

AFGHANISTAN: SURVEY ON DRIVERS OF MIGRATION

REGIONAL EVIDENCE FOR MIGRATION POLICY AND ANALYSIS (REMAP)
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM)
DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX (DTM)

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Disclaimer

This report is part of the outputs under the European Union funded project “Regional Evidence for Migration Analysis and Policy (REMAP)”. The objective of DTM REMAP is to strengthen the evidence-based formulation and implementation of humanitarian and development policy and programming on migration and forced displacement in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the use of the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM, its Member States, the European Union or other donors. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries. References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

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Definitions

Migrant: An Afghan national who crossed an international frontier and lived abroad for more than 3 consecutive months.¹

Migration facilitator: This term refers to anyone that is involved in the facilitation of migration services (irregular and regular) via air, land or sea routes in exchange for money. Those services can reach from consultative services for visa application and acquiring (fraudulent) documents, to transportation arrangement, to the facilitation of border crossings. The term used does not intend to neglect the differences in services and often used terms for those persons providing the migration services.

Refugee: A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.²

Trafficking-in-persons: The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.³

Origin (country of): In the migration context, a country of nationality or of former habitual residence of a person or group of persons who have migrated abroad, irrespective of whether they migrate regularly or irregularly.⁴

Destination (country of): In the migration context, a country that is the destination for a person or a group of persons, irrespective of whether they migrate regularly or irregularly.⁵

Travel document: A document issued by a government or by an international organization which is accepted as a proof of identity for the purpose of crossing international borders.⁶

NOTE: When the label "Multiple answers possible" appears above a graph or when a dagger symbol (†) appears in the text, it means that a single respondent was allowed to provide more than one answer. For this reason, totals do not add up to 100%.

¹Note: this is the statistical definition used in this study to differentiate a migrant from other travelers, but it is not the official definition endorsed by IOM. For the official definition of migrant please [click here](#).

²Glossary on Migration, url: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2015, protracted conflict, poverty, persecution and limited economic opportunities in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Iraq and the Horn of Africa contributed to a significant increase in migration flows to Europe (IOM, 2017). That year, over one million migrants and refugees reached Europe through land and sea routes (IOM, 2015). Afghan migrants have constituted one of the largest nationalities arriving in the European Union (EU) since IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) started registering arrivals in Europe in 2015. They also make up one of the largest proportions of asylum claims made in the EU during the same period (IOM, 2015; IOM, 2019; EUROSTAT, 2020). Between 2015 and 2019, DTM registered a large proportion Afghan migrants arriving in Greece using the Eastern Mediterranean route (IOM, 2015; IOM (a) 2019).

During the second quarter of 2016, the chosen routes and volume of migration towards western Europe changed significantly. In south-eastern Europe, the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and North Macedonia registered 95 per cent of all migrants transiting through the region in 2016, while in 2018, Bosnia and Herzegovina registered the most migrants (IOM (b), 2019). Migrants of different nationalities also prefer to take different, albeit frequently changing, routes. In 2019, Afghan migrants were most frequently registered in North Macedonia and Serbia, whereas nationals of the Syrian Arab Republic were most frequently registered in the Republic of Albania and Kosovo, closer to the Adriatic Sea (IOM (b), 2019).

Total migration flows towards Europe declined from over 1 million in 2015 to around 145,000 in 2018 (IOM, 2015; IOM (a) 2019). The Eastern Mediterranean route, measured in arrivals in Greece, saw the largest decrease in terms of migration flows from 2017 until 2019, in part because of the EU-Turkey Statement (IOM (a), 2019). This bilateral agreement states that all persons residing in Greece who do not have a right to international protection will be returned to Turkey. At the same time, it states that Syrian refugees will be resettled from Turkey to European countries in the European Economic Area (IOM (a), 2019).

A similar bilateral agreement, the Joint Way Forward, signed in 2016 between the EU and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, has allowed for increased returns from Europe to Afghanistan (IOM (a), 2019). As of 2019, Turkey has also started returning Afghan migrants. Despite an increased focus on returns, as well as decreasing protection space and economic decline in the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan resulting in lower numbers of out-migration, Afghan migrants continue to represent around 9 per cent of the total migration flow registered by DTM (IOM, 2019; IOM (c), 2019). In December 2019, DTM reported that 44 per cent of all arrivals in Greece were of Afghan nationality, making Afghanistan the country of origin with the highest numbers of migrants in 2019 (IOM (a), 2019).

This quantitative study, the Survey on Drivers of Migration (SDM), is the first stage of a three-year research and policy program conducted by IOM and financed by the European Union under a regional program called REMAP (Regional Evidence for Migration Analysis and Policy). The objective of REMAP, which is implemented by DTM at regional and country levels, is to strengthen the evidence-based formulation and implementation of humanitarian and development policy and programming on migration and forced displacement in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan through the dissemination of insights gained from DTM's research.

Data for the SDM was collected between September and November 2019, targeting Afghan potential migrants in 7 provinces (Herat, Kabul, Ghor, Balkh, Nimroz, Faryab and Kunduz). A structured questionnaire was used and respondents were interviewed in person. DTM data collection teams, who have extensive experience in collecting migration data, were trained by DTM's in-country staff. 1,489 respondents in 12 districts with high international, outward migration were interviewed. Geographical sampling was based on Flow Monitoring registration data collected from February to December 2018. The objective of this study is to unpack the overall migration process to Europe and other regional destination countries along the Afghan migration route to Europe, as well as to cover a range of other migration variables such as push and pull migration factors and challenges that potential migrants face at individual,

household and community-levels.

This report is divided into two main sections, with a summary of key findings providing an overview of the main findings and policy-level implications. The first section covers the methodology used in this research study, including the research method used, sampling and limitations. The second section covers the findings and is divided into four thematic sub-sections. The report starts by drawing a socio-economic profile of the interviewed potential migrants. It then explores the drivers of Afghan migration in terms of pull factors attracting migrants to specific destinations and push factors encouraging people to leave, as well as challenges that potential migrants face at individual, household and community levels. The third subsection of the report covers how potential migrants obtain information relevant to their migration decision-making, their future intentions and transnational support structures. The last part of the data analysis explores conditions to stay and future aspirations.



II. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The key finding of this report is that push and pull factors, as well as the challenges Afghan potential migrants face daily at personal, household and community levels, revolve around a lack of livelihood options and insecurity. The lack of livelihood options and insecurity are mutually reinforcing – years of prolonged conflict has led to a lack of overall economic development and vice versa. The division of potential migrants along categories of, on the one hand, those fleeing insecurity, persecution and violence, and on the other, those migrating for economic reasons, cannot easily be maintained – both for individual cases, as well as a categorisation for those looking to leave Afghanistan.

These insights have been consistent with previous research undertaken by DTM and others on the topic, mostly notably the CFMS (IOM (d), 2019; IOM (e), 2019; EASO, 2016). More research is needed to analyse different and changing migration routes, motivations, capabilities, financing, networks, regulatory frameworks and the role of smuggling networks and diaspora groups on the determinants of Afghan migration to Europe, both in countries of origin, transit and destination and for different segments of Afghan migrants – which is beyond the scope of the current research.

2.1 Demographics and socioeconomic profile

The socio-economic profiles of potential migrants for the current study were similar to profiling studies conducted in 2016 by DTM, such as the Comprehensive Migration Flow Survey (CMFS) (IOM (d), 2019; IOM (e), 2019). Results show that Afghan potential migrants are generally male (87%) and of working age (on average 28 years old). Fifty-two per cent indicated being married and 49 per cent reported having children.

Half of the respondents had previously experienced cross-border migration (45%) and one-third of respondents (33%) had experienced internal displacement at least once in their lifetime. Those with cross-border experience were located in districts close to international borders in Herat, Balkh and Nimroz. Those who had experienced internal displacement were found in Kunduz city (93%) and Mazar-e-Sharif (63%).

Most respondents had not completed levels of education higher than high school, with a third of respondents having completed no education at all (32%). These results were similar to those reported in the CFMS (IOM (d), 2019). Respondents' education attainment levels varied between different intended destinations. Those aiming to reach countries within the EU had significantly higher levels of completed education. Twenty-seven per cent of Afghan migrants intending to migrate to the EU had completed a bachelor's degree or high-

er and 35 per cent completed high school. Of the potential migrants planning to migrate to the Islamic Republic of Iran, only 1 per cent had completed a bachelor's degree or higher and 42 per cent had not completed any education, signifying lower levels of educational attainment among those intending to migrate to the Islamic Republic of Iran compared to those looking to migrate to the EU. One possible explanation for this finding is that families who are able to afford higher levels of education also have more disposable funds to "invest" in the migration journey, often preferring to invest in migration journeys with higher potential "pay-offs" in the form of future remittances, levels of education and perceived economic success.

Employment backgrounds of those surveyed for the SDM were similar to results from the CFMS (IOM (d), 2019). Most potential migrants were employed during the 6 months prior to their departure, with results remaining constant irrespective of destination or other socio-economic factors. Most indicated being either self-employed (30%) or earning daily wages (25%). Over half of all respondents (58%) reported that their personal income in the last six months was insufficient to meet their monthly expenses, indicating that they were either underemployed, daily or seasonally employed or that the potential migrant did not earn enough to meet his or her families' needs.

2.2 Pull factors: reasons for going to a specific destination

This section explores the factors behind the potential migrants' decisions to migrate to either the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey or the EU. The analysed pull factors highlight that Afghan migrants are generally in search of livelihood opportunities, employment and security within their country, as well as in their intended destinations. The majority of Afghan migrants choose to migrate to the EU, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey due to their perceived access to job opportunities (32%, 68% and 65% respectively), presence of friends and/or family in the intended destination (18%, 15% and 12%), safety (12%, 6% and 9%) or obtaining citizenship in the intended destination (10%, 0%, 3%). The most common secondary pull factor is the availability of educational scholarships, most notably in the Islamic Republic of Iran (17%). These motivations correspond with push factors encouraging migrants to leave the country. This coherence confirms previous analysis on the alignment of push and pull factors of Afghan potential migrants from the CMFS (IOM (d), 2019).

The availability of friends and family in the intended destination underlines the importance of transnational networks. More than half of respondents reported that they gathered information about their intended destination through social media (56%). Other important sources of information

were social gatherings at public places (16%), or family and friends living abroad (12%). Results from the SDM show a shift in the information sources potential migrants use to get information on their potential destination compared to data collected in 2016 for the CFMS (IOM (d), 2019). Potential migrants are increasingly relying on online sources of information instead of information obtained face-to-face.

2.3 Push factors: reasons for leaving Afghanistan

The data collected for this SDM confirms previous insights from the CFMS related to the twin push factors that guide migration decision-making: lack of jobs/livelihoods were the strongest push factor, followed by insecurity (IOM (d), 2019; IOM (e), 2019). For decades, the main push factors for Afghan migration have been insecurity and its socioeconomic consequences. Prolonged conflict has not only led to reduced security, but also impacted socio-economic development of the country, diminishing access to livelihoods, healthcare, education and the rule of law. The results of the service quality index developed for this study (found on page 15) further confirms that potential migrants find access to jobs, salaries, safety and the rule of law in Afghanistan to be poor. The overwhelming majority face challenges related to livelihoods and insecurity at personal (91%), household (92%) and community levels (96%). When asked about the main trigger leading to their decision to migrate, 74 per cent indicated deciding to migrate after experiencing unemployment.[†] Only in one province, Kunduz, did security score higher than jobs and livelihoods as a push factor to migrate abroad.

2.4 Migration networks, support and planning

Migrant networks are a set of interpersonal, sometimes transnational relationships between former migrants, migrants and non-migrants who share similar places of origin

(MPI, 2011). The SDM found that potential migrants often have family or friends living in their intended destinations and these networks intend to provide some support to migrants, mostly at their intended destinations. 63 per cent of potential migrants indicated that they would be supported by their networks abroad. Networks that would offer support would most often offer financial support (32%), followed by assistance in finding accommodation (25%) or employment (25%).[†] Comparing results from the SDM to results from the CFMS obtained in 2016 (IOM (d), 2019) shows that potential migrants are receiving some form of support from their networks abroad. Results from the SDM were consistent irrespective of their intended destination.

An important distinction emerged between migrants going to Europe, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey in the intended duration of time that potential migrants were planning on spending in their destination. While those going to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey most commonly planned to be away for one to three years (26% for the Islamic Republic of Iran and 34% for Turkey), the majority of respondents going to Europe planned to stay there forever (60%). Seventy-five per cent of interviewed potential migrants planned to leave Afghanistan sometime within the month of the interview taking place.

2.5 Conditions to stay

Potential migrants were asked what would need to change in their home country to convince them to stay. Confirming the analysis on push- and pull factors in preceding sections, respondents answered that employment prospects and the security situation would need to improve to convince them to stay. This finding is supported by CMFS results from 2016 (IOM (d), 2019). Eighty per cent of respondents reported that better job opportunities would motivate them to stay, 64 per cent would stay if there was an improved security situation and 62 per cent would stay if there was an end to the conflict and violence in the country.[†]



1. METHODOLOGY

1.1 Research and sampling method

A quantitative approach was adopted to analyse the drivers of Afghan migration to the EU, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey, in-line with other drivers of migration country studies being conducted under DTM REMAP in the region. A quantitative method was selected to analyse specific thematic areas previously identified by the research team: socio-economic profiles, drivers and reasons for migration, challenges and access to services in Afghanistan, migration networks and future aspirations. This approach allowed for a systematic, standardised comparison of factors that contribute to different migration choices and aspirations. The research focused on potential migrants who had taken concrete measures to migrate abroad, including:

- Finding a migration facilitator;
- Making payments for the journey to a migration facilitator;
- Booking travel tickets for (parts) of the migration journey;
- Obtaining a visa for travel to transit countries.

The research team, in consultation with various stakeholders and following a review of Flow Monitoring registration data from the DTM team based in Afghanistan, selected nine key districts in which to conduct data collection (IOM (c), 2019). These districts had the highest figures of out-migration and were accessible to data collection teams. Sampling targets were established for each district in order to arrive at comparable sampling figures. The nine districts in which data collection physically occurred were:

- Province: Herat, District: Herat city
- Province: Herat, District: Injil
- Province: Herat, District: Guzara
- Province: Herat, District: Ghoryan
- Province: Balkh, District: Mazar-e-Sharif
- Province: Faryab, District: Maymana
- Province: Nimroz, District: Zaranj
- Province: Kunduz, District: Kunduz
- Province: Kabul, District: Kabul City

DTM teams also sampled potential migrants originating from Feroz Koh and Tulak districts (in Ghor province) as well as from Shindand district (in Herat). These three districts also had high levels of out-migration, but data collection teams were unable to reach them due to insecurity and physical remoteness. Instead, potential migrants originating from Feroz Koh and Tulak (Ghor) and Shindand (Herat) were sampled by the DTM team in Herat city, as their migration route necessitates passing through Herat city. A scouting mission confirmed that sufficient numbers of migrants from these districts are passing through Herat for those populations to be sampled there.

DTM's data collection teams received a two-day training in six of the selected provinces targeted for data collection. Three out of fourteen enumerators were female. Data was collected in person by enumerators using a structured questionnaire. A non-probabilistic sample of 1,489 respondents was collected by the research field teams. Enumerators used convenience sampling and snow ball techniques to reach the target population. These techniques were used because potential migrants are considered hidden groups, and no sampling frame exists from which to draw random samples. To reduce potential biases, the research team conducted regular group discussions and debriefings with the enumerator teams.


1.2 Limitations

This research study presents limitations frequently encountered researching hidden populations, especially related to the sampling method and sample size. Due to the nature of this study, the collected sample is non-probabilistic, meaning that the sample population is not necessarily representative of all potential Afghan migrants choosing to migrate to the EU, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey from Afghanistan. The results of this study should be interpreted carefully, as generalization of results and inferences are constrained by the research design. To reduce the incidence of possible biases related to migration decision-making, the research team designed strict criteria to identify potential migrants who are taking tangible steps towards migration, as explained in the research and sampling method above.


1.3 Data analysis rationale: destinations, provinces and districts

Throughout the report, respondents were grouped by province of origin, district of origin and intended destination. The analysis was based on the top three destinations for Afghan potential migrants: the EU, inclusive of the United Kingdom, Turkey or the Islamic Republic of Iran. This grouping exercise was developed following a rigorous literature review. Analysis was structured around intended destinations to uncover differences in migration profiles, patterns and resources corresponding to different potential destinations. Groupings for the geographical disaggregation were based on the likelihood of respondents sharing similar characteristics across provinces and districts of origin.


PROVINCE AND DISTRICT MAP



NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN SAMPLE BY PROVINCE AND DISTRICT OF ORIGIN



NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN SAMPLE BY DESTINATION





2. DATA ANALYSIS

2.1 Demographics and socio-economic profile

Eighty-seven per cent of the sample population were male, and the average age was 27.9 years old. The average household size was 7.9 people. Gender differences across destination countries were negligible and largely related to the sampling design.


Age differences between groups were observed. With an average age of 25.9 years, respondents intending to migrate to Turkey were the youngest of the sample population. Respondents planning to migrate to the Islamic Republic of Iran had an average age of 28.6 years and were the oldest group of respondents.

Forty-nine per cent of the respondents reported to have children. In 56 per cent of the cases, children were living with the respondent in the current location.

Fifty-two per cent of the respondents were married. Respondents intending to migrate to the Islamic Republic of Iran were mostly married (60%), while a little over half of respondents (55%) planning on going to Turkey were single. Respondents intending to go to the EU were split nearly equally between single respondents (51%) and respondents with other marital statuses (49%).




POPULATION PYRAMID




Sixty-eight per cent of respondents had some level of education. Most Afghan migrants with an education had completed high school (28%), primary education (14%), or secondary education (13%).


The education level of the respondents varied significantly between different destinations. Twenty-seven per cent of Afghan migrants intending to migrate to the EU completed a bachelor's degree or higher, representing the group with the highest level of education. Out of potential migrants planning to go to the Islamic Republic of Iran, forty-two per cent had not completed any education, and represent the group with the lowest education level. Literacy rates of potential migrants without education were low: ten per cent of potential migrants with no education could read, while only two per cent could write.



RESPONDENTS BY EDUCATION LEVEL (top 5 answers)




MARITAL STATUS



16-24

A fifth of all respondents between these ages were married.


CHILDREN




44%

Of respondents who have children do not have their children with them in the current location.**

EDUCATION LEVEL BY DESTINATION



RESPONDENTS WITH NO EDUCATION




* The sample size for this percentage is lower than 10 respondents.

** Respondents from Shindand, Tolak, and Feroz Koh were interviewed in Herat city.


In the six months prior to interviewing, most Afghan migrants were either self-employed (30%), working for daily wages (25%), or unemployed (23%). Over half of all respondents (58%) reported that their personal income in the last six months was not sufficient. One quarter of all respondents reported not having a personal income. Only six per cent of respondents had a personal income that was sufficient for themselves and their family. This can be primarily attributed to the high rate of unemployment among respondents as well as to those who were housewives or students and therefore did not have an income.

When breaking down the type of employment in the last six months by destination, the results are largely homogenous. Both respondents intending to migrate to Europe and respondents intending to migrate to Turkey were most commonly unemployed or self-employed. The top two employment categories for those intending to migrate to the Islamic Republic of Iran were working for daily wages (31%) or self-employment (31%).

WAS PERSONAL INCOME SUFFICIENT?




TOP 2 EMPLOYMENT STATUSES DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS BY DESTINATION




EMPLOYMENT STATUS DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS

(top 5 answers)



PREVIOUS CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT EXPERIENCE




Respondents were asked about their previous migration experiences to explore the extent to which previous migration plays a role in shaping new mobility patterns. Overall, 45 per cent of respondents had migrated internationally before and 33 per cent had experienced being internally displaced. There are, however, distinct disparities in previous experiences between potential migrants originating from different provinces and districts. Potential migrants living in provinces and districts that are heavily conflict-affected were more likely to have experienced internal displacement, while those from border provinces and districts had more likely experienced international migration. 8 per cent of respondents from Feroz Koh had been internally displaced before, while 93 per cent had in Kunduz. Over half of those in Kunduz had migrated before (56%) while the same demographic only represented a fifth of those in Feroz Koh (20%).

DISCLAIMER: This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries in this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.


2.2 Reasons and drivers for migration

2.2.1 Pull factors

MAIN REASONS FOR CHOOSING INTENDED DESTINATION (top 5 answers)



MAIN REASONS FOR CHOOSING INTENDED DESTINATION BY DESTINATION (top 2 answers)




This section explores the factors behind the potential migrants' decisions to migrate to either the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey or the EU. The analysed pull factors highlight that Afghan migrants are generally in search of livelihood opportunities, employment and security within their country, as well as in their intended destinations. The majority of Afghan migrants choose to migrate to the EU, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey due to their perceived access to job opportunities (32%, 68% and 65% respectively), presence of friends and/or family in the intended destination (18%, 15% and 12%), safety (12%, 6% and 9%) or obtaining citizenship in the intended destination (10%, 0%, 3%). The most common secondary pull factor is the availability of educational scholarships, most notably in the Islamic Republic of Iran (17%).

These motivations correspond with push factors encouraging migrants to leave the country (see pages 13 and 14). This coherence confirms previous analysis on the alignment of push and pull factors of Afghan potential migrants from the CMFS (IOM (d), 2019). Meanwhile, the availability of friends and family in the intended destination underlines


the importance of transnational networks.

More than half of respondents reported that they gathered information about their intended destination through social media (56%). Other important sources of information were social gatherings at public places (16%), or family and friends living abroad (12%). Results from the SDM show a shift in the information sources of potential migrants compared to data collected in 2016 for the CMFS, in which 64 per cent of respondents reported that they gathered information about their potential destination from friends in Afghanistan (IOM (d), 2019). Potential migrants are increasingly relying on online sources of information instead of information obtained face-to-face.

MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION (top 6 answers)




MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION BY DESTINATION (top 3 answers)





2.2.2 Push factors

MAIN REASONS FOR MIGRATION (top 5 answers)




For decades, the main reasons behind Afghan migration have been linked to the ongoing conflict and its socio-economic consequences. Previous studies carried out by DTM found similar evidence, reinforcing current findings (IOM (d), 2019; IOM (e), 2019). Push factors for Afghan migrants largely correspond to the pull factors analyzed in the previous pages. 65 per cent of the sample population decided to migrate because of a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities. 9 per cent cited conflict and the general security situation as their reason to migrate, 7 per cent made the decision due to the lack of economic growth or prosperity in the country. Financial problems/debts (6%) and security threats (6%) were also important reasons to migrate.

Insecurity and economic factors were the most common reasons for migration regardless of someone's intended destination. Three-fourths of those intending to migrate to the Islamic Republic of Iran cited a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities as the primary reason for their decision to migrate. The same reason accounted for 34 per cent of migrants intending to go to Europe and 55 per cent of migrants intending to go to Turkey. Conflict and the general

security situation are the second most common reason to migrate for those intending to go to Europe or Turkey, accounting for 17 per cent of potential migrants going to each destination. Lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities were the number one reason to migrate across all provinces except for Kunduz, where conflict and the general security situation are the most common reasons for migration (43%).

When asked about specific moments or events that triggered their decision to migrate, 74 per cent reported that they decided to migrate after experiencing unemployment.[†] Other important trigger events were security incidents (23%), family members or friends migrating and encouraging the individual to join (17%) and family members living abroad encouraging them to join (16%).[†] These findings are supported by results from the 2016 CMFS (IOM (d), 2019; IOM (e), 2019).


REASONS FOR MIGRATION BY DESTINATION (top 2 answers)



LIFE EVENT THAT TRIGGERED MIGRATION (top 5 answers, multiple answers possible)




LIFE EVENT THAT TRIGGERED MIGRATION BY PROVINCE (top 2 answers, multiple answers possible)




2.2.3 MOST REPORTED CHALLENGES (top 5 answers only)*

PRIMARY CHALLENGE



SECONDARY CHALLENGE




Almost all potential migrants faced numerous challenges at the personal (91%), household (92%) and community level (96%). Challenges across all levels revolved mainly around employment, income and security. The most frequently reported primary-level personal challenges were unemployment (57%), insufficient income (24%) and personal security threats (7%). One outlier was Kabul, where 31% of respondents noted they did not face any personal challenges. The most common secondary personal level challenges were insufficient income (38%), financial problems (20%) and a lack of hope for the future in Afghanistan (13%). At the household level, insufficient income was reported as the main primary challenge (56%), while the main secondary challenge was a lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities (30%). While economic and livelihood issues remained prevalent among secondary challenges, respon-

dents reported a lack of security (46%) as the number one secondary challenge at the community level. The presence of armed groups (7%) and a lack of rule of law (8%) were also cited as important secondary challenges.

When disaggregating by intended destination, potential migrants planning to go to Europe specified personal security threats and a general lack of security as common primary personal (23%), household (13%) and community (40%) level challenges. Potential migrants intending to go to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey specified challenges related to their economic situation across the personal and household levels. At the community level, a lack of security was reported as the second most common primary challenge for both the Islamic Republic of Iran (31%) and Turkey (32%).

SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED CHALLENGES





* These questions were only asked to respondents who responded "yes" to whether they experienced challenges for each level. The above top 5 graphs do not account for respondents who only experienced one challenge (i.e. did not have a secondary challenge to report).

2.2.4 SERVICE QUALITY INDEX



AFGHANISTAN

1=very poor 2=poor 3=average 4=good 5=very good


Afghan potential migrants were asked to rate the services present in their communities. By averaging the ratings given to different services, a service quality index was created for each province and district where surveys took place. A service quality matrix was created by averaging each survey rating per each province.



SERVICE QUALITY BY PROVINCE



SERVICE QUALITY BY DISTRICT




Potential migrants gave their perception of the quality of services in their districts of origin an average rating of 2.2, equating to slightly above "poor". Education services were rated the highest at 2.9, while job availability was rated the lowest at 1.6. The province that experienced the highest quality services was Faryab (2.9) and the province that experienced the lowest was Ghor (1.5). Both sampled districts in Ghor, Feroz Koh and Tolak, experienced very poor overall perception levels of services, at an average of 1.5 and 1.3 respectively (equating to either very poor or poor). Health services in Faryab stand out with the highest perception rating of 3.8. Access to jobs in both Ghor and Kunduz score very low at ratings of 1.1. Anti-corruption services perception rate was very low at 1.3 in Ghor and Kabul.


The information presented on the current and preceding pages visualises the results of potential migrants' perception of the quality of services in their districts of origin. As such, results should be interpreted carefully, as those from more remote and conflict-affected areas are likely to rate the quality of services in their area of origin higher than those living in urban centres such as Herat and Kabul. This is mainly due to the exposure of young adults to the quality of services elsewhere (including abroad) and the moderating factor of perceptions, which would result in relatively low scores of quality of services in urban centres. An example of this would be the surprisingly high score of health service provision in Faryab, which scores higher in terms of health service provision than Kabul (3.8 against 2.1).



SERVICE QUALITY MATRIX




SERVICE QUALITY MATRIX




2.3 Migration networks, support and planning

DO YOU HAVE FRIENDS OR FAMILY ALREADY IN THE INTENDED DESTINATION? BY DESTINATION



HAVE ANY OF THEM SUPPORTED YOU WITH YOUR MIGRATION ARRANGEMENTS?



HOW HAVE THEY SUPPORTED YOU WITH YOUR MIGRATION ARRANGEMENTS? (top 5 answers only, multiple answers possible)




Migrant networks are a set of interpersonal, transnational relationships between former migrants, migrants and non-migrants who share similar places of origin, friendship and family kinships (MPI, 2011). These transnational networks reduce the social, economic and emotional costs of migration as well as its risks (GFMD, 2016). The current study confirms the existence of transnational linkages for Afghan potential migrants: 78 per cent of respondents reported that they already had friends or family living in the intended destination, with consistently high proportions of respondents answering the same for each intended destination (EU 78%, the Islamic Republic of Iran 77%, Turkey 83%).

Whilst the existence of Afghan transnational linkages is affirmed by the current study, the actual assistance potential migrants receive from their diaspora communities can be considered "reluctant" (RMMS, 2016). Overall, 27 per cent of those who had family or friends in their intended destination

were receiving support from family members, while 26 per cent were receiving assistance from friends. Support networks most often assisted potential migrants financially (57%), as well as finding them accommodation (45%) employment (44%) and obtaining documentation (14%).[†]

The intended duration of stay of the sampled potential Afghan migrants differed significantly between migrants planning to go to Europe and those intending to migrate to the Islamic Republic of Iran or Turkey. Potential migrants going to the latter two destinations most commonly planned to be away for one to three years (26% for the Islamic Republic of Iran and 34% for Turkey), whereas the majority of respondents going to Europe planned to stay there forever (60%). 75 percent of interviewed potential migrants planned to leave Afghanistan sometime within the month of interviewing.

HOW LONG DO YOU PLAN TO BE AWAY? (top 2 answers)




2.4 Conditions to stay

Participants were asked whether they would consider staying in Afghanistan under certain conditions. Better job opportunities (80%), an improved security situation (64%), an end of violence/conflict in the country (62%) and an improvement of the rule of law (19%) scored highest.[†] Conditions that would need to change in Afghanistan for potential migrants to remain in-country thus centred mainly around employment and security. This reinforces the existence of a link between migration intentions, push- and pull factors and the challenges potential migrants face at various levels.


Participants were also given the choice of answering "yes, but only if" to the above question, in order to account for extra conditions that they might have for considering to stay in Afghanistan. These extra conditions largely corresponded to the conditions of employment, security, and education. Out of the 17 per cent of respondents who answered "yes, but only if" to whether they would consider staying in Afghanistan if the security conditions were better, 84 per cent reported that they would consider staying only if they also had better livelihood opportunities, while 11 per cent reported they would consider staying if they had better education opportunities.[†]

WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE FOR YOU TO STAY? (top 5 answers, multiple answers possible)



* Another potential response to this question was: "Better quality education for my children."

WOULD YOU CONSIDER STAYING IN AFGHANISTAN IF...?




YES, BUT ONLY IF...

(top 2 answers, multiple answers possible)



WOULD YOU CONSIDER STAYING IN AFGHANISTAN IF...? BY DESTINATION



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