



International Organization for Migration (IOM)

The UN Migration Agency

Displacement Tracking Matrix | DTM

MOSUL CRISIS

POPULATION MOVEMENTS ANALYSIS

October 2016 to June 2017





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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IOM Iraq thanks the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) for its continued support. IOM Iraq also expresses its gratitude to IOM Iraq's Rapid Assessment and Response Team (RART) members for their work in collecting the data, often in very difficult circumstances; their tireless efforts are the groundwork of this report.

WHAT IS THE DTM?

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is IOM's information management system to track and monitor population displacement during crises. Composed of a variety of tools and processes, the DTM regularly captures and processes multilayered data and disseminates information products that facilitate a better understanding of the evolving needs of the displaced population, whether on site or en route.

Through IOM's Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs)—composed of 123 field staff—present throughout the Iraqi territory, the DTM collects data on numbers and locations of IDPs and returnees using an extended network of over 9,500 key informants. In addition to information collected from key informants, RARTs visit and assess identified locations hosting IDPs to collect more detailed and in-depth information on the displaced or returned population.

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MOSUL CRISIS

POPULATION MOVEMENTS ANALYSIS

1 | INTRODUCTION



INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to provide a chronological analysis of the population movements - displacement and return - that have taken place since the beginning of the Mosul crisis to the end of June 2017.

The offensive by the military forces of Iraq to retake Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) territories in Mosul city and large areas in Ninewa Governorate was launched in October 2016. At the time this report was drafted, in June 2017, hostilities were still ongoing. Most of east and south Ninewa and most of Mosul city had been retaken, with the exception of a few neighborhoods of the old city on the western side of the Tigris River.

On 29 June, the Iraqi forces took over Al-Nuri mosque, marking a significant step in the recapture of the old city. On 9 July, the Iraqi Prime Minister announced that all neighborhoods in west Mosul had been retaken and were under ISF's control. Even though some minor clashes were still ongoing, the Government of Iraq considered the city of Mosul fully *liberated* as of July 2017.

At the same time, Ninewa Governorate, some areas in Telafar district (west of Mosul) and some in Al Ba'aj and Hatra districts (south and south-west of Ninewa), were still under ISIL's control. Outside Ninewa, Hawija district in Kirkuk Governorate, east Al Shirqat district in Salah al-Din Governorate and some central-west regions bordering Syria –particularly west Anbar and some areas of west Salah al-Din Governorate – were also still under ISIL control.

The analysis in this report is based on data collection exercises conducted by IOM Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) through its Emergency Tracking methodology (ET), from October 2016 to the end of June 2017. The events that took place between 29 June and 9 July did not significantly affect the general displacement and return trends outlined in this report. The analysis refers to data collected up to 29 June, to allow enough time for validation.¹ However, the data collection exercise is ongoing and the most updated figures are available on DTM Iraq's dedicated portal.²

The ET was first developed in 2015 to monitor the displacement and return movements in Anbar Governorate, and then started to be widely distributed as it covered ISIL's occupation of Ramadi in May 2015. The tool has since then evolved and been refined to respond more effectively to the ever-changing conflict context and related humanitarian needs.

Throughout 2016, the ET covered the displacement and return movements caused by the military operations to recapture ISIL-controlled areas in Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Ninewa; these operations paved the way to the Mosul offensive.³ As the humanitarian response to the Mosul crisis required real-time data, the DTM created a dedicated online portal that provides daily information about locations of origin and locations of displacement, population movements' trends, shelter arrangements, maps and analyses. The DTM officially launched the ET portal with the beginning of the Mosul operations in October 2016.

The DTM now has an archive of daily updates and information covering the population movements triggered by the Mosul crisis, which have fed into this analysis and helped identify main patterns and trends over time.

The report is articulated as follows:

- 1. Mosul crisis are contextualized: overview of the displacement history preceding the operations and of the displacement situation at the time the offensive began;**
- 2. Displacement and return movements during Mosul crisis are analyzed chronologically: three different phases in Mosul operations that influenced displacement and return pattern are identified;**
- 3. Focus is shifted to specific areas of displacement: these have been affected differently by the crisis –receiving fewer or more IDPs– and had different responses to the influx.**

Findings are illustrated in maps, info-graphics and charts. All the data are available on DTM's Mosul Portal, where the entire archive can be retrieved.

The analysis presented in this report is also available on the "Mosul Crisis - Atlas of Displacement" and is accessible from the dedicated DTM Mosul Portal. This is a web Geographic Information System (GIS) tool that provides an interactive overview of the crisis throughout its three phases, allowing users to understand and read the geographic dimension of the displacement and its patterns.

1. The Emergency Tracking (ET) is DTM's crisis-based tool designed to monitor and track sudden displacement or return movements triggered by specific crises. The DTM ET methodology is explained in the following chapter. Further information available on IOM Iraq DTM portal: <http://iraqdtm.iom.int>.

2. To access the DTM ET Portal, please visit: <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/EmergencyTracking.aspx>

3. The DTM activated several ETs to track displacement and return movements related to various crises, such as the Anbar corridor operations from March 2016, the Mosul corridor (Salah al-Din and Southern Ninewa operations) from June 2016, and Hawija operations from August 2016.

2 | METHODOLOGY

THE DTM EMERGENCY TRACKING (ET)



METHODOLOGY

THE DTM EMERGENCY TRACKING (ET)

The DTM Emergency Tracking (ET) is one of the key components of IOM Iraq DTM methodology.⁴ Activated on an ad hoc basis, it aims at tracking displacement or return movements triggered by specific crises.

The ET provides information about the number of families by location of displacement up to the fifth administration level, namely neighborhood in urban areas, village in rural areas, and separately, in camps.

Data are collected through IOM's Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs), composed of 123 staff members deployed across Iraq, and engaged in data collection and field emergency response activities. Data are gathered through interviews conducted with a well-established network of over 9,500 key informants, including community leaders, mukhtars, local authorities and security forces. Information is also collected from the government's registration data, camp management and partner agencies.

ET updates are released on a daily basis at the onset of a crisis; the schedule is then adapted to the unfolding humanitarian

needs. Given the challenging operational context of DTM, the ET strives to provide best estimates while acknowledging its limitations. Data are further verified and validated during the process and finally included in the regular DTM Master List (ML) and Returnee Master List (RML), published biweekly.


The ET typically monitors a more contained geographical area than the ML/RML, which allows collecting more detailed geographical information. However, the timeframe does not allow gathering in-depth information on the shelter type or demographics of the population in movement. More comprehensive monitoring and assessment tools, as defined within the DTM methodology, aim to capture this information at later stages.

However, DTM data, whether collected through the regular ML/RML or through the ET, are designed to capture and report a snapshot of the existing displacement or return situation for the indicated date range. The DTM has been able to provide estimates of the cumulative caseload and the results are presented in this report, but these require further analysis and are not self-evident from the totals reported in the updates.



4. For more information about the DTM methodology and information products, please visit: <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> and <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/EmergencyTracking.aspx>.

3 | DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS



إبطال
تليوي
الفوج

DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

IDPS

According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.” (United Nations, 1998). DTM considers IDPs all those who have fled from their original home and are living in a different settlement in a different location. The number of individuals is calculated by multiplying the number of families by six, the average size of an Iraqi family.

RETURNEES

The DTM considers returnees all those individuals previously displaced who return to their sub-district of origin, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or to another shelter type. The DTM’s definition of returnees is unrelated to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy for a durable solution. The DTM records permanent return and does not capture “go-and-see” visits.

LOCATION

A location is defined as a camp, a village in rural areas or a quarter (neighborhood) in urban areas.

Locations’ boundaries are determined based on the key informants and RARTs’ knowledge and evaluation.

PRIVATE SETTINGS

Include rented houses, hotels/motels and host families.

CRITICAL SHELTERS

Include informal settlements, religious buildings, schools, unfinished or abandoned buildings and other informal settlements.

DTM – Displacement Tracking Matrix

GoI – Government of Iraq

IDP – Internally Displaced Person

IED – Improvised explosive device

IFG – Federal Government of Iraq

IOM – International Organization for Migration

ISF – Iraqi Security Forces

ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant


KRG – Kurdistan Regional Government

KRI – Kurdistan Region of Iraq

MoMD – Ministry of Migration and Displacement

PMF / PMU – Popular Mobilization Forces / Popular Mobilization Units

UXO – Unexploded Ordnance



4 | HIGHLIGHTS AND KEY FIGURES



HIGHLIGHTS AND KEY FIGURES

Number of IDPs displaced from 17 October 2016 to 29 June 2017 (cumulative)	1,021,476
Number of IDPs still displaced on 29 June 2017	819,534
Number of returnees as of 29 June 2017	201,942
Phase 1: Number of IDPs displaced between 17 October and 1 November 2016 (cumulative)	16,992
Phase 2: Number of IDPs displaced between 1 November 2016 and 25 February 2017 (cumulative)	206,976
Phase 3: Number of IDPs displaced between 25 February and 29 June 2017 (cumulative)	797,508
Number of IDPs displaced from Mosul city (cumulative)	830,244
Number of IDPs displaced from east Mosul city (cumulative)	95,658
Number of IDPs displaced from west Mosul city (cumulative)	734,586
Number of IDPs displaced to Ninewa governorate from 17 October 2016 to 29 June 2017 (cumulative)	983,928
Number of IDP displaced out of Ninewa governorate from 17 October 2016 to 29 June 2017 (cumulative)	37,548
Number of IDPs hosted in camps and emergency sites as of 29 June 2017	356,658
Number of IDPs hosted in out-of-camp settings as of 29 June 2017	462,876




MOSUL

5 |


SETTING THE SCENE

DISPLACEMENT OVERVIEW BEFORE MOSUL OFFENSIVE



BEGINNING AND END OF ALL OPERATIONS

from March 2016 to October 2016



- 22 May '16 | Falluja offensive**
The offensive to regain control of the city and the district of Falluja is launched. By the end of the operations, over a one-month period, more than 85,000 individuals displaced from the city of Falluja and its outskirts
- Jun '16 | Mosul corridor**
The military operations to retake areas under ISIL's control in Salah al-Din and southern Ninewa governorates begin. The hostilities target areas in Al Shirqat and Baiji districts, in Salah al-Din Governorate, and Qayara district in Ninewa Governorate. Since May 2017 clashes in Salah al-Din have been ongoing. By the end of June 2017, the Mosul corridor operations have caused a cumulative displacement of more than 200,000 individuals



- 16 Jun '16 | **Al Shirqat offensive**
 The military operations to recapture ISIL-controlled regions in Salah al-Din Governorate begin and heavily affect Al-Shirqat, Baiji and al-Daur districts
- 19 Jun '16
 End of Makhmour district military operations
- 21 Jun '16 | **Qayara military operations**
 The offensive to retake the sub-district of Qayara, Mosul district, southern Ninewa Governorate, begin. Premptive displacement has taken place during the weeks preceding the hostilities

- 28 Jun '16
 After gaining control of the city of Falluja on 26 June, the Iraqi Army fully recaptures the remaining suburbs.
- 9 Jul '16
 The Iraqi Army takes over Qayara airbase.
- Aug '16 | **Hawija district military operations**
 The operations to retake the district of Hawija, in Kirkuk Governorate, had started earlier in 2016 but intensified at the beginning of August. Hostilities are ongoing but stalled since the beginning of the Mosul offensive in October 2016. Between August 2016 and June 2017, the clashes have caused the displacement of approximately 100,000 individuals"

- 24 Aug '16
 The military takes over the town of Qayara and the surrounding areas
- Sep '16
 Returns to the sub-district of Qayara begin from early September
- 17 Sep '16 | **Returns to Falluja**
 Following encouragement by local authorities, return movements kick off. Between September and the end of 2016, approximately 165,000 individuals return. By the end of June 2017, the number is over 400,000
- 17 Oct '16
 The offensive to recapture the city of Mosul and the remaining areas in Ninewa Governorate under ISIL's control begin. In the meantime, clashes in Salah al-Din and Hawija, although with less intense, are still ongoing



Data are extracted from IOM Iraq DTM Emergency Tracking archive and biweekly Master List/Returnee Master List

Introducing the nationwide displacement situation prior to 17 October 2016, when the military operations to retake Mosul began, allows to better evaluate the impact of new displacement and return movements on the preexisting context. It also sheds light on how that situation might have influenced the population movement patterns, particularly in terms of direction, routes and shelter type options.

Some governorates neighboring Ninewa, such as Salah al-Din and Anbar, were still affected by hostilities during the Mosul offensive, hence for a large part were off-limits to IDPs. By the time the Mosul offensive was launched, other neighboring governorates such as Dahuk and Erbil had been hosting a high number of IDPs for more than two years and a half, that is, since June–July 2014, when ISIL occupied Ninewa Governorate. These neighboring governorates were not keen on allowing more IDPs and implemented restrictive policies. Many other governorates enforced strict security regulations such as only allowing in IDPs who had sponsorships –and in some cases, would not allow them in at all.

At the time the Mosul military operations started on 17 October 2016, Iraq had been in conflict for almost three years. ISIL occupied territories in Anbar Governorate at the end of 2013, rapidly expanding to Ninewa and Salah al-Din, followed by Kirkuk and Diyala governorates. The city of Mosul and Ninewa Governorate had been under ISIL's control since as early as June 2014.

At the beginning of Mosul operations, the DTM had identified 3.2 million IDPs in Iraq, of who 1.2 were originally from Ninewa Governorate.⁵ Approximately 600,000 individuals had displaced between June and July 2014, when ISIL captured the city of Mosul and significant portions of Ninewa.

These IDPs, who displaced from Ninewa before the beginning of Mosul operations, were not evenly distributed across the country: 33% (approximately 400,000 individuals) were hosted in Dahuk Governorate, 15% (170,000) in Erbil Governorate and 24% (300,000) in Ninewa Governorate. Half of the IDPs displaced to Ninewa (approximately 150,000 individuals), were displaced to Akre and Al-Shikhan districts, legally within Ninewa borders but de facto under KRG control, respectively since 1991 and 2003.

The distribution of IDPs by shelter type is also key to understand the impact that the Mosul offensive had on the preexisting displacement context: as of 13 October 2016, the IDP population in camps was 15% of the total IDP population (approximately 470,000 individuals). By the end of June 2017, the population in camps grew to 770,000 individuals (corresponding to 23% of the displaced population at the end of June) as a direct consequence of the operations in Mosul.

As of mid-October 2016, the DTM had identified 1 million returnees; of these, 135,000 had returned to areas in Ninewa that had been retaken in early 2015.⁶

The only other area in Ninewa that recorded significant returns was Haj Ali in Qayara sub-district, retaken in July 2016 during the Qayara operations. Approximately 25,000 recently displaced IDPs returned as soon as the area was cleared despite the precarious livelihood conditions, after a brief period of displacement to Dibaga camps in Makhmour district.


The timeline (Page 14 and 15) provides a concise overview of the military operations that preceded the Mosul offensive. At the time Mosul offensive was launched, hostilities were ongoing in Kirkuk Governorate and in Salah al-Din, particularly in Baiji and Al Shirqat districts. At that time (October 2016), along the Mosul corridor (i.e. those areas connecting the recaptured districts of Anbar to southern Ninewa), the DTM had identified 84,000 IDPs from Baiji, Al Shirqat, Al Daur and Qayara. In addition, another 30,000 individuals were displaced due to the hostilities in Hawija and 13,000 IDPs who displaced in March 2016 because of operations in Makhmour were still in displacement and had not returned yet. The number of IDPs scattered along the Mosul corridor kept on growing after the beginning of the Mosul offensive, despite the stall of the military operations in Hawija.⁷

Map 1 shows the displacement along the Mosul corridor at the beginning of the Mosul offensive.

5. DTM Master List and Returnee Master List Round 56 updated as of 13 October. Available at <http://iraqdtm.iom.int>.

6. The DTM located returnees mainly in Sinjar, Telafar and Tilkaif districts, which had been retaken by the Peshmerga at the end of 2014 and first months of 2015. Return movements were recorded as early as December 2014, with intensified waves during the spring of 2015. These events prompted the launch of the DTM Returnee Master List, first published in April 2015.

7. ET Hawija, released on 17 October 2016; ET Salah al-Din and Ninewa, released on 16 October 2016.



Kirkuk 20,892
 Erbil 28,374
 Salah al-Din 78,666

127,932 IDP Individuals
21,322 IDP Families

Total number of IDPs by Shelter Category

Critical Shelter
 64,038

Camps/Emergency Sites
 46,974

Private Settings
 2,048

Unknow Shelter Arrangements
 4,350

IDP individuals by District of Origin Salah al-Din and Ninewa ET*



*Including Makhmur IDPs

13,158	Makhmur
13,998	Mosul
14,484	Baiji
55,554	Al Shirqat
97,194	Total

IDP individuals by District of Origin Hawija ET



30,738 Hawija

MAP 1 | MOSUL CORRIDOR DISPLACEMENT SITUATION AS OF 17 OCTOBER 2016
 The map shows the displacement situation caused by the operations along the Mosul corridor just before the beginning of Mosul military operations, as of 17 October 2016.


6 | MOSUL CRISIS

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN MOVEMENTS
SINCE 17 OCTOBER 2016

CHRONOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The operations to retake the city of Mosul and the remaining areas of Ninewa under ISIL's control started on 17 October 2016. The first displacement movements were reported a day later. The DTM has identified three phases of displacement flows, broken down to facilitate analysis.

FIGURE 1 | POPULATION MOVEMENTS TIMELINE DURING MOSUL CRISIS
 17 October 2016 - 29 June 2017



1. FIRST PHASE:

17 October to 1 November 2016

The military operations started on 17 October and initially targeted the areas around Mosul, particularly east and southeast of the city. The army reached the edge of the city at the end of October. During the first couple of weeks, hostilities mainly affected rural areas and displacement from villages in the districts and sub-districts of Al Shura, Baashiqa, Tilkaif, Hamdaniya and Namroud took place.

2. SECOND PHASE:

1 November 2016 to 25 February 2017

At the beginning of November, the Iraqi forces reached Kokjali, a suburb of Baashiqa sub-district –the first urban suburb of Mosul city. Hostilities then moved to more densely populated urban areas. The Prime Minister declared the east side of Mosul *liberated* on 24 January 2017. During this phase, displacement was mainly from east Mosul, which continued at a slower pace in the weeks following the retaking of east Mosul by the Iraqi forces.

3. THIRD PHASE:

25 February to end of June 2017

Even though the official launch of the offensive to retake west Mosul was announced on 19 February, no displacement was recorded until 25 February. West Mosul was more densely populated, hence military operations progressed more slowly and caused more large-scale damage than in the east side. By the end of June, most neighborhoods had been retaken, with the exception of the old city. During this period, displacement was almost exclusively from the west side of the city.⁸

8. The DTM relies on its updates of 1 November 2016 and 23 February and 29 June 2017 as benchmarks to conduct its analysis.

6.1 |

FIRST PHASE

17 OCTOBER TO 1 NOVEMBER 2016

Phase 1

Oct '16

17 Oct '16

1 Nov '16

1 Nov '16

CONTEXT AND MAIN EVENTS

In the first couple of weeks, hostilities targeted rural areas in the northeastern, eastern and southern areas of Ninewa and around the city of Mosul, while western areas, particularly Telafar district, mostly remained under ISIL's control. As shown in Map 2, clashes primarily affected the sub-districts of Al Shura, Baashiqa, Merkaz Tilkaif, Merkaz Hamdaniya and Al Namroud.

Some factors determining displacement patterns emerged as early as operations began and remained recurring during the crisis.

The Iraqi forces had a large impact on the direction and characteristics of displacement.⁹ Typically, IDPs would move towards the frontline, ideally towards mustering points, where they were gathered by army forces (whether Peshmerga, ISF or PMF, depending on the area) and then transported towards screening sites for security clearance. Screening sites were more or less mobile and changed over time. In some cases, buildings such as mosques or schools were temporarily used as a first shelter; in other cases, the screening sites consisted of a few Rubb Halls at the entrance or close to the camps. As a rule of thumb, no IDP could be admitted to camps or allowed to move in with host families prior to the security clearance. Thus, shelter options were initially reduced either to host families who could provide sponsorship or to camps, as security regulations did not leave much room for other alternatives. During the crisis, 19 camps or emergency sites were opened to respond to the new displacement, all within Ninewa borders, and a few existing ones were used as well (Dibaga, Qaymawa and a number of camps out of Ninewa).

The direction of displacement was mostly dictated by the IDPs' place of origin, as IDPs were often transported to the closest screening site and closest camp. As shown in Map 2 and Table 1, by the end of this first phase, on 1 November 2016, IDPs from Gwyer were hosted in the nearby Dibaga camps, IDPs from Baashiqa and Tilkaif in Hamdaniya camps, while IDPs from Al Shura and Qayara were displaced within Qayara sub-district, part of which had been retaken a few months earlier.

As well, the availability of shelter determined the location of displacement. On the one hand, the availability of plots in the existing camps or in those under construction influenced the flux


of IDPs. On the other, IDPs were not granted access to several governorates, including the neighboring KRI governorates¹⁰, and hence could not rely on host families and relatives who displaced two years earlier and were at that moment residing in the KRI.¹¹

Occasionally, secondary displacement was also observed when IDPs moved from one camp to another. There could be a number of reasons for this: family reunification, transfer due to the availability of new plots or transfer as a transit towards the south. For instance, camps in northern Ninewa (Shikhan and Akre) and Hamdaniya are located in regions that are under Peshmerga control and KRG administration. The same applies to the camps in Makhmour, where administration is shared between Erbil and Ninewa, but military control has been Kurdish since 2003. Families hosted there could not process any sponsorship application for the KRG areas because access to KRI was not allowed. Hence, IDPs would move to camps in southern Ninewa, specifically to Al Qayara sub-district, and then proceed through Salah al-Din, heading either south to Anbar or most likely to Baghdad.

9. As reported in the Humanitarian Response Plan (January-December 2017), "At the onset of the military campaign to retake western Mosul, the Iraqi Security Forces confirmed their intention to adhere to their humanitarian concept of operations, putting civilian protection at the centre of their military strategy. Security forces will ask civilians to remain in their homes, promising that every effort will be made to protect them. Where this is not possible, the ISF intends to help families cross front-lines to safety. With military operations expected to continue for months, partners are rushing to expand emergency sites south of Mosul in areas designated as safe zones by authorities." (p.36). Iraq: 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan - January-December 2017 (online) available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq> retrieved on 11 July 2017.

10. The only exception was that of IDPs flying to Erbil, after transiting through Baghdad. More explanation in chapter 8.2.

11. During the following phases, some families moved to central-south Iraq to rely on sponsorship and move in with relatives.



MAP 2 | PHASE 1: MAIN DISPLACEMENT MOVEMENTS AND LOCATIONS OF DISPLACEMENT AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 2016

The map shows the main displacement movements that took place during the first phase of Mosul military operations and the concentration of IDPs as of 1 November 2016.


DISPLACEMENT TRENDS OVERVIEW

CUMULATIVE FIGURES

Figure 2 shows the caseload as of 1 November 2016. By the time the operations reached Kokjali, the cumulative number of IDPs was of 16,992 individuals. Return movements to newly

retaken areas had not been recorded yet as circumstances did not allow returns. Most locations of origin were still under conflict during this phase, or not yet cleared for returns.

FIGURE 2 | NUMBER OF IDPS DURING PHASE 1
 17 October - 1 November 2016



Still displaced | on 1 Nov '16
 2,832 Families | 16,992 Individuals

Cumulative | from 18 Oct to 1 Nov '16
 2,832 Families | 16,992 Individuals

LOCATIONS OF DISPLACEMENT

During the first phase, only three governorates received the initial wave of IDPs. Ninewa, from the very beginning, was the main governorate of displacement, hosting 96% of new IDPs (16,230 individuals) as of 1 November 2016. Anbar and Erbil governorates immediately received new IDPs, but their number remained constant during the following phases of the offensive. As of 1 November 2016, Erbil was hosting 318 IDPs from Gwyer sub-district, while Anbar had received approximately 444 IDPs from Al Shura and Qayara sub-districts. Graph x shows the distribution of IDPs as of 1 November 2016 by sub-district of displacement, while Graph x shows their arrival over time.

In Erbil, only Makhmour district was open to IDPs. IDPs from Gwyer sub-district were displaced to camps in Dibaga sub-district or to nearby villages. IDPs going to Anbar crossed Hatra district and Salah al-Din Governorate by their own means, often through ISIL-controlled areas, to reach safe haven in Anbar. In some cases, IDPs settled in Anbar and in others they crossed Anbar as a transitory step towards Baghdad Governorate.¹²

FIGURE 3 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT
 17 October - 1 November 2016




FIGURE 4 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT
 as of 1 November 2016

NINEWA	95%	ANBAR	3%
Al-Hamdaniya	4,218	Falluja	444
Mosul	9,822	ERBIL	2%
Tilkaif	2,190	Makhmur	318

12. These events are discussed in chapter 8.3.

SHELTER CATEGORY

As of 1 November 2016, 52% of IDPs (8,790) were hosted in camps or screening sites. This included the entire IDP population in Anbar hosted in Bezabize Central Camp, the IDP population in Erbil hosted in Dibaga Camp in Makhmur district, and a large number of IDPs in Ninewa across different camps in Qayara and Merkaz Hamdaniya sub-districts (Figure 6). At this stage, 33% of IDPs (5,652) were allowed to move in with host families. This was the case in Qayara and Al Namrud sub-districts, where IDPs were mostly from nearby locations and could easily rely on relatives who could sponsor them. Finally, approximately 15% of IDPs displaced at that moment had to settle in critical shelters.





FIGURE 6 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY SHELTER CATEGORY
 17 October - 1 November 2016



LOCATIONS OF ORIGIN

IDPs were originally from the sub-districts affected by the hostilities, namely Al Shura (45%), Merkaz Tilkaif (14%), Baashiqa (13%), Namroud (11%) and Qayara (7%). Figure 8, a timeline, shows how displacement took place as military operations progressed.

FIGURE 7 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN
 as of 1 November 2016

FIGURE 5 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SHELTER CATEGORY AND GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT
 as of 1 November 2016





FIGURE 8 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN
 17 October - 1 November 2016




TABLE 1 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN AND SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT
 as of 1 November 2016

Governorate of displacement	Sub-district of displacement	Sub-district of origin								Grand Total
		Al-Namroud	Al-Qayara	Al-Shura	Baashiqa	Gwyer	Hamam al Aleel	Markaz Tilkaif	Other	
Erbil	Dibaga	0	0	0	0	318	0	0	0	318
Anbar	Al-Amirya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	444	444
Ninewa	Al-Namroud	1,800	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,800
	Al-Qayara	0	1,200	7,722	0	0	900	0	0	9,822
	Markaz Al-Hamdaniya	0	0	0	2,274	0	0	144	0	2,418
	Markaz Tilkaif	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,190	0	2,190
Grand Total		1,800	1,200	7,722	2,274	318	900	2,334	444	16,992

6.2 |

SECOND PHASE

1 NOVEMBER 2016 TO 25 FEBRUARY 2017

Phase 2

17 Oct '16

1 Nov '16

1 Nov '16

1 Nov '16

The hostilities reach Kokjali, a suburb at the edge of eastern Mosul. The operations to retake east Mosul city begin.

1 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

Approximately 23 out of 70 neighborhoods are retaken by mid-December.

29 Dec '16

The military operations resume to retake the remaining 47 neighborhoods of east Mosul.

1 Jan '17

24 Jan '17

The Iraqi announce neighborhoods of Mosul control

CONTEXT AND MAIN EVENTS

On 1 November, the Iraqi forces reached Kokjali, a suburb of eastern Mosul that officially belongs to Baashiqa sub-district but is the stepping stone into east Mosul's urban area. The military operations stalled around 14 December 2016. At that time, about a third of the east side of the city was under the Iraqi forces' control. The offensive resumed with more intensity on 29 December and by 24 January Iraq's Prime Minister publicly announced the recapture of all neighborhoods in east Mosul, after having had to withdraw a similar announcement a few days earlier. During the following weeks, displacement from the east side of the city continued. Security remained precarious because of frequent attacks by ISIL fighters who managed to infiltrate from the west side. Drones targeted numerous areas, and many neighborhoods, particularly those overlooking the Tigris bank, were reached by mortars and snipers. The clashes inflicted severe damage on the general infrastructure and on dwellings in the eastern side of the city. Residents of eastern neighborhoods reported widespread contamination by unexploded ordnances (UXOs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). People complained about the scarcity of food distributions, and lack of regular income was often mentioned as a crucial issue that curbed access to food, although markets were active. There was no running drinking water, which had to be purchased in bottles. Numerous neighborhoods reported problems in sanitation and hygiene because of the damages to the sewerage system. Hospitals and health care facilities were not fully functioning, and there was no electricity supply for weeks because the electricity network had been damaged during the clashes, and fuel was not affordable. Many houses did not have running water, electricity or heating in the middle of the winter.¹³ These conditions pushed hundreds of families to leave the city although it had been retaken, as they sought temporary shelter and assistance in camps (Map 3).

During that period, return movements began (Map 5). Returns took place because many villages received security clearance, particularly in Al Shura and Qayara sub-districts, where families began to return as early as mid-November. The first returns to Hammam Al Aleel and Al Namroud were registered by the end of November, particularly from Qayara Jad'ah camps, and Baashiqa followed before mid-December. This means that returns towards the rural areas recaptured during the first phase began in the first six weeks of the second phase of the operations that targeted the urban areas of east Mosul.

Returns to the city of Mosul were reported as of the second half of December 2016 and increased moderately until mid-January 2017. Around 15 January there were around 15,000 returnees to rural areas, but there were fewer than 3,000 returns to Mosul. Returns increased more rapidly from the end of January, particularly after the Iraqi Prime Minister declared east Mosul retaken. On 25 January, the KRG issued a statement on the return of IDPs to their homes: "We very much welcome the return of IDPs to their places of origin and we will continue to do everything in our power to support and facilitate their voluntary return upon their free choice."¹⁴ Following this statement, the return of IDPs from KRG-controlled areas, such as Hamdaniya district or Al Shikhan, began to be recorded more consistently. The first return movements were recorded a day later, on 26 January, from Khazer M1 camp in Merkaz Hamdaniya sub-district and from Nargizliya camp in Shikhan district, both under KRG control. Returns were often facilitated and supported by local authorities, including the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD), which provided transportation as far as Kokjali or the frontline, from where returnees moved independently. Many IDPs also returned by their own means.

13. Since January 2017, DTM has conducted weekly field visit to assess the population and collect preliminary information about their main needs, accessible services, security and infrastructure. Preliminary results were shared with the UN Humanitarian Operation Centre lead by UN OCHA Iraq. More information about the findings of this assessment will be provided in the following chapter.

14. KRG Cabinet press release. Available at <http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=55324> retrieved on 2 July 2017.

DISPLACEMENT TRENDS OVERVIEW


CUMULATIVE FIGURES

Between 1 November 2016 and 23 February 2017, the DTM estimated that 206,976 individuals were displaced. These, added to the total number of individuals displaced during the first phase (between 17 October and 1 November) brought the cumulative number of individuals displaced since the beginning of the operations to almost 223,968 by the end of February.

During this second phase (1 November – 23 February), returns

were recorded for the first time. Overall, an estimated 62,250 individuals returned to their homes between these dates.


At the beginning of the operations in west Mosul, 223,968 individuals had been forced to leave their homes: of these, more than 161,718 were still in displacement by 23 February, while 62,250 had returned by the same date.



MAP 3 | PHASE 2: MAIN DISPLACEMENT MOVEMENTS

The map shows the main displacement movements that took place during the second phase of Mosul military operations.

FIGURE 9 | NUMBER OF IDPS AND RETURNEES DURING PHASE 2
 1 November 2016 - 23 February 2017




LOCATIONS OF DISPLACEMENT

As shown in Figure 11 and Map 4, by the end of February 2017 Ninewa Governorate was hosting the highest number of IDPs with 93% (150,486 individuals). IDPs were particularly concentrated in Merkaz Hamdaniya sub-district (41% or 65,868), and in Qayara sub-district (37% or 59,448). These two areas host most of the camps and emergency sites that were built to respond to the Mosul humanitarian crisis.¹⁵

As previously explained, during the first two weeks of Mosul operations (17 October – 1 November), IDPs were hosted in Ninewa, Erbil and Anbar. In the second phase, IDPs began to reach other governorates including Babylon, Baghdad, Qadissiya and Salah al-Din, where they reached relatives able to provide support and sponsorship.


FIGURE 10 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT
 1 November 2016 - 23 February 2017




15. More details are provided in chapter 8.1.



FIGURE 11 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT
 as of 23 February 2017



NINEWA _____	93%	SALAH AL-DIN _____	1%
Akre	48	Al-Daur	84
Al-Hamdaniya	68,808	Samarra	486
Al-Shikhan	9,378	Tikrit	1,152
Hatra	1,440	ANBAR _____	0%
Mosul	70,728	Falluja	444
Telafar	72	Ramadi	120
Tilkaif	12	BABYLON _____	0%
BAGHDAD _____	5%	Al-Mahawil	36
Abu Ghraib	96	Al-Musayab	18
Adhamia	2,904	Hashimiya	12
Al Resafa	1,044	Hilla	84
Kadhimia	534	ERBIL _____	0%
Karkh	3,528	Erbil	12
Mada'in	24	Makhmur	462
Mahmoudiya	12	QADISSIYA _____	0%
Thawra2	132	Diwaniya	18



The map shows the location of displacement of IDPs and their concentration as of 23 February 2017.

SHELTER CATEGORY

Most IDPs were hosted in camps and newly opened emergency sites. The percentage of IDPs hosted in camps grew from 50% on 1 November 2016 to 80% on 23 February 2017, with less than one fifth of the IDPs hosted in private settings.

The increase was of 121,248 individuals, bringing the total number of IDPs hosted in camps to 129,720 as of 23 February. An explanation to this increase might be that newly displaced IDPs were directed towards camps, unless they could leave Ninewa by their own means and seek shelter elsewhere in Iraq.

The number of IDPs hosted in camps grew exponentially during this second phase (Figure 12 and 13) and the increase was so remarkable that it affected the IDP distribution by shelter type countrywide.





FIGURE 13 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY SHELTER CATEGORY

1 November 2016 - 23 February 2017



LOCATIONS OF ORIGIN

As of 23 February, 64% of IDPs still in displacement were originally from the city of Mosul (102,792 individuals), while the rest were IDPs from several rural areas around the city who had not returned yet to retaken regions, particularly Tilkaif, Baashiqa, Al Shura and Qayara (Figure 14).

As observed during the first weeks of the Mosul offensive, the proximity to the area of origin and the progress of operations inevitably influenced the displacement patterns during the second phase. It was also determined by the availability of plots where camp construction had been ongoing during the crisis. The availability of plots was in turn influenced by return movements, since vacant plots could be reallocated to newcomers. This meant that those camps with a higher number of returnees tended to have a higher turnover.

FIGURE 14 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN as of 23 February 2017






FIGURE 15 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN 1 November 2016 - 23 February 2017





RETURN TRENDS OVERVIEW

By 23 February 2017, the number of returnees was estimated at 62,250 individuals, but return movements to Merkaz Mosul sub-district (meaning mostly east Mosul) did not start until December 2016. However, by the end of February 2017 returnees to Merkaz Mosul represented 43% (26,820 individuals) of the overall returnee population, followed by returnees to Baashiqa (27% or 16,734) and to the remaining sub-districts in southern Ninewa affected by the hostilities in October 2016 (Figure 16).

MAP 5 | PHASE 2: RETURN MOVEMENTS AND LOCATIONS OF RETURN AS OF 23 FEBRUARY 2017

The map shows the main return movements that took place during the second phase of Mosul military operations and the concentration of returnees as of 23 February 2017.

It is also interesting to analyze return movements according to the last location of displacement (Figure 18). By 23 February, 70% of the total returnees (43,548) had returned from Merkaz Hamdaniya camps, while returnees from camps in Qayara represented 14% of the overall number of returnees (8,814).

FIGURE 16 | NUMBER OF RETURNEES BY SUB-DISTRICT OF RETURN as of 23 February 2017





FIGURE 17 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF RETURNEES BY SUB-DISTRICT OF RETURN 1 November 2016 - 23 February 2017



It is not surprising that Qayara and Merkaz Hamdaniya were the main last sub-districts of displacement of most returnees, since the two areas hosted a very high share of the overall IDP population displaced from Mosul. By the end of February, a cumulative number of 109,416 IDPs had gone through Hamdaniya and 68,262 through Qayara, and of these, 65,868 (in Hamdaniya) and 59,448 (in Qayara) were still displaced as of 23 February while the rest had returned. While most of the returns from Qayara took place from mid-November and headed

towards rural areas, most of the returns from Merkaz Hamdaniya were towards east Mosul and kicked off in the second half of January, particularly after the successive declarations about east Mosul recapture and the KRG statement on its willingness to support and facilitate voluntary returns.

FIGURE 18 | NUMBER OF RETURNEES BY LAST SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT
 as of 23 February 2017





FIGURE 19 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF RETURNEES BY LAST SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT
 1 November 2016 - 23 February 2017



SUMMARY TABLES

TABLE 2 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN AND GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT *as of 23 February 2017*

Governorate of displacement	Sub-district of origin															Grand Total
	Al- Mu-halabiya	Al-Namroud	Al-Qayara	Al-Shura	Altal	Ayadiya	Baashiqa	Bartalla	Gwyer	Hamam al Aleel	Markaz Mosul	Markaz Sinjar	Markaz Telfafar	Markaz Tilkaif	(blank)	
Anbar	0	0	216	228	0	0	0	0	0	0	120	0	0	0	0	564
Babylon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	120	18	0	6	0	150
Baghdad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8,172	0	0	0	102	8,274
Erbil	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	318	0	0	0	0	0	144	474
Ninewa	4,524	3,090	1,290	4,488	18,594	72	11,544	24	0	960	94,092	0	1,278	10,530	0	150,486
Qadissiya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	18
Salah al-Din	0	120	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	240	0	0	0	1,362	1,722
Sulaymaniyah	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	0	0	0	30
Grand Total	4,524	3,210	1,506	4,716	18,594	72	11,556	24	318	966	102,792	18	1,278	10,536	1,608	161,718

TABLE 3 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN AND SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT IN NINEWA GOVERNORATE *as of 23 February 2017*

Governorate and district of displacement	Sub-district of origin												
	Al- Muhalabiya	Al-Namroud	Al-Qayara	Al-Shura	Altal	Ayadiya	Baashiqa	Bartalla	Hamam al Aleel	Markaz Mosul	Markaz Telfafar	Markaz Tilkaif	
Ninewa	4,524	3,090	1,290	4,488	18,594	72	11,544	24	960	94,092	1,278	10,530	
Al-Namroud	0	2,124	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	816	0	0	
Al-Qayara	3,084	810	1,200	4,488	18,594	0	0	0	954	29,190	1,128	0	
Al-Shura	0	0	90	0	0	0	0	0	0	420	0	0	
Baashiqa	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,152	0	0	636	0	282	
Markaz Akre	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	0	0	0	0	0	
Markaz Al-Ham-daniya	0	156	0	0	0	0	9,840	24	0	50,328	150	5,370	
Markaz Al-Shikhan	0	0	0	0	0	0	504	0	6	4,002	0	4,866	
Markaz Hatra	1,440	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Markaz Mosul	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,700	0	0	
Markaz Tilkaif	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	
Zummar	0	0	0	0	0	72	0	0	0	0	0	0	
(blank)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,000	0	0	
Qadissiya	4,524	3,090	1,290	4,488	18,594	72	11,544	24	960	94,092	1,278	10,530	
Ninewa	4524	3090	1290	4488	18594	72	11544	24	0	960	94092	0	
Grand Total	4524	3210	1506	4716	18594	72	11556	24	318	966	102792	18	

TABLE 4 | NUMBER OF RETURNEES BY SUB-DISTRICT OF LAST DISPLACEMENT AND SUB-DISTRICT OF RETURN *as of 23 February 2017*

Sub-district of return	Sub-district of last displacement										
	Al-Namroud	Al-Qayara	Al-Shura	Baashiqa	Markaz Al-Hamdaniya	Markaz Al-Shikhan	Markaz Erbil	Markaz Kirkuk	Markaz Makhmur	Markaz Mosul	Markaz Tilkaif
Al-Namroud	2550	0	1200	0	360	0	0	0	0	1212	0
Al-Qayara	0	1944	0	0	1632	0	0	0	150	0	0
Al-Shura	0	5880	0	0	0	0	18	12	0	0	0
Baashiqa	0	0	0	792	15432	0	0	0	0	354	156
Hamam al Aleel	0	894	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Markaz Mosul	600	96	0	756	24438	930	0	0	0	0	0
Markaz Tilkaif	0	0	0	1008	1686	150	0	0	0	0	0

6.3 |

THIRD PHASE

25 FEBRUARY TO 29 JUNE 2017

Phase 3

25 Feb '17

1 Mar '17

19 Feb '17

The military operations to retake west Mosul are announced to begin.

25 Feb '17

First displacement movements from West Mosul are recorded.

1 Apr '17

1 May '17

CONTEXT AND MAIN EVENTS

On 19 February 2017, the Iraqi Government announced the launch of the military operations to retake west Mosul. In the first week, fighting concentrated around the airport and Ghazlani military base, both not densely populated areas. When on 23 February the clashes reached inhabited neighborhoods, displacement began to be recorded. On 26 May 2017, the Iraqi forces managed to reach the old city, the last part of west Mosul to be retaken and stronghold of ISIL forces.¹⁶ The final assault was reportedly launched on 18 June with the military advancing through several neighborhoods in the old city. On 29 June, the Iraqi Army took Al Nouri Mosque and only a few neighborhoods in the old city were still under ISIL's control.

The operations in west Mosul confirmed the worrying prediction about their impact on population movements. West Mosul neighborhoods were more densely populated and their urban, crowded setting proved more challenging for military actions. This meant that the number of potential IDPs would be higher and that military operations would have caused much larger-scale destruction and damage, forcing more people to flee. A significant number of east Mosul residents were able to remain in their homes despite the difficult conditions, whereas this was not the case for over seven hundred thousand people in west Mosul.

The displacement movements from west Mosul presented specific features that differentiated them from previous movements from east Mosul or the surrounding areas and that posed significant challenges to the humanitarian response and to data collection.

Displacement from west Mosul followed two main channels: one was clearly identifiable, while the other was more difficult to detect and monitor.

The main channel was that of transit through Hammam al-Aleel screening site. As shown in Map 6, IDPs from west Mosul were gathered by military forces as soon as their neighborhoods were reached, transported to a first screening site at Aqrab Junction (also referred to as Scorpion Junction, its name in English) and then to Hammam al-Aleel screening site. When clashes reached the old city, new screening sites were used, such as Ninewa International Hotel, from where most IDPs were transported to Hammam al-Aleel screening site and only occasionally allowed to cross directly to eastern Mosul. From Hammam al-Aleel screening site, after security clearance, IDPs could choose whether to be transported to camps –which depended on the availability of plots– or whether to move back to east Mosul through Kokjali.

Thus, a main feature of the third phase (25 February – 29 June 2017) is that a high number of IDPs ended up in out-of-camp locations, often in hard-to-reach areas, notably east Mosul. This had an impact on the humanitarian response, as this type of locations present challenges to access and aid delivery. As for data collection, unlike in the case of registrations in camps, the process of identification of IDPs in out-of-camp locations proved complex and time consuming, especially because no coordinated identification system was in place.

The DTM responded by integrating its regular ET methodology with a flow-monitoring system, supervising movements through Hammam al-Aleel screening site daily and collecting information on the intended destination of IDPs who left the screening site. This allowed triangulating and crosschecking information about the overall IDP population leaving west Mosul through this channel. All new arrivals to camps were also recorded, and the difference between the flow-monitoring total and the figures collected from camps, triangulated with the information on intentions, allowed to estimate the number of IDPs originally from west Mosul who would displace to east Mosul.

The less visible displacement path was the internal movement from west to east Mosul, of IDPs who displaced preemptively without leaving the city. This group anticipated the beginning of the operations and expected the eastern side to be retaken earlier. According to several key informants on the ground, these movements occurred as early as the last quarter of 2016. Even before west Mosul operations started, local authorities – who were officially appointed following the recapture of east Mosul– reported that they first recorded IDPs from west Mosul in January 2017, that is, two months before the launch of the offensive. DTM estimates that 50,000 to 60,000 individuals chose this alternative.

From January 2017, as soon as access to east Mosul was granted, the DTM initiated a close collaboration with local authorities in east Mosul and supported the establishment of a joint information collection system that gathers data on IDPs displaced within the city of Mosul. DTM seconded staff to local authorities to conduct joint field visits and collect direct information –at the neighborhood level– on IDPs who fled west Mosul. The findings of this exercise were integrated into the regular DTM ET only after several rounds of triangulation and direct validation on the ground by governmental and non-governmental sources.¹⁷ These figures were published on 29 June. The sharp increase visible on Figure 21 is attributed to the integration of the new findings, not to a specific event, since displacement took place over a long period.

16. The office of the Prime Minister issued an evacuation order, urging all remaining civilians to escape through specific mustering points established by security actors. Leaflets were dropped over the concerned areas and announcement were made on the radio. However, the order was later withdrawn.

17. DTM will strive to update these records on a weekly basis, as joint field visits are carried out throughout the approximately 70 neighborhoods covered in east Mosul. Collaboration with local authorities and the MoMD is ongoing to expand the system to west Mosul and refine the tracking of returnees across the city.


DISPLACEMENT TRENDS OVERVIEW

CUMULATIVE FIGURES

As of 29 June 2017, the DTM estimated that 1,021,476 IDPs (cumulative number) had fled the city of Mosul or its surroundings since the beginning of the operations on 17 October 2016. Of these, 797,508 were identified after 23 February when the offensive on west Mosul began. An estimated 50,000 to 60,000 were identified in the third phase but had

most likely displaced before that, and the remaining were displaced after the beginning of west Mosul offensive.


At the end of June 2017, an estimated 819,534 were still in displacement while 201,942 are reported to have returned to their locations of origin (Figure 20).



MAP 6 | PHASE 3: MAIN DISPLACEMENT MOVEMENTS

The map shows the main displacement movements that took place during the third phase of Mosul military operations.

FIGURE 20 | NUMBER OF IDPS AND RETURNEES DURING PHASE 3
 23 FEBRUARY - 29 JUNE 2017



Still displaced
 on 29 Jun '17



Returned
 as of 29 Jun '17



Cumulative
 from 18 Oct '16 to 29 Jun '17



Cumulative
 from 23 Feb '17 to 29 Jun '17



LOCATIONS OF DISPLACEMENT


As of 29 June, the governorate hosting the near total number of IDPs from Mosul operation remained Ninewa, with 95% (782,166 individuals) (Figure 22). The district of Mosul was hosting 77% of Mosul IDPs (627,990). Almost half of these IDPs (47% or 383,646 individuals) were hosted in the city of Mosul itself, mostly in east Mosul city.

As mentioned previously, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 individuals might have displaced to east Mosul before the beginning of west Mosul operations. These were identified only later and integrated in the DTM records in June 2017.

Assuming that this displacement occurred before February, east Mosul would have recorded an increase of more than 330,000 IDPs in approximately three months. This number is higher than the total number of IDPs displaced from Ninewa during phases 1 and 2 (from 17 October 2016 to 23 February 2017) and who scattered across 28 districts.

Following the city of Mosul (Merkaz Mosul sub-district), the second two sub-districts hosting the highest number of IDPs were Qayara and Merkaz Hamdaniya, with respectively 22% (184,176) and 10% (84,942) of IDPs. Qayara and Merkaz Hamdaniya hosted most camps built to respond to the present crisis.¹⁸


FIGURE 21 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT
 23 FEBRUARY - 29 JUNE 2017




18. At the beginning of west Mosul operations, only 2% of the total IDP population displaced until then had been identified in Mosul, corresponding to approximately 2,700 individuals.



FIGURE 22 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT AS OF 29 JUNE 2017



NINEWA _____ 95%	ANBAR _____ 0%	THI-QAR _____ 0%
Akre 48	Falluja 444	Nassriya 150
Al-Hamdaniya 123,972	Ramadi 588	Suq Al-Shoyokh 54
Al-Shikhan 11,976	ERBIL _____ 0%	MISSAN _____ 0%
Hatra 1,440	Erbil 12	Ali Al-Gharbi 6
Mosul 627,990	Makhmur 462	Amara 222
Telafar 8,682	QADISSIYA _____ 0%	Qal'at Saleh 12
Tilkaif 8,058	SULAYMANIYAH _____ 0%	BABYLON _____ 0%
BAGHDAD _____ 2%	Chamchamal 18	Al-Mahawil 36
Abu Ghraib 522	Halabja 6	Al-Musayab 18
Adhamia 5,880	Kalar 36	Hashimiya 18
Al Resafa 2,862	Rania 18	Hilla 126
Kadhimia 984	Sulaymaniya 552	BASRAH _____ 0%
Karkh 7,194	WASSIT _____ 0%	Abu Al-Khaseeb 66
Mada'in 48	Al-Azezia 24	Al-Zubair 102
Mahmoudiya 30	Al-Hai 12	Basrah 186
Thawra2 228	Al-Na'maniya 18	Shatt Al-Arab 48
SALAH AL-DIN _____ 1%	Al-Suwaira 18	DIYALA _____ 0%
Al-Daur 84	Kut 30	Al-Khalis 120
Samarra 486		Ba'quba 150
Tikrit 1,152		



MAP 7 | PHASE 3: LOCATIONS OF DISPLACEMENT AS OF 29 JUNE 2017
 The map shows the location of displacement of IDPs and their concentration as of 29 June 2017.

SHELTER CATEGORY

The shelter types used by the newly displaced IDPs changed drastically during this phase (Figure 24). While until the beginning of the west Mosul offensive most IDPs who displaced from Mosul and surrounding areas were hosted in camps, during the third phase there was a shift to out-of-camps settings.

The percentage of IDPs in camps dropped from 80% on 23 February to 44% on 29 June, although this did not represent a drop in the number of IDPs in camps: in actual values, the population in camps more than doubled, increasing from 129,720 to 356,658 (that is, by 175%, or 226,938 individuals). The number of IDPs in out-of-camps settings grew from 31,746 on 23 February to 462,876 by 29 June. This increase can be explained by the wave of displacement from west Mosul, which was channeled towards newly recaptured areas in east Mosul.

By the end of June, 44% of IDPs were hosted in camp-like settings, such as camps (32% or 264,504) and emergency sites (11% or 92,154), while 56% were in out-of-camp settings (Figure 23). Of this 56% (of IDPs in out-of-camp settings), 7% (61,044) resided in private dwellings (mainly in Ninewa and Baghdad governorates), 1% in critical shelters (mainly in Salah al-Din), and 48% (389,898) in 'unknown' shelter types.

A major feature of the last phase is related to the increase of IDPs in unknown shelter types, which grew by approximately 390,000 individuals. This is due to the recently established data collection system in Mosul city which is still being refined to

FIGURE 23 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SHELTER CATEGORY AND GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT AS OF 29 JUNE 2017






FIGURE 24 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY SHELTER CATEGORY 23 FEBRUARY - 29 JUNE 2017



report accurate information about shelter types, in collaboration with local authorities. Although it is expected that most IDP families might be in private settings with host families, as data is being validated, all IDPs reported in Mosul city by the end of June 2017 were considered 'hosted in unknown shelter type'.¹⁹ Hence, the increase of IDPs from west Mosul in out-of-camp settings is temporarily reflected in the number of IDPs in unknown shelter types.

LOCATIONS OF ORIGIN

There were 735,492 IDPs displaced from Mosul district as of 29 June, corresponding to 90% of IDPs still in displacement at that moment (Figure 25)

At the end of February, 64% of IDPs were originally from Merkaz Mosul sub-district (102,792), but at the end of June this percentage grew to 87% (713,892). This change is due to the magnitude of the displacement from west Mosul that took place after 25 February, and to the return movements towards the areas retaken since November 2016 that surround Mosul but do not belong to Mosul sub-district.

Finally, it is interesting to note that save for a few exceptions, only IDPs from Mosul city displaced outside Ninewa, while IDPs from rural areas tended to displace to nearby locations –where they were still displaced as of June 2017 although these areas had been retaken for several months.

FIGURE 25 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN AS OF 29 JUNE 2017





FIGURE 26 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN 23 FEBRUARY - 29 JUNE 2017



19. The DTM will strive to provide more accurate information through its regular updates.

NINEWA

MAP 8 | PHASE 3: RETURN MOVEMENTS AND LOCATIONS OF RETURN AS OF 29 JUNE 2017

Returns by location of return Sources: Esri, USGS, NOAA

Concentration: High (dark blue) to Low (light blue)

Blue circle icon: Last sub-district of displacement

RETURN TRENDS OVERVIEW

By the end of June 2017, there were an estimated 201,942 returnees: that is, they increased by 224% (139,692) compared to the initial 62,250 at the end of February 2017.

The map shows the main return movements that took place during the second phase of Mosul military operations and the concentration of returnees as of 29 June 2017.

Approximately 58% of all IDPs (116,352 individuals) identified at the end of June 2017 had returned to Merkaz Mosul sub-district (city of Mosul).

The return movements to Mosul went hand in hand with the improvement of the security situation in east Mosul and the progress of military operations in west Mosul (Figure 28)

FIGURE 27 | NUMBER OF RETURNEES BY SUB-DISTRICT OF RETURN AS OF 29 JUNE 2017





FIGURE 28 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF RETURNEES BY SUB-DISTRICT OF RETURN 23 FEBRUARY - 29 JUNE 2017



A significant number of IDPs returned to rural areas that had been retaken while the west Mosul operations were ongoing. For instance, the number of returnees to Hammam al-Aleel sub-district grew significantly after the Iraqi forces took over towards the end of March; 21% of currently identified returnees (approximately 42,282 individuals) have been identified across several villages in that area (Figure 27).²⁰ Reportedly, ISIL forcibly displaced the inhabitants of these villages towards the city of Mosul in November 2016; Iraqi forces recaptured that area at the end of March 2017, and from mid-May returns to Hammam al-Aleel sub-district started to be recorded. This is also why, when observing the return movements by the

last sub-district of displacement (Figure 29), it appears that approximately 40,000 individuals were previously displaced inside Mosul. Yet this is hardly an isolated episode. When hostilities take place, displacement does not necessarily occur towards the frontline, especially when (such as in this case) civilians are used as human shields. Displacement that took place in non-accessible areas, such as ISIL-controlled zones, is impossible to track. It is therefore possible that similar situations will be observed in the future when further rounds of data collection are completed.

Finally, the largest sub-district of last displacement was Merkaz Hamdaniya (57% of returnees or 115,482 returned from there) mostly returning to Mosul (Table 7). As to the other sub-districts of last displacement, IDPs displaced locally, meaning IDPs displaced in Al Namroud returned to Al Namroud, IDPs in Qayara returned partly to Mosul but also to Al Shura and IDPs in Baashiqa returned to Tilkaif.

FIGURE 29 | NUMBER OF RETURNEES BY LAST SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT

AS OF 29 JUNE 2017





FIGURE 30 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF RETURNEES BY LAST SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT

23 FEBRUARY - 29 JUNE 2017



20. The sharp increase recorded on 15 June (Figure 28) should not be attributed to a specific event; rather, after validation and verification, the final findings of DTM's assessments conducted in the area in the previous weeks were integrated into the ET dataset.

SUMMARY TABLES

TABLE 5 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN AND GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT
AS OF 29 JUNE 2017

Governorate of displacement	Sub-district of origin																
	Al- Muhalabiya	Al-Namroud	Al-Qayara	Al-Shura	Altal	Ayadiya	Baashiq	Bartalla	Gwyer	Hamam al Aleel	Markaz Al-Ba'aj	Markaz Hatra	Markaz Mosul	Markaz Sinjar	Markaz Telafar	Markaz Tilkaif	Other
Anbar	0	0	216	228	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	588	0	0	0	0
Babylon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	168	18	0	6	0
Baghdad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17,748	0	0	0	0
Basrah	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	402	0	0	0	0
Diyala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	270	0	0	0	0
Erbil	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	288	0	0	0	9,828	0	0	0	0
Missan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	240	0	0	0	0
Ninewa	4,410	1,716	1,290	4,668	18,396	72	9,624	24	0	948	51,846	0	677,742	0	1,902	9,528	0
Qadissiya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	0
Salah al-Din	0	120	0	120	0	0	0	0	0	78	0	6	5,952	0	0	0	120
Sulaymaniyah	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	630	0	0	0	0
Thi-Qar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	204	0	0	0	0
Wassit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	102	0	0	0	0

TABLE 6 | NUMBER OF IDPS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN AND SUB-DISTRICT OF DISPLACEMENT IN NINEWA GOVERNORATE
AS OF 29 JUNE 2017


Governorate and sub-district of displacement	Sub-district of origin													
	Al- Muhalabiya	Al-Namroud	Al-Qayara	Al-Shura	Altal	Ayadiya	Baashiq	Bartalla	Hamam al Aleel	Markaz Al-Ba'aj	Markaz Mosul	Markaz Telafar	Markaz Tilkaif	
Al-Namroud	0	1,560	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23,502	13,968	0	0	
Al-Qayara	2,892	0	1,200	4,668	18,396	0	0	0	948	19,944	135,000	1,128	0	
Al-Shura	0	0	90	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,706	0	0	
Baashiq	0	0	0	0	0	0	588	0	0	0	4,794	0	234	
Hamam al Aleel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	51,756	0	0	
Markaz Akre	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Markaz Al-Ham-daniya	0	156	0	0	0	0	8,562	24	0	0	70,866	150	5,184	
Markaz Al-Shikhan	78	0	0	0	0	0	426	0	0	0	6,966	576	3,930	
Markaz Hatra	1,440	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Markaz Mosul	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	383,646	0	0	
Markaz Telafar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8,400	0	0	0	
Markaz Tilkaif	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,878	0	180	
Rubiya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	0	
Zummar	0	0	0	0	0	72	0	0	0	0	162	0	0	


TABLE 7 | NUMBER OF RETURNEES BY SUB-DISTRICT OF LAST DISPLACEMENT AND SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN
AS OF 29 JUNE 2017

Sub-district of return	Sub-district of last displacement												
	Al-Namroud	Al-Qayara	Al-Shura	Baashiq	Hamam al Aleel	Markaz Al-Ham-daniya	Markaz Al-Shikhan	Markaz Erbil	Markaz Kirkuk	Markaz Makhmur	Markaz Mosul	Markaz Tilkaif	
Al-Namroud	2,616	0	1,200	0	0	570	0	0	0	0	1,506	0	
Al-Qayara	0	1,944	0	0	0	1,632	0	0	0	150	300	0	
Al-Shura	0	5,880	0	0	0	0	0	18	12	0	0	0	
Baashiq	0	0	0	834	0	16,200	0	0	0	0	144	138	
Hamam al Aleel	0	0	0	0	0	2,220	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Markaz Mosul	0	894	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41,388	0	
Markaz Tilkaif	1,740	8,340	0	756	4,506	92,094	8,916	0	0	0	0	0	
Markaz Mosul	0	0	0	4,008	0	2,766	1,170	0	0	0	0	0	

7 | MOSUL CORRIDOR

END OF JUNE 2017





Total number of IDPs by Shelter Category




Camps/Emergency Sites 437,418

Unknow Shelter Arrangements 397,542

Private Settings 123,444

Critical Shelter 109,230

Reception Center 1,212



MAP 9 | MOSUL CORRIDOR AND MOSUL OPERATIONS DISPLACEMENT SITUATION AS OF 29 JUNE 2017
 THE MAP SHOWS THE DISPLACEMENT CAUSED BY THE MOSUL OPERATIONS AND THE IMPACT THIS HAD ON THE DISPLACEMENT SITUATION CAUSED BY THE MOSUL CORRIDOR OPERATIONS, WHICH WERE ONGOING, AS OF 29 JUNE 2017.

8 | REGIONAL PROFILES

The analysis in the following paragraphs provides a snapshot of the displacement situation as of 29 June 2017 in different areas of Iraq, and investigates specific patterns and trends of displacement from Mosul.

On the short term, the regional breakdown helps to appreciate the varying magnitudes of population movements at a regional level by 29 June 2017, and to evaluate how the latest movements affected the preexisting displaced population.

On the long term, it is valuable to observe how a crisis born in the same epicenter of the June–July 2014 crisis produced entirely different results in terms of population movements. To have a more comprehensive understanding of the displacement and return dynamics that emerged during the military operations in Mosul, it is worth investigating not only why people displaced to certain areas, but also why they did not.

The Iraqi territory has been divided in three main regions (consisting of only those governorates where displacement from Mosul was recorded). Specific attention was given to Ninewa Governorate because it was the most affected by the Mosul crisis.

The chapter is structured as follows:

1. Ninewa Governorate;
2. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah);
3. Central North Iraq (Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Salah al-Din and Wassit);
4. South Iraq (Basrah, Missan, Qadissiya and Thi-Qar).

8.1 | NINEWA

- Ninewa was by far the most affected governorate during the humanitarian crisis that followed the Mosul offensive, launched in October 2016.
- As of 29 June, Ninewa Governorate hosted 95% (782,166 individuals) of the IDP population displaced due to the military operations in Mosul.
- Countrywide, according to the DTM round 74 (29 June 2017), Ninewa was the first governorate of displacement, hosting a total of 1,008,300 IDPs (30% of IDP population). This number included IDPs displaced before October 2016 in addition to the Mosul operations caseload.
- Ninewa became the primary IDP governorate of origin in November 2016, meaning that since 10 November 2016, 39% of IDPs in Iraq (1,204,464) were originally from Ninewa. Since then, the number has grown to 1,892,964, i.e. 56% of total IDP population countrywide.²¹
- By the end of June, the district of Mosul hosted 77% of the entire IDP population from Mosul (627,990). Merkaz Mosul sub-district (city of Mosul), hosted 47% of IDPs, corresponding to 383,646 individuals.
- The second and third sub-districts hosting the highest share of IDPs were Al Qayara in southern Ninewa, with 22% (184,176) and Merkaz Al Hamdaniya, with 10% (84,942).
- The fourth sub-district of displacement was Hammam al-Aleel (6% or 51,756). Immediately after the beginning of west Mosul operations, the IDP population started increasing, particularly with the opening of the screening site and of the two camps Hammam al-Aleel 1 and 2.
- The distribution of IDPs within Ninewa changed during the operations. Until the end of February, the two sub-districts hosting the highest number of IDPs were Merkaz Hamdaniya (44%) and Qayara (40%), hosting 65,868 and 59,448 individuals respectively as of 23 February.
- From the beginning of the operations in west Mosul, the sub-district of Mosul began to record the arrivals of new IDPs, meaning those IDPs fleeing west Mosul, transiting

FIGURE 31 | NUMBER OF IDPs DISPLACED IN NINEWA DISTRICTS AS OF 29 JUNE 2017





FIGURE 32 | PERCENTAGE OF IDPs DISPLACED TO NINEWA SUB-DISTRICTS AS OF 29 JUNE 2017




(% OF TOTAL IDPS IN IRAQ)

through Hammam al Aleel, and then reaching east Mosul from Kokjali.

- A large number of IDPs fleeing west Mosul also found shelter in Qayara sub-district and Merkaz Hamdaniya camps. The cumulative number of IDPs hosted in both sub-districts was similar at the end of June 2017, meaning that during the operations, Qayara and Merkaz Hamdaniya camps hosted a total of 201,234 and 200,424 individuals respectively.
- However, the curve of Merkaz Hamdaniya is more stable than that of Qayara (Figure 34). This is explained by the high turnover in Merkaz Hamdaniya camps, from where most returnees identified in Mosul had returned (57% or 115,482). In other words, in Qayara the number of new IDPs was higher than the number of returnees (8% of total returnees or 17,058) –and therefore the number of IDPs

21. DTM 58 as of 10 November 2016 and DTM 74 as of 29 June 2017.


FIGURE 33 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPs DISPLACED TO NINEWA DISTRICTS
 17 OCTOBER 2016 - 29 JUNE 2017



kept growing, whereas in Merkaz Hamdaniya the number of returnees was as high as the number of new arrivals, which kept the camp population more stable over time.

- As of 29 June, Ninewa also hosted 201,942 returnees, of which 58% to Merkaz Mosul (116,352) and 21% to Hammam al Aleel (42,282), which was retaken in March 2017.

FIGURE 34 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPs DISPLACED TO NINEWA SUB-DISTRICTS
 17 OCTOBER 2016 - 29 JUNE 2017



- By the end of June, Mosul sub-district was hosting approximately 383,646 IDPs and 116,352 returnees.
- Also by the end of June, 50% (389,646) of IDPs displaced from Ninewa were hosted in unknown shelter types, while 45% (354,240) were in camps and emergency sites. As explained, the number of IDPs in unknown shelter types corresponds to the number of IDPs identified in Mosul whose shelter could not be assessed at that moment.
- The percentage of IDPs hosted in other shelter types is negligible: the response to the population movements during the Mosul crisis relied heavily on camps that were concentrated in some sub-districts of Ninewa and that were built over time. Figure 36 n shows the camps by name and the evolution of their population over time.

FIGURE 35 | NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF IDPs DISPLACED TO NINEWA DISTRICTS BY SHELTER CATEGORY AS OF 29 JUNE 2017





FIGURE 36 | NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF IDPs POPULATION IN NINEWA CAMPS AND EMERGENCY SITES OVER TIME 17 OCTOBER - 29 JUNE 2017



8.2 | KRI

- Despite its proximity to Ninewa Governorate, the KRI was not as affected by the population movements caused by the military operations in Mosul as in summer 2014, when ISIL took over Ninewa. This is due to KRG policies.
- As of mid-October 2016, the KRI was already hosting 49% of the IDPs from Ninewa at that time (582,282 individuals). An additional 149,304 (13%) were hosted in Akre and Al Shikhan districts, within Ninewa borders but under Dahuk's military and administrative authority.²²
- The KRI was also hosting IDPs from other governorates of origin, bringing the total of hosted IDPs to 939,180 individuals, i.e. 29% of the whole IDP population in Iraq at that moment.
- This situation had an impact on KRI policies regarding the new wave of displacement. Camps were set up in KRG-controlled areas within Ninewa Governorate, while access to the KRI by land was not allowed. IDPs could be allowed to enter the KRI only after security clearance and if they had a sponsor, and only through Erbil and Sulaymaniyah's airports as entry points.
- As of 29 June, the number of IDPs displaced because of the Mosul offensive and hosted in the KRI was approximately 10,758 individuals (1% of the entire caseload), distributed across the governorates of Erbil (10,128) and Sulaymaniyah (630).
- However, a significant number of IDPs were hosted in KRG-controlled areas that officially fall within Ninewa's border, but are administratively and/or militarily under the control of KRI authorities. This is the case of the camps in Al Shikhan and Akre, accounting for approximately 12,024 individuals, and the camps in Merkaz Hamdaniya, hosting 84,942 individuals. Hence, 96,966 individuals were hosted within Ninewa's official borders but had no access to KRI by land (with some rare exceptions).
- The IDPs hosted in Erbil were concentrated in two districts: Makhmour and Erbil. Those IDPs in Makhmour (414 individuals) were in a similar situation to those in Al-Shikhan, Akre or Hamdaniya; that is, they were hosted in a

FIGURE 37 | NUMBER OF IDPs DISPLACED TO THE KRI GOVERNORATES
 AS OF 29 JUNE 2017




FIGURE 38 | PERCENTAGE OF IDPs DISPLACED TO KRI SUB-DISTRICTS
 AS OF 29 JUNE 2017

SULAYMANIYAH		ERBIL	
CHAMCHAMAL	0%	ERBIL	1%
Aghjalar	6	AinKawa	240
Takia	12	Baharka	1,140
HALABJA	0%	Banslaw - Kasnazan	2,376
Markaz Halabja	6	Banslaw - Qushtappa	840
KALAR	0%	Khabat - Kawergosik	720
Markaz Kalar	36	Khabat - Rizgari	1,950
RANIA	0%	Markaz Erbil	2,448
Markaz Rania	18	MAKHMUR	0%
SULAYMANIYA	0%	Dibaga	414
Bakrajo	60		
Bazyan	6		
Markaz Sulaymaniya	486		

(% OF TOTAL IDPs IN IRAQ)

22. DTM 56 as of 13 October 2016.

FIGURE 39 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPs DISPLACED TO KRI GOVERNORATES
 17 OCTOBER 2016 - 29 JUNE 2017




camp (Dibaga in this case), had no access via land to Erbil, but were under KRG control.

- Erbil district was hosting approximately 9,714 IDPs as of 29 June. Reportedly, these arrived to Erbil from east and west Mosul from the very beginning of 2017. Figure 39 shows a sharp increase on 22 June; this is not due to a specific event, but to the integration and release, that day, of the results of the data validation exercise conducted in Erbil by DTM.
- IDPs hosted in out-of-camp settings in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah were allowed to enter the governorates only

after a security clearance and only if the entry points were the airports of Erbil or Sulaymaniyah (there is no airport in Dahuk). IDPs from Mosul had to head south, cross Salah al-Din, be granted access to Baghdad (according to Baghdad's security regulations) and from there fly to KRI where they were admitted only upon security clearance and sponsorship.

- Of the total IDP population hosted within KRI borders, the only groups hosted in camps are those in Dibaga. The remaining are hosted in private settings, typically with host families.


FIGURE 40 | NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF IDPs DISPLACED TO KRI DISTRICTS BY SHELTER CATEGORY
 AS OF 29 JUNE 2017



Overall percentage across Iraq

- ▲ 4% Camps
- ▲ 0% Emergency Site
- 🏠 0% Critical Shelter
- 🏠 96% Private Settings
- 🏠 0% Reception Center
- ? 0% Unknow Shelter Type

FIGURE 41 | NUMBER OF IDPs DISPLACED TO THE KRI DISTRICTS BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN
 AS OF 29 JUNE 2017



Overall percentage across Iraq

- 0% Baashiqa
- 100% Markaz Mosul
- 3% Gwyer

8.3 |

CENTRAL NORTH IRAQ

- Central North Iraq received a low number of IDPs. As of 29 June, the region hosted approximately 3% of the IDP population from Mosul (25,746 individuals).
- Not all governorates in this region received IDPs from Mosul: at varying degrees, only Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Salah al-Din and Wassit hosted any IDPs from Mosul.
- IDPs were concentrated particularly in Baghdad Governorate (with 17,748 individuals). Baghdad Governorate was already hosting 54,606 IDPs from Ninewa displaced before October 2016, corresponding to 5% of the IDPs from Ninewa at that time.²³
- The second governorate hosting the highest number of IDPs displaced because of Mosul operations was Salah al-Din, with approximately 6,396 individuals (1% of the total).
- The limited flow of IDPs from Ninewa to central Iraq was due to various factors, including distance, costs, security and regulations of the host governorate.
- IDPs who headed south did so by their own means of transportation (typically a private car or taxi). A journey from southern Ninewa to Anbar or Baghdad could be quite costly for a household, and could last several days.
- Security regulations played another important role: IDPs would only be admitted to Baghdad and Babylon through sponsorship by a family residing in that governorate.

Babylon modified existing regulations (issued in 2015 and restricting access of new IDPs) to allow IDPs from Mosul who had relatives in Babylon to enter the governorate.


- Other governorates in the region did not allow new IDPs to enter the governorate, irrespective of the presence of potential sponsors. That was the case of Najaf, which as of mid-October 2016 was hosting a large number of IDPs from Ninewa displaced before October 2016 (approximately 75,612 individuals, corresponding to 6% of IDPs from Ninewa at that time).

FIGURE 43 | PERCENTAGE OF IDPs DISPLACED TO CENTRAL-NORTHERN SUB-DISTRICTS AS OF 29 JUNE 2017

ANBAR		KARKH	0%
FALLUJA	0%	Al-Mansour	3,330
Al-Amirya	444	Al-Rasheed	3,552
RAMADI	0%	Markaz Karkh	312
Al-Wafaa	282	MAHMOUDIYA	0%
Markaz Ramadi	306	Al-Rasheed	18
		Markaz Mahmudiya	12
BABYLON		THAWRA2	0%
AL-MAHAWIL	0%	Sadir 2	198
Al-Mashro'a	6	Sadir 5	30
Al-Niel	6	DIYALA	
Markaz Al-Mahawil	24	AL-KHALIS	0%
AL-MUSAYAB	0%	Hibhib	120
Al-Iskandaria	18	BA'QUBA	0%
HASHIMIYA	0%	Ba'quba Center	150
Al-Madhatiya	6	SALAH AL-DIN	
Al-Qasim	12	AL-DAUR	0%
HILLA	0%	Markaz Al-Daur	720
Abu Gharaq	6	AL-SHIRQAT	0%
Markaz Al-Hilla	120	Markaz Al-Shirqat	2,610
		(blank)	12
BAGHDAD		SAMARRA	0%
ABU GHRAIB	0%	Dijla	204
Khan Dhari	120	Markaz Samarra	1,434
Markaz Abu Ghraib	402	TIKRIT	0%
MADA'IN	0%	Al-Alam	222
Markaz Al-Mada'in	18	Markaz Tikrit	1,194
Nahrawan	30	WASSIT	
ADHAMIA	1%	AL-AZEZIA	0%
Al-Rashdia	216	Al-Hafriya	12
Markaz Al Adhamia	5,472	Markaz Al-Azezia	12
Markaz Al-Hussieniya	192	AL-HAI	0%
AL RESAFA	0%	Markaz Al-Hay	12
9 Nissan	1,818	AL-NA'MANIYA	0%
Al-Karrada	246	Markaz Al-Noamaniya	18
Markaz Al-Resafa	798	AL-SUWAIIRA	0%
KADHIMIA	0%	Markaz Al-Suwaira	18
Al-Hamamiyat	66	KUT	0%
Al-Taji Al-Jadeed	48	Markaz Al-Kut	24
Markz Al Kadhimia	804	Wassit Sub District	6
Sab'a Al-Bour	66		


(% OF TOTAL IDPS IN IRAQ)

FIGURE 42 | NUMBER OF IDPs DISPLACED TO THE CENTRAL-NORTHERN GOVERNORATES AS OF 29 JUNE 2017




23. DTM 56 as of 13 October 2016.

FIGURE 44 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPs DISPLACED TO CENTRAL-NORTHERN GOVERNORATES
 17 OCTOBER 2016 - 29 JUNE 2017



- Several IDPs transited through Baghdad Governorate to fly to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah or to proceed to southern governorates.
- Most IDPs 81% (20,802) were hosted in private settings, which is not surprising given the strict sponsorship regulations. The IDPs hosted in camps were all concentrated in Anbar.
- While most of Central North governorates started receiving IDPs around December and January, Anbar had received the first wave in November 2016. These first families had escaped ISIL-controlled areas, particularly in Qayara and Al Shura, crossed Salah al-Din and reached Anbar from the north west.
- IDPs in Central North Iraq were mainly from the city of Mosul, not from the surrounding areas (Figure 46). The number of IDPs in Baghdad grew rapidly from the beginning of January, when the operations in east Mosul resumed.
- The number of IDPs in Salah al-Din began to grow more rapidly when the west Mosul operations intensified, as of from March 2017.


FIGURE 45 | NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF IDPs DISPLACED TO CENTRAL-NORTHERN GOVERNORATES BY SHELTER CATEGORY
 AS OF 29 JUNE 2017



Overall percentage across Iraq

- ▲ 8% Camps
- ▲ 0% Emergency Site
- 🏠 11% Critical Shelter
- 🏠 81% Private Settings
- 🏠 0% Reception Center
- ❓ 1% Unknow Shelter Type

FIGURE 46 | NUMBER OF IDPs DISPLACED TO THE CENTRAL-NORTHERN GOVERNORATES BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN
 AS OF 29 JUNE 2017



Overall percentage across Iraq

- 0% Al-Namroud
- 1% Al-Qayara
- 1% Al-Shura
- 0% Hamam al Aleel
- 0% Markaz Hatra
- 96% Markaz Mosul
- 0% Markaz Sinjar
- 0% Markaz Tilkaif
- 0% Other

8.4 | SOUTH IRAQ

- South Iraq (Basrah, Missan, Qadissiya and Thi-Qar governorates), was hosting a modest number of IDP families (144 or 864 individuals) from Mosul as of 29 June 2017.
- As in the case of Central North Governorates, factors such as distance, costs, presence of relatives and friends who could provide support, and host governorate regulations affected the flow of IDPs towards the south.
- South Iraq's governorates were not hosting a significant number of IDPs from Mosul or Ninewa displaced before October 2016, hence the absence of a widespread network of relatives and friends who could provide support.
- Reaching southern governorates in many cases involved crossing Baghdad, which meant an additional security screening.
- All IDPs in southern governorates were hosted in private settings as of 29 June, most likely with host families.
- All IDPs in southern governorates were from the city of Mosul. Even though their presence was monitored from January, no records were available until February. A remarkable increase took place in April and May, but the sharp increase visible on 16 May 2017 (Figure 51) is due to the integration of newly validated data.

FIGURE 47 | NUMBER OF IDPs DISPLACED TO SOUTHERN GOVERNORATES AS OF 29 JUNE 2017




FIGURE 48 | PERCENTAGE OF IDPs DISPLACED TO SOUTHERN SUB-DISTRICTS AS OF 29 JUNE 2017

BASRAH		QADISSIYA	
ABU AL-KHASEEB	0%	DIWANIYA	0%
Markaz Abu al Khaseeb	66	Markaz Al-Diwaniya	18
AL-ZUBAIR	0%	THI-QAR	
Markaz Al-Zubair	102	NASSRIYA	0%
BASRAH	0%	Markaz Al-Nassriya	144
Al-Hartha	18	Ur	6
Markaz Al-Basrah	168	SUQ AL-SHOYOKH	0%
SHATT AL-ARAB	0%	Al-Fadhliya	18
Al-Nashwa	6	Markaz Suq Al-Shoyokh	36
Markaz Shat Al-Arab	42		
MISSAN			
ALI AL-GHARBI	0%		
Ali Al-Sharqi	6		
AMARA	0%		
Markaz Al-Amara	222		
QAL'AT SALEH	1%		
Markaz Qalat Saleh	12		

(% OF TOTAL IDPS IN IRAQ)

FIGURE 49 | NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF IDPs DISPLACED TO SOUTHERN GOVERNORATES BY SHELTER CATEGORY

AS OF 29 JUNE 2017




FIGURE 50 | NUMBER OF IDPs DISPLACED TO SOUTHERN GOVERNORATES BY SUB-DISTRICT OF ORIGIN

AS OF 29 JUNE 2017





FIGURE 51 | NUMBER, OVER TIME, OF IDPs DISPLACED TO SOUTHERN GOVERNORATES

17 OCTOBER 2016 - 29 JUNE 2017





IOM IRAQ

MOSUL CRISIS

POPULATION MOVEMENTS ANALYSIS

October 2016 to June 2017



International Organization for Migration | IOM -Iraq Mission
Displacement Tracking Matrix | DTM

