylum-seekers in Africa were from South Sudan, resulting in the largest refugee crisis on the continent. In the face of violence and food insecurity, the number of people fleeing South Sudan, predominantly women and children,²⁹ has continuously increased since the escalation of the conflict in 2016 and despite the signing of the peace deal in 2018. Meanwhile, in Somalia, due to sustained insecurity in the country, large numbers of people have been displaced abroad for three decades, many of whom were born in or have lived in exile all their lives.³⁰ Somali refugees and asylum-seekers were principally found in neighbouring Kenya (34%), Ethiopia (29%) and Yemen (8%), in one of the most complex humanitarian crises – which has been exacerbated by the ongoing drought. Notably, South Sudan (2.4 million) and Somalia (856,000) were among the top 10 origin countries of refugees and asylum-seekers in the world. South Sudan,

in particular, held the fourth place globally after the Syrian Arab Republic (7 million), Ukraine (5.5 million) and Afghanistan (3.1 million). The third largest origin country from the region was Eritrea; over half a million (578,000) Eritreans sought refuge abroad in 2022, mostly in Ethiopia (28%), the Sudan (23%) and Germany (12%). In addition, 25,000 Eritrean refugees residing in the Tigray region and 34,000 in the Afar region were affected, and sometimes redisplaced, by the conflict in northern Ethiopia.³¹ Of the 4.8 million refugees and asylum-seekers from the EHoA, 55 per cent were hosted within the region. Three EHoA countries were among the top five host countries for people originating from the EHoA, namely Uganda (1.1 million), Ethiopia (818,000) and Kenya (493,000), along with the Sudan (1 million) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (310,000). Overall, refugees and asylum-seekers from the EHoA were largely driven by protracted conflict, with most originating from South Sudan (50%), Somalia (18%), Eritrea (12%), Burundi (8%) and Ethiopia (6%).

Figure 7. Refugees and asylum-seekers by top five origin countries in the East and Horn of Africa, 2012–2022 (millions)



Source: UNHCR, 2023.

Note: Data for 2022 were available up until midyear at the time of writing this report.

29 UNHCR, 2019.

30 UNHCR, 2022a.

31 UNHCR, 2022b.



Women with 20-liter water jerrycans on their heads in Turkana, Kenya. © IOM 2022 / Alexander Bee



Burao IDP camp. © IOM 2022 / Claudia Rosel Barrios

1.3 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Climate and conflict events in the EHoA consistently force people to move across and within borders. The ongoing drought, flash and riverine flooding, new eruptions of violence as well as protracted instability and insecurity are the key drivers of internal displacement in the region. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), there were 6 million internal displacements in the region between January and December 2022, of which half were driven by conflict and violence (3 million) and half by disasters (3 million).³² This number decreased by 18 per cent from the previous year, during which IDMC reported 7.4 million internal displacements – the highest number ever recorded in the region. Over the past 10 years, internal displacements in the region have skyrocketed from around 1 million in 2012, with conflict and violence generally pushing the larger numbers. The escalation of

the conflict in northern Ethiopia drove the number of internal displacements attributed to conflict and violence in the region to new highs in 2021, totalling 6.1 million for the region and representing 83 per cent of all internal displacements. Of these, 5.1 million (84%) were recorded only by Ethiopia. The drop in conflict displacements in 2022 can be attributed to the de-escalation of the northern Ethiopia conflict that brought the signing of a peace deal in November 2022.


However, 2022 data revealed a significant change in the drivers of internal displacement in the EHoA region, with disasters contributing 50 per cent of all displacements as opposed to around 20 per cent in 2021 (while conflict displacements reduced from representing around 80% to 50% of all displacements). More specifically, internal displacements caused by

32 Figures for this section were taken from IDMC, 2023. Internal displacements (or flows) refer to the number of forced movements of individuals within their country's borders that occurred in a particular period, not to the total accumulated number of IDPs resulting from displacement over time (or IDP stock). See [Chapter 2](#) for a more detailed regional overview of internal displacement that includes the latest estimates of the IDP stock compared to the internal displacements in a given period presented in this section. See IDMC, n.d for the methodology used by IDMC to calculate internal displacements.

disasters more than doubled from 2021 to 2022 (from 1.2 million to 3 million), which can be linked to the prolonged drought in the Horn of Africa and repeated instances of severe flooding across the region.³³ Disaster displacements have seen an upward trend in the EHoA over the past 10 years; they most recently outnumbered conflict displacements in 2020, a year that saw unprecedented flooding in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and South Sudan. These regional trends typically differ from global trends whereby internal displacements are

largely driven by climate events. In 2022, 32.6 million (or 53%) internal displacements worldwide were attributed to disasters, compared to 28.3 million (or 47%) conflict displacements. Across sub-Saharan Africa, conflict displacements accounted for the greater share of internal displacements in 2022 (55%) compared to disaster displacements (45%), which is nearly in line with regional trends. In all, the EHoA hosted 36 per cent of all internal displacements in sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 8. New displacements in the East and Horn of Africa due to conflict, violence and disasters, 2012–2022 (millions)



Source: IDMC, 2023.

Note: IDMC reports separately on figures for the Abyei Area, which are not included in the EHoA aggregate.

In 2022, the top three countries in the region with the most internal displacements remained, as in 2021, Ethiopia (2.9 million), Somalia (1.8 million) and South Sudan (933,000), all of which experienced both conflict and climate disasters. These three countries demonstrate a larger trend in the region in which the same areas may be simultaneously affected by various displacement crises, exacerbating the humanitarian burden. Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan ranked in the top five countries in sub-Saharan Africa with the most internal displacements, along with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (4.4 million) and Nigeria (2.6 million). At the global level, Ethiopia and Somalia had the sixth

and ninth most internal displacements. In Ethiopia, conflict displacements were less than half those of the previous year (-60%), although they remained significant and accounted for most internal displacements in the country. Floods, landslides and a countrywide drought also triggered an additional 873,000 internal displacements, which is nearly four times the disaster displacements recorded in 2021 (240,000).

33 See Chapter 2 for more details on the Horn of Africa drought and seasonal floods.




Water trucking activity in Dollow IDP site in Somalia. © IOM 2022 / Claudia Rosel Barrios

Somalia surpassed South Sudan in 2022 as the country with the second largest number of internal displacements. These movements were predominantly driven by the drought afflicting large regions of the country, which, in tandem with protracted violence, continued to deteriorate food security and livelihoods. Flooding throughout the year also fuelled internal displacements, albeit to a lesser extent. Overall, disaster displacements in Somalia quadrupled between 2021 and 2022 (from 271,000 to 1.2 million). South Sudan continued to be the most severely flood-affected country in the region, while simultaneously grappling with conflict and violence that have contributed to an environment of insecurity.

In addition, Kenya (333,000), Uganda (36,000), Burundi (13,000), Rwanda (7,800), Djibouti (6,100) and the United Republic of Tanzania (4,200) also experienced new internal displacements in 2022. In particular, Kenya recorded the biggest spike in disaster displacements, seeing almost nine times more such movements in 2022 (318,000) than in 2021 (36,000). With the exception of Kenya, the other four countries saw a significant decline in internal movements pushed by disasters, namely floods and storms, between 2021 and 2022.

Figure 9. Top three countries in the East and Horn of Africa with most new displacements, 2021–2022 (millions)



Source: IDMC, 2023.

Note: IDMC reports separately on figures for the Abyei Area, which are not included in the EHOA aggregate.




A group of women prepare enset in Misha, Ethiopia. © IOM 2021 / Yonas Tadesse

1.4 MIGRANT WORKERS

Labour migration – both regular and irregular – is a key feature of the migratory landscape of the EHoA region and is mostly driven by high levels of unemployment in countries of origin, rapid population growth and widespread poverty as well as by the attractiveness of higher salaries and better opportunities in countries of destination and the well-established corresponding diaspora networks. Many migrant workers in this region resort to informal networks to seek work and better lives outside the EHoA. These movements occur along unregulated labour migration routes, primarily involving Ethiopians on the Eastern Corridor towards the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and Middle Eastern countries, and on the Southern Route towards South Africa. Labour migration from Ethiopia is largely informal due to limited options for regulated economic migration.³⁴

Figure 10. Latest available estimates on the total population, international migrants and migrant workers in the East and Horn of Africa




- Migrant workers
- Working-age international migrants
- International migrants
- Total population

Source: African Union Institute of Statistics Migration database (25 February 2022); DESA, 2021a.

Note: The latest available estimates were from 2019 for migrant workers (African Union Institute of Statistics Migration database) and from mid-2020 for the total population and international migrants (DESA, 2021a). The international migrant population of working age refers to the number of migrants aged 15 years and older. The representation is not to scale.

Revised country-specific data were not available in 2022 and the latest estimates on migrant workers remained as of 2019.³⁵ The EHoA migrant labour force amounted to 3.6 million individuals in 2019, with male migrant workers (1.9 million or 54%) outnumbering female migrant workers (1.7 million or 46%).³⁶ Most of these migrants lived and worked in Uganda (27%), followed by Ethiopia (21%), Kenya (14%), South Sudan (13%), Rwanda (9%) and the United Republic of Tanzania (8%). In addition, the majority of migrant workers were 36 years or older (2.2 million or 62%), leaving around 1.3 million migrant workers aged between 15 and 35 years (38%). In the younger age bracket (15–35), the share of male migrant workers (53%) was, on average, greater than the share of female migrant workers (47%), with larger gaps recorded in Eritrea (60% male versus 40% female) and Kenya (58% male versus 42% female).

Figure 11. Migrant workers in the East and Horn of Africa as a share of the regional labour force, by country and age group, 2019



Source: African Union Institute of Statistics Migration database (25 February 2022).

An estimated 4.2 million international migrants of working age (aged 15 years and older) were identified in the EHoA, representing roughly two thirds (67%) of the international migrant population. More specifically, 33 per cent of immigrants were 14 years or younger, 17 per cent were aged between 15 and 24 years, 47 per cent were aged between 25 and 64 years, and 3 per cent were 65 years or older.³⁷ According to the DESA population prospects, the share of the population aged 25–64 years in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow until 2050, following recent reductions in fertility.³⁸ Such increasing numbers, particularly of younger workers compared to more senior workers or the elderly, will shift the age pyramid towards a more favourable distribution, thereby creating the potential for accelerated economic growth and social development. However, this scenario can only be achieved by ensuring access to quality education, decent work opportunities and health care, all of which can be challenging in some countries in the EHoA. At the same time, the elderly population (older than 65 years) is expected to grow more quickly than the population younger than 65 years, including in sub-Saharan Africa – the geographic area with the youngest age distribution in the world – although its increase will be much smaller than in any other geographic areas.³⁹ Caring for older persons may, furthermore, become a burden for the younger generations, especially in low-income countries where social security and pension systems are either non-existent or not properly functional.⁴⁰

Intraregional and extraregional labour migration is driven by the high demand for low- and medium-skilled workers from the EHoA, such as domestic and construction workers. In particular, the demand for female workers has been pulled by highly gendered labour recruitment practices, especially of Ethiopian women in Saudi Arabia since the late 1990s.⁴¹ Many countries in the region have signed bilateral labour migration agreements with GCC and Middle Eastern countries to strengthen labour cooperation as well as regulate the recruitment and employment of short- or long-term labour. These countries include Qatar

35 See IOM, 2022e for a more detailed analysis of labour migration at the continental level and in sub-Saharan Africa, in particular.

36 Figures for this section were taken from African Union Institute of Statistics Migration database (25 February 2022).

37 DESA, 2021a.

38 DESA, 2022a.

39 Ibid.

40 See Chapter 4 of Abebe and Mukundi-Wachira (eds.), 2023 for more details on access to social security in the EHoA.

41 Fernandez, 2017. The steep increase in the number of Ethiopian women employed as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries is a consequence of the ban of migration to Saudi Arabia imposed by the Filipino and Indonesian Governments, following cases of abuse of workers from these countries.

(which has signed a bilateral agreement with Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and the United Republic of Tanzania), Saudi Arabia (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania), the United Arab Emirates (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania) and Jordan (Ethiopia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania). The number of signed agreements between EHoA and GCC countries has increased over the past 10 years. Although most migrant workers in GCC countries are from East or South Asia, migrant workers from the EHoA have recently grown in numbers, mainly due to policy shifts such as in Kenya and Uganda, but also because they are considered a cheaper labour force than their Asian counterparts.⁴² For instance, a Ugandan domestic worker in GCC countries would earn USD 240 per month whereas a domestic worker from the Philippines would earn nearly double that amount (USD 400 per month).⁴³

Labour externalization is a common practice in Uganda and Ugandans seek low-skilled employment abroad, regardless of their education levels.⁴⁴ The five-year labour agreement with Saudi Arabia, which was originally signed in 2015 and then amended in 2017, stipulated the employment of 1 million Ugandan nationals as domestic workers, most of whom were female. This agreement was suspended in December 2022 due to repeated concerns over the violation of Ugandan migrant workers' rights, but was renewed in March 2023.⁴⁵ In 2021, around 87,000 Ugandan nationals relocated to GCC and Middle Eastern countries under the Ugandan Government's Labour Externalization Programme.⁴⁶ This number was similar in 2022 (85,000), with a monthly average of at least 7,700 migrants leaving Uganda for employment purposes.⁴⁷ Kenyan nationals

have also been relocating to these countries in greater numbers in recent years.

South Africa is another attractive destination that attracts migrant workers from the EHoA region, primarily due to its upper-middle-income status which positions the country in the same income group as Brazil and China.⁴⁸ South Africa hosted 2.9 million immigrants at midyear 2020, comparable to China (3 million), and immigrants are considered to be well integrated in the labour market.⁴⁹ Although migrant workers in South Africa create more jobs for the native-born population, they are more likely to be employed than the native-born population, especially in the labour-intensive sectors of agriculture and mining but also in construction, retail and service sectors.⁵⁰ Moreover, South Africa attracts a high number of Ethiopian and Somali migrants who travel irregularly along the Southern Route and primarily work in the informal sector. These two groups usually have strong traditions of migrating to South Africa given the presence of well-established and successful diasporas as well as the deeply-rooted aspiration for the "South African Dream", wherein great financial success can be achieved in a relatively short period of time compared to what could be achieved if they stayed home.⁵¹ Many Ethiopians operate informal businesses in co-ethnic agglomerates, such as Jeppe in Johannesburg. In 2017, Johannesburg's Inner City Partnership estimated that USD 380 million were being earned in profit annually in Jeppe, around twice the turnover of Africa's biggest shopping centre, and migrant businesses were regularly remitting an average of USD 500 to their families.⁵² However, the working conditions of Ethiopian and Somali migrants in South Africa have been tainted by insecurity, precarity, marginalization and rising xenophobic violence.⁵³

42 Ratha et al., 2022.

43 Ibid.

44 Nampewo et al., 2022.

45 *Eagle Online*, 2023.

46 *The Economist*, 2022.

47 *Business Insider*, 2023.

48 The income level classification used in this section is that of the World Bank.

49 DESA, 2021a.

50 ILO and OECD, 2018.

51 IOM, 2023f.

52 Ibid.

53 See [Chapter 3](#) for more details.



Women carry stones to build a school in Rutana province in Burundi as part of the IOM cash-for-work programme. © IOM 2022 / Amaury Falt-Brown

In terms of intraregional labour migration, Kenya and Rwanda are two major economic hubs that attract skilled workers from other EHOA countries.⁵⁴ The two countries also signed a bilateral agreement to facilitate the mobility of English-speaking teachers from Kenya to Rwanda, after the latter decided to make English the official language in the schooling system in December 2019. Kenyan workers are valued within the region for their high qualifications and skills, and often work in the aid, hospitality or finance sectors in Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, some Ugandan workers seek employment in the hotel industry in Kenya, South Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania, but most work in the informal sector.⁵⁶ Due to the language barrier faced by Djiboutian workers who primarily speak French, many of them do not move intraregionally and instead look for opportunities abroad. For instance, the Djibouti Government is in the process of signing a bilateral agreement with Kuwait to employ French-speaking teachers.

The two main regional economic communities (RECs) in the EHOA region – the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – have both adopted protocols on the free

movement of workers to promote intra-REC labour mobility; the EAC protocol is in force while the IGAD protocol is yet to be ratified.⁵⁷ Regional integration efforts have encouraged the removal of structural, legal and physical barriers to labour mobility in order to facilitate access to employment, ensure the protection of workers' rights and streamline the mutual recognition of their skills and qualifications.⁵⁸ Policies that enable a favourable environment for labour migration can benefit the economic and social development of countries in the region, including by mitigating labour market imbalances; for instance, migrant workers from Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania were employed by Kenya and Rwanda to help address their existing labour gaps.⁵⁹ Significant developments related to labour mobility have been made by both EAC and IGAD in the past years. However, countries in the two RECs have different regulations and approaches to labour mobility, and the path towards achieving regional integration for labour mobility is a lengthy and laborious process that will require years of continuous cooperation between Member States.

54 Oucho et al., 2023.

55 ILO, 2020b.

56 Oucho et al., 2023.

57 EAC, n.d; IGAD, 2020.

58 Abebe and Mukundi-Wachira (eds.), 2023.

59 Ibid.

1.5 INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES

Economic remittances are a vital lifeline for millions of households in the EHoA region.⁶⁰ The reliance on remittances contributes to poverty alleviation and socioeconomic growth and transformation as these money transfers drive the home economy and foster households' well-being by helping them afford basic needs, housing spending, education fees, health care and business expenses to sustain themselves. Remittances also shape migration flows by supporting the subsequent migration of family and community members.⁶¹

According to the latest estimates on inward remittances as of November 2022, international remittance flows to the EHoA increased by 3 per cent in 2022 to reach USD 9.6 billion in total (from USD 9.3 billion in 2021).⁶² Although data on remittances were available for the EHoA region, data for some countries, mainly Somalia and South Sudan, remained excluded from the analysis done by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) and the World Bank due to data validity concerns. Consequently, the figures provided in this section should be regarded as indicative, while also considering that these estimations do not include informal remittance flows, which remain difficult to track.

Kenya was the country in the region that received the most remittances in 2022, with a total of USD 4.1 billion. As in 2021, Kenya continued to hold the third rank among sub-Saharan African countries, after Nigeria (USD 21 billion) and Ghana (USD 4.7 billion). Remittances received by Kenya in 2022 rose by 9 per cent from 2021 (USD 3.8 billion) and were more than three times the number recorded a decade ago (USD 1.2 billion in 2012). Most importantly, these flows surpassed the country's leading tea exports, which were worth USD 1.2 billion in 2022, underlining the key role that remittance flows play in the home economy.⁶³ Excluding Somalia and South Sudan, Uganda came in second place with USD 1.1 billion, a 4 per cent increase from the number recorded in 2021 (USD 1.1 billion). The recent increase in migrant workers from both Kenya and Uganda in the GCC countries is very likely to increase the amount of earnings sent back home to these two countries in the next years. Moreover, remittances received by Rwanda and Kenya contributed to around 4 per cent of each country's gross domestic product in 2022, compared to 3 per cent for Uganda.

60 It is important to note here that remittances are private funds and cannot replace official development assistance and other public spending.

61 IOM, 2022f.


62 Figures for this section were taken from KNOMAD, 2022. Data for 2022 were forecasted estimates published in November 2022 at the time of writing this report. The revised data showed differences in the total inward remittances received in 2021 compared to the figure reported in the previous edition (USD 8.9 billion). No data were available for Eritrea.

63 *The East African*, 2023.



A man reorganizes supplies in his shop in Misha, Ethiopia. © IOM 2021 / Yonas Tadesse

Figure 12. Countries in the East and Horn of Africa receiving international remittances by total in USD million and as a share of gross domestic product, 2021–2022



Source: KNOMAD, 2022.

Note: Data for 2022 were forecasted estimates published in November 2022 at the time of writing this report. These estimates continued to highlight concerns over the validity of data for Somalia and South Sudan. No data were available for Eritrea.

Overall, remittances to low- and middle-income countries worldwide continued to grow in 2022 and observed a 5 per cent increase to USD 626 billion, compared to USD 597 billion in 2021. These remittance flows are expected to further increase by 2 per cent to reach USD 639 billion in 2023. Excluding China, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries continued to surpass official development assistance and foreign direct investment flows for the eighth consecutive year, highlighting the importance of remittances as a significant source of external finance in these countries. For many African economies, remittances provide an opportunity for development against a declining trend of foreign direct investment and foreign aid.⁶⁴ Moreover, the operationalization of

the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into force in January 2021, is expected to promote intracontinental trade, investment and mobility, and also facilitate harnessing and mobilizing diaspora resources for African development.⁶⁵

In sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, remittance flows stood at USD 53 billion in 2022, a 5 per cent growth compared to 2021 (USD 50 billion) and are expected to reach USD 55 billion in 2023 (4% increase). The sustained growth in remittances in 2022 was mainly driven by migrants' determination to support their families back home as well as by the improvement of migrant workers' income and employment situation in host countries following the gradual post-pandemic


64 AfDB, 2022.

65 *Africa Renewal*, 2022. Trading under the AfCFTA officially started in October 2022 when eight countries, among which Kenya, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania, joined the guided trade initiative.

economic recovery. Meanwhile, sub-Saharan Africa continued to be the most expensive region to send remittances to, with an average cost of 7.8 per cent for sending USD 200 across international borders in 2022. This cost was still more than double the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of 3 per cent by 2030. In the second quarter of 2022, the cost of sending

USD 200 from the United Republic of Tanzania to Uganda was the highest in sub-Saharan Africa at around 35.2 per cent of the amount transferred, making this corridor the most expensive one across sub-Saharan Africa. Two other expensive remittance corridors were also located in the EHoA, namely from the United Republic of Tanzania to each Kenya and Rwanda.

Figure 13. Average cost of sending USD 200 in remittances by region, April–June 2022



Source: KNOMAD, 2022.

Research conducted by the Regional Data Hub in five communities of high emigration in Ethiopia corroborated that remittances play a key role in the well-being of migrant households and contribute a great share to their income.⁶⁶ Remittances to Ethiopia are sent through both formal and informal channels, including the formal banking system, money transfer companies, such as Western Union, and systems of informal agents. Over half (59%) of the migrant households surveyed received remittances once the migrant arrived at destination, while 83 per cent of households with multiple migrants reported receiving remittances from at least one migrant. Most households

received remittances on a fairly regular basis – once or twice a year (49%) or every three to four months (37%). Remittances were used to cover daily living costs (85%), to purchase consumer goods or appliances (42%) and to invest into new or improved housing (34%), such as better water and sanitation facilities and the usage of a separate kitchen. Migrant households displayed higher standards of living in terms of ownership of household goods (furniture, televisions and mobile phones) compared to non-migrant households. Notably, the relative improvements in livelihoods experienced by migrant households receiving remittances were often a powerful motivator for aspiring migrants to migrate.⁶⁷


66 IOM, 2022f.

67 Non-financial transfers (such as the transfer of goods, skills, ideas, beliefs and behaviours) also play a key role in perpetuating migration, although they are difficult to measure. See Chapter 3 for more details on social remittances.

However, living circumstances in households reliant on remittances may deteriorate rapidly when remittance flows cease abruptly because migrants are deported or due to other circumstances that impact their ability to work and remit. The COVID-19 pandemic, for example, made many migrants unable to remit due to job loss. Research data showed that remittance-dependent families were particularly vulnerable during the pandemic as remittance flows were interrupted and, in many cases, stopped completely. Three out of four surveyed households who were only rarely or never receiving remittances reported that the pandemic had had no impact on their livelihood and living standards. In contrast, migrant households that reported receiving remittances on a fairly regular basis were more likely to report that their living situation had worsened due to COVID-19. These findings suggest that in a time of crisis affecting both migrant-sending and migrant-hosting countries, families dependent on remittances may be worse off than families who do not rely on remittances to sustain themselves.⁶⁸



68 IOM, 2022g.



CHAPTER 2


INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: A REGIONAL OVERVIEW

2.1 REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN OVERVIEW

Conflict, instability and fragile peace processes, as well as climatic shocks, acute food insecurity and widening inequality continued to drive humanitarian needs and fuel displacement in the EHoA region. In 2022, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in the region reached 43.8 million, which represented an 8 per cent increase from 2021 (40.7 million) and nearly four times the number recorded in 2016 (12.1 million).⁶⁹ Ethiopia (25.9 million) continued to be the most severe humanitarian context in the region, followed by South Sudan (8.4 million), Somalia (7.7 million) and

Burundi (1.8 million).⁷⁰ On the global level, Ethiopia ranked second after the Democratic Republic of the Congo (27 million) and just before Afghanistan (24.4 million).⁷¹ Overall, the EHoA region contributed to around 16 per cent of the global population in need of assistance in 2022 (274 million), an almost comparable percentage to the previous year (17%).⁷² The regional number of people in need is expected to further increase to 47.8 million through 2023, while the global number is projected to jump to a record 339 million people.⁷³

Figure 1. People in need of humanitarian assistance in the East and Horn of Africa, 2016–2023 (millions)



Source: UNOCHA, n.d.a; UNOCHA, n.d.b; UNOCHA, n.d.c; UNOCHA, n.d.d; UNOCHA, n.d.e; UNOCHA, n.d.f; UNOCHA, n.d.g.

Note: The 2020 figure for Ethiopia was not updated in the first source (UNOCHA, n.d.a) but the revised figure (19.2 million) can be found in the last source (UNOCHA, n.d.g). The 2021 figure for Ethiopia combines the number of people in need from the Humanitarian Response Plan (19 million) and from the Northern Ethiopia Response Plan (5.2 million). The 2023 figure for Ethiopia is an estimate drawn from the Global Humanitarian Overview; this estimate will be updated in the Humanitarian Needs Overview.

69 UNOCHA, n.d.a; UNOCHA, n.d.b; UNOCHA, n.d.c; UNOCHA, n.d.d; UNOCHA, n.d.e.

70 Ibid.

71 UNOCHA, n.d.f.

72 UNOCHA, 2022a; IOM, 2022e.

73 UNOCHA, n.d.f; UNOCHA, 2022a.

As anticipated, 2022 was another year during which the populations of the EHoA region were subject to high levels of internal displacement. The region was home to at least 9.6 million IDPs as of December 2022.⁷⁴ Ethiopia (3.8 million), Somalia (3 million) and South Sudan (2.3 million) hosted the largest displaced populations, contributing to 94 per cent of the regional IDP population.⁷⁵ As in previous years, conflict remained one of the leading causes of displacement in the region and conflict-induced displacement was concentrated in these top three countries, mostly due to widespread fighting at the national level and localized instances of violence. Meanwhile, climate-induced displacement occurred simultaneously due to the recurrence of droughts, floods and other climate events. In light of the prolonged drought plaguing the Horn of Africa, drought-induced displacement increased significantly in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia and was recorded for the first time in Djibouti.

As conflict and climate events persisted throughout 2022, the regional displacement figure was expected to be higher than the one recorded in 2021. However, the number of IDPs in 2022 remained almost unchanged compared to 2021 (9.6 million), recording a decrease of around 50,000 IDPs between the two years.⁷⁶ There are two main reasons behind this slight decrease. Due to operational constraints in northern Ethiopia, only figures from the accessible zones of the Tigray region were included in the total number of IDPs, explaining the 12 per cent decline in the IDP figure in Ethiopia from 2021 to 2022 (from 4.2 million to 3.8 million). Moreover, while Somalia saw an increase in internal displacement throughout 2022, the new IDP figure (3.9 million) was only endorsed in February 2023.

The increasingly complex and protracted nature of internal displacement in the EHoA is a key feature of the regional landscape. Many IDPs, especially in Ethiopia and Somalia, have lived in displacement for years and in some cases for decades, with little or no concrete steps taken to allow for a durable solution, such as return or local reintegration. In Ethiopia, for instance, 21 per cent of all IDPs have been internally displaced for more than five years and this share increases to 42 per cent when looking at only the Somali region.⁷⁷

Table 1. Stock of internally displaced persons in the East and Horn of Africa, December 2022

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF IDPs
Burundi	75 300
Djibouti	6 086
Ethiopia	3 797 809
Kenya	407 280
Rwanda	3 592
Somalia	2 967 500
South Sudan	2 257 672
Uganda	43 290
United Republic of Tanzania	2 153
Total	9 560 682

Source: Burundi (IOM, 2022a); Djibouti (IOM, 2022b); Ethiopia (IOM, 2023a); Kenya (IOM, 2023b); Rwanda (IDMC, 2023); South Sudan (IOM, 2023c); Uganda (IDMC, 2023); United Republic of Tanzania (IDMC, 2023).

Note: IDP figures presented in the table were the latest available figures for the period considered as of December 2022, except for Ethiopia for which data collection began in late 2022 but ended in February 2023. Due to operational constraints in northern Ethiopia, data were provided only for the accessible zones and areas of the Tigray region. Data for Somalia were the latest available IDP data endorsed by the Somalia National Bureau of Statistics on behalf of the government as of March 2021.

74 See Figure 2 for figures per country and sources.

75 Ibid. Due to operational constraints in northern Ethiopia, data were provided only for the accessible zones of the Tigray region.

76 IOM, 2022e.

77 IOM, 2023a.




A 60-year-old former pastoralist has seen his livelihood slowly die out due to the recent drought plaguing Turkana county in Northern Kenya.
© IOM 2023 / Muse Mohammed

2.2 CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Conflict events in the EHoA region continued to occur in 2022, with over 8,000 instances of conflict recorded throughout the year and hotspots concentrated primarily in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan.⁷⁸ Protracted and new conflicts are a key characteristic of this region and most of the violence has been caused by armed conflict

at the national level, intercommunal tensions, fighting over scarce resources, attacks by non-State actors but also protests and political riots. The number of fatalities, including violence against civilians in some instances, reached over 16,000 in 2022.⁷⁹

Figure 2. Conflict events in the East and Horn of Africa, 2022



Source: ACLED, n.d.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. ACLED collects real-time data on the locations, dates, actors, fatalities and types of all reported political violence and protest events around the world. Conflict events include violence against civilians, battles, explosions/remote violence, protests/riots and strategic developments.

78 ACLED, n.d.

79 Ibid.

The crisis in northern Ethiopia evolved considerably through 2022. The year began with continued tensions and periodic displacements in the Tigray, Amhara and Afar regions. Nonetheless, mass returns began in Amhara following a reduction in conflict in January 2022 and continued with a temporary truce from late March to August 2022, at the end of which conflict resumed, prompting new and repeated displacements as well as driving humanitarian needs. Then, on 2 November 2022, the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front signed a peace agreement for a cessation of hostilities in northern Ethiopia. Since then, security and humanitarian access have improved and returns of IDPs to their areas of origin picked up again, although their access to basic social services continues to be challenging due to damage to, and, in some instances, the full destruction of, public infrastructure and limited livelihood opportunities. Due to insecurity and operational constraints, the latest regional IDP figure for the Tigray region, drawing on data collection from August 2021, remained 1.8 million throughout most of 2022.⁸⁰ With the cessation of hostilities and improved access, the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) was able to collect data at the end of 2022 and estimate the presence of 655,000 IDPs in the accessible zones of the Tigray region.⁸¹

Northern Ethiopia is not the only conflict-stricken area in the country. Excluding the Tigray region, nearly 1.8 million people were displaced due to conflict by the end of 2022 and conflict was the main driver of displacement, representing 59 per cent of the overall displaced population.⁸² Conflict-induced displacement was prevalent in the regions of Somali (1.3 million), Oromia (960,000), Amhara (389,000), Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' (SNNP – 211,000) and Benishangul Gumuz (125,000).⁸³ In the Somali region, conflict was interconnected with the dynamics of drought and food insecurity and mostly took the form of interregional clashes and cattle raiding,

fuelled by the competition over diminishing pastoral resources. Additionally, 84,000 persons were displaced in Konso, Alle and Derashe woredas in SNNP due to intercommunal violence, which was aggravated by the drought dynamics between pastoral communities.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, attacks by unidentified armed groups continued in the Oromia region in the first half of 2022, with local authorities estimating over 572,000 people displaced in the west, mainly in East Wellega (230,000), West Wellega (116,000), West Shewa (89,000), Kellem Wellega (87,500) and Horo Gudru Wellega (50,000), added to 550,000 IDPs reported in West Guji (295,000) and Guji (249,000) zones in the south.⁸⁵ In Benishangul Gumuz, attacks carried out by unidentified armed groups also intensified, including at the border with the Sudan, resulting in the displacement of over 469,000 people by August 2022 according to local authorities.⁸⁶

In Somalia, conflict is one of the core drivers of displacement as the country has endured more than 30 years of conflict and violence. Current tensions mainly stem from power struggles in the political sphere, activities of non-State armed groups, recurrent interclan tensions as well as competition over scarce resources. The electoral impasse from 2021 to early 2022 resulted in a major political crisis that created tensions and sparked violence, displacing hundreds of thousands of people.⁸⁷ While electoral violence subsided at the end of this impasse, when Somali leaders agreed in February 2022 to hold presidential elections in May 2022, instability endured across Somalia as non-State actors used this opportunity to intensify their offensive. Attacks in March, August, September and October 2022 inflicted a high number of civilian casualties, with at least 200 killed and many more wounded.⁸⁸ The expansion of non-State actors' activities in Somalia also took advantage of the period of transition between the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) which took place during April 2022.

80 IOM, 2021.

81 IOM, 2023a. Data were compiled as of February 2023 and did not include North-western and Western zones as well as parts of Central zone.

82 IOM, 2023a.

83 Ibid.

84 UNOCHA, 2022b.

85 Ibid.

86 UNOCHA, 2022b; Adugna and Debale, 2023.

87 UNOCHA, 2021a. Between April and May 2021, about 207,000 persons were displaced following political clashes in Mogadishu.

88 VOA, 2022a; *Al Jazeera*, 2022; *The Guardian*, 2022a; *France 24*, 2022.



An armed herder leads his cattle to a water source in the mountains in Turkana, Kenya. Intensifying cross-border conflict is driving pastoralists to arm themselves to protect themselves and their livestock. © IOM 2022 / Alexander Bee

In addition, an upsurge in conflict occurred from June 2022 after the military offensive launched by the Somali Government against non-State armed groups and its related counter-attacks. Overall, 607,000 persons were displaced by conflict and insecurity in 2022, mainly in Hiraaan (252,000), Galgaduud (121,000) and Banadir (117,000) regions, including 101,000 persons displaced due to military offensive activities in September 2022 alone.⁸⁹ In addition, interclan tensions were exacerbated by the ongoing drought as the fight over depleted resources added fuel to the already existing and long-lasting struggle for power.

Conflict and violence, including communal clashes, also remained the leading causes of displacement in South Sudan in 2022, forcing over 1.4 million out of 2.3 million people to flee their homes (65%).⁹⁰ Of the 1.4 million IDPs, about 981,000 persons were displaced by conflict at the national level (mainly in Central Equatoria, Upper Nile and Unity) and 493,000 persons due to communal violence (mainly in Warrap, Unity and Jonglei).⁹¹ The counties most affected by conflict and violence overall were Unity (241,000), Central Equatoria (241,000),

Western Equatoria (192,000), Jonglei (182,000), Warrap (164,000) and Upper Nile (163,000).⁹² Despite the signing of the revitalized agreement on conflict resolution in 2018 and the formation of a unity government in 2020, the implementation of the peace deal has been extremely slow and delayed multiple times over the past years. Conflict and violence have, therefore, remained rampant and ever-shifting across the country. In December 2022, an escalation of hostilities was observed in Upper Nile, displacing around 86,000 people since mid-August 2022, after fighting erupted in the village of Tonga and expanded into northern Jonglei and Unity.⁹³ Meanwhile, communal clashes due to pre-existing tensions between ethnic groups, competition over resources and grazing areas, cattle raiding and other power struggles also continued in Warrap, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria.⁹⁴ Overall, the last quarter of 2022 saw a sharp rise in violence, concentrated in Upper Nile, Warrap and Jonglei, with the number of civilians harmed increasing by 87 per cent, compared to the same period in 2021.⁹⁵

89 UNHCR, n.d.b; UNHCR, 2022c.

90 IOM, 2023c.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 UNHCR, 2022d; IOM, 2023g.

94 UNMISS, 2023.


95 Ibid.

2.3 HORN OF AFRICA DROUGHT

Through 2022, the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) continued to experience the longest and most severe drought in over 40 years, putting a strain on livelihoods, rain-fed agriculture, ecosystem services and people’s resilience as well as increasing forced migration and displacement-related vulnerabilities.

The deteriorating humanitarian environment in countries of origin, especially in Ethiopia and Somalia where conflict and insecurity persist, has forced more people to leave their homes in search of water, pasture, safety and assistance.

Figure 3. Evolution of drought conditions in the East and Horn of Africa, 2022



Source: IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre East Africa Drought Watch database (30 May 2023).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. The ICPAC [combined drought indicator](#) is used to identify areas affected or with the potential to be affected by agricultural drought.



Some 44,500 drought-resistant trees and vegetable seedlings are planted in Turkana, Kenya, where the community is trained to care for these plants as an alternative way of life. © IOM 2023

The 2022 March to May rains observed a delayed onset and were also below average (75% less than the 1981–2020 average), with eastern Kenya, the southern parts of Somalia and eastern Ethiopia receiving less than 60 per cent of the historical average.⁹⁶ With this fourth consecutive failed rainy season, severe drought conditions persisted over the Horn of Africa and the situation did not improve at the onset of the October–December seasonal rains, which usually account for 70 per cent of the total annual rainfall in the region, particularly in eastern Kenya.⁹⁷ Facing a fifth failed rainfall season, an estimated 36.6 million people were affected by the drought in the Horn of Africa at the end of the year, including 24.1 million in Ethiopia, 7.8 million in Somalia, 4.5 million in Kenya and 200,000 in Djibouti.⁹⁸ Poor rainfall performance also led to abnormal dryness

in Uganda’s Karamoja region, the north-eastern and central parts of the United Republic of Tanzania, parts of eastern and western Rwanda as well as some parts in the north and east of Burundi.

In total, the drought displaced 2.7 million people by December 2022 and an estimated 5.7 million IDPs were living in drought-affected areas.⁹⁹ In Somalia, around 1.5 million people have been displaced by drought since 2021, while 3 million IDPs were living in drought-affected areas.¹⁰⁰ In Ethiopia, around 781,000 people were displaced by drought, mainly in the Somali (545,000) and Oromia (232,000) regions, while around 2.3 million IDPs were living in drought-affected areas; the most affected areas were located in the southern and south-eastern parts of the country.¹⁰¹

96 FEWS NET, 2022a.

97 WMO, 2022.


98 IOM, 2023b.

99 IOM, 2023a; IOM, 2023b.

100 IOM, 2023b.

101 IOM, 2023a.

Figure 4. People displaced by drought in the Horn of Africa, 2022



Source: IOM, 2022b; IOM, 2022c; IOM, 2022d; IOM, 2023a; IOM, 2023d; IOM, 2023e; UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Data collection for the counties of Mandera, Samburu and Wajir in Kenya is planned for 2023.

Box 1. Food insecurity

The worsening drought continued to drive high levels of acute food insecurity as well as high humanitarian needs across the Horn of Africa. Affected communities were unable to rear livestock, cultivate and harvest crops, and purchase food to meet their basic needs, while exorbitant staple food prices and high inflation further limited food availability and access.^a Many communities, thus, had to rely on life-saving assistance to survive. By the end of 2022, nearly 23 million people were severely food insecure in the region, including an estimated 11.8 million in Ethiopia, 6.7 million in Somalia and 4.4 million in Kenya.^b

In Somalia, around 300,000 people out of the 6.7 million food insecure population faced Catastrophic food insecurity and the two districts of Baidoa and Burhakaba in Bay region were predicted to face famine from October to December 2022.^c In Ethiopia, the drought-affected regions of Afar, Somali, Oromia, SNNP and Dire Dawa saw a quick deterioration of food security by September 2022, including extreme outcomes (Crisis and Emergency) and some households in northern Ethiopia experienced Catastrophic conditions.^d Meanwhile, the most affected areas in Kenya were the arid and semi-arid lands where over 1.2 million people faced Emergency food insecurity from October to December 2022, mainly in the counties of Turkana (185,000), Mandera (173,000), Wajir (117,000) Garissa (126,000), Marsabit (92,000) and Isiolo (54,000).^e

High levels of not only food but multisectoral assistance received in parts of southern Somalia and southern and south-eastern Ethiopia prevented extreme food insecurity outcomes as well as averted the risk of famine in Somalia towards the end of 2022.^f However, the likelihood of this risk has remained a great concern through 2023, especially in the agropastoral areas of Burhakaba and among IDPs in the towns of Baidoa and Mogadishu.^g

Acute food insecurity in the region does not stem solely from extreme weather patterns but is a result of the interconnected effects of multiple factors such as global inflation, climate change, poverty, marginalization, poor governance, conflict and humanitarian access constraints. South Sudan, bordering the Horn of Africa, is another country struggling with acute food insecurity, mainly due to floods but also dry spells in some parts of the country, in the midst of recurring violence and a macroeconomic crisis. By the end of 2022, around 6.6 million people (54% of South Sudan's population) were experiencing acute food insecurity, including 2.2 million in Emergency conditions and 61,000 people in Catastrophic conditions in Jonglei State (Fangak, Canal/Pigi and Akobo) and Pibor County in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area.^h

a WFP, 2022. Compared to the end of 2021, the average monthly price of a local food basket in East Africa increased by nearly half; in particular, inflation reached 15 per cent in Kenya and the price of maize and sorghum tripled in Somalia.

b UNOCHA, 2022c; IPC, 2022a; IPC, 2022b.

c IPC, 2022a. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is an innovative multi-partner initiative for improving food security and nutrition analysis and decision-making. There are three IPC classifications that distinguish Acute Food Insecurity, Chronic Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition. The Acute Food Insecurity classification, in particular, has five phases: Minimal/None (IPC Phase 1), Stressed (IPC Phase 2), Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe/Famine (IPC Phase 5).

d IPC, 2022c. It was not possible to conduct an IPC analysis in Ethiopia in 2022; however, the reported figures were compiled using IPC-compatible analyses.

e IPC, 2022b.

f FEWS NET, 2023.

g Ibid.

h IPC, 2022c.

The ongoing drought displaced but also threatened the existence of pastoralist and agropastoral communities in the region, which rely heavily on livestock herding for livelihoods and sustenance. Throughout the year, the worst drought-affected areas in the arid and semi-arid lands of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia lost millions of animals, equating to even costlier economic losses, while the surviving livestock were extremely emaciated due to lack of water and pasture, yielding poor to no milk production. Moreover, by the time the current multi-year drought hit, many pastoralists had not yet fully rebuilt their herd sizes from previous droughts, meaning that they lost even more animals and incurred further income and nutrition losses. Overall, more than 13.2 million livestock died across the region, including over 6.8 million in Ethiopia, 2.6 million in Kenya and over 3.8 million in Somalia.¹⁰²

In the northern pastoral counties of Kenya, the lack of forage and water greatly affected livestock sale value and milk production; milk production was 15 to 80 per cent below average in most pastoral areas in December 2022, with negligible levels in Turkana.¹⁰³ Pastoralists were pushed to travel longer distances to water sources and grazing areas; trekking distances were estimated to reach 12–18 kilometres, with Marsabit recording distances as high as 30 kilometres.¹⁰⁴ These conditions led to atypical livestock migration within pastoral areas but also to neighbouring agropastoral and agricultural areas; they also drove cross-border movements into southern Somalia, southern Ethiopia and eastern Uganda.¹⁰⁵ In other instances, pastoralists lost all their capital and had no choice but to leave or “drop out” of the livestock-based livelihood system. By the end of the year, about 1.1 million pastoralist dropouts were recorded in the counties of Garissa, Isiolo, Marsabit and Turkana.¹⁰⁶ Some pastoralists became displaced, while others looked for alternatives to pastoralism, such as fishing.¹⁰⁷ Abnormal pastoral migration was

also observed in southern and south-eastern Ethiopia whereby pastoralists had to move their livestock to the highlands of Oromia and to the Siti and Fafan zones of the Somali region.¹⁰⁸ Higher competition over scarce resources coupled with lower revenues from livestock and milk sales exacerbated the financial situation of pastoralist communities which were also unable to produce sufficient income from firewood and charcoal sales or petty trade.¹⁰⁹

Climate change has made droughts more frequent, more intense and more pervasive over the past years. In general, climate vulnerability in the African continent is higher than in any other place in the world due to various underlying factors, such as extreme poverty, instability, food insecurity and lack of access to basic services; therefore, African populations are harder hit by the climate crisis.¹¹⁰ The adverse effects of sudden- and slow-onset climate events have pushed more people to move. However, quantifying drought-induced human mobility is challenging because of how environmental drivers, especially in slow-onset disasters, are difficult to isolate from the economic, health or conflict impacts that may occur simultaneously, often as a result of deteriorating environmental conditions. In this region, migration is a common and accepted livelihood strategy for many communities, which are often highly dependent on agriculture, farming and pastoralism. As a result, adverse climate events, such as droughts, can severely impact the livelihoods and coping mechanisms of these communities, thus triggering new mobility patterns as well as involuntary immobility. In Djibouti, for instance, elderly women and large families who had never migrated began moving short and medium distances, including crossing international borders, towards resources to survive the drought.¹¹¹

102 Ministry of Agriculture of Ethiopia; National Drought Management Authority of Kenya; Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range of Somalia; FAO.

103 FEWS NET, 2022b.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 IOM, 2023b.

107 Medium, 2022.

108 IOM, 2022c.

109 Ibid.

110 ACMI, 2022.

111 IOM, 2023h.



Tume is one of the hundreds of thousands of drought-affected people who have migrated in search of water, pasture and urgent assistance in Ethiopia.
© IOM 2022

2.4 SEASONAL FLOODS

Flooding is not uncommon in the EHoA region. Each year, flash and riverine floods pose a threat to hundreds of thousands of people. There are two main rainy seasons in the region – the long rains, typically from March to May, and the short rains from October to December – but these seasons differ by location. Ethiopia, for instance, has a third rainy season from June to September, while South Sudan’s wet season generally runs from April to November. Due to the effects of climate change, rainfall variability has become unpredictable across seasons, causing more erratic and extreme weather events, such as severe floods which, in this region, occur simultaneously with drought within the same country. As rainfall variability is predicted to continue to increase, such weather events are expected to become more frequent and more intense, with serious implications for economic activities, food security, health and sanitation as well as water management and its sustainable use.

South Sudan, hit by severe flooding for the fourth consecutive year, remained the most affected country in the region. While the March–May rains performed poorly in 2022 and exacerbated drought conditions across the region, many parts of the country were still impacted by waterlogged damage from the late 2021 floods. These floods had affected at least 835,000 people between May and December 2021.¹¹² As of March 2022, a total of 33 out of 79 counties (42%) remained badly affected by the non-receding floodwaters.¹¹³ Given the already high saturation of the soil, especially in the Sudd wetlands and other areas along the Nile River basin, further rains throughout 2022 set the stage for rapid inundation and maintained a high risk of flooding across the country, while the inability to cultivate the submerged fields aggravated the food emergency. Between late August and October, two thirds of the country experienced flooding, including the states of Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria, which were not affected by the 2021 floods; on 9 September 2022, the Government of South Sudan declared flood-affected parts of the country as national disaster areas and appealed for assistance.¹¹⁴ In total, 909,000 people were affected by floods as of October 2022, mainly in the states of Northern Bahr el

112 UNOCHA, 2021b.

113 VOA, 2022b.

114 UNOCHA, 2022d.



Men paddle past a school that was completely submerged by the rising lake water in Gatumba, Burundi. © IOM 2021 / Triffin Ntore

Ghazal (252,000), Warrap (208,000), Unity (118,000) and Western Equatoria (111,000), and 29,800 people were displaced as of September 2022, mainly across eastern Western Equatoria.¹¹⁵ In Unity, the water levels surpassed the peak levels recorded in 2021 and flooded the towns of Rubkona and Bentiu, including the IDP sites and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) base. Bentiu is the largest IDP camp in the country and its population stood at 102,800 individuals as of October 2022, added to around 57,500 individuals living in sites around the camp; some of these sites were built on higher grounds in 2021 due to the high risk of flooding in the area.¹¹⁶ In addition, the collapse of dykes, bridges and roads further constrained the flood response, in a country where insecurity and violence prevail and already hamper access.

In Ethiopia, floods have a strong seasonality. According to Ethiopia's National Disaster Risk Management Commission, nearly 1.1 million people were affected by floods in the regions of Afar, Amhara, Gambella, Oromia, SNNP and Somali as of July 2022; the month of July is generally considered the peak of the rainy season.¹¹⁷ IOM recorded around 205,000 people displaced by seasonal and flash floods in June–July 2022, with higher numbers reported in the Somali (85,600 IDPs), SNNP (71,500), Afar (33,300) and Gambella (11,700) regions.¹¹⁸ Between August and October 2022, flooding in Gambella, in particular, reached another high with at least 185,000 displaced persons and an additional 79,600 affected people, according to local authorities.¹¹⁹ Communities along the riverbanks were mainly affected by loss of livelihoods, damage of crops (72% of cropland was damaged), death of livestock (8% of all livestock), destruction of houses, schools and social infrastructure (impacting the education of 56,000 children) as well as water contamination resulting in a higher risk of waterborne disease outbreaks.¹²⁰

Burundi is also among the most affected countries in the EHoA region given the cyclicity of floods and other climate events, such as torrential rains, hailstorms, landslides and strong winds. Between January 2018 and December 2022, Burundi faced 26 instances of flooding that affected over 15,000 houses, in addition to washing away important infrastructure and agricultural crops.¹²¹ Communities living on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, namely in the provinces of Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Makamba and Rumonge, are the most vulnerable to the overflowing of the lake and subsequent flooding. However, the severity of floods in 2022 was not as high as in 2021, when the Government of Burundi declared an emergency over floods in late April 2021 and tens of thousands of Burundians were displaced.¹²² At the very beginning of the year, floods in Bujumbura Mairie affected over 500 persons (including over 300 IDPs), while around 250 persons in the same province were affected by more flooding in late February 2022 (no IDPs recorded).¹²³ Additionally, the province of Cibitoke experienced strong winds and torrential rains that caused considerable damage and displaced around 5,300 persons in September 2022.¹²⁴

In other countries, floods took a heavy toll on human lives. Strong rainfall in eastern Uganda in late July 2022 triggered severe flash and riverine flooding that killed 29 people (including 23 in Mbale City, which was the most affected area) and affected 20,000, displaced 5,600 and left 400,000 without access to clean water.¹²⁵ More flooding occurred in early September and late December 2022, causing more displacement, casualties and damage to houses and infrastructure.¹²⁶ In addition, severe floods in Rwanda's capital city, Kigali, resulted in the death of three persons in three separate incidents on 17 November 2022.¹²⁷

115 UNOCHA, 2022e; ECHO, 2022a.

116 IOM, 2022h; IOM, 2022i.

117 UNFPA, 2022.

118 IOM, 2022j.

119 UNOCHA, 2022f.

120 Ibid.

121 IOM, 2023i.

122 IOM, 2022e.

123 IOM, 2022k; IOM, 2022l.

124 IOM, 2022m.

125 ECHO, 2022b.

126 ECHO, 2022c; ECHO, 2022d.

127 Floodlist, 2022.



Meanwhile, some of Kenya's great lakes, including Lake Victoria and Lake Turkana – the world's largest desert lake – were also flooded in 2022.¹²⁸ The flooding of Lake Turkana, in particular, is considered a rare occurrence because the area is simultaneously impacted by drought. Entire villages and grazing areas were engulfed by water after the 2019–2020 flash floods; however, the progressive expansion of Lake Turkana in the following years, due to tectonic activity that is rising the water levels, continues to threaten the lives and livelihoods of the communities living by the lake.¹²⁹ Climate change projections foresee greater likelihood of floods in Lake Turkana arising from heavier rains in the next 20 years.¹³⁰

Additionally, Somalia's regions of Sool, Sanaag and Bari experienced flash floods following heavy storms in May 2022 and Qardho in the Bari region faced severe flooding in late October 2022.¹³¹ The water levels along the Juba and Shabelle rivers increased due to the heavy rains, yet they remained below the flood risk level.¹³²

Overall, while heavy rains relieved abnormal dryness in some parts of the region, they caused flooding in other parts. By the end of the year, wetter than usual conditions were still expected over parts of Burundi, central Kenya, Rwanda, southern Uganda, northern and eastern United Republic of Tanzania, and a few isolated areas in the northern parts of Somalia as well as southern and south-western Ethiopia.¹³³

128 *All Africa*, 2022; *BBC*, 2023.

129 *The Guardian*, 2022b.

130 UNEP, 2021.

131 FAO, 2022a; FAO, 2022b.

132 FEWS NET, 2022c.

133 IGAD, 2022a; IGAD, 2022b.



CHAPTER 3

MIXED MIGRATION ALONG THE MAIN CORRIDORS


3.1 MIGRATION ROUTES OVERVIEW

Interregional migration from the EHoA is categorized along three main routes: the Eastern Route towards the Arabian Peninsula and in particular Saudi Arabia, the Southern Route towards the southern part of the continent and in particular South Africa, and the Northern Route towards North Africa and Europe. Important flows also take place within the region, classified as the Horn of Africa Route. All four routes are characterized by mixed migration, wherein different categories of migrants, including refugees, regular labour migrants and irregular migrants move within and out of the region.

For example, there are significant flows of female labour migrants from the EHoA to the GCC countries for

domestic work, many of whom migrate through regular channels with the help of recruitment agencies, while some migrate irregularly overland via Djibouti and Somalia. Most of these migrant workers are Ethiopian nationals, although the past 10 years have seen a surge in the number of Ugandan labour migrants to the GCC countries. Since 2016, more than 223,000 Ugandan domestic and professional migrant workers have migrated to GCC and Middle Eastern countries.¹³⁴ Migrant workers moving to the GCC countries through regular channels do not necessarily experience fewer protection risks and challenges upon their arrival compared to those who migrate irregularly.

Figure 1. Movements tracked along the main migration routes in the East and Horn of Africa, 2022




Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Movements were tracked in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen. Flow monitoring activities in Somalia were suspended between March and mid-October 2022. To address this gap, the Regional Data Hub built a predictive model to estimate the missing data (auto regressive integrated moving average).

The past years saw a drastic reduction in overall movements along all three corridors during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic (482,000 in 2020), followed by a gradual increase in movements towards pre-pandemic levels in 2021 (674,000).¹³⁵ Movements picked up significantly across all three migratory corridors in 2022 (41% increase compared

to 2021), totalling 950,000 movements and exceeding pre-pandemic levels by 28 per cent (744,000 in 2019).¹³⁶ The number of movements observed in 2022 marked the end of the impact of COVID-19-related restrictions on mobility in the region and was the highest number tracked since the DTM flow monitoring network was established in the EHoA region in 2018 (914,000).

Figure 2. Total movements tracked along the four routes in the East and Horn of Africa, 2019–2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

Note: Flow monitoring activities in Somalia were suspended between March and mid-October 2022. To address this gap, the Regional Data Hub built a predictive model to estimate the missing data (auto regressive integrated moving average).

135 Figures for this section were taken from IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

136 Flow monitoring activities in Somalia were suspended between March and mid-October 2022. To address this gap, the Regional Data Hub built a predictive model to estimate the missing data (auto regressive integrated moving average). However, only the number of movements was estimated and the data were not broken down by flow monitoring indicator.




A group of young men walk along the road from Garowe to Bossaso. © IOM 2023 / Ismail Osman

The Eastern Route had traditionally been the busiest route in the region until it was heavily impacted by mobility restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in the Horn of Africa Route accounting for the largest number of movements in 2020 and 2021. However, 2022 saw a significant shift in the migratory dynamics in the region with movements on the Eastern

Route increasing significantly compared to 2021, resulting in the Eastern (441,000) and Horn of Africa (433,000) routes seeing similar numbers of migratory movements. These two corridors each accounted for around 46 per cent of all movements tracked along the four routes, while the Southern (6%) and Northern (2%) Routes accounted for the remaining movements tracked.

Figure 3. Movements tracked in the East and Horn of Africa by route, 2019–2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

Note: Flow monitoring activities in Somalia were suspended between March and mid-October 2022. To address this gap, the Regional Data Hub built a predictive model to estimate the missing data (auto regressive integrated moving average).

As was the case in previous years, the origin and destination of overall movements remained largely unchanged, with most of the tracked movements originating in Ethiopia (71%) and Somalia (13%). Of the overall movements tracked in the region, most were headed towards Saudi Arabia (38%) and Yemen (15%), mostly along the Eastern Route, and to Ethiopia (15%) and Somalia (9%) along the Horn of Africa

Route. As a transit country for migrants headed to Saudi Arabia, most migrants headed to Yemen intend to travel onward to Saudi Arabia, although active conflict in parts of the country has resulted in some migrants becoming stranded during transit and choosing to travel back to the Horn. As of December 2022, there were 43,000 stranded migrants in Yemen, 1,400 in Somalia and 672 in Djibouti.


3.2 EASTERN ROUTE

Of the three interregional migratory routes out of the Horn of Africa, the Eastern Route hosts the largest number of migrants each year. This corridor is mostly travelled on by Ethiopian labour migrants heading to the GCC countries, and in particular to Saudi Arabia, in search of work opportunities. Migration along this corridor originated along historical trade routes, with the surge in irregular labour migration and increased consolidation of broker networks beginning in the late 1990s, when large flows of Ethiopian women began migrating to the GCC countries regularly to carry out domestic work. Nowadays, it is one of the world’s busiest maritime migration routes.

Over the last two decades, both regular and irregular labour migration along the Eastern Corridor have increased in response to economic and environmental

pressures in origin countries, including famine, climatic shocks, overpopulation, land scarcity, unemployment, underemployment and widespread poverty, with modern-day migration along this corridor occurring in the context of strong and well-established networks between origin communities in Ethiopia and the diaspora abroad. Stark income disparities between sending countries (such as Ethiopia) and destination countries (such as Saudi Arabia) also fuel migration aspirations, as migrants are drawn to certain destinations where they perceive they can find employment and benefit from relatively higher salaries compared to what they would earn at home. Conflict and violence also fuelled some of the decisions to migrate in 2022, together with seasonal and short-term mobility trends, further compounded by the drought and related climate-induced displacement.

Figure 4. Arrivals in Yemen from the Horn of Africa, returns from Yemen to Djibouti and Somalia and stranded migrants in Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen, 2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Data on returns from Yemen and stranded migrants were provided through consultations with key informants.


After flows along the Eastern Route severely reduced due to the impact of COVID-19 in 2020 (from 468,000 in 2019 to 158,000 in 2020), movements along this route picked up significantly in 2022, increasing by 64 per cent compared to 2021 (from 269,000 to 441,000). Likewise, arrivals to Yemen from the Horn of Africa almost tripled between 2021 and 2022 (from 27,700 to 73,200). Although these movements are only around half of the numbers tracked in the pre-COVID-19 period (160,000 estimated arrivals in 2018 and 138,000 in 2019), arrivals picked up considerably in the last quarter of 2022 and are expected to continue at a high rate in 2023. Of the migrants tracked upon arrival in Yemen, 92 per cent were Ethiopians and 8 per cent were Somalis, while around 76 per cent were male and 24 per cent female.

Migration to the GCC countries is a highly gendered phenomenon, with women accounting for most documented movements and men – typically young, single and with low levels of education – for the majority of undocumented flows along the Eastern Route.¹³⁷ In 2022, the number of unaccompanied migrant children along the Eastern Route doubled compared to 2021 (from 7,300 to 14,900) and these unaccompanied children represented 38 per cent of all children tracked in 2022 (39,700). In particular, the number of girls travelling alone more than doubled in the past year (from 1,700 to 4,000). Similarly, the number of female migrants travelling along the Eastern Route also doubled (from 53,200 to 106,700), with women and girls accounting for 26 per cent of all those moving along the Eastern Route in 2022 (an increase of 6% compared to 2021). The number of women and girls who left Ethiopia along the Eastern Route more than doubled between 2021 and 2022 (from 43,400 to 88,500). The increasing number of vulnerable migrants, including women and children migrating along this corridor, is related to the lack of livelihood opportunities in origin countries, as well as localized violence in some parts of the region. These push factors were further compounded by the ongoing drought, such as in Djibouti, where new drought-related migration patterns emerged.¹³⁸

While still predominantly economic in nature, migration along the Eastern Corridor became increasingly mixed in 2022. The share of migrants reporting economic reasons in 2022 reduced compared to 2021 (from 96% to 90%), whereas the share of movements due to conflict, violence or persecution and drought-related

movements increased (from 2% to 7% and from 0.4% to 3%, respectively). Migration drivers are complex and it is often not one single factor that triggers the final decision to migrate. Climate-related factors, such as droughts and floods, have an adverse impact on livelihoods, particularly in areas that rely heavily on agriculture, which is the case for the majority of communities of high emigration in Ethiopia.

Figure 5. Arrivals in Yemen from the Horn of Africa by nationality, gender, age and vulnerability, 2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

137 IOM, 2020a.


138 IOM, 2023h.

Migration is a common and accepted livelihood strategy for many communities in Ethiopia – the main country of origin of interregional migration from the Horn of Africa, but the severe and prolonged drought had devastating effects on livelihoods. According to data collected jointly by IOM and the Mixed Migration Centre, all respondents reporting drought-related factors came from locations in Ethiopia that were projected to face emergency food insecurity or be at a high risk of famine by October 2022, namely the regions of Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Somali.¹³⁹ The majority of the drought-affected respondents had departed Ethiopia either in 2022 or 2021, indicating that most had left their areas of origin following four to five consecutive failed rainy seasons.¹⁴⁰ Drought mostly impacted respondents and their households in Ethiopia through loss of income (80%), crop failure (66%), loss of livestock (65%), food scarcity (53%), crop disease (45%), high food prices (44%) and livestock disease (40%).¹⁴¹ An examination of which impacts of drought triggered the decision to migrate

revealed that loss of crops (72%) and loss of livestock (65%), followed by the increase in food prices (52%) were the main triggers of migration.¹⁴²

Eastern Corridor migration occurs along two main routes, one via Djibouti and one via Somalia. The areas around Obock in Djibouti and Bossaso in the Puntland region of Somalia are the main embarkation hubs for migrants crossing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. In the years up until the COVID-19 pandemic, the route via Bossaso was more frequented by migrants than the route via Obock, accounting for around two thirds of arrivals to Yemen (62% in 2019 and 66% in 2020). This dynamic changed in 2021 and 2022 with more migrants arriving from Djibouti than Somalia in recent years (60% in 2021 and 55% in 2022). Departures from Djibouti and Somalia were relatively similar in the first half of 2022; however, departures from Djibouti significantly exceeded those from Somalia in the third quarter of the year.

Figure 6. Arrivals in Yemen from Djibouti and Somalia, 2019–2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

139 MMC and IOM, 2023a; MMC and IOM, 2023b; FEWS NET, 2022d.

140 MMC and IOM, 2023a; MMC and IOM, 2023b.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.



Ethiopian migrants prepare to fly to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from Sana'a, Yemen on an IOM voluntary humanitarian return flight. © IOM 2022 / Rami Ibrahim

Returning flows

The Eastern Route is also characterized by bidirectional flows, wherein migrants move along this corridor towards Yemen and the GCC countries, but some also return to the Horn. With the ongoing conflict and high number of stranded migrants, the protection situation for migrants in Yemen remains dire due to the increased number of frontlines that inhibit safe and orderly migration. Migrants are routinely and systematically exploited by smugglers, traffickers and other actors they encounter *en route*, and are deprived of their basic rights, including forced transfers across lines of control, kidnapping for ransom, exploitation, abuse, neglect and violence. Furthermore, due to the growing number of frontlines, migrants have resorted to the use of new informal routes, further exposing them to heightened protection risks and concerns.

Some migrants transiting through Yemen are also detained, die or go missing due to the effects of the ongoing armed conflict characterized by, among others, unexploded ordinances and remnants of war.¹⁴³ Anecdotal reports also indicate forced recruitment of migrants by parties to the conflict as well as incidents of sexual violence against migrant women and girls, often perpetrated by smugglers and armed groups.

In particular, women who owe smugglers money are often subjected to sexual exploitation. Gender-based violence is a particular concern in areas with powerful trafficking networks and a dearth of referral partners results in an overstretched migrant response sector with limited resources trying to prevent, mitigate and respond to incidents. Furthermore, several cases of migrant deaths were reported at the Yemeni border with Saudi Arabia and Oman.¹⁴⁴

Given the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen and challenges faced by migrants attempting to transit through Yemen, some migrants opt to independently return to the Horn of Africa. This dynamic was first observed during the COVID-19 pandemic, when movement restrictions and difficulties accessing Saudi Arabia resulted in many migrants choosing to return. Lack of access to economic opportunities in Yemen, where many host communities are under economic distress and resources are strained, have also hindered migrants' capacity to generate an income along the journey to support themselves. Others experience challenges moving onwards towards Saudi Arabia, while the active conflict, abuse and exploitation in Yemen are all factors driving spontaneous return movements to the Horn.


143 HRW, 2020; HRW, 2021; United Nations, 2022b.

144 OHCHR, 2022.

In 2022, nearly 7,500 migrants returned from Yemen to Djibouti (5,900) and Somalia (1,500), representing a 43 per cent decrease compared to 2021 (13,000).¹⁴⁵ Migrants returning from Yemen to the Horn are among the most vulnerable groups moving along this corridor. They have usually not succeeded in fulfilling their aspirations (typically finding a job abroad and sending

remittances home), have often become stranded in detention, have suffered other significant abuses while in transit, and have mostly depleted their resources and incurred further debts for their return journey, which may hamper the process of successful reintegration once they return home.

Figure 7. Returns from Yemen to Djibouti and Somalia, May 2020–December 2022



Source: IOM, 2020–2022.

Note: Data on returns from Yemen were provided through consultations with key informants.

The decrease in migrants returning spontaneously to the Horn from Yemen in 2022 was likely linked to the increasing number of voluntary humanitarian return (VHR) flights from Yemen, organized by IOM in coordination with the Ethiopian authorities to provide safe, voluntary and dignified returns to migrants stranded in Yemen. Around 4,100 migrants were returned to

their countries of origin in 2022, 400 of whom were unaccompanied children. The majority of those assisted were Ethiopian nationals (95%). In addition, 600 Somali refugees received return support in 2022 through the assisted spontaneous returns organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).


145 Data on returns from Yemen were provided through consultations with key informants.



A group of Ethiopian women sit inside a house where smugglers give them refuge before they leave to Obock, Djibouti. © IOM 2021 / Alexander Bee


In addition to migrants returning to the EHoA from transit countries, such as Yemen, migrants who reached their destination may also be forced to return. Large return migration flows from Saudi Arabia began in 2016 when the Government of Saudi Arabia tightened immigration controls to address unemployment by forcibly returning irregular migrants to their country of origin. Irregular migrants were offered a 90-day amnesty period during which they could leave the country without penalty, after which detainment and forced returns began. Since then, 719,000 irregular migrants have been forcibly returned to Ethiopia (519,000), Yemen (158,000) and Somalia (42,500).¹⁴⁶ Of those returned to Ethiopia, around 93,500 were returned in 2022, marking an 18 per cent increase compared to 2021 (79,500), despite forced returns being suspended for four months during the year. The majority of returnees to Ethiopia in 2022 were men (81%), and despite the increase in total returns, the number of female returnees decreased by 29 per cent in the past year. Child returnees also decreased by 40 per cent and children of both sexes were returned at relatively equal rates (52% male and 48% female), with most being younger than five years (74%).

Figure 8. Ethiopian returnees from Saudi Arabia by gender and age group, 2022



Source: IOM Returns from Saudi Arabia database (10 May 2023).

Figure 9. Returns of Ethiopian nationals from Saudi Arabia, 2019–2022



Source: IOM Returns from Saudi Arabia database (10 May 2023).

Note: Returns to Ethiopia were suspended from December 2021 to February 2022 and from September to October 2022 due to the COVID-19 outbreak and the conflict in northern Ethiopia.

146 Data on forced returns to Ethiopia were taken from IOM Returns from Saudi Arabia database (10 May 2023; covering 2017–2022). Returns to Ethiopia were suspended from December 2021 to February 2022 and from September to October 2022 due to the COVID-19 outbreak and the conflict in northern Ethiopia. Data on forced returns to Yemen were taken from IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023; covering 2019–2022). Returning migrants from Saudi Arabia could not be tracked by IOM between January and May 2021 due to the inaccessibility of the flow monitoring point at the Saudi Arabia–Yemen border. Data on forced returns to Somalia were provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Directorate of Somalia (2020–2022).



Portrait of an Ethiopian woman sitting inside a house in Obock, Djibouti. © IOM 2021 / Alexander Bee

Between 2017 and 2022, most Ethiopians intended to return to the regions of Amhara (33%), Oromia (31%) and Tigray (29%). In 2022, however, nearly 60,000 people (64%) intended to return to the conflict-affected regions of Amhara (42%), Tigray (20%) and Afar (2%). Due to the armed conflict in northern Ethiopia and the critical security situation hindering access to parts of these regions, many returnees who reported an intention to return to them found themselves stranded in shelters in Addis Ababa, unable to return home and reunify with their families and with little recourse to continue their journey or otherwise support themselves. In October 2022, it was estimated that 3,000 forced returnees were stranded in shelters operated by the Government of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa. The large number of stranded returnees led to the overcrowding of these shelters and strained Ethiopia's capacity to receive returnees, leading to a temporary suspension of return flights in September and October 2022. However, the security situation improved in those areas in early November 2022,

allowing for forced returns to resume in November (5,600), with December registering the highest number of deportations in 2022 (16,300).


By December 2022, the number of migrants accommodated at shelters decreased due to improved access to parts of Tigray and flights were resumed, though facilities remained crowded and shelters continued to struggle to meet the needs of migrants while operating with limited resources. Services such as water, sanitation, hygiene, health assistance, child necessities and psychosocial support were also strained, limiting reception capacity. This situation is especially concerning as prior to being deported, migrants are reportedly detained in Saudi Arabia for indefinite periods of time – sometimes for up to 18 months – in substandard conditions where they may experience insufficient food and medical care, poor sanitation and ill-treatment.¹⁴⁷ Medical and mental health problems, including communicable diseases and conditions requiring psychiatric treatment, are commonly observed after arrival.

Furthermore, a needs assessment by the International Labour Organization found that while deportees had invested a great deal of capital into their migration journey and 77 per cent had dependents to support, efforts to support them upon return to Ethiopia were insufficient.¹⁴⁸ The signing of the northern Ethiopia peace deal between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in November 2022 helped ease the return process for migrants previously stranded in these centres. As of late March 2023, all stranded migrants had returned to Tigray, and government-run shelters were only hosting migrants for the first day after arrival for screening, referral and cash assistance.

Yemen received the second largest number of forced returnees in 2022 (66,000), which was more than double the number reported in 2021 (28,000) and surpassing the levels reached before the COVID-19 pandemic (50,000 in 2019). As in Ethiopia, most deportees to Yemen were men (95%), while women and children accounted for 2 and 3 per cent of returnees, respectively; children returned to Yemen in 2022 were mostly boys (74%). In 2022, over one in three returned children were unaccompanied (34%), marking a reduction in unaccompanied children compared to 2021 (57%).


Meanwhile, around 15,000 migrants were returned to Somalia in 2022. Most deportees in 2022 were men (70%), followed by women (25%) and children (5%), and intended to return to Mogadishu (65%) and Hargeisa (25%).¹⁴⁹

Figure 10. Yemeni returnees from Saudi Arabia by gender and age group, 2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

Figure 11. Returns of Yemeni nationals from Saudi Arabia, 2019–2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

148 ILO, 2019.

149 The breakdown by gender, age group and intended destination in the 2022 data on forced returns to Somalia was available for the period between January and September only.

Returning migrants often arrive in their country and community of origin exhibiting various forms of vulnerability and protection needs. Due to conflict, drought and other adverse conditions, some areas of return remain inaccessible and/or unfavourable, forcing returnees to settle in alternative locations with relatives whose capacity to accommodate their needs are limited, while others are at risk of destitution. Moreover, many migrants return empty-handed and some are stigmatized due to their failed migration. Women and girls who are victims of sexual violence and are

returning with children born as a result of rape face additional stigma and often find it difficult to reintegrate into their community. There are also instances where returning children are rejected by families in situations where alternative care arrangements are limited or non-existent. Some returnees (especially non-voluntary returnees) do not benefit from reintegration support, making it difficult for them to re-establish themselves in their communities and lead a productive life. Returning to the same, if not worse, conditions remains a major trigger for irregular re-migration.




3.3 SOUTHERN ROUTE

A growing number of Horn of Africa migrants have been observed moving towards the southern part of the continent, and in particular South Africa, since the beginning of the 1990s. The majority of migrants observed along this route are Ethiopians and Somalis, most of whom travel in an irregular manner using

various modes of travel including on foot, in vehicles, by boat and by air. Irregular movements along this route are facilitated by an intricate network of smugglers and other actors involved in the migratory process, such as migrants' relatives in South Africa and their families at origin.

Figure 12. Migration routes along the Southern Corridor, 2022



Source: IOM Regional Data Hub research database (10 May 2023).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

The migration of Ethiopians to South Africa is rooted in regime changes in the early 1990s. This time marked the overthrow of the totalitarian Derg regime, which allowed for the liberalization of migration governance in Ethiopia as well as the end of apartheid in South Africa.¹⁵⁰ The end of apartheid led to progressive asylum legislation in South Africa that granted asylum-seekers numerous rights, such as the right to work while their claims were being processed and South Africa did not have an encampment policy as is the case for many other countries in Africa.¹⁵¹ These progressive asylum laws led to the establishment of an Ethiopian diaspora community in South Africa and a significant number of Ethiopian asylum-seekers fleeing ethnic conflict and seeking economic opportunity followed in the footsteps of these pioneer migrants.

Although the migration of Ethiopians to South Africa began in the 1990s, it increased significantly in the 2000s when large numbers of Ethiopians, particularly individuals originating from the towns of Hosaena and Durame and their satellite rural areas in the Hadiya and Kembata zones of SNNP region began migrating to South Africa in search of economic opportunities. Several factors contributed to the establishment of strong migration networks between these areas and South Africa, in particular the alleged involvement of officials from these areas in the Ethiopian diplomatic mission to South Africa, who arranged job opportunities for migrants from their hometowns and assisted their migration.¹⁵² The SNNP region, and particularly the Hadiya and Kembata zones, are the main areas of origin of Ethiopians along the Southern Route to this day.

Over the past two decades, transnational smuggling networks along this route have become increasingly well established and play an important role in facilitating irregular movements along this migratory corridor. Social networks have also been found to play an important role in perpetuating migration between southern Ethiopia and South Africa, as many Ethiopians in South Africa were able to successfully start businesses and send home remittances; their success continues to motivate youth in their hometowns to follow in their footsteps.

Gauging the volume of migrants moving along this corridor is extremely difficult as movements largely remain unmonitored due to their covert nature. In 2022, the Southern Route made up 6 per cent of all movements tracked in the EHoA region, with 58,200 movements observed. Most of these movements (76%) were intraregional and headed towards Kenya, while 21 per cent were intended towards South Africa. Most migrants tracked on the Southern Route were Ethiopians (85%) and Somalis (14%). The majority of movements tracked towards South Africa in 2022 were recorded through Moyale along the Ethiopia–Kenya border (9,800), marking a 5 per cent decrease compared to 2021 (10,200). Most of these migrants were men (95%) from the SNNP and Oromia regions (88% and 10%, respectively), while 5 per cent were boys and only 1 per cent of migrants were women. No girls were migrating to South Africa by land via Moyale.

The high prevalence of male migrants on the Southern Route is corroborated by registration data collected at the IOM migration response centre (MRC) in Moyale, where 98 per cent of the 2,800 migrants registered at the MRC in 2022 were male migrants, mostly from the SNNP region (97%).¹⁵³ The actual number of migrants travelling along the Southern Route towards South Africa is likely significantly higher than the approximately 10,000 annual movements tracked in Moyale in the past two years, due to the clandestine nature of movements that makes them hard to record, and limited data capacity by IOM and partners in key locations along the route.

In the SNNP region, the Hadiya and Kembata zones have experienced rapid population growth and environmental degradation in recent years, putting much pressure on available land in an area that has traditionally been largely agricultural. Research conducted with households in Misha, a community of high emigration along the Southern Route located in the Hadiya zone, found that only 26 per cent of households who were farming for their own consumption reported self-sufficiency, mostly due to small plot sizes (97%).¹⁵⁴ Simultaneously, job opportunities outside of agriculture

150 Estifanos and Zack, 2020.

151 IOM, 2009.

152 Kanko et al., 2013.

153 IOM Migration Response Centre database (10 May 2023).

154 IOM, 2023f.

are extremely limited, even for university graduates, which has led to high youth unemployment and underemployment in low-paying jobs. The lack of decent, alternative livelihoods to agriculture in rural areas, such as Misha, fosters an environment in which migration is seen as a viable livelihood strategy for unemployed and underemployed youth.

In Misha, migration to South Africa is widespread in the area and viewed as an acceptable strategy to improve livelihoods (for 90% of the surveyed households), which may explain the existence of very strong migration networks between Hadiya and Kembata zones in SNNP and the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa.¹⁵⁵ Research data also showed that the social and material success that migration has given to successful migrants from the area has increased their relatives' social status and members of the community link personal, material and social success to migration to South Africa, leading to a conviction among young people in Misha that migration is key to escaping poverty. The majority of households interviewed were aware of the great risks of migrating along the Southern Route, yet were making calculated choices regarding the possible benefits of migration versus remaining in Ethiopia in the absence of viable, income-generating activities.

Migration along the Southern Route is more expensive and covert compared to migration along the Eastern Route. Migrants travelling overland must cross a large number of countries to reach South Africa, many of which have strict laws regulating irregular entry into their territories. Such overland journeys are fraught with danger as migrants are exposed to a multitude of risks including physical hardship and lack of basic needs and services. Migrants along the Southern Route are also exposed to various forms of violence, exploitation and abuse by different actors they encounter *en route*, including their smugglers.

Furthermore, intensified border controls and constantly evolving routes designed to circumvent detection by authorities have resulted in unsafe smuggling practices, such as transporting migrants in airless fuel tankers and shipping containers, travelling long distances at night in overloaded vehicles without taking breaks, circumventing checkpoints on foot across rough terrain and spending nights outside in national parks, forests and other areas with dangerous terrain and wildlife.

155 Ibid.



Incidents of mass deaths of migrants along this route have been frequently reported in recent years, including the death of 64 Ethiopian men who died of asphyxiation in a sealed shipping container in Mozambique in 2020,¹⁵⁶ the bodies of 27 Ethiopians who died of extreme hunger and exhaustion found abandoned in Zambia in 2022¹⁵⁷ and the bodies of 29 Ethiopians in a mass grave in Malawi.¹⁵⁸

Migrants along the Southern Route also regularly face detention when intercepted while migrating irregularly. Transit countries such as Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe detain migrants who have been found to be migrating in an irregular manner through their territories and in some of these countries migrants are tried under criminal law. Although the exact number of migrants detained along the Southern Route is difficult to ascertain, IOM together with the Ethiopian Embassy conducts periodic verification visits to detention facilities holding migrants throughout the United Republic of Tanzania. Between 2019 and 2022, IOM counted over 4,000 migrants during such visits; around 800 were recorded in 2022, including children. However, it was estimated that the actual number of Ethiopian migrants in detention was around 5,000, as not every prison holding Ethiopian migrants was assessed. In February 2023, Vita Kawawa, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Service Standing Committee of the Tanzanian Parliament stated that there were around 7,500 migrants in prisons in the country, meaning that approximately 23 per cent of inmates in the United Republic of Tanzania were foreign nationals in 2022.¹⁵⁹ It is assumed that the vast majority of foreign inmates in the United Republic of Tanzania are migrants travelling along the Southern Route.

Once migrants arrive in South Africa, most Ethiopian and Somali migrants work in the informal sector as they often lack the residence status and necessary permits to work formally. Insecurity and precarity characterize the experience of these migrants, particularly for those working in townships where crime rates are high. Extortion by gangs and officials, violence as well as many other threats to their security are reportedly rampant, while migrants have limited access to state protection and legal recourse. Rising xenophobia has also led to migrants being scapegoated for a multitude of social and economic problems in the country and migrant workers and their businesses are often targeted during waves of xenophobic violence. Nonetheless, research data suggest that most migrants who reach South Africa are successful in finding employment and sending remittances, which provide important lifelines to their families in Ethiopia.¹⁶⁰

156 IOM, 2020b.

157 IOM, 2022n.

158 IOM, 2022o.

159 *The Chanzo Reporter*, 2023. According to the Tanzanian Department of Prisons, the total prison population reached over 32,000 in 2022.

160 IOM, 2023f.

Box 2. Network migration along the Eastern and Southern Routes

Migration networks, defined as sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, friendship and shared community origin, play a large role in perpetuating migration along both the Eastern and Southern Corridors, where migration between particular areas tends to be sustained through social ties that are formed between origin and destination.^a Transnational migration networks facilitate migration by allowing would-be migrants to learn about migration opportunities, information on the journey itself as well as conditions and employment opportunities at destination from previous migrants and those who are abroad. The rise in the use of communication technologies facilitates the development of such networks, as they allow would-be migrants and those on the move to access information in real time and across borders, therefore not limiting such interaction to face-to-face encounters. As migratory movements increase and strong networks are established between destination and origin countries, migratory flows may become self-sustaining as information, money and people move through these channels.

Research data collected in communities of high emigration in Ethiopia found that many migrants along both the Southern and Eastern Routes are migrating in the footsteps of relatives and friends before them.^b Would-be migrants had selected their preferred destination based on the presence of family and/or friends that could support and advise them in planning their journey and settling in once they arrive, meaning they could plan their journeys more easily and quickly compared to destinations where they had no network to tap into. Meanwhile, 86 per cent of multi-migrant households reported that at least one individual chose to migrate to the same country as another family member.^c

Migration networks are also instrumental in improving individuals' ability to migrate as they allow prospective migrants to receive recommendations regarding brokers and support in financing the migration journey. Broker selection is essential to ensure a safe journey with minimal challenges and interpersonal connections are key in securing a reliable facilitator. Over 50 per cent of migrant households reported that migrants' contacts with brokers were arranged through friends or relatives abroad.^d Moreover, in communities displaying the strongest network ties, such as Misha in SNNP region, remittances played a large role in funding migration journeys (39%).

When compared to single-migrant households, multi-migrant households seem to establish strong, transnational ties and be more involved in migration as a household livelihood strategy, including higher levels of involvement in the planning and financing of migration. They also exhibit higher rates of migration success – that is, migrants arriving at destination and sending remittances – as well as greater perception of relative well-being compared to single-migrant households. The communities exhibiting the strongest networks showed the highest rates of success, even when migration is irregular and occurring along highly dangerous routes, such as the Southern and Eastern Routes. Strong and trustworthy networks not only encourage travel but also reduce the risks associated with migration.^e

a Massey et al., 1993.

b IOM, 2022p.

c Ibid.

d Ibid.

e Ibid.



A group of teenage friends in Kassala in the Sudan who fled from their families in Eritrea to try to cross to Europe. © IOM 2023 / Sari Omer

3.4 NORTHERN ROUTE

The Northern Route from the Horn of Africa towards North Africa and Europe is the least frequented migratory corridor of the region, accounting for only 2 per cent of all movements tracked in the EHoA in 2022. Nonetheless, these movements almost tripled in the past year (from 6,200 in 2021 to 17,700 in 2022) and even exceeded the pre-COVID-19 movements tracked in 2019 (15,400). Most movements tracked on this route came from Ethiopia (95%), with the majority headed towards the Sudan (59%) or Europe (37%); the United Kingdom (9%), Germany (6%), Belgium (4%), Norway (4%) and Sweden (4%) were the most common countries of intended destination in Europe. Movements along the Northern Route are characterized by a mixture of economically motivated movements (45%), seasonal migration (33%) and forced movements due to conflict (8%). As the DTM operational coverage along this route is limited and movements are likely underestimated, triangulation with other data sources collected in transit countries outside the region, such as the Sudan, Libya and Europe, can provide further insights into movements along this route.

Most migrants moving north from the Horn of Africa transit through the Sudan, which hosted a large number of Eritrean (118,000) and Ethiopian (58,000) refugees in 2022.¹⁶¹ Eritreans have been hosted in refugee camps in the Sudan since the late 1960s, while the number of Ethiopian refugees in the Sudan has traditionally been low until 2020, when the northern Ethiopia crisis began and, thus, Ethiopian refugee numbers in the Sudan saw an almost tenfold increase. Both Ethiopian

and Eritrean asylum-seekers usually enter the Sudan along their shared eastern borders, from where they are taken to refugee camps for refugee status determination. Prima facie recognition in the Sudan was declared for all Ethiopian asylum-seekers related to the conflict in northern Ethiopia, while Eritreans undergo refugee status determination but have a very high acceptance rate.¹⁶²

Although the Sudan has an encampment policy for refugees, many are known to leave the camps to seek better standards of living and employment opportunities outside of the camps. These refugees are often smuggled from eastern Sudan to Khartoum and other cities in the Sudan through a network of facilitators. A significant number of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees have, therefore, settled in Khartoum. However, many Eritreans and Ethiopians living in the Sudan, as well as those who have arrived more recently, are contemplating migrating onward to other countries in Africa, such as Rwanda, Uganda and South Sudan, as well as north towards Libya, Egypt and Europe.¹⁶³ Individual networks in these countries, such as the presence of relatives and friends who have already migrated, often determine the intended final destination. Furthermore, Eritrean and Ethiopian migrants in Khartoum experience severe economic hardship due to the poor economic situation and high inflation in the Sudan as well as routine violence and extortion, impeding their ability to support themselves.¹⁶⁴ Although Eritreans and Ethiopians in the Sudan generally appear aware of the risks of migrating to Europe, their life in the Sudan has become very difficult and taking on the costs and challenges of the journey for the prospect of a better life in Europe is worthwhile in the eyes of many.¹⁶⁵

161 UNHCR, 2023.

162 A prima facie approach refers to the recognition by a State or UNHCR of refugee status on the basis of readily apparent, objective circumstances in the country of origin or, in the case of stateless asylum-seekers, their country of former habitual residence. A prima facie approach acknowledges that those fleeing these circumstances are at risk of harm that brings them within the applicable refugee definition.

163 Data collected by the Regional Data Hub as part of a research study along the Northern Route that was ongoing at the time of writing this report.

164 Ibid.


165 Ibid.

Libya is another key country through which migrants and refugees headed towards Europe from the region transit. Under 2 per cent of the 694,000 migrants present in Libya by the end of 2022 (or around 10,000) were from the EHoA, most of whom were Eritrean (3,600), South Sudanese (3,250), Somali (1,800) and Ethiopian (1,300) nationals.¹⁶⁶ Migrants often spend a significant amount of time in Libya before crossing the Mediterranean to Europe, as they often plan to work along the route to afford the sea crossing or become stranded due to depletion of the financial resources with which they had started their migration.

The sociodemographic characteristics of EHoA migrants in Libya remained similar to the previous years.¹⁶⁷ Over half of the migrants were in the 20–29 age bracket, with 16 per cent younger than 20 years and only 6 per cent

older than 40 years; the average age of respondents was 26 years. Most migrants were single (68%) and two thirds had completed at least primary school. One in five reported never having attended school, while 18 per cent had completed high school and/or held a university degree. The most common drivers of migration were war and conflict (38%), insufficient income at home (16%) and lack of job opportunities in the countries of origin (13%). A larger proportion of Somali, Ethiopian and South Sudanese migrants cited war and conflict (49%, 48% and 48%, respectively) as the main reason for their migration, potentially due to the ongoing crisis in northern Ethiopia. Eritreans were most commonly migrating due to insufficient income at home (29%), targeted violence or persecution (19%) and lack of job opportunities in Eritrea (18%).

Figure 13. Top five reasons for migration by main nationalities in Libya, 2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

Note: Data were collected in Libya. Multiple choices were allowed for migration drivers.

166 IOM, 2023j.

167 Ibid. Information on the sociodemographic characteristics were compiled using a DTM flow monitoring survey sample of 288 migrants in Libya in 2022. Most migrants were Ethiopian (37%), Eritrean (27%), Somali (24%) and South Sudanese (10%) nationals.

To reach Libya, most Eritreans travelled directly from Eritrea via the Sudan (62%), through Ethiopia and the Sudan (29%) or via the Sudan to Chad, the Niger and then to Libya (5%). Most Ethiopians travelled from Ethiopia to the Sudan and then directly to Libya (98%). Meanwhile, Somali migrants commonly migrated via Ethiopia to the Sudan and then onwards to Libya (47%), or from Somalia to Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan and then to Libya (14%), from Somalia to Ethiopia, the Sudan, Chad and Libya (11%) or from Somalia via Eritrea to the Sudan and Libya (10%). Some Somalis also migrated to the Sudan and Libya via Yemen (9%). Around two thirds of migrants arrived in Libya in a group of migrants with individuals they had not known prior to their migration, while around one in four had been travelling with individuals who were either friends or family members.

Most migrants reported that Libya was not their intended final destination and that they planned to migrate to another country from Libya (53%), while around 1 in 4 respondents had no fixed intention or plan and 1 in 10 intended to stay in Libya. However, 59 per cent of migrants were not working but looking for a job in Libya, indicating that their ability to migrate onwards may be hampered by lack of funds to pay for the next leg of their journey. Overall, a quarter of migrants in Libya were unemployed, a migrant unemployment rate that is higher than before the COVID-19 pandemic (17% in February 2020).¹⁶⁸ A lack of decent work and livelihood opportunities can significantly hamper migrants' ability to meet their basic needs and continue their journeys, thus making them more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. The transit migration and possible stranding of migrants from the EHoA in Libya is also concerning as years of instability have resulted in the humanitarian situation for migrants in Libya being highly precarious and reports on migrants' rights being violated continue to be frequent.¹⁶⁹ The Mediterranean crossing from Libya to Europe is also very dangerous, with over 1,400 deaths and disappearances at sea, including

69 children, recorded on the Central Mediterranean Route in 2022.¹⁷⁰

Arrivals of EHoA migrants by sea and land in the Mediterranean region (3,750 migrants) constituted 2 per cent of the total arrivals registered at disembarkation points in Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus in 2022.¹⁷¹ These figures mark a 25 per cent decrease in arrivals from the EHoA compared to 2021 (5,000). Most of those arriving by sea to Europe were Eritreans (59%), Somalis (26%) and Ethiopians (11%), and were recorded along the Central Mediterranean Route in Italy (75%), followed by arrivals along the Eastern Mediterranean Route in Cyprus (17%) and Greece (7%).

In 2022, an unprecedented number of EHoA nationals were apprehended while transiting through the Western Balkan region (16,000), mainly from Burundi (15,000), Somalia (750) and Eritrea (120),¹⁷² marking an approximately tenfold increase in the number of migrants from the EHoA identified along this route compared to 2021 (1,500). The increased numbers of Burundians on the Western Balkan Route – mostly registered by authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia – was largely triggered by a political agreement on visa-free travel for Burundians to Serbia that was introduced in 2018.¹⁷³ The Government of Serbia ended the visa-free travel in October 2022 and the impact this decision will have on flows of Burundians along this route is yet to be seen.

168 IOM, 2023k.

169 ICMPD, 2023.


170 IOM, 2023k.

171 Information on nationality is based on the nationality declared by migrants as reported by the national authorities. For Spain, the nationality breakdown refers to all arrivals by sea, including those to the Canary Islands via the Western African Atlantic route and is available from Frontex. See IOM, n.d. for updated figures on arrivals to Europe.

172 Figures are based on data collected in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Kosovo. References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

173 Dragojlo, 2022.

Figure 14. Countries of origin and countries of application for first-instance asylum applicants from the East and Horn of Africa, 2022




Source: Eurostat, 2023a.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

Data from Eurostat offer more insight into the migration of EHoA nationals to Europe.¹⁷⁴ More than 150,000 first-time asylum applications were lodged by EHoA nationals in the past five years. While the number of annual applications was significantly lower in 2020 (21,000) than in pre-pandemic years (31,000 in 2018 and 29,000 in 2019), first-time applications reached 30,000 in 2021 and then 40,000 in 2022, exceeding pre-pandemic levels. These numbers suggest that EHoA migrants seeking asylum in the European Union are increasing, with a large share of female migrants (41% in 2022). Unaccompanied children applying for asylum were also on the rise in 2022, totalling around 3,600 which is a 75 per cent increase compared to 2021. Most children were from Somalia (65%) or Eritrea (24%) and applied for asylum in the Kingdom of the Netherlands (27%), Greece (22%), Germany (11%), Cyprus (10%) and Belgium (7%).¹⁷⁵

Somalis were the top applicants in 2022 and lodged the largest number of applications in the past five years (67,000), followed by nationals of Eritrea (50,500), Burundi (10,000) and Ethiopia (12,000). More specifically, the number of Somali, Eritrean and Burundian applicants has steadily risen over the last three years, with applications by Burundian nationals being almost seven times higher in 2022 (6,150) than in 2021 (965), likely due to the political agreement on visa-free travel between Burundi and Serbia. Germany received the largest number of asylum applications from EHoA nationals in 2022 (26%), followed by Belgium (15%) and France (13%).

Figure 15. First-instance asylum applications lodged by migrants from the East and Horn of Africa in the European Union by nationality, 2018–2022




Source: Eurostat, 2023a.

174 Eurostat, 2023a; Eurostat, 2023b. It should be noted that some migrants also arrive through regular means and apply for asylum in Europe, and that not all individuals arriving in Europe wish to apply for asylum.

175 Eurostat, 2023c.

Figure 16. First-instance asylum applications lodged by migrants from the East and Horn of Africa in the European Union by sex and nationality, 2022



Source: Eurostat, 2023a.




Boy from Eritrea who aspires to journey to Europe for education, and who currently resides at Shagarab refugee camp in the Sudan. © IOM 2023 / Sari Omer

Of the more than 30,000 first-instance asylum applications lodged by EHoA nationals in 2022, 66 per cent were positive and 34 per cent were rejected. Eritreans had the highest rate of positive first-instance decisions (85%), followed by South Sudanese (65%), Somalis (62%) and Burundians (61%). Over 90 per cent of Burundian, Rwandese and Djiboutian applicants who received positive decisions were recognized as refugees under the Geneva Convention. Eritreans were also likely to receive Geneva Convention status (86% of positive

decisions), while only 58 per cent of positive decisions regarding Somali applicants received such status. The type of status an applicant receives is important as the rights, benefits and length of stay associated with each status differ between the types of protection granted. Those who are granted subsidiary protection and humanitarian protection may be accorded fewer rights in some countries compared to those who are granted full refugee protection under the Geneva Convention.

Figure 17. First-instance asylum decisions regarding migrants from the East and Horn of Africa in the European Union by nationality, 2022




Source: Eurostat, 2023b.

Note: Data on humanitarian status were not available for Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia.

3.5 MIGRANT PROFILES

Figure 18. Migrant profiles by route, 2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).

Note: Flow monitoring activities in Somalia were suspended between March and mid-October 2022. To address this gap, the Regional Data Hub built a predictive model to estimate the missing data (auto regressive integrated moving average). However, the missing data were not included in this section, as only the number of movements was estimated and the data were not broken down by flow monitoring indicator. Indicators on nationality, sex and age group, vulnerabilities and reasons for migration were compiled using a DTM flow monitoring registry sample of around 742,000 tracked movements in 2022: Eastern Route (415,000), Horn of Africa Route (262,000), Southern Route (48,000) and Northern Route (18,000). Indicators on education and employment were based on a DTM flow monitoring survey non-representative sample of 25,000 respondents interviewed in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia in 2022.



Newly arrived migrants wait to be registered at the migration response centre in Bossaso. © IOM 2023 / Ismail Osman

In 2022, most migrants travelling along the four routes were Ethiopian (85%) and Somali (13%) nationals, with Ethiopians mainly moving on the Eastern Route (64%) and Somalis on the Horn of Africa Route (81%). Given the overall resumption of migration flows in 2022, the number of Ethiopian migrants increased from 69 per cent in 2021. Across all routes, most migrants were men (60%), followed by women (27%), boys (7%) and girls (6%), and overall, were relatively young (57% aged between 18 and 29 years). As the Horn of Africa Route is traditionally used for short-term movements, such as regular commute, family visits or access to humanitarian aid, this route observed the largest numbers of women (31%) and children (19%) on the move; it was also the only route with more girls (10%) than boys (9%). Moreover, the number of unaccompanied migrant children doubled in the past year (from 11,400 to 22,400), most of whom were boys (68%). The gap between genders was larger along the Northern (77% for boys versus 23% for girls) and Eastern (74% versus 26%) Routes, compared to the Horn of Africa Route (55% versus 45%) which had almost equal proportions of boys and girls.

While the share of migrants who reported not having any formal education decreased from 49 per cent in 2020 to 25 per cent in 2021, this share increased again in 2022 to reach 37 per cent. However, in line with

previous observations, most migrants without formal education were tracked along the Horn of Africa Route (47%) whereas migrants with the highest levels of education (secondary and tertiary) were tracked along the Northern Route (23%). Overall, 30 per cent of migrants completed primary education, 11 per cent finished secondary school and only 2 per cent received tertiary education. Female migrants were more likely to have completed primary education than male migrants (33% versus 29%); however, the percentage of female migrants who finished secondary education (9%) was lower than male migrants (12%). Meanwhile, in 2022, the majority of people on the move were unemployed before migrating (76%), which is similar to 2021 (79%) but 9 percentage points higher than 2020 (67%); this increase in unemployment is likely a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and its compounded effect on migrants' socioeconomic situation. With the exception of the Horn of Africa Route, which had the highest share of employed (17%) and self-employed (12%) migrants, the share of unemployed migrants across the other three routes was above 80 per cent. Overall, across all routes, of those who were employed before starting their journey (21%), many were working in agriculture and forestry (38%), activities of households for own use (11%) and construction (10%).¹⁷⁶


176 "Activities of households for own use" includes the activities of households as employers of domestic personnel such as maids, cooks, waiters, valets, butlers, laundresses, gardeners, gatekeepers, stable-lads, chauffeurs, caretakers, governesses, babysitters, tutors, secretaries, etc. This term allows the domestic personnel employed to state the activity of their employer in censuses or studies, despite the employer being an individual. The product produced by this activity is consumed by the employing household.

Moving for economic reasons has, by far, been the top migration driver in the EHoA region, representing 70 per cent of drivers across all four routes in 2022 and 90 per cent for the Eastern Route. This percentage followed a gradual increase in the last few years, moving from 55 per cent in 2020 to 62 per cent in 2021. However, climate-induced mobility has also been on the rise due to the severe prolonged drought plaguing the region. One in 10 tracked movements was due to drought, with nearly a quarter of movements along the Horn of Africa Route being drought-related (22%). Although most movements on the Eastern Route were economically driven (90%), forced movements due to conflict (7%) and food insecurity (3%) became more prevalent in 2022 (from 2% and 0.4% in 2021, respectively). Meanwhile, seasonal migration along the Northern Route continued to increase (from 28% in 2021 to 33% in 2022); this migration primarily involves Ethiopian agricultural workers who are employed in the Sudan on a seasonal basis. Migrants moving on

the Eastern Route usually do not know how long they intend to stay in their destination country (44% in 2022 and 49% in 2021), whereas those moving along the Southern Route plan to stay for more than a year (68% in 2022 and 59% in 2021).

In general, migrants continue to move along these routes despite the dangers and challenges they face. In 2022, 69 per cent of surveyed migrants faced difficulties, an increase from 42 per cent in 2021. The most reported difficulties were lack of food and water (66%), financial constraints (44%) and lack of shelter or place to sleep (40%). The Eastern Route remained the most challenging route, especially in terms of food and water scarcity (72%), and the share of migrants facing difficulties along this route increased from 54 per cent in 2021 to 85 per cent in 2022. Most migrants travelling along the Southern Route faced financial challenges (81%) and difficulties related to identification documents (23%).

Figure 19. Difficulties faced during the journey, 2022



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (10 May 2023).


Note: Indicators on difficulties faced are compiled using a DTM flow monitoring survey sample of 22,000 respondents. Respondents are free to not answer any question that they might find sensitive. Up to three responses were possible for this question. Only around 15,000 respondents said they had been facing any difficulties.

3.6 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

Trafficking in persons is a serious violation of human rights that challenges progress on the SDGs and affects every region of the world. People who are trafficked can be exploited for a range of purposes including sexual abuse and forced marriage, forced labour, removal of organs, forced combat, illegal adoption and forced criminality. Between 2011 and 2021, over 156,000 individual cases of trafficking were detected worldwide, of which 3,000 were in the EHoA.¹⁷⁷ Detected survivors of trafficking from the EHoA were nationals of Kenya (28%), Uganda (23%), Ethiopia (20%), Burundi (13%), Eritrea (8%), Somalia (5%), the United Republic of Tanzania (2%) and Rwanda (1%). Similarly, the top three countries where detected people were exploited were Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, aligning with the broader trend in sub-Saharan Africa whereby people are typically exposed to trafficking in their

country of origin (85% of people were trafficked domestically).¹⁷⁸ Kenya, in particular, where reported cases are also on the rise, serves as a key regional hub for sourcing, transit and destination of trafficked persons.¹⁷⁹ Across sub-Saharan Africa, 14 per cent were trafficked in another sub-Saharan country, usually in East Africa and southern Africa, and 1 per cent to other parts of the world, mostly in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.¹⁸⁰ Notably, Middle Eastern and GCC countries are top destinations for migrants travelling irregularly on the Eastern Route. Despite a relatively small percentage of survivors identified outside of Africa, people trafficked from sub-Saharan Africa are found worldwide, demonstrating the complex networks that traffickers have established on the continent and the great degree of impunity under which they operate.¹⁸¹

Figure 20. Countries of origin of trafficked persons in the East and Horn of Africa, 2011–2021



Source: CTDC, n.d.

Note: For confidentiality reasons, victims' characteristics in countries with fewer than 10 victims were not reported. Data were insufficient for Djibouti and South Sudan.

177 Figures for this section were taken from CTDC, n.d. The Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) is the world's largest data repository of human trafficking case data, publishing harmonized data from multiple counter-trafficking organizations around the world. IOM collects data on trafficking in persons as part of the CTDC to strengthen the evidence base on trafficking in persons globally. The latest data available for the EHoA region were from 2021 as data for 2022 were still being consolidated globally at the time of writing this report. See IOM, 2022e for a more detailed overview on trafficking in persons in the EHoA region.

178 UNODC, 2023. The latest data available for the EHoA region were from 2020.

179 NCRC, 2022.

180 UNODC, 2023.

181 Ibid.



A woman survivor of trafficking in the shop that she opened as part of her reintegration in Burundi. © IOM 2022 / Laëtitia Romain

The profile of trafficked persons varies between geographic contexts, with women and girls forming 70 per cent of survivors at the global level, decreasing to 49 per cent in Africa but significantly raising to 78 per cent in the EHoA. However, in the EHoA, there was significant variability in gender disaggregation between countries.¹⁸² Women and girls represented the majority of survivors originating from the United Republic of Tanzania (95%), Burundi (91%), Kenya (89%), Uganda (87%), Rwanda (85%) and Ethiopia (65%), while Eritrea (50%) had parity in the gender of survivors and Somalia saw a larger share of men and boys (35% women and girls). These numbers suggest that the country of origin may moderate the relationship

between sex and vulnerability to trafficking. Additionally, the activities trafficked people are forced to engage in are highly gendered, with women and girls more frequently subjected to sexual exploitation, and men and boys more often subjected to forced labour.¹⁸³ Sexual exploitation was the most frequent form of exploitation detected in the EHoA (42%), followed by forced labour (39%), although people are often subjected to mixed forms of exploitation during their trafficking experience. Children who have been trafficked continued to be detected at high rates in the EHoA and formed the majority of identified survivors (56%) in Africa, in contrast to the global trend of 21 per cent.

182 Although data on trafficking in persons are often treated as representative due to the urgent need for evidence-based response, these data cannot be considered a random sample of the population of trafficked persons.

183 Nevertheless, trafficked women and girls can be found performing forced labour and men and boys being sexually exploited.

Increasing evidence in the EHoA points to the overlap that occurs, at times, between smuggling and trafficking in the region, whereby an irregular journey may begin consensually through the use of a broker and eventually or intermittently become non-consensual and characterized by deception, coercion, abuse, exploitation and extortion, among others. The intricate link between smuggling and trafficking networks can be seen along the Eastern and Southern Routes; for instance, on the Southern Route, irregular migrants were kidnapped or subjected to abuses, such as periods of forced labour during their journey, particularly in Malawi and Mozambique.¹⁸⁴

Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and are often targeted by traffickers through tactics such as false promises, deception and coercion. People may also be made vulnerable by their circumstances; for example, traffickers are known to target people who are affected by poverty and economic shocks or those who are displaced, separated from their families, driven to migrate by conflict, or forced to migrate irregularly on routes with established organized criminal networks.¹⁸⁵ These findings are particularly concerning for the EHoA as the region sees significant flows of internal displacement and irregular migration. Additionally, climate change is a “stress multiplier” that can increase economic vulnerability to trafficking due to loss of livelihoods for farmers and pastoralists, as highlighted by the effects of the ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa.¹⁸⁶

Many countries in the EHoA have taken action to capacitate actors on cross-border counter-trafficking coordination, detect survivors of trafficking in persons, diminish the prevalence of this violation and strengthen data collection standards, in line with international legal instruments.¹⁸⁷ Nevertheless, operational challenges that constrain the detection of survivors and prosecution of perpetrators persist. In sub-Saharan Africa, 0.4 survivors were identified for every 100,000 people within the population, compared to the global rate of 1 for every 100,000 people.¹⁸⁸ This low detection rate is indicative not of a lower prevalence of trafficking in persons but

rather of a decreased capacity to prevent, intercept, investigate and prosecute the crime. While detection rates in the EHoA remain low, evidence suggests that authorities are often complicit and criminal networks operate with a great degree of impunity.¹⁸⁹ As a result, existing data are critically limited and temporal trends are largely attributed to varying operational capacity over the years rather than varying trafficking prevalence, narrowing the scope of understanding of trends in the region. This demands stronger commitment to quality data and good migration governance, including targeted interventions to trafficking in persons to realize Target 8.7 of the SDGs “eradicate forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking” and Target 5.2 “eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls, including trafficking,” as well as Objective 10 of the Global Compact for Migration for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration “prevent and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration.”

184 IOM, 2023f.

185 UNODC, 2023; IOM, 2022q.

186 UNODC, 2023.

187 United States Department of State, 2022.

188 UNODC, 2023.


189 United States Department of State, 2022.

3.7 MISSING MIGRANTS PROJECT

In 2022, 91 people died while migrating in the EHoA, including 29 at sea in the Gulf of Aden.¹⁹⁰ Along the extraregional leg of the Eastern Route, an additional 794 died around the border of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. On the Southern Route, at least 58 people are known to have lost their lives during the year while transiting to South Africa. These figures on verified deaths while on

the move provide a snapshot of a broader crisis, while many more people are known to die in remote regions where their deaths may never be reported, nor their families notified. Overall, 1,710 migrants have died in the region and 53,000 worldwide since data collection began in 2014, demonstrating the deadly risks migrants continue to incur when engaging in irregular journeys.

Figure 21. Migrant deaths and disappearances in the East and Horn of Africa, 2014–2022




Source: IOM Missing Migrants Project database (24 May 2023).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.


190 Figures for this section were taken from IOM Missing Migrants Project database (24 May 2023). See IOM, 2023I for more information on people who die or disappear during migration in the EHoA.

Figure 22. Migrant deaths and disappearances in the East and Horn of Africa by location, 2022




Source: IOM Missing Migrants Project database (24 May 2023).

Figure 23. Migrant deaths and disappearances on the Eastern Route by location, 2022



Source: IOM Missing Migrants Project database (24 May 2023).

Figure 24. Cause of death during migration in the East and Horn of Africa, 2014–2022



Source: IOM Missing Migrants Project database (24 May 2023).

Note: Of the people who lost their lives by drowning, 805 were in the Gulf of Aden, 251 in Lake Albert between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 7 in the Indian Ocean off the shore of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania and 1 in the Tekeze River between Ethiopia and Eritrea.



A group of young men walk along the road from Garowe to Bossaso. © IOM 2023 / Ismail Osman

Eastern Route

Along the Eastern Route, the most common causes of death in 2022 were violence (794); drowning (29); hazardous transport (20); inadequate shelter, food and water (12); sickness and inadequate access to health care (11); violence (9); accident (1) and unknown causes (8). In one incident in 2022, a vehicle accident claimed the lives of six migrants who were travelling from Tadjourah to Obock in Djibouti in an overcrowded vehicle. Smugglers fled from the crash, leaving behind injured and traumatized survivors.¹⁹¹ Additionally, migrants on this route commonly endure hardships from travelling through the harsh terrain of the Djiboutian desert, where they may face temperatures up to 50 degrees Celsius, acquire injuries and suffer from near starvation and dehydration due to limited access to drinking water. People migrating under these conditions have been known to adopt risky survival strategies, such as drinking non-potable water, causing them to fall ill, while medical support to address illnesses contracted in remote areas is limited. Additionally, it is common that smugglers abandon people in the desert if they fall ill or otherwise cannot continue the journey. Other abuses included abduction for ransom, restricted freedom of movement, physical and sexual abuse and withholding of identity documents at the hands of smugglers. Along the maritime route through the Gulf of Aden, deaths and disappearances are frequent due

to the common practice of overcrowding small boats that are unseaworthy. Between 2017 and 2022, at least 805 people are known to have died at sea in this area.

In October 2022, a boat departed from Djibouti carrying at least 28 people and capsized in the Bab al-Mandab Strait due to high tides and strong winds, and no survivors were found.¹⁹² In other cases, smugglers have been known to throw people overboard when the vessel was at risk of sinking. Oftentimes, the number and identities of people who perished at sea is difficult to verify as there is no registry of passengers, and their families may never be notified about the death of their loved one.

Upon arrival at the Arabian Peninsula, migrants risk getting caught in the armed conflict in Yemen while transiting to the northern border to reach Saudi Arabia, and medical recourse for injuries is limited in an environment of protracted violence and insecurity. In 2022, 794 Ethiopians died by violence while on the move in Yemen, including from gunshot wounds, explosive remnants of war and altercations at the border. Additionally, migrants are increasingly under the tight control of smugglers, impeding humanitarian access and protection support, while “disappearances” during forced transfers are common and reports are rife of physical and sexual abuse of women and children.

191 IOM, 2022r.

192 IOM, 2022s.

Southern Route

The Southern Route poses notorious dangers to migrants who must travel long distances and cross numerous country borders using alternating smugglers to reach the south of the continent. On this route, people on the move commonly endure hardships from insufficient food and water, detention, asphyxiation in sealed transport containers, and abuse and abandonment by smugglers.

In 2022, the bodies of 29 young Ethiopian men, who were determined to have died of asphyxiation, were discovered in a mass grave and in surrounding forests in Mzimba in Malawi.¹⁹³ In a separate incident near Lusaka in Zambia, 27 Ethiopian men were discovered to have died of starvation after their bodies were found on the side of the road.¹⁹⁴ In another event in 2020, 64 Ethiopian nationals were found to have lost their lives by asphyxiation, while 14 more were found breathing and rescued from the sealed shipping container of a freight truck after it was required to pull over at a police checkpoint in Tete in Mozambique.¹⁹⁵ Police stopped the truck after hearing people hammering the container walls from within. The migrants heading southward, none of whom carried identity documents, had boarded the truck in Malawi in search of education and economic opportunity in South Africa. Previous calamities of similar nature have been reported on this route.¹⁹⁶

The hundreds of deaths of people on the move captured in the EHoA reflect the dangers that people are placed in when not afforded regular and dignifying pathways to migration. These figures offer a preliminary understanding of a broader challenge that demands greater commitment to quality and harmonized data to inform evidence-based policy and prevent further loss of life, in view of Objective 8 of the Global Compact for Migration “save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants”. Good governance that allows for safe, orderly and regular migration is also crucial to realize the SDGs, promote prosperous societies at origin and host countries, and protect the rights of migrants and their families.

193 IOM, 2022o.

194 IOM, 2022n.

195 IOM, 2020b.

196 IOM, 2016.


Box 3. Migration response centres

To address the immediate needs of people making dangerous migratory journeys, IOM and government partners operate eight MRCs in the region where people may receive life-saving support, including food and water, health care, temporary shelter, and referrals for legal assistance and family tracing services.^a In 2022, around 13,500 people sought assistance at the MRCs, mainly in Moyale (21%), Dire Dawa (18%), Bossaso (17%), Metema (14%), Obock (12%), Hargeisa (10%), Togochale (8%) and Semera (<1%).

Men formed the largest share of people seeking assistance (59%), followed by women (19%), boys (15%) and girls (7%), similar to the profiles seen in 2021.^b However, in 2022, children at MRCs travelled unaccompanied (64%) at higher rates than those in 2021 (53%), with variation by gender. In particular, the proportion of girls who were unaccompanied increased significantly, with 53 per cent of girls unaccompanied in 2022 compared to 27 per cent in 2021, while boys were unaccompanied in 2022 (69%) at similar rates to 2021 (65%). This trend, by which most children seeking assistance are travelling alone, represents a population vulnerable to extortion, forced labour, abuse and trafficking.


Among people of all ages, lack of basic services was by far the greatest hardship reported (68%), followed by detention (19%), withholding of identification documents (5%) and physical or psychological abuse (3%). Along the Eastern Route, the significant increase in the number of movements by women and girls in 2022 represents a more vulnerable population at greater risk for sexual violence, exploitation and trafficking. In some cases, migrants may be hesitant to speak about traumatic experiences for fear of retaliation by smugglers and due to associated psychosocial challenges. Still, people seeking assistance often share anecdotal evidence with MRC staff of hardships they experienced, including witnessing friends and fellow travellers die on the move, many of whom may never be documented due to insufficient information on low-profile deaths that occur in remote areas and limited capacity to verify cases.

Figure 25. Accompanied and unaccompanied children at migration response centres by gender, 2022



Source: IOM Migration Response Centre database (10 May 2023).

Figure 26. Top five hardships reported by migrants seeking assistance at migration response centres, 2022



Source: IOM Migration Response Centre database (10 May 2023).

a See Figure 21.
b IOM, 2022e.

3.8 RETURN AND REINTEGRATION

Assisted return trends

In a region such as the EHoA, where migration outflows are notable and mostly of irregular nature, assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) and VHR initiatives constitute fundamental instruments of migration management and migrant protection which primarily target migrants who become stranded while attempting to reach their intended destination.¹⁹⁷ Launched in December 2016, the European Union-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration (EU-IOM Joint Initiative) is the first comprehensive programme to save lives, protect and assist migrants along key migration routes in Africa. In particular, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative aims to enable migrants who decide to return to their countries of origin to do so in a safe and dignified way and restart their lives in their countries of origin. The EU-IOM Joint Initiative in the Horn of Africa operates in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia as well as the Sudan.

AVRR programmes provide a human rights-based, migrant-centred and cost-effective option to migrants who desire or need to return home but lack the means to do so.¹⁹⁸ For this reason, AVRR is an integral part of a comprehensive approach to migration management. AVRR assistance can also be provided to migrants in vulnerable situations, such as victims of trafficking, unaccompanied and separated children or migrants with health-related needs, for whom strict safeguards are applied throughout the entire return and reintegration process. AVRR programmes aim to provide administrative, logistical and financial support to migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in the host/transit country and who decide to return to their country of origin.

Meanwhile, VHR is a form of assisted return, applied in humanitarian settings, that often represents a life-saving measure for migrants who are stranded or in detention.¹⁹⁹ With similar principles and objectives to those of AVRR, the IOM approach to VHR is based on the respect of migrants' rights, including the right to return and the provision of timely, unbiased and reliable information on the return and reintegration process, to ensure migrants can make an informed decision on whether to return or not. This approach is also accompanied by vulnerability and medical screenings to ensure appropriate safeguards are put in place throughout the whole return and reintegration process.

From 2017 to 2022, around 45,000 individuals (81% male, 19% female) were assisted by IOM to return to the EHoA region and the Sudan. Most migrants were provided return assistance within Africa or Yemen while travelling on the Eastern Route (63%), the Northern Route (27%) and the Southern Route (8%). Around 21 per cent of the individuals who were assisted to return were estimated to be children at the time of return (18% accompanied, 3% unaccompanied).²⁰⁰

197 IOM, 2022t. This section is based on the results and evaluation of the European Union-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa (EU-IOM Joint Initiative).

198 Ibid.

199 Ibid.

200 AVRR and VHR beneficiaries often do not possess identification documents and/or do not know or do not want to provide their exact date of birth. For this reason, the share of children is to be considered an estimate rather than a fully verified datum.

Table 1. Route classification and sending countries for assisted returns

ROUTE CLASSIFICATION	SENDING COUNTRIES REPRESENTED
Eastern Route (Africa)	Djibouti and Somalia (including domestic movements)
Eastern Route (Arabian Peninsula)	United Arab Emirates and Yemen
Eastern Route (Middle Eastern countries)	Iraq, Lebanon and Türkiye
Northern Route (Africa)	Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, the Niger, South Sudan, the Sudan and Tunisia
Northern Route (European countries)	Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and Kosovo*
Southern Route	Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe

* References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

Along the Eastern Route, the most important for the EHoA region in terms of volume, IOM provided return assistance to around 28,300 migrants (81% male, 19% female; with an average age of 22 years at arrival) between 2017 and 2022, most of whom became stranded while attempting to reach Saudi Arabia or another GCC country. The assisted returns mostly took place from transit countries such as Yemen (54%), Djibouti (28%) and Somalia (17%), and mainly concerned Ethiopian (70%) and Somali (26%) nationals. Only around 450 migrants (fewer than 2% of the Eastern Route total) returned from countries that can generally be considered as destination countries (Iraq, Lebanon, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates). This specific group is mainly composed of female migrants (79%) of significantly higher average age (28 years), possibly owing to the greater availability of regular pathways of migration for female domestic workers.

The forced return of migrants from Saudi Arabia is arranged bilaterally with the relevant authorities in the countries of origin without the involvement of IOM due

to the forced nature of these movements. IOM does, however, provide immediate assistance to migrants forcibly returned from Saudi Arabia at the port of entry. Somali migrants forcibly returned from Saudi Arabia land in Mogadishu and some of them cannot easily reach their final destination within the country due to insecurity. The total number of returns along the Eastern Route included around 3,200 movements of Somali returnees who were provided with domestic onward transportation assistance within the country.


Along the Northern Route, from 2017 to 2022, IOM provided return assistance to around 12,100 migrants (76% male, 24% female; with an average age of 28 years at arrival). The assisted returns mainly took place from Libya (46%), Egypt (21%), the Sudan (8%) and the Niger (7%), and mostly concerned Sudanese (61%), Ethiopian (21%) and Somali (13%) nationals. Individuals assisted to return along this route included not only migrants in transit through Libya and other Saharan countries that were attempting to reach Europe, but also migrants (especially Sudanese nationals) who had

spent a significant number of years in Libya or Egypt and decided to return due to the worsening security and/or economic situation in these countries.²⁰¹ Only 14 per cent of the assisted returns along the Northern Route, corresponding to around 1,700 individuals, were from a country in Europe, with Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (632 and 247, respectively) accounting for the largest share.

Along the Southern Route, from 2017 to 2022, IOM provided return assistance to around 3,700 migrants (99% male, 1% female; with an average age of 22 years at arrival).²⁰² The assisted returns mainly took place

from the United Republic of Tanzania (53%), Malawi (24%), Zambia (10%) and Mozambique (8%), and the vast majority were Ethiopian nationals (97%). Only 1 per cent of the assisted returns along the Southern Route took place from South Africa, confirming how AVRR and VHR initiatives focus primarily on migrants who become stranded *en route*. Due to the criminalization of irregular migration in several of the transit countries along the Southern Route, some of these movements were facilitated from detention centres in close liaison with the relevant authorities.

Figure 27. Migrants assisted to return, 2017–2022



Source: IOM Migrant Management Operational System Application database (10 May 2023).

Note: All routes have a similar trend.


Assisted returns towards the EHoA region and the Sudan reduced sharply in 2020 due to the movement restrictions imposed to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. At the end of 2022, assisted returns have still to reach the level of 2019. It is anticipated that, while

the demand for return assistance is generally deemed to remain either constant or to increase along all three main routes, the supply will face more stringent funding constraints (especially in 2023 and 2024) due to effects of the conflict in Ukraine.

201 This trend is reflected in the relatively higher average age at return of Sudanese returnees on the Northern Route (29 years versus 25 years for Ethiopians and 22 years for Somalis).

202 In the past years, funding availability for AVRR initiatives assisting migrants along the Southern Route was insufficient, largely due to a narrow support base (of donors and the broader international community). As such, resources and programmes available to assist migrants in need along this route are increasingly limited, which partially explains the smaller number of migrants assisted compared to the other routes.

Figure 28. Migrants assisted to return by route, 2022



Source: IOM Migrant Management Operational System Application database (10 May 2023).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

Reintegration challenges and remigration

IOM views reintegration to be sustainable when returnees have reached levels of economic self-sufficiency, social stability within their communities and psychosocial well-being that allow them to cope with (re)migration drivers. Having achieved sustainable reintegration, returnees are able to make further migration decisions a matter of choice, rather than necessity. In 2017, IOM introduced the Integrated Approach to Reintegration framework to guide the development of reintegration initiatives, including the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in the Horn of Africa.²⁰³ This framework, together with the IOM definition of sustainable reintegration, emphasizes the multidimensional nature of a reintegration process – economic, social and psychosocial – and the need to approach migrant reintegration in a comprehensive manner, considering the factors that can affect reintegration at the individual, community and structural levels. The integrated approach aims to address the complex challenges faced by returning migrants, such as arriving back in a vulnerable state, facing stigma and dealing with stressors linked to their migration journey, debt or loss of assets. Studies and evaluations conducted under the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in the Horn of Africa have highlighted these challenges.

The IMPACT Study highlighted the difficult socioeconomic conditions faced by returning migrants upon their return, including conflict and severe political and macroeconomic instability, which impact their reintegration outcomes.²⁰⁴ The COVID-19 pandemic and associated shocks further exacerbated these challenges, with many self-employed returnees having to close their businesses during lockdowns.²⁰⁵ Access to food, health, housing and education, as well as acceptance by family and communities, were also affected. Returnees adopted various coping strategies,

such as relying on family and social networks and increasing engagement in agriculture, which was found to be an effective resilience strategy for mitigating the impact of the pandemic on their well-being and aiding their recovery.

Furthermore, reintegration outcomes are further affected by debt and indebtedness which are common among migrants and returnees.²⁰⁶ While debt can be associated with better reintegration outcomes in specific circumstances, such as pre-migration debt or debt not related to migration, it more often restricts the ability of returnees to respond to economic challenges and secure a sustainable livelihood. Debt also has negative impacts on psychosocial well-being, social networks and household dynamics, which can further hinder reintegration efforts for migrants and returnees.

Moreover, the risks and threats faced by migrants during their migration journeys include lack of access to basic needs, extreme physical exhaustion, illnesses and various types of abuse and violence – physical, verbal and sexual abuse, economic and labour exploitation, and racism and discrimination.²⁰⁷ These experiences have significant consequences for returning migrants at the individual and sociorelational levels, such as health issues, sleeping problems, emotional distress and social stigma. Female returning migrants often face additional stigma due to sexual abuse and exploitation. Understanding the dynamic relationship between returning migrants and their surrounding environments, including families, communities, laws and policies, in facilitating reintegration processes is of great importance. Resilience was observed among many returning migrants who used personal coping skills and peer support networks. Community-based mental

203 IOM, 2017.

204 The IMPACT Study is a flagship impact evaluation aimed at obtaining robust estimates of the impact of reintegration assistance provided under the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in the Horn of Africa, informing the definitions of standard impact evaluation methodologies for reintegration programmes and improving the understanding of sustainable reintegration metrics. The evaluation was conducted by Itad between March 2020 and March 2023, and focused on Ethiopia, the Sudan and Somalia – the three countries with the largest returnee reintegration caseload in the programme.

205 The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic was exacerbated by other extreme events that affected the region unevenly at about the same time in 2020, namely desert locust infestations, flooding in parts of Somalia and the Sudan, and conflict, especially in the southern parts of Somalia. As separating the effects of these co-occurring shocks from the shock caused by the pandemic, including the measures taken by governments to limit the spread of infection, is difficult, the study refers to these shocks collectively as COVID-19-linked shock.

206 IOM, 2022u. This study was conducted by the European Union-IOM Knowledge Management Hub, which aims to strengthen learning across return and reintegration programmes, and support the harmonization of approaches, processes and tools under the European Union-IOM Actions addressing migrant protection and sustainable reintegration in Africa, Asia and beyond.

207 IOM, 2023m. This mixed-method study was conducted by a mental health and psychosocial support specialist and focused on the mental health and psychosocial support needs of returning migrants in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan, providing a detailed analysis of the experiences and coping mechanisms of returnees.


health and psychosocial support activities also played a crucial role in facilitating interaction and decreasing stigma towards returnees, contributing to their well-being and reintegration. Furthermore, exposure to harmful environments during migration can have a cumulative effect on returnees' health, resulting in chronic physical and mental health conditions, which can negatively affect their reintegration outcomes.²⁰⁸ In addition, there is a strong linear relationship between poor health and poor reintegration outcomes among returnees post-return: the worse the health of returnees at post-return, the worse their overall reintegration outcome.²⁰⁹

Finally, a study conducted under the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in the Horn of Africa looked at why some migrants decided to re-migrate after returning to their country of origin.²¹⁰ The enumerators presented different scenarios to the participants, where they could choose to either re-migrate via irregular pathways or stay in the country, based on factors like their income at home or abroad, the risks of remigration and the costs involved. Most returnees preferred not to re-migrate, regardless of the factors presented to them. However, when they considered remigration, the most important variable was their income at home: a higher income at home reduced the intention to re-migrate more than proportionally. Experiencing challenging economic conditions and stigma, on the other hand, increased the preference for remigration, regardless of other factors. The study also found that whether returnees received economic reintegration assistance in cash or in kind did not significantly affect their preference for remigration, a finding that is crucial in informing the debate about the design of effective migrant protection and assistance programming. Overall, the evidence clearly points to the importance of increasing economic opportunities and reducing stigmatization in order to reduce re-engagement in irregular and endangering forms of migration.

208 IOM, 2022v.

209 Ibid.

210 IOM, 2023n.



Returnee households in Muyinga, Burundi receive hygiene and non-food item kits to support their dignified reintegration.
© IOM 2023 / Laëtitia Romain



MIGRATION OUTLOOK

The EHoA region is expected to continue witnessing a highly fluid mobility landscape through 2023 and beyond. Anthropogenic climate change has resulted in adverse weather and climate extremes in the region, leading to extensive losses and damages to nature and people as well as increasingly driving displacement.²¹¹ The most vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to climate change are the same communities who are the most affected. As the drought in the Horn of Africa entered its sixth consecutive failed rainy season in March 2023, the frequency of concurrent heatwaves and droughts across multiple locations is projected to increase.²¹² These extreme conditions can trigger a paradigm shift, whereby policymakers and practitioners should realize that situations like the ongoing drought can be the “new normal” and may not return to a previous state of “normalcy.”²¹³ Climate change will continue to dramatically affect the region; thus, the number of both internal and cross-border migrants is expected to increase significantly in the coming years.

The regional focus should also be kept on conflict-induced mobility and the various conflict hotspots across the region and in neighbouring countries. The outcome of the fight against non-State actors in Somalia remains unclear but will undoubtedly lead to internal displacement. It is also unclear how the situation in South Sudan will unfold in the face of the upcoming general elections planned for 2024 and if these elections will threaten to derail the already fragile peace process. More importantly, renewed tensions are a common characteristic of this region and one of the key aspects that make the EHoA particularly complex. Although the peace deal put an end to hostilities in northern Ethiopia, the road to recovery and post-conflict transition will be long and difficult, while the risk of flare-ups in the conflict remains high and this risk also applies to other regions of Ethiopia.²¹⁴ Additionally, the situation in neighbouring countries is not improving as can be seen from the resurgence of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that has triggered refugee movements into Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and

the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as the unfolding conflict in the Sudan since mid-April 2023.²¹⁵

The impact of the crisis in the Sudan on mobility and stability in the region is yet to be determined, but the humanitarian situation was already defined as reaching a breaking point and its scale and speed as unprecedented by late April 2023.²¹⁶ The rising levels of cross-border movements into Ethiopia and South Sudan, including of refugees, returnees and third-country nationals, are extremely concerning and further exacerbating an already complex mixed migration landscape. The Sudan is historically a country of origin, destination and transit of multiple migration flows; these migrants previously suffered economic hardship due to inflation and the country's poor economic and financial situation, while also regularly experiencing violence and extortion by authorities and other actors, impeding their ability to support themselves. New mixed migration patterns are expected to emerge as the humanitarian situation becomes more severe. Moreover, the risk that Eritrea and Ethiopia might get involved in the crisis, compounded by the influence played by the Sudan's other neighbours, are all aggravating factors that could spin this conflict into a protracted regional crisis. Meanwhile, the unresolved border dispute between the Sudan and Ethiopia could also deteriorate and lead to further localized displacement.

While instability, fragility and climate shocks have continued to force people to move within and outside the EHoA region, the socioeconomic drivers of mobility have become more severe in the past year. The deteriorating economic situation across the region, fuelled by rising food and energy prices, has eroded livelihoods and incomes, pushing more people to move away from their homes in search of alternatives to cope with such shocks. As a result, migration drivers are becoming increasingly intertwined, ever more complex and forced in nature. Overall, in the region, mobility is increasing, whether forced or as a coping strategy, and how this increase is going to be reflected along the migration corridors is yet to be seen. However, assuming a continuation of the trends observed along

211 IPCC, 2023.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

214 Tronvoll and Maru, 2023; *The New Humanitarian*, 2023.

215 United Nations, 2023; International Crisis Group, 2023.

216 UNOCHA, 2023.

the Eastern Corridor in the beginning of 2023, migrant arrivals from the EHoA in Yemen are predicted to surpass the levels reached in 2019 (138,000) by the end of the year.

At the same time, the protection environment for migrants is likely to deteriorate as mixed migration drivers intensify, cross-border movements increase and smuggling and trafficking continue to proliferate – in parallel with migrants' heightened vulnerability, which pushes them towards adopting negative coping strategies, such as family separation and more risky smuggling practices. Migrants, especially those moving irregularly, will continue to face protection risks, human rights violations and challenges in accessing services. In particular, the increase in incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, as seen in 2022, is likely to worsen as more women and girls move in an irregular manner, while migrant children, many of whom are often unaccompanied, will continue to move with little information on the risks that these journeys involve. As observations during recent years have shown, the will to migrate does not cease in this region; it may temporarily decline in times of crisis, when migrants' journeys are only diverted to more expensive and risky routes, but movement flows inevitably pick up again. In light of these observations, it remains critical to incentivize pathways for regular labour migration that can reduce the impact of trafficking and smuggling practices, while enhancing the protection of migrants' rights by facilitating their access to services during the migration process until supporting circular migration schemes across origin and destination countries.

Moreover, return and recovery in this context will remain difficult and unsustainable at times. In many countries in the EHoA, the effects of conflict and climate events are persisting and pervasive, thereby preventing the return of IDPs, refugees and migrants to their areas of origin, which are generally worse off. More specifically, populations displaced by drought will likely be pushed internally and to cross into neighbouring countries to seek humanitarian assistance that is limited in some drought-affected areas, while many of those affected by conflict continue to await more conducive (yet often hard to attain) conditions to

their return, such as reconstruction efforts, improved security and reconciliation. Return movements are projected to increase compared to 2021 and 2022 if such conducive conditions for return are created and ensured, particularly in northern Ethiopia as the peace process evolves, and if the provision of humanitarian assistance and access to vulnerable populations are not hindered.

Within this complex setting, regional coordination and integration on migration have been prioritized through 2022 and 2023. States were brought together during multiple high-level events to boost efforts to include migration in existing regional cooperation frameworks, harmonize policies, strengthen cross-border collaboration, promote migration governance schemes, enhance migrant protection and address the challenges of irregular migration, among others. Considering the severity of the Horn of Africa drought, the importance of human mobility in the context of climate change was raised through the Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change, which was signed in July 2022 by 15 African States, most of which were from the EHoA region.²¹⁷ This landmark declaration aims to address challenges related to climate-induced mobility while ensuring continued growth and economic development. In addition, the first African Climate Action Summit in September 2023 will aim to challenge the status quo and drive forward the acute need for further action to scale up finance and enable a just economic transition for Africa. These actions will be critical for stabilizing vulnerable communities and supporting their adaptation to crises so they are not forced to move. In parallel, through the multi-agency regional Migrant Response Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen (MRP), the need to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance, protection interventions and development support to migrants and host communities along the Eastern Route – the busiest and most risky corridor in this region – was reiterated at the global appeal launch in February 2023.²¹⁸ Furthermore, in March 2023, the fourth Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration (RMFM) called for a stronger collaboration on labour migration governance and regional integration, including working on bilateral

217 *Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change*, 29 July 2022; IOM, 2022w.

218 IOM, 2023o.

labour agreements, ethical recruitment, migrant workers' rights, skills development and job creation.²¹⁹

Finally, RECs in the EHoA – EAC and IGAD – are leading the regional integration agenda and play a key role in advancing human mobility, and by extension freedom of movement, which is a crucial element of regional integration. Thanks to its ratified Common Market Protocol, the levels of integration reached within the EAC are more structured than in IGAD and the African Union, which are advancing similar free movement regimes. By growing its membership in the years to come, EAC could expand opportunities for trade and labour mobility, help jointly address common challenges – climate change, peace and security, and

poverty – as well as enhance its influence as a strong block at the continental and global levels. The launch of the “State of Migration in East and Horn of Africa” report in May 2023, co-authored by IOM, EAC and IGAD, offered an invaluable platform to jointly analyse and discuss the transformative potential of regional integration and human mobility for the socioeconomic development of the region.²²⁰ However, the volatility of conflict, the increasing intensity of climate change added to economic disparities, unemployment and lack of opportunities will remain the main challenges to achieve regional integration and, in turn, advance human mobility that is safe, orderly and regular.

219 IOM, 2023p.

220 IOM, 2023q; Abebe and Mukundi-Wachira (eds.), 2023.



After taking a perilous boat journey across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen's shores, Ethiopian migrants walk for days along the coast to reach Aden, Yemen or other major transit hubs. © IOM 2022 / Rami Ibrahim

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